


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


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his
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RECESSIONAL

God of our fathers, known of old,
Lord of our far-flung battle-line,
Beneath whose awful Hand we hold
Dominion over palm and pine—
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget — lest we forget!

The tumult and the shouting dies;
The captains and the kings depart:
Still stands Thine ancient sacrifice,
An humble and a contrite heart.
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget — lest we forget!

Far-called, our navies melt away;
On dune and headland sinks the fire:
Lo, all our pomp of yesterday
Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!
Judge of the Nations, spare us yet,
Lest we forget — lest we forget!

If, drunk with sight of power, we loose
Wild tongues that have not Thee in awe,
Such boastings as the Gentiles use,
Or lesser breeds without the Law —
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget — lest we forget!

For heathen heart that puts her trust
In reeking tube and iron shard,
All valiant dust that builds on dust,
And guarding, calls not Thee to guard,
For frantic boast and foolish word —
Thy Mercy on Thy People, Lord! — Amen.

Rudyard Kipling

The Book of History

A History of all Nations

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT

WITH OVER 8000 ILLUSTRATIONS

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

VISCOUNT BRYCE, P.C., D.C.L., LL.D., F.R.S.

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Volume XIII

EUROPEAN POWERS TODAY

Russia . The Balkan Wars

Austria . Germany . Holland . Belgium

Switzerland . Italy . France

Spain . Portugal . Scandinavian States

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

AMERICA BEFORE COLUMBUS

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GREAT DATES FROM THE FRENCH REVOLUTION TO OUR OWN TIME

<p>A.D. 1789</p>	<p>MAY: Meeting of States-General. JUNE: Tennis Court Oath. The States-General becomes the National or Constituent Assembly. JULY 14th: Fall of Bastille. AUG.: Abolition of Feudal privileges. OCT.: Insurrection of Women.</p>	<p>A.D. 1803</p>	<p>MARCH: Secularisation of ecclesiastical states in Germany. MAY: War declared between France and Great Britain; French occupy Hanover.</p>
<p>1790</p>	<p>FEB.: Leopold II. Emperor. JULY: Treaty of Reichenbach. AUGUST: Mutinies, and massacre of Nancy.</p>	<p>1804</p>	<p>FEB.: Royalist Plot of Piechegu and Cadoudal; Moreau exiled. MARCH: Murder of Duc d'Enghien. Issue of the Code Napoleon. MAY: Napoleon I. Emperor of the French. Pitt returns to office. Russia forms alliance with Prussia. NOV.: Alliance joined by Austria.</p>
<p>1791</p>	<p>MARCH: Death of Mirabeau. MAY: Canada Act. JUNE: Flight of Louis to Varennes. AUG.: Conference of Pittnitz. SEPT.: Louis accepts the Constitution. OCT.: "Legislative" Assembly meets.</p>	<p>1805</p>	<p>MARCH: Villeneuve sails from Toulon. MAY: Italian Republic becomes a monarchy, with Napoleon king. Eugene Beauharnais viceroy. JULY: Calder defeats Villeneuve. SEPT: Third Coalition formed. OCT.: Capitulation of Ulm. Trafalgar. DEC.: Austerlitz. Treaties of Schönbrunn and Presburg. Bourbon Dynasty of Naples deposed.</p>
<p>1792</p>	<p>JAN.: Treaty of Jassy. FEB.: Treaty between Austria and Prussia. MARCH: 1st, Francis II. Emperor; 29th, Gustavus III. of Sweden assassinated. APRIL: France declares war on Austria. JUNE: Mob breaks into Tuileries. JULY: 24th, Prussia declares war; 27th, Brunswick's proclamation. AUG.: Mob attack on Tuileries; Louis a prisoner. Supremacy of Paris Commune. Fall of Longwy. SEPT.: September massacres. Cannonade of Valmy. "National Convention" meets; Republic proclaimed. OCT. and NOV.: Success of Republican armies. DEC.: Trial of Louis XVI. opens.</p>	<p>1806</p>	<p>JAN.: Death of Pitt. End of Holy Roman Empire. APRIL: Joseph Bonaparte King of Naples. JUNE: Louis Bonaparte King of Holland. JULY: Confederation of the Rhine. OCT.: Prussia crushed at Jena and Auerstädt. NOV.: The Berlin Decree.</p>
<p>1793</p>	<p>JAN.: Second partition of Poland. Louis beheaded. FEB.: Declaration of war with England and Holland. Revolt of La Vendée. MAR.: Revolutionary Tribunal. APRIL: Flight of Dumouriez. JUNE: Fall of Gironde. JULY: Revolt of Girondist departments. Death of Marat. SEPT.: Law of the Suspect. Carnot. OCT.: Republican Calendar. Marie Antoinette and Girondins guillotined. NOV.: Reign of Terror. DEC.: Toulon captured.</p>	<p>1807</p>	<p>JAN.: The Orders in Council. Act abolishing Slave Trade. FEB.: Eylan. MARCH: Portland Ministry. Canning Foreign Secretary. APRIL: Treaty of Bartenstein. JUNE: Friedland. JULY: Treaty of Tilsit. Jerome Bonaparte King of Westphalia. SEPT.: Copenhagen bombarded. OCT.: Treaty of Fontainebleau. French troops enter Spain. Stein begins his reforms in Prussia. DEC.: Junot at Lisbon.</p>
<p>1794</p>	<p>MARCH: Fall of Hébertists. APRIL: Fall of Danton; Robespierre supreme. Pichegru in Netherlands. JUNE: 1st, Howe's victory; 26th, Jourdan's victory at Fleurus; 28th, Thermidorian reaction. Fall of Robespierre; end of Reign of Terror. OCT.: Pichegru overruns Holland.</p>	<p>1808</p>	<p>MARCH: Abdication of Charles IV. of Spain. MAY: Meeting at Bayonne. Rising of Spain. JUNE: Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain. Murat King of Naples. JULY: Capitulation of Baylen. AUG.: Vimeiro. Convention of Cintra. OCT.: Meeting of Erfurt. NOV.: Fall of Stein. Napoleon goes to Spain. DEC.: Advance and retreat of Sir John Moore. Napoleon leaves Spain.</p>
<p>1795</p>	<p>JAN.: Third partition of Poland. APRIL: Peace of Basle with Prussia. JULY: Peace of Basle with Spain. Emigrés crushed at Quiberon. OCT.: Insurrection of Vendémiaire suppressed. Directory established.</p>	<p>1809</p>	<p>JAN.: Moore at Corunna. FEB.: Fall of Saragossa. APRIL: Wellesley at Lisbon. Austria declares war. MAY: Tyrolese revolt. Aspern. Annexation of Papal States. JUNE: Soult forced to evacuate Portugal. JULY: Wagram; Talavera. Walcheren Expedition. OCT.: Peace of Vienna. Bernadotte becomes Crown Prince of Sweden.</p>
<p>1796</p>	<p>MAY: Bonaparte in Italy. Lodi. SEPT.: Archduke Charles repulses invasion of Jourdan and Moreau. OCT.: Spain allies with France. NOV.: Arcola; Paul I. Tsar of Russia. Gustavus IV. assumes government of Sweden.</p>	<p>1810</p>	<p>MARCH: Napoleon marries Marie Louise. JULY: Annexation of North Sea Coast Districts. SEPT.: Busaco; Cortes meets at Cadiz. NOV.: Torres Vedras. DEC.: Tsar withdraws from Continental System.</p>
<p>1797</p>	<p>JAN.: Rivoli. FEB.: Cape St. Vincent. APRIL-JUNE: Mutinies in British Fleet. Treaty of Leoben. Repression of Venice. Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics constituted. SEPT.: Coup d'état of Fructidor. Death of Hoche. OCTOBER: Camperdown. Treaty of Campo Formio. NOV.: Frederic William III. King of Prussia.</p>	<p>1811</p>	<p>MAY: Fuentes d'Onoro and Albuera.</p>
<p>1798</p>	<p>APRIL: Helvetic Republic constituted. MAY: Egyptian expedition sails from Toulon. Rebellion in Ireland. JUNE: Vinegar Hill. JULY: Battle of the Pyramids. AUG.: Battle of the Nile. Second coalition formed.</p>	<p>1812</p>	<p>JAN.: Ciudad Rodrigo. APRIL: Badajoz. JUNE: Moscow Expedition starts. Liverpool Ministry. JULY: Salamanca. SEPT.: Borodino. Burning of Moscow. OCT.: Retreat from Moscow. NOV.: Bridge of Beresina. DEC.: Agreement of Tauroggen.</p>
<p>1799</p>	<p>APRIL: Helvetic Republic constituted. MAY: Egyptian expedition sails from Toulon. Rebellion in Ireland. JUNE: Vinegar Hill. JULY: Battle of the Pyramids. AUG.: Battle of the Nile. Second coalition formed.</p>	<p>1813</p>	<p>FEB.: Treaty of Kalisch. MAY: Lützen and Bautzen. JUNE: Vittoria. Treaty of Reichenbach. AUG.: Katzbach and Dresden. SEPT.: Treaty of Töplitz. OCT.: Leipzig.</p>
<p>1800</p>	<p>JAN.: Parthenopean Republic of Naples. MARCH: Stockach. APRIL: Magnano. MAY: Bonaparte repulsed at Acre. JUNE: Trebbia. AUG. Novi. Capture of Dutch Fleet in the Texel. SEPT.: Restoration of Naples monarchy. Withdrawal of Suwarrow. OCT.: Return of Bonaparte. NOV.: Coup d'état of Brumaire. Bonaparte First Consul.</p>	<p>1814</p>	<p>JAN.: Treaty of Kiel. Norway joined to Sweden. FEB.: La Rothière. MARCH: Capitulation of Paris. APRIL: Battle of Toulouse. Napoleon goes to Elba; Bourbon restoration. MAY: Treaty of Paris. NOV.: Congress of Vienna meets.</p>
<p>1801</p>	<p>JUNE: Marengo. AUG.: Union between Great Britain and Ireland. DEC.: Hohenlinden.</p>	<p>1815</p>	<p>MARCH: Napoleon lands and returns to Paris. MAY: Murat overthrown at Tolentino. JUNE: Ligny, Quatre-Bras, and Waterloo. JULY: Second Bourbon restoration. Napoleon sent to St. Helena. Holy Alliance. NOV.: Peace of Paris.</p>
<p>1802</p>	<p>FEBRUARY: Resignation of Pitt. Treaty of Lunéville. MARCH: Abercrombie at Aboukir. APRIL: Nelson at Copenhagen. Alexander I. Tsar. OCTOBER: Peace preliminaries. The Batavian Republic organised.</p>	<p>1818</p>	<p>Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Evacuation of France by forces of the Allies. Pindari war in India.</p>
		<p>1819</p>	<p>The Six Acts.</p>
		<p>1820</p>	<p>Accession of George IV. Queen Caroline scandals. Royalist reaction in France. Revolution of Riego in Spain. Revolution in Portugal and separation from Brazil. Insurrections in the two Sicilies. Congress of Troppau, afterwards Laibach.</p>

GREAT DATES FROM THE FRENCH REVOLUTION TO OUR OWN TIME

A.D. 1821	Death of Napoleon. Suppression of Italian revolts. Greek insurrection against Turkey.	A.D. 1853	Turkey declares war against Russia.
1822	Canning, Foreign Secretary. Independence of South American colonies recognised. Congress of Vienna. Greek successes.	1854	Crimean war. Battles of Alma, Balaclava, and Inkerman.
1823	Ferdinand VII. of Spain re-establishes absolutism by French help. Reaction in Portugal. Huskisson's commercial policy in England.	1855	Palmerston Ministry. Fall of Sebastopol. Alexander II. Tsar.
1824	Accession of Charles X. in France.	1856	End of War. Persian and Chinese wars. Lord Canning in India.
1825	Ibrahim Pasha in Greece. Nicholas I. Tsar of Russia.	1857	Indian Mutiny; revolt broken.
1826	Canning prevents Spanish Intervention in Portugal. Fall of Missolonghi.	1858	Orsini's bomb. Derby Administration. Mutiny suppressed; India transferred to the Crown.
1827	Canning, Prime Minister. Anglo-Russian Treaty of London. Death of Canning. Battle of Navarino.	1859	Napoleon supports Sardinia against Austria; Magenta and Solferino. Peace of Villafranca. Palmerston's return.
1828	Wellington, Prime Minister. Test and Corporation Acts repealed. Clare election. Usurpation of Dom Miguel in Portugal. War between Russia and Turkey.	1860	Union of Savoy and Nice to France. Garibaldi in Sicily. The Commons, the Peers, and the Paper Duty.
1829	Catholic emancipation. Treaty of Adrianople. Greek independence recognised.	1861	Victor Emmanuel King of Italy. Death of Cavour. Abd ul-Aziz Sultan. William I. in Prussia. Emancipation of Russian serfs. North American Civil War.
1830	Accession of William IV. in England. Grey Prime Minister. The July Revolution. Louis Philippe King of the French. Risings in Belgium, Poland, and Sicily. Accession of Ferdinand II. in Naples.	1862	Battle of Aspromonte. King Otto expelled from Greece. Bismarck Prussian Minister. Cotton famine.
1831	Belgium recognised as an independent kingdom. Polish revolt suppressed. English Reform Bill rejected.	1863	Schleswig-Holstein war. Suppression of Poland. The Alabama.
1832	Reform Act passed.	1864	Death of Palmerston.
1833	Otto of Bavaria King of the Hellenes. Isabella succeeds in Spain. Miguel expelled from Portugal. Slavery abolished in the British Empire.	1865	Russell Ministry. Gastein Convention.
1834	Melbourne Ministry. Poor Law Reform. On Melbourne's dismissal by the king, Peel attempts to form Ministry.	1866	Seven Weeks' War of Prussia and Austria. Sadowa. Venetia ceded to Victor Emmanuel. French in Rome. Dual Government of Austria-Hungary.
1835	Melbourne Ministry returns. Palmerston in control of Foreign Affairs. Ferdinand I. Austrian Emperor.	1867	Disraeli's Reform Bill. B.N.A. Consolidation Act. Abyssinian War.
1837	Accession of Victoria. Hanover separated from Great Britain. Papineau's revolt in Canada.	1868	Isabella expelled from Spain. Fenian outrages. Abolition of Church rates.
1838	Lord Durham in Canada. Development of Chartistism.	1869	Gladstone Administration. Irish Land Bill and Disestablishment.
1839	Mehemet Ali in Syria. Abd ul-Mejid sultan. Peel and the Bedchamber question. Anti-Corn Law League.	1870	Franco-German War; Sedan; Third Republic. Italy unified. English Education Act.
1840	Mehemet Ali checked. Marriage of Queen Victoria. Canadian Act of Reunion. Chinese "Opium" War.	1871	Surrender of Paris. German Empire proclaimed. Black Sea Conference.
1841	Kabul disaster. Peel, Prime Minister.	1872	Alabama award.
1842	Dost Mohammed restored. Peel's sliding scale. The Disruption in Scotland.	1873	MacMahon President in France.
1843	Annexation of Sindh. Gwalior Campaign.	1874	Afonso XII. in Spain. Disraeli Administration.
1845	First Sikh War; ended next year.	1875	Purchase of Suez Canal shares.
1846	Repeal of the Corn Laws. Pius IX. Pope. Russell administration.	1876	Bulgarian atrocities. Abd ul-Hamid Sultan.
1847	Fielden's Factory Act.	1877	Russo-Turkish War. Annexation of Transvaal.
1848	February Revolution; Second French Republic. Risings in Sicily and Naples. March Revolution in Germany. Revolt of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark. Revolts of Lombardy and Venice against Austria. Frankfort Parliament. Radezky defeats Charles Albert of Sardinia at Custoza. Accession of Frederic VII. in Denmark, Francis Joseph in Austria; Louis Napoleon President of French Republic. Daul-housie in India. Collapse of Chartist movement in England. Reaction victorious in Germany and Austria. Second Sikh War.	1878	Treaty of San Stefano. Berlin Congress. Afghan wars; ended in 1880.
1849	Hungarian revolt suppressed. Victor Emmanuel King of Sardinia. Dissolution of Frankfort Parliament. Reaction in Central Italy. Annexation of Punjab.	1879	Zulu War; Isandhlwana.
1850	North German Confederation. Convention of Olmütz. Australian Constitution Bill. The Queen's memorandum to Palmerston.	1880	Gladstone Administration.
1851	Coup d'état in France. Palmerston dismissed. Great Exhibition.	1881	Majuba. Retrocession of Transvaal.
1852	Schleswig-Holstein question. Cavour Minister. Death of Duke of Wellington. Napoleon III. Emperor.	1882	Bombardment of Alexandria. Tel-el-Kebir.
		1884	Franchise and Redistribution Acts.
		1885	Death of C. G. Gordon. Penjdeh incident.
		1886	First Home Rule Bill. Salisbury Ministry.
		1888	Parnell Commission.
		1889	Annexation of Burmah.
		1895	Salisbury's Unionist Administration. Jameson raid.
		1898	Conquest of Sudan.
		1899	Boxer rising in China. South African War begins.
		1900	Australian Commonwealth.
		1901	Accession of Edward VII.
		1902	End of Boer War.
		1903	Russo-Japanese War.
		1904	Separation of Norway and Sweden.
		1905	(Dec.) Campbell-Bannerman (Lib.), Prime Minister.
		1906	Grant of responsible government in S. Africa.
		1909	Union of S. Africa.
		1910	Accession of George V.
		1911	Republic in Portugal.
		1912	Manchu dynasty expelled, and republic declared in China.
		1912	} Balkan States defeat Turkey.
		1913	

GLIMPSES OF EUROPE'S CAPITAL CITIES



IN THE HEART OF LONDON

Valentine





VIEW FROM THE MONUMENT, SHOWING THE RIVER THAMES, THE TOWER & TOWER BRIDGE



TRAFALGAR SQUARE AND THE NELSON COLUMN AS SEEN FROM THE WEST SIDE



ANOTHER VIEW FROM THE MONUMENT, SHOWING ST. PAUL'S IN THE DISTANCE

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LONDON, THE CAPITAL OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE



PANORAMIC VIEW, SHOWING EIGHT OF THE BRIDGES ACROSS THE RIVER SEINE



THE AVENUE DE L'OPERA, WITH THE OPERA HOUSE IN THE DISTANCE.

Frith

"LA VILLE LUMIÈRE"; SCENES IN THE BEAUTIFUL CAPITAL OF FRANCE.



A GENERAL VIEW, SHOWING THE IMPERIAL PALACE AND THE CATHEDRAL



UNTER DEN LINDEN, ONE OF THE MOST FAMOUS STREETS IN EUROPE
IN BERLIN, THE PROSPEROUS CAPITAL OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE.



NEVSKII-PROSPEKT, ONE OF THE FINEST THOROUGHFARES IN THE WORLD



THE OLD ADMIRALTY BUILDING FROM ONE OF THE BRIDGES SPANNING THE NEVA
PETROGRAD, THE MODERN CAPITAL OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE



PART OF THE FRANZENSRING, THE PRINCIPAL BOULEVARD OF VIENNA



Photochrome

BUDAPEST, SHOWING THE SUSPENSION BRIDGE ACROSS THE RIVER DANUBE
THE CAPITAL CITIES OF AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY



A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW, SHOWING THE PICTURESQUE MOSQUES AND MINARETS



ANOTHER VIEW OF THE CITY, INCLUDING THE GALATA BRIDGE
CONSTANTINOPLE, THE CAPITAL OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE



LOOKING TOWARDS THE RUINS OF THE ACROPOLIS

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GENERAL VIEW OF THE MODERN TOWN

ATHENS, THE CAPITAL OF ANCIENT AND MODERN GREECE



ROME, SEEN FROM ST. PETER'S, SHOWING THE TIBER AND THE CASTLE OF ST. ANGELO



GENERAL VIEW OF BERNE, WITH THE BERNESE OBERLAND IN THE DISTANCE

ROME AND BERNE: THE CAPITALS OF ITALY AND SWITZERLAND



PANORAMA OF MADRID, GIVING A GLIMPSE OF THE PRADO IN THE FOREGROUND



GENERAL VIEW OF LISBON, LOOKING FROM ST. PEDRO DE ALCANTARA

MADRID AND LISBON: THE SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE CAPITALS



THE BRUSSELS PALAIS DE JUSTICE; ONE OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST BUILDINGS



THE BRONZE STATUE OF WILLIAM II. AT THE HAGUE.

SCENES IN THE CAPITAL CITIES OF BELGIUM AND HOLLAND



Photochrome

A PICTURESQUE GLIMPSE OF BUCHAREST, THE CAPITAL OF ROUMANIA



GENERAL VIEW OF SOFIA, WITH MONUMENT TO ALEXANDER II. OF RUSSIA



PANORAMIC VIEW OF BELGRADE AS SEEN FROM THE RIVER DANUBE

THE CAPITALS OF ROUMANIA, BULGARIA, AND SERVIA



EUROPE: SEVENTH DIVISION
THE EUROPEAN
POWERS TO-DAY

AND A SURVEY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

As concerns our present great geographical division—Europe—we have now reached the last historical phase. It remains for us to take the states into which that division is now split up, to give an account of their present-day characteristics, and to relate the present with the past and the immediate future. For it is not the historian's part to prophesy, though he has provided the data for prophetic inductions, within very circumscribed limits.

At this stage, therefore, we give a picture of the political and social conditions prevailing, first of all, in every Continental state, large or small, from Russia to Andorra, dwelling on those features which appear to be of the strongest interest in each individual case.

Finally, we turn to Great Britain, and thence digress to an account of her world-empire, which needs to be treated as a unity, although such treatment of it has been impossible to fit into our continuous narrative of world-history built up on a geographical basis. For it is the history of an expansion into every quarter of the globe, the picture of an empire whose flag is planted on every continent, whose dominion in every continent but Europe itself extends from sea to sea, and claims to include, metaphorically at least, in that dominion the boundless ocean itself.

RUSSIA

By Dr. E. J. Dillon

TURKEY, GREECE AND THE BALKANS

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By Henry W. Nevinson

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SCANDINAVIA



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THE UNITED KINGDOM

By Arthur D. Innes, M.A.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

By Sir Harry H. Johnston, K.C.B.





THE FIRST DUMA, WHICH SAT FROM MAY 10TH TILL JULY 22ND, 1906
From the drawing by L. Sabbatier




THE SECOND DUMA, WHICH LASTED FROM MARCH 5TH TILL JUNE 16TH, 1907



THE THIRD DUMA, WHICH ASSEMBLED ON NOVEMBER 1ST, 1907

RUSSIA'S PARLIAMENT: PICTURES OF THE THREE DUMAS



EUROPEAN POWERS TO-DAY

RUSSIA IN OUR OWN TIME

ITS POVERTY, CORRUPTION, AND OPPRESSION WITH A GLOOMY AND UNCERTAIN OUTLOOK

By Dr. E. J. Dillon

THE Russia of the twentieth century is the product of manifold social forces, religious influences, and political currents, of which the most salient and obvious began to be keenly felt and generally noticed in the reign of Peter the Great. Down to that historic epoch the nation had kept studiously aloof from the progressive peoples of Europe, leading a life apart.

Unlike the Poles and Czechs, whom communion with papal Rome had brought into continuous contact with al' that was stimulating in Western civilisation, Russia isolated herself by embracing Byzantine Christianity and accepting Byzantine culture. Peter the Great was the first ruler

**Thinking
Russia in
Two Camps** to break with this paralysing past and to endeavour to bring his people into line with their European neighbours.

The task was superlatively arduous, and the efforts constantly made since then to accomplish it divided thinking Russia into two camps, which towards the middle of the nineteenth century received the names of the Slavophile and the Western.

The men of the latter party yearned for the regime of France or England. Those of the former thanked God for having vouchsafed to His chosen people the best of all possible institutions: Greek orthodoxy as the most perfect Christian creed; Russian autocracy, conceived as a paternal relation between tsar and people, and therefore the most satisfactory of all forms of government; and the village commune as the

highest type of social organism. Perfect in idea, those institutions had been abused by men, and were consequently now capable of great improvement. But to put them wholly away for Western innovations would be suicidal. Indeed, the circumstance that they constituted the exclusive heritage of the Russian race might, it was argued, be taken as a proof that Providence has destined the Slav Messiah of the nations to take the place of effete Europe in the vanguard of the cultured world.

The note of Slav thought being the universal and the absolute, it too often happens that inadequate attention is paid by Russian reformers to the concrete, the real, the relative. In this way

**The Dream
of the
Idealists** it came to pass that the friends of Western culture in the tsardom longed not so much for the

grafting of European ideas on the Russian stock as for a quick and complete break with the past and the complete regeneration of the nation on the lines of extreme Socialist theories. Orthodoxy, autocracy, and the village commune, everything Russian, was to be thrown into the melting-pot, whence a rejuvenated nation was to emerge.

When far-resonant events like the Crimean War allied themselves with these nihilistic notions, from the union of the two sprang that powerful current of anarchistic thought and feeling which openly and secretly has been undermining the bases of the Russian Empire ever since. With this tendency, which has made itself felt

in all classes of society—being industriously spread by village schools and popular literature, as well as by the teachings of professional revolutionists—the names of Alexander Herzen, Nicholas Dobroliuboff, and Leo Tolstoy have been closely associated. Most of the active leaders of the reform movement, saturated

**Russia's
War with
Japan**

to the heart's core with those subversive ideas, were unwilling to make allowances for Russian ways of thought, modes of living, religious feeling, and secular customs. Midway between these two camps stood the ruling oligarchs—planless, listless, resourceless.

The war with Japan revealed and intensified the astounding weakness of the established political and social fabric, hastened the downfall of the regime, and offered the reform party a golden opportunity to put their fanciful projects to the test of realisation. When the tsar, giving way to what seemed the wishes of his people, had laid down his prerogative of absolutism and promised far-reaching political and social reforms, the ground, cleared of ancient encumbrances, presented a unique site for the erection of a stable democratic fabric.

Guided by ordinary common-sense and commanded by an unflinching will, the reform party might have successfully infused into the nation all the democratic current it was capable of absorbing. The leverage it had acquired was enormous. Some few discerned then what the many can plainly see to-day—that that party by first accepting the power, without responsibility, which was well within its reach, might have soon afterwards obtained the reins of government, and begun its grandiose and perilous experiment upon the nation.

But, confident of an easy victory, disdainful of help, impatient of advice, and chafed by delay, the Democrats violently opposed, in lieu of steadily supporting, Count Witte's administration.

**Democrats
in Quest
of Allies**

In quest of allies, they made a high bid for the support of the Jews, the peasants, the working man, the lower clergy, and the troops by promising reforms which it would have taken a century of continuous effort and untold sums of money to realise. At the best of times Russian reformers lack the saving sense of measure, but now they broke loose from all restraints and ended by alienating the sympathies of many

true Democrats who could gauge the tendency of the time and estimate the speed and the trend of the main social and political currents of semi-articulate Russia.

Since the partial revolution of 1905-6, which rendered many weighty problems acute without starting practical solutions for any of them, Russia has been passing through a transitional phase, the duration of which it is impossible to predict. That extraordinary upheaval, which may be aptly characterised as the result of a struggle not so much between two forces as between two weaknesses, between an epileptic and a paralytic organism, began in truly characteristic fashion. Whole sections of the Statute Book and State Law were abrogated by implication. Customs and traditions, hallowed by ages, were informally but effectively abolished, and nothing whatever was put in their places. In short, a sponge was passed over the slate, on which the mob was allowed to write its conflicting demands, and almost everybody was surprised to see that anarchy ensued. Some of the worst effects of the confusion which was thus

**Fruits of
the Recent
Revolution**

produced still continue to make themselves felt in the principal departments of public life. Many of the political and social questions then formulated are still pressing for answers. Between the theory and practice of the present administration many a chasm is still unbridged.

Thus it would tax the ingenuity of a Montesquieu to determine the type of monarchy which in Russia has succeeded absolutism, and the courtly Almanach de Gotha has illustrated the difficulty by offering a definition of the regime in terms which contradict each other. One may take it that the government is still an autocracy, tempered, as the rule of the first Romanoffs was, by the wishes of the people; but with this difference, that in the seventeenth century public opinion was focussed fitfully in the Zemsky Councils, whereas to-day it is permanently embodied in the Duma and the Council of the Empire.

One of the most momentous changes brought about by the revolution of 1905 affects the legislative machinery of the tsardom. Formerly the monarch was the sole fountain head of law, and although he invariably availed himself of the services of the Council of the Empire and the Senate, which drafted Bills and interpreted statutes, his influence upon law-

making was paramount and unchallenged. But the charter which he bestowed upon his people in 1905 contains a promise that henceforth no measure shall be inscribed upon the Statute Book without the assent of the two representative Chambers.

That is now become one of the fundamental maxims of the Russian Constitution. But, like all such principles, it is applicable and absolute only in normal times. During periods of public trouble exceptions are provided for. For example, if in the intervals between two Dumas, the Crown believes that the needs of the empire call for special legislation, the tsar may on his own authority promulgate it, on condition that on the re-assembling of the nation's spokesmen the measure be laid before them for confirmation or repeal. The one instance in which the emperor, going further, altered the fundamental laws themselves and accomplished what was technically a coup d'état, occurred in June, 1907, when he authorised M. Stolypin to change materially the electoral law. Among the arguments brought forward in defence of this bold line of action two seem especially cogent. The franchise as established in 1905 had no claims whatever to be included among the fundamental laws, which alone are "immutable." Indeed, it had been printed among them solely in consequence of a mere chancellery blunder. Moreover, by their nature the conditions which a citizen of almost any country must fulfil in order to qualify as a voter, especially when the franchise is very restricted, are not stable. They change with the times, and no serious legislator would seek to canonise them.

Another consideration that weighed with the Crown and the Premier was the danger that threatened representative institutions in Russia at that critical period of their existence. Two successive Dumas had come together, bitterly disappointed the hopes of their friends, and realised those of their enemies. And if the third experiment should fail, the grant of an elective Chamber would most probably have been suspended sine die. In order to avert this calamity it seemed necessary to get together an assembly that would consent to discharge its own functions within the narrow limits outlined by the constitution. A set of arbitrary voting qualifications was therefore drawn up by the Prime Minister, which,

however illogical, unfair, and indefensible they may be on theoretic grounds, attained the end in view. The third Duma accordingly met, passed laws, discussed Bills, increased the pay of its own members to an extent that was deemed exorbitant, and accustomed the nation to the working of a legislative assembly. The responsibility attaching to that course and the credit for these results belong principally, if not exclusively, to M. Stolypin. The Duma in its present shape, and indeed the entire machinery of government, continue to exhibit in a superlative degree signs of the haste with which they were elaborated and proofs of the faultiness of their working.

In form they are stamped with the mark of transition, in character they exhibit the defects of the qualities which render the Slavs socially popular and politically inferior. The "Cabinet," presided over by the Premier, includes only a certain number of the tsar's official advisers, and eliminates nearly all the more important ones. The Ministers of War, Marine, and Foreign Affairs, as well as the Minister of the Imperial Court are outside the Cabinet. At bottom this may be an advantage, for it makes them quite independent of the Prime Minister. If they take part in any parliamentary discussion, the act is understood to be quite spontaneous on their part, and in each case they must first obtain the express authorisation of the emperor. The Prime Minister's authority does not touch them, nor does the Crown, when appointing or dismissing them, consult him.

The autocracy as it prevailed down to 1905 has thus disappeared, but it seems impossible to define with anything approaching to precision the type of government that has taken its place. Nor would it be easier to trace the limits that divide the legislative, judicial, and executive powers from each other. The tsar, indeed,

still retains his old title of Autocrat, despite the needlessly bitter opposition offered to it by democratic politicians who spend most of their energy in barren tilting against windmills. But he has preserved more than the title. No measure can acquire the force of law without his assent. All authority emanates from him. He is the source of justice and mercy, and his dispensing power—of which, however, he but seldom makes

The Cabinet and its Members

Two Dumas that Failed

The Tsar Still an Autocrat

use—is extensive enough to enable him indirectly to temper or annul a penal law. The tsar is the one connecting link between the Russian nation and all the foreign members of the international community. He is also the war-lord of Russia, to whom the land and sea forces owe obedience, and he is the sole judge of the acts of

Disappointed Liberal Reformers his Ministers, who are responsible to no other institution in the empire. What disappointed Liberal reformers most bitterly complain of is the Duma's impotence even in financial matters. And in truth its influence is chiefly negative.

The Lower Chamber may criticise, but cannot reform. If its members pass a Bill obnoxious to the Government, the Upper House is virtually certain to throw it out. A Chamber of Reconciliation is then convoked, composed of a number of members of both legislatures. If these fail to agree, everything remains as it was before, and if a money vote is in question, the Minister continues to receive the sum allotted to him by the estimates of the preceding year. That the Duma should be thus restricted to the rôle of censor is deemed to be one of the worst defects of the present system of government.

On the other hand, it cannot be gainsaid that the soft, plastic character of the Slavs, the feebleness of their social interests, and the ease with which they turn away from deeds to words, are also to some extent answerable for the barrenness of the legislative sessions. The late Speaker, M. Khomyakoff, who is himself endowed with the admirable characteristics of the Slav in an eminent degree, has frequently pointed out the evil and explained it. Speaking in November, 1908, to a publicist about the glut of Bills and the slowness with which they are dealt with, he is reported to have said: "Looking at it all round, I must say that, to my thinking, the legislative machinery should

Squabbles in the Duma be changed in some way. I cannot indicate how this is to be done . . . but it is easy to see that if on July 1st this year

there remained 222 Bills untouched, and by November 1st of the same year 290 more were laid before the House, well, there is something to think about. . . . But all that would be nothing if the members of the Duma hit it off together, more or less. But they are eternally squabbling, eternally fighting. With regret I am obliged

to say that of late these quarrels have increased. On the whole, however, that is in our character. Let four men come together, and the very first thing they do is to rummage each other's souls in quest of each other's defects. About the good points nobody cares, but they infallibly rake up the delinquencies."

It is almost impossible to watch the working of the administrative mechanism of to-day without seeing that the Duma has lost the fascination for Russia which it possessed in the year 1906. It was then looked up to as a sort of brazen serpent in the Desert of Bureaucracy, created in order to heal. To-day it is but one of the many state departments of which there were then too many, whose privileged members are paid high salaries by the starving people for doing little or nothing. It has ceased to be a fountain of good, and is looked upon as a source of malignant evils.

It has no hold whatever on the country, and therefore cannot act as a breakwater against the heavy rollers of the revolutionary sea which threatens to sweep away the dynasty and the monarchical regime.

The Creeping Paralysis of the Duma And as the Duma is the only rampart which the monarchy now possesses against a general democratic movement—just

as the police is the only protection on which the monarch relies against terrorist plots—it follows that, parallel with the creeping paralysis of the Duma goes the perilous weakening of the monarchical regime.

Thus the Russian Autocracy might be likened to a mighty rock which after centuries of repose has just rolled from the summit of a high mountain, but has been stopped midway down. In its present precarious position it may remain for years, or it may suddenly resume its downward course to-morrow, crushing everything in its way. This latter contingency is deemed by many to be all the more likely as many forces are working deliberately, methodically, and perseveringly, to set it rolling; while most of the officials who have undertaken the task of thwarting these, are either listless, negligent, or else secretly in the service of the enemy.

Evidently, then, change is a necessity. The sole question is, who shall have the shaping of it? At present the dynasty has the opportunity, and, to a limited extent, the ways and means, but apparently lacks the right men or else the will to appoint them. Even of the Bureaucrats,

who at present wear the livery and receive the pay of the Crown, a large percentage are desirous of ulterior and far-reaching changes. A new political and social revolution is what they ardently hope for. And they would not only welcome its advent but would work actively to hasten it if they could take this step with impunity. Some of them indeed do, but stern necessity compels the majority to bide their time in relative quiescence.

This attitude is but one of many symptoms of a dangerous disorder which the ruling classes cannot, or will not, diagnose. Since the October 17th to 30th, 1905, there has been a bewildering dislocation of the political forces of the country, but it came to pass so gradually that even its occurrence—to say nothing of its significance—has not been realised or even noticed by the professional watchmen of the nation. But its effects are felt, although they are not being traced to the true cause. The Cabinet, the dynasty, the ruling classes—administrative and legislative—are now on one side, and the people are on the other. There is no organic nexus

between the governing bodies and the nation. Liberty is banished to the parliamentary island of the Tavrida Palace, law to the hall of the Senate and the pages of the civil and criminal codes, justice to the world to come, and the few measures of reform with which the Duma or the Cabinet periodically toy are as indifferent to the nation as the caress of a soft and tender hand squandered on a tortoise's shell would be to the slumbering tortoise inside.

The nation is marching steadily along its own grooves of thought, and striving towards its own ideals, and the governing classes are moving over theirs. The link between them is purely mechanical, not organic, and that, too, seems destined shortly to snap. Even now the subterranean forces of upheaval are so active, so constant, so successful, and the resistance offered them is so feeble, that even strangers with open eyes and ears, and nimble minds, can predict with perfect confidence the coming of the second revolution.

The principal mainstay of the dynasty, and, indeed, of order in the empire, is at present the army, whose loyalty has withstood temptations that appeared irresistible. Suspected in 1905 of being honeycombed with sedition, it still constitutes not only the most efficient pro-

tection to the regime, but to all elements of peaceful progress in the nation. In 1905 vigilant observers confidently predicted the saturation of the army with anarchistic or socialistic views within three years, that being the period necessary for a complete renovation of the troops. But although the efforts of the revolutionary party are concentrated on the land and sea forces, without whose help or connivance they will find it difficult to carry out their subversive designs, the temper of the troops is still on the whole satisfactory. But even the army is not immune from the individual efforts of such apostles of the revolution as the late Gershuni, whose almost irresistible influence might aptly be likened to that of the pied piper of Hamelin. Socialism and Anarchism are now reaching the private soldier and common man by means of the Press, which the revolutionary forces of the country can handle with surprising effects. The bulk of daily papers, as well as weekly and monthly journals, are arrayed against the government, and their present moderation of tone is solely a result of the powerful deterrents which martial law puts in the hands of governors and general-governors. A change of regime to-morrow, or even the repeal of exceptional legislation, would effect a sudden and complete transformation in their methods of warfare.

That the army still needs complete reorganisation in almost every respect is evident, and not merely to experts, but also to careful outside observers. In the course of the years 1906 and 1907, the Government removed nearly all the highest commanders from active service, the chiefs of corps and divisions, and likewise about two-thirds of the other commanding officers. But independently of this weeding-out process numbers of excellent officers have voluntarily quitted the army because of the miserly pay there, the slowness of advancement, the lack of stimulus to enterprise, and of the crushing out of individuality by rigorous centralisation. Hundreds of them found it utterly impossible to live on the pittance they received.

Of these many resigned their commissions, while others plunged into debt. The life of the average officer, from the grade of major downwards, was a never-ending sequence of disillusiones and hardships.

**Russia's
Loyal
Troops**

**The Shadow
of a Second
Revolution**

**The Army
in Need
of Reform**

The War Ministry, when it shortened the term of service from four years to three, failed to allow for the fact that the training would have to be intensified correspondingly. Twenty-five per cent. more work was accordingly expected of the staff officers, who received neither better pay nor more help than before. Yet the staff of officers had nearly always been inadequate. As the number who are continually lacking amounts to about 4,000, the work that falls to those who are in the service is doubled and sometimes trebled. Every year the military schools send out about 2,500 young officers to the army, which is annually losing about 4,000. The deficit is therefore growing instead of diminishing, and most of those who leave the service are said to be the best educated and the most highly qualified.

From January, 1909, the pay of the Russian officers was increased, but only slightly. Lack of funds keeps them from receiving their due, for gold is one of the chief forces that move the steel of armies, and Russia is poor. Still, much larger sums might have been made available for the troops by intelligent thrift. The hundreds of millions assigned in 1908 to the building of the Amoor railway line would, in the opinion of experts and patriots, have been much better invested in raising the material and moral level of the soldiers and officers. Men of talent whom a military career was wont to attract under the first Nicholas and the second Alexander now seek at the Bar, in trade, commerce and industry, or in various departments of the civil service, a suitable field for their activity and adequate remuneration for their time and labour.

In Russia, garrison service is marked by sameness, and the efforts put forth to vary its monotony too often demoralise those who make them. Hence the morale of the officers' corps stand in quite as much need

Problem of Garrison Service

of being improved as their material condition. And unless this problem is worked out to a desirable solution, the common men, who constitute the finest fighting material in the world, will lack efficient instructors, without whom the raw stuff cannot be fashioned into a living organism. In a country like Russia, the barracks could, and should, be turned into a kind of

national school for the upbringing of the primitive beings that enter them every year. Little has been done by the tsar's military advisers in the way of profiting by the lessons of the late war. And yet most other countries have utilised Russia's painful experience. The hand grenade, for instance, proved a most useful weapon during the Japanese campaign, and the War Ministry accordingly resolved to introduce it. Two departments, therefore, undertook to supply hand grenades to the army—the artillery and the engineers' corps—but as they have been unable to agree how to set about it, the step has not yet been taken. The utility and necessity of siege artillery is another of the practical conclusions which were drawn from the experience obtained during the Manchurian campaign. But the Russian army, which was not supplied with siege guns in 1904, is not supplied with them yet.

Again, about half of the divisions are still without quick-firing guns, because there is no money to buy them, the sum needed being computed at \$100,000. Yet for the new and uncouth headgear which has

Essential Qualities of the Politician

recently been introduced, a sum of \$7,000,000 was assigned unhesitatingly. The police, too, which is one of the least efficient in the world, is manifestly undergoing a process of slow reorganisation. Here, however, the work of improvement is more difficult owing to the exiguity of qualified men, for in Russia no one can become a good policeman who is not a man of nerve and a citizen of more than average moral worth. And individuals endowed with such ethical and physical equipments have no motives for becoming social pariahs by donning a livery which renders them in the eyes of Russian society what the publicans were in the eyes of the Jews.

In order to be and to remain an honest and incorruptible member of the police force in Russia, a man must be heroically virtuous, wholly temptation proof. Doubtless, every department of the administration in the tsardom has its own peculiar temptations, but that of the police teems with them. The pay is absurdly small; the work is hard; the risks are great; the antipathy of the public is intense and ruthless, and if a member is dismissed by his superiors, he is virtually an outcast. During the discharge of his duties money is thrust upon him at every hand's turn, sometimes for what he does, at other times



RUSSIA'S FINEST INFANTRY: THE SEMINOVSKY BEING REVIEWED BY THE TSAR



THE TSAR, WITH AN IKON IN HIS HAND, BLESSING RUSSIAN INFANTRY



ANOTHER PICTURE SHOWING THE TSAR RÉVUEING THE SEMINOVSKY REGIMENT
THE TSAR OF RUSSIA AMONG HIS SOLDIERS

for what he leaves undone, and very often on the principle on which the Chinese pay their doctors, so long as they have no need of their professional services. Under these circumstances to fall is easy, even to an immaculate citizen. And the bulk of the police are the reverse of immaculate. The secret political police organisation, which at a time like the present is one of the mainstays of the regime, has been shown by recent events to be at once implicitly trusted and absolutely untrustworthy. Its workings tend to undermine the throne, which it is paid to support, and its agents—some consciously, others unwittingly—defeat the very object which the organisation exists to promote. Nor is it to be supposed that any partial reform will infuse new life into the service so long as the Government lacks men of common honesty to work as agents, money to pay them well, and an organising intellect to give direction to their efforts.

Russia's police organisation is divided into two branches, of which one deals with ordinary crime and criminals, and the other with individuals and associations whose aim is to overthrow the Government or to assassinate its members. And the influence of both divisions upon the community is now seen to be positively mischievous. In some cases the chiefs, and in most instances the agents, undisguisedly adopt measures which run counter to the principles on which society rests.

They violate the law, scoff at morality, tamper with Imperial behests, paralyse the arm of the most powerful Minister, change a judicial or administrative thunderbolt into a simple petard, open prison doors to dangerous malefactors, reveal state secrets to bloodthirsty terrorists, and finally reach a point at which public opinion, clamouring to have them punished, is uncertain whether to classify them as cunning conspirators or as stupid officials. The ordinary police system, which is more amenable to supervision than the political, is undoubtedly corrupt to the core. Badly-paid underlings or impecunious chiefs conspire with thieves, highwaymen, and other criminals, whom they not only screen from punishment, but aid and abet in the commission of crime. In the year 1908 some extensive conspiracies, in which members of the police took part,

were brought to light. The Government instituted strict investigations, which led to further discoveries of a nauseous kind. The accused were sent for trial, the scandal was intense and widespread, and the public mistrust of the police became more deep-rooted than before. But the system remains what it was. It may well be doubted whether the moral calibre of the Russian constable can be greatly improved before his material well-being has been adequately provided for by his employers. But if the ordinary police in Russia resembles salt that has lost its savour, the political section may be likened to a disinfectant with which a potent poison has been mixed.

True, in no country is scrupulous respect for austere morality a characteristic of the body of men whose duty it is to discover in order to frustrate political crimes. So long as they keep within certain broad limits, and refrain from committing a breach of certain rudimentary ethical principles, they are sure to be judged by an easy standard. But in the practice of the Russian secret police all restraints appear to have been ignored, all breaches of human and divine law to be permitted. The **Evil Record of the Spy Azeff** Lopoukhine - Azeff scandal, which stirred the Russian nation to its inmost depths in 1909 revealed a code of maxims and a sequence of acts for which even men of lax morality find no excuse, and people of average intelligence can suggest no reasonable explanation.

The head of the police, Lopoukhine, set great store by a spy named Azeff, who was the soul and brain of the revolutionary committee which conceived and arranged some of the political outrages that preceded and accompanied the revolution. For the seven years ending in 1909, Azeff enjoyed the confidence alike of the terrorists and the police, and, so far as one can judge, achieved feats of sufficient importance to justify it in each case. He is said to have planned, among other crimes, the assassination of General Bogdanovitch, Governor of Ufa, of the Minister Plehve, from whom he was receiving large sums of money every year, and of the Grand Duke Sergius.

On the other hand, he betrayed the most successful Russian revolutionist that ever lived, Gershuni, who was proud of being his intimate friend. And while Azeff, the redoubted and redoubtable revolutionist,

**Workings
of the Secret
Police**

**Evil Record
of the
Spy Azeff**

**Corruption
Among
the Police**

was thus playing false to his party on the one hand, and was procuring the murder of prominent members of the Imperial Government on the other hand, one of the most influential chiefs of the provincial police—Bakai, the assistant-director of the secret police of Warsaw—was betraying Azeff to the revolutionists. But as the revolutionary committee could not on such questionable evidence convict its trusted leader of foul play, it appealed to Lopoukhine, the police director who had been the zealous co-operator and intimate friend of the despotic Minister Plehve, and this gentleman gave evidence against the secret agent whose services he had utilised and appreciated.

Among the causes that have led to this anarchy are the lack of unity of system and moral laxity. Under Plehve, for instance, there were five different bodies of secret police, each one working by itself and directing its efforts principally against the others. These were, the force under the police department, the police of the Department of Public Safety, the police of the Minister of the Interior, the palace police, and the police of the Foreign Department. It is easy to see how these bodies might unintentionally baulk each other's schemes; but that, moved by spite, hatred, or other base motives, they should deliberately play into the hands of the revolutionists is more difficult for foreigners to understand. To Russians, however, it seems not only probable, but true. And among the instances they bring forward in support of this grave accusation the following is the most striking.

While the cleverest Russian revolutionist, Gershuni, was living in a tailor's family in Kieff, planning the assassination of the Governor of Ufa, his every deed and word were revealed to the chief of the Kieff secret police. The traitors were two zealous revolutionists, the tailor and his daughter in whose house Gershuni was living. Now the chief of the Kieff police, General Novitsky, forwarded urgent telegrams to the Home Secretary, Plehve, asking for instructions and expecting to be authorised to arrest the conspirators. But Plehve, who is alleged to have had a grudge against the destined victim of the assassins, ordered the police director to stay his hand. "Observe, report, keep everything absolutely secret, but do nothing rash." Such was the gist of the Minister's

mysterious behest. And during a whole month the chief of the Kieff police continued to report, and the Home Secretary went on repeating his instructions. At last the day set apart for the crime was drawing near, and the police director informed Plehve that the four conspirators whose names he had communicated long before had started for Ufa to commit the deed. But still Plehve made no sign. And in May, 1903, General Bogdanovitch, Governor of Ufa, was duly shot dead by the four assassins, who went away unmolested.

As things now stand in Russia, the throne alone would seem to separate the nation from anarchy, while the police shield the throne from destruction. On the efficiency of the police, therefore, the duration of the present regime will continue to depend, unless it be laid upon some more solid groundwork.

A thorough reorganisation of the police will entail heavy expenditure. Money, therefore, is a requisite. And what is true of the army and the police is equally true of every state department in the empire: without funds, no root-reaching reform is feasible. On the other hand, without purifying reform the diseased organism cannot be healed nor the enfeebled financial forces reinvigorated. We are apparently face to face with a vicious circle.

On the finances in the first instance, and on the economic condition of the country in last analysis, the future of the nation very largely depends. For the longer needful reforms are delayed, the more intense and widespread will disaffection become, and the slighter will be the influence of the conservative elements in the country. These elements are at present almost entirely confined to the higher classes. Formerly, indeed, the peasantry, too, were included among them, but erroneously; because the Russian mooshik—this is one of the Russian terms for peasant—bore stoically what he could not alter, and dared not criticise, he was set down as a worshipper of the autocracy. And, in order to obtain a Conservative majority in the Duma, the peasant was enfranchised by the first electoral law. In the interests of the nation, that mistake had to be righted as soon as the unwelcome fact became clear that he was quite indifferent to politics, as

Forces that Prevent Anarchy

How Plots are Revealed

The Peasants' Idea of Politics

politics, but was ready to join any party, legal or illegal, that would give or promise him gratuitously the land belonging to the squires, the Crown, or the Church.

Intellectually little better than the French or British peasant of the eleventh century, the mooshik lazily tills the land which he occupies but does not own. He is but a member of the village community in which the ownership is vested. Hence he lacks the sharp-cut notion of personal property, which to European peoples is almost an innate idea. He sees no moral wrong in sequestering by force the land that belongs to another, especially if that other is of a different class; nor can he discern any danger to himself in that course, although underlying it is a principle which, if logically applied, would reduce him to utter poverty. On the benighted condition of the vast agricultural class which thus constitutes a formidable and proximate danger to the well-being of the nation, the third Prime Minister, M. Stolypin, concentrated his attention.

Among a set of urgent problems all pressing for instant solution, he singled out the agrarian question as the most momentous. Soon after he had accepted office he acquired the conviction that unless he could win over the peasantry to such conservatism as enlightened selfishness

engenders, the country would be ruined. But his way was blocked with many obstacles. Seemingly, the peasantry had already thrown in their lot with the enemies of the empire. Revolutionary groups had bribed them with the promise of free land, rightly feeling that to be successful the anti-monarchical movement must have the active support of the masses. And it was because having won they failed to keep that support, and the movement consequently remained a mere urban revolution, that Russia is still an autocracy. Of the 170,000,000 who now inhabit the

tsardom, only 12·8 per cent. dwell in cities, the other 87·2 per cent. live in the country, and of these 74·2 per cent. are tillers of the soil. The entire peasant class of the empire amounts to 67·2 per cent., or two-thirds of the population. These figures enable one to understand the importance of the peasantry to the revolutionist leaders and the recklessness with which they made their bid for its support. Brutal anarchism was the form which the subversive movement assumed among the tillers of the soil.

M. Stolypin's mode of warring against this violent outburst was to smash the last of the three idols of the Slavophiles—the village commune—to divide among



A RUSSIAN CROWD BEING HELD IN CHECK BY COSSACK SOLDIERS



A COSSACK REGIMENT RIDING THROUGH THE STREETS OF ST. PETERSBURG

individual husbandmen the land theretofore possessed in common, and thus grafting the idea of personal property on the sluggish, untutored minds of the rustics to wait until that should bring forth political and social fruit. This vast and fateful experiment is now in process of realisation. In the haste with which it had to be undertaken and the political colour that was necessarily imparted to it in consequence of the stress and strain of the moment lie the sources of its two sets of defects.

But the efforts made by the Government were praiseworthy. The domain lands of the Imperial family and extensive estates bought from wealthy noblemen were parcelled into lots by the Peasants' Bank, and are now divided among the farmers who undertake to refund the cost price to the State. The continuous migration of landless husbandmen to Siberia is also being directed and fostered by the Government, which further proposes to invite the same land-seeking class to colonise certain districts of Central Asia. The number of families that migrated to Siberia during the year 1908 was computed by the central authorities at 74,500, or, say between 370,000 and 450,000 individuals of both sexes. The extent of land parcelled out among these is estimated at 3,000,000 dessiatines, a dessiatine being equal to 13,067 square yards, or approximately 2½ acres ;

**Emigration
to Siberia
Encouraged**

this amounts to nearly 17,000 square miles. This salutary agrarian reform, simple though it may seem, will require the expenditure of sums of money so vast that the special agrarian fund will not suffice to furnish them. One may be pardoned for doubting whether even yet the Ministry itself fully realises the amounts that will ultimately be absorbed by this grandiose experiment, or the political changes it will bring forth. That the peasants will fail to redeem the bonds issued by the government to the noblemen who are selling their land, and that the deficit must one day be covered by the State, seems to many a foregone conclusion.

But the total cost of the transfer will probably not be limited to this loss. For the peasant, who already lives from hand to mouth, will be unable, from lack of ready money, to till the land as the noblemen tilled it. He must therefore obtain credit or sell out. Yet, in lieu of receiving the wherewithal to keep his new farm on its old level of productivity he has to saddle himself from the outset with debts which will cripple him and damage the community. The system of cultivation that still obtains in Russia may be tersely described as plunder of the soil. Much is taken, and little or nothing is given back. The three-field system, which involves enormous work, the lack of variety of crops, and the absence of

artificial manures, contribute to exhaust the fertility of the land. But it is difficult to see how any Minister, situated as M. Stolypin was, could have provided funds enough for the agrarian revolution which he courageously inaugurated. It is worth noting that, contrary to expectation, the peasants do not readily

Land for the Peasants

purchase the land which the Agrarian Bank acquired at its own risk from the landlords and divided into lots suited for farms. And yet the terms on which the bank offers them are very advantageous to the purchaser. Between November, 1905, and November, 1908, the bank thus bought 3,682,000 dessiatines from noblemen who had either actually suffered or were afraid of suffering from the violence of the peasantry.

Yet, of all this land, only 656,000 dessiatines have been bought by the would-be tenant farmers, or, say, 18 per cent. of the whole. The remainder, amounting to more than 3,000,000 dessiatines, remains on the hands of the bank, which has been authorised to make further purchases amounting to 2,000,000 dessiatines. In this way 5,000,000 dessiatines are in a transitional state—a result which must have a mischievous effect on the material well-being of the community.

In the Budget this dead loss figures as a minus, for the former owners of these estates have already been remunerated in government bonds, bearing interest at 5 and 6 per cent. And the interest on this debt has to be paid with regularity. The result is that the Government, in order to make good the loss of the bank, draws upon the taxpayer, and having assigned 7,000,000 roubles to the peasants' bonds in 1908, gave a subsidy of 17,500,000 in 1909.

But a more scathing criticism than could be based upon the probable financial consequence of the measure lies in the grounded fear that by its limitations it will demoralise the village community, which it cannot wholly abolish, will ruin the bulk of the peasant farmers, whom it cannot furnish with adequate means of tilling the newly acquired soil, will cut millions adrift from the land, deprive them of permanent work, rob them of the material and moral help which they heretofore received from the village community, and expose them unequipped for resistance to the powerful temptations

M. Stolypin's Doubtful Experiment

of professional revolutionists. In other words, M. Stolypin's experiment, if there were funds to ensure to it the highest degree of success, could not bring forth good fruits before a couple of generations. But realised only in part—and plainly in its subversive part—owing to the dearth of funds to carry out the whole, and relied upon as an immediate remedy for the pressing political evils of to-day, it strikes most Russian observers as a superlatively mischievous scheme, which, however, does credit to the heart of M. Stolypin.

That the peasantry is as sorely in need of culture as the land will be taken as a self-evident proposition by all who have lived among them. Crass ignorance, mediæval superstition, paralysing fatalism, and a propensity to thriftlessness and laziness, are among their negative characteristics, and also among the active causes of the poverty from which they constantly suffer. Indeed, such is the character of the Russian agricultural class that, according to a competent, but one hopes a mistaken, judge, M. Obratsoff, the introduction of personal property among them will in three years cause about 20,000,000 of them to be landless. "The owners will exchange their farms for alcohol, just as they now exchange their carts and their garments for drink. There are families who have drunk their unsold land for twenty years in advance."

Idleness in Rural Russia

It is interesting in this connection to note the views of another authority, A. J. Savenko, who affirms that the fundamental impressions which rural Russia makes on the observer are the laziness, listlessness, and ignorance of its inhabitants. "The indolence of the majority of the peasants transcends all bounds. For dwellers in cities, who live in an atmosphere of steady toil, it is positively bewildering. The peasants are averse to doing anything. Work of any sort is distasteful to them, and they shirk it by every means in their power. Old and young are characterised by sloth, but youth takes the foremost place. In a large village you cannot find a single good worker, male or female. They will not consent to exert themselves even for most substantial remuneration, preferring to sit with folded arms at home. They live in want; some of them beg; but none wish to labour. . . . All in all, I think that in the course of a whole year the

peasants work no more than from one to two months. The remainder of the time they spend in utter idleness, which has a stupefying effect on them.

"Cynicism is a natural consequence of this sloth and listlessness. The peasants live in incredible squalor. Their æsthetic requirements are lowered to a microscopic minimum. The need of the most elementary comforts are wholly unfelt. They lead literally the life of hogs. Brutish cynicism shows itself through the whole course of rustic existence. I do not know wherein the spiritual side of it consists. The bulk of them are not conscious of any bond between themselves and the nation or the State. Religion no longer plays the part that it once did in the life of the people. In a fairly large village there is no church, and none of the villagers are in the least put out by the lack of one. Only one necessity is everywhere felt in the gloomy existence of the peasantry—the necessity of *vodka*—and that thirst is stilled abundantly."

A correlate to the laziness of the peasant is the large number of days of rest he enjoys even during the busiest months of the year when every hour of daylight ought to be utilised to the fullest.

For example, August 1st is a holiday, the sixth is a holiday, the fifteenth is a holiday, the twenty-ninth and the thirtieth are holidays. Add to these the four Sundays, and you have nine days in one month during which no work is done.

But it is not only in the country that this disregard of time is noticeable. In trade and commerce, at the Bar, in the banks, on the railways—in short, everywhere it is the same. The Board of the Siberian Railway has lately published statistics of the number of hours the trains were late on that line during two consecutive years. In 1906 they lost 2,514 hours, and in 1907, 2,335 hours, *i.e.*, in 1906, 104½ days; and in 1907, 97 days and 7 hours. In the course of three years the Siberian trains lost exactly one year. And these statistics deal only with passenger trains.

Poverty is the correlate of sloth and thriftlessness, and it may well be doubted whether in any other country in Europe the material existence of the peasants leaves so much to be desired as in Russia. "The peasant's dwelling is a wooden or mud hut, more suited for cattle than for human beings. The peasants, with-

out distinction of sex, and oftentimes the cattle, take their rest in one narrow, mephitic room. Such a rudimentary convenience as a bed is a very great rarity in a farmer's house. The villages and hamlets in which the rural population of Russia are sheltered burn to ashes once in twenty years, completing

its ruin. Some hygienists hold, however, that if Russia were not periodically thus consumed by fire she would rot away in her infected huts and cabins. . . . Nor is the food of the peasant any better. Compared with what it was, there is a certain change for the worse. . . . It consists mainly of bread and potatoes. Even such vegetables as cabbage, onions, and cucumber are disappearing from the table of the bulk of the peasants."

The wealth-creating power of the Russian husbandman is what the personal characteristics and the social conditions enumerated above would lead one to expect. Take the five principal cereals of the country—rye, wheat, oats, barley, Indian corn—and we find that in the year 1900 the total produce was but 3,269 million poods—a pood is 36 pounds; there are 62 poods in a ton—valued at 1904.7 millions of roubles. That is in Russia, where agriculture constitutes the main occupation, giving work to 74 per cent. of the entire population. Now, in the United States, where only 36 per cent. of the population till the land, the harvest of cereals in that same year amounted to 5,340 million poods, valued at 2,800 million roubles. Thus the American farmers gathered in 63 per cent. more—in weight—than the Russians. And yet the population of the tsardom is, roughly speaking, double that of the North American Republic.

If we now inquire how much of the corn is eaten by the people who raise it, we shall find the Russian husbandman lagging far behind his rivals.

In fact, one may truly say of him what was said of the French tiller before the revolution: "He always has too little to eat, and occasionally dies of hunger." During the year 1904 the American citizen consumed 54.3 poods of corn; the German, 28.0; Austro-Hungarian, 23.3; French, 23.3; British, 23.0; Russian, 18.3. The melancholy significance of these figures will become more clear when we

Russia in Contrast with America

The Food of the Peasants

The Peasants Poor and Thriftless

bear in mind that together with corn foods the other peoples eat meat, fish, eggs, vegetables, butter, and fruits in much larger quantities than Russians. Nor should it be forgotten that Russia exports about 15 per cent. of the entire harvest of cereals, which amounts to about 3 to 4 poods a head of the population. The following suggestive table gives in poods the production and the consumption of the five cereals enumerated above by six nations in 1894 and 1904 :

The Scanty Fare of the Russians

Countries	Production per head		Consumption per head	
	1894	1904	1894	1904
Britain	10·8	8·2	23·9	23·0
Germany	21·1	26·1	23·7	28·0
France	27·2	28·4	27·5	23·3
Austria-Hungary ..	24·9	23·1	23·1	23·3
United States ..	51·3	72·8	42·8	54·3
Russia	26·6	26·3	22·8	18·3

The sameness and scantiness of the Russian peasant's repasts are all the more surprising that game is abundant in the interior and fish plentiful in Russian seas, rivers and lakes. The amount of fish caught in Russian waters every year is computed by the well-known expert, Borodin, at 1,120 million kilogrammes, of which about 19,000,000 kilogrammes are caught in the Caspian Sea ; 35,000,000 in the Baltic and White Seas ; 17,000,000 in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov ; over 6,000,000 in the Arctic and Pacific Oceans ; and 5,000,000 in the Ural Sea.

Carp and perch contribute about 754,000,000 kilogrammes ; herring about 152,000,000 ; salmon, about 45,000,000 ; sturgeon, approximately, 34,000,000 ; different other kinds, about 40,000,000 ; not counting 64,000,000 kilos of fresh-water fish. And it should be borne in mind that this wealth of fish food is obtained with a minimum of expenditure in money and labour, for fisheries and pisciculture in Russia are still in a very primitive state. The sea, like

Russia's Great Fish Supply

the land, is being ruthlessly plundered ; poaching is almost universal, and down to a short time ago close seasons were openly disregarded. Yet Russia supplies three times as much fish as the United States, five times as much as Great Britain, and six times as much as France. The amount of cattle possessed by the peasantry, according to the latest statistics, was

in 1908 : in European Russia, exclusive of Poland, 25,000,000 head ; in Poland, 3,000,000 ; in Asiatic Russia, 6,000,000 ; in the Caucasus, 5,000,000 ; in Finland, 2,000,000. But although the absolute total in that year was undoubtedly greater than in any of the foregoing years, the percentage per 1,000 souls of the population had fallen perceptibly. In the sixties of the last century it was about 340 ; in the seventies, 327 ; in the eighties, 319 ; in the nineties, 311.

Fires caused by gross neglect or malice constitute one of the scourges of the tsardom. It is computed that every year fire destroys property valued at 400,000,000 roubles, about \$210,000,000. Of every thousand roubles' worth insured by the various companies almost 80 per cent. of the premium is thus consumed. Assuming that the value of insured property in the tsardom amounts to sixty milliards of roubles, the yearly loss suffered by the insurance companies alone through fire is estimated by experts at 336,000,000 roubles. And this forms but a portion of the total loss,

Improved State of the Workers

because a large amount of property is never insured. Now, a considerable percentage of these fires might be easily hindered by the application of ordinary prudence on the part of the peasants and by watchfulness on the part of the authorities, who have done little to suppress incendiarism.

Among the Sphinx questions of the year of the revolution, 1905, the economic condition of the Russian working man was thrust in the foreground as the most pressing of all. And, considering that the changes brought about in the social and political framework of Russia were due in large part to the strikes organised by factory hands, the mistake was pardonable. And crying evils were redressed. The Russian workman, having beaten the world's record for strikes, had most of his genuine grievances speedily remedied ; the hours of work have been shortened, the pay has been raised, the risks have been lessened, the methods of terminating his engagement have been made easy and satisfactory to him, and over and above he has dealt a stunning blow to the employers of labour, whose profits he has cut down, and whose business he has in many cases wholly ruined. But parallel with the rise in

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wages went the increase in prices for the necessaries of life, and some articles are further out of the workmen's reach today than before the revolution. In the Moscow district in January, 1897, there were 248,500 workmen receiving in wages 42,500,000 roubles, or, say, 170 roubles a year per man. In 1903 there were 293,000 men in receipt of 56,500,000, or 192 roubles a head, making a rise of 12 per cent. But during the same period the prices of food rose by 25 per cent (bread), 36 per cent. (meal), and even 50 per cent. (peas).

In consequence of the strikes of 1905-1906 a further great rise took place in the prices of bread, foodstuffs generally, and the necessaries of life. One of the results of the revolution was a further augmentation of the wages of workmen without any corresponding increase in their productivity. The absorbing power of the home markets was unfavourably affected by this perturbation. This was noticed at the fair of Nijni Novgorod in 1908, when the turnover fell short of the average of former years by no less than 15-20 per cent. In

Industry's Loss through Strikes

1905, women's wages were still very low, the average not exceeding 6-8 roubles a month—about three to four dollars. Since then the lot of the working man and woman has been very substantially bettered. In 1907 a series of far-reaching measures, calculated to improve it still further, and including insurance against accidents, was drafted by the late Minister of Trade and Industry, M. Filosofoff, and would have been laid before the Duma in the form of a Bill had it not been for his sudden death at the close of that year.

The marvellous vitality of Russian finances and the solidity of their economic basis were brought into sharp relief by the revolutionary movement of 1905, which dealt a severe blow to industry, commerce and finances. In 1905 the number of strikes totalled 13,110, while the number of workmen taking part in them amounted to no less than 2,709,695. The damage done was incalculable. This phenomenon is unprecedented in the economic history of Europe. It may well be doubted whether in any other country the financial and industrial fabrics would have successfully borne such a formidable strain. In Russia the gold standard is still intact; trade, commerce, and in-

dustry, although passing through a protracted crisis, are seemingly regaining their buoyancy, and altogether the outlook, without being precisely inspiring, is described by observant Russians as less depressing than might reasonably have been expected. Russia's credit in 1909 may be gauged by the terms on which she

Russia Living Beyond Her Means

concluded her 4½ per cent. loan in January of that year. The conjuncture was highly unfavourable. War clouds hung over the Balkan Peninsula. It was feared that Austria, Turkey, Bulgaria, Servia, and possibly Russia herself, might be drawn into the coming sanguinary struggle.

The Russian rente stood at 77½, and it was known that the Finance Minister must at almost all costs raise funds abroad in order to pay off the war loan of 300,000,000 roubles contracted in France in 1904. Yet, despite these adverse conditions, a loan of 450,000,000 roubles was raised in January, 1909, of which the usual price was 89½, the bankers' commission 3½, and the net proceeds received by the Treasury, 85½. And considering all the circumstances, these results are considered to be fairly satisfactory.

At the same time it cannot be gainsaid that Russia has now reached a point at which she must either live by the exertions of her own wealth-creating class, without the continuous help of foreign capitalists, or else be content, after a series of financial crashes, to find her normal level. To many who are quite unbiassed observers she appears to be now living beyond her means. The vast sums which have been expended on the strategic Amoor railway at a time when the army and the police have yet to be reorganised, the navy to be rebuilt, the peasants to be financed in their new character of tenant farmers, education to be cheapened and diffused, the whole system of internal administration to be remodelled, fill one with misgivings, not

The Nation in Danger of Bankruptcy

indeed, as to Russia's resources, which are enormous, but respecting the ability of her rulers to develop and utilise them sufficiently to make the revenue cover the expenditure. With reluctance I venture to utter my strong conviction that unless some genial administrator—a statesman as well as a specialist—successfully encounters the hero's task of reconstructing the financial and economic fabric of the Russian Empire, applying freely the drastic

remedies by which alone the present disorders are curable, the nation, having first lost its old standard, will inevitably sink into the slough of bankruptcy and financial anarchy before the Russian constitution is twenty-four years old. That the peasant is too heavily taxed considering his present income is as evident as it is that his present income is much too slender considering the extent to which sobriety, thrift, and industry might increase it. Another defect in the present financial system is that the tax-gathering is done in September, when the farmer is obliged to sell what he has just threshed in order to satisfy the collector. For there is no postponing the season; it is as the laws of the Medes and Persians. Even in districts where tobacco is grown, which cannot be brought to market before November, the taxes are, for the sake of uniformity, gathered in September. The result is that in many places where ready money is not available the belongings of the farmer are distrained.

The pivot of the financial machinery is the sale to foreign countries of cereals, which contribute more than any other kind of export to pay the interest on the foreign debt. For the balance of trade in Russia must necessarily be active; that is to say, the total value of the exports must largely exceed that of the imports. That is one of the consequences of the nation's indebtedness. Russia is forced to sell part of the harvest to her neighbours, however urgent may be her own need of it. In 1908 the exportation of corn and other foodstuffs fell off to a disquieting extent affecting the trade balance correspondingly. The following comparison of the value of the exports and imports in millions of roubles for the following four years needs no further commentary:

Year	Value of exports in million roubles	Value of imports in million roubles	Excess of exports over imports in million roubles
1905 ...	1017	583	434
1906 ...	1043·5	650·5	393
1907 .	1016·8	759·8	257
1908 ...	932	752·8	179·2

Manufactures in Russia, which were, so to say, built up by the Finance Minister, Witte, with the money of foreign capitalists, are still suffering from the strikes, the spoliation, and the incendiarism that

accompanied the revolution. The West Russian Manchester, Lodz, until 1905 one of the most prosperous manufacturing cities in Europe, was well-nigh ruined and swept out of existence by the anarchistic wave. And the recent sudden increase in the activity of the Moscow manufactures and the briskness of their trade is attributable solely to the ruin of those at Lodz.

At present, however, there are signs that Russian industry is slowly recuperating—the staple industries, metallurgy, the collieries, the Baku oil-wells, are no longer stagnant. Russian firms have competed successfully for orders from Italy and other foreign countries for railway waggons and metal rails. In short, the lowest depths of depression appear to have been reached, and the present rise, if very gradual, is at least continuous. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that a large percentage of the capital sums invested in Russian industry melted away wholly during the heat of the revolution. And yet the Russian money market still offers uncommonly favourable terms for capital.

Railway Building in Russia During a great part of the year 1908 the official rate of discount was 7½ per cent., while the private rate was still higher. Even on excellent security advances bore interest at the rate of 10 per cent.

In the tsardom there is hardly any capital available for industrial enterprises. It is mostly locked up in Government securities. About 25 per cent. of the foreign loans is held in Russia by Russians, or, say, 344,000,000 roubles; while over a milliard and a half has been invested in internal loans during the past five years.

The building of new railways and the working of old ones generally offer a fair test of the level of a country's material prosperity. In Russia, since the war, little has been attempted in the way of constructing new lines. Some that had been begun before have been completed, such as the Moscow girdle line, the Orenburg-Tashkent, the Perm-Ekaterinburg lines, and a few others. In 1908 the grandiose Amoor railway, which is expected to cost much and bring in little, was begun. The second track of the Trans-Siberian was commenced, and a most useful line connecting Northern Russia with the Donetz coal district was undertaken by a private company. But railways, which create wealth in other

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countries, are not profitable in Russia. They are often ruinous, owing to the frauds in countless shapes which turn the immense profits into the pockets of dishonest schemers. Millions of passengers travel without tickets every year, and many of them lord it over those who pay their way. The railways are forced to pay enormous damages for the loss of fictitious consignments. In short, the losses needlessly incurred in exploiting the principal lines are enormous, and it is the peasant, the workman, and the manufacturer who have at last to make good this deficit. It is computed that 100,000,000 roubles are swallowed up every year by these colossal frauds. And in lieu of plucking up this abuse by the roots, the authorities, finding it less troublesome to lessen the deficit by raising the passenger tariff, have had recourse to this expedient, with undesirable results. First-class passengers are either disappearing altogether from several lines, or they are represented by the privileged people who still travel gratis.

Experts affirm that as the peasants might easily increase their slender yearly pittance by thrift, sobriety, and sheer hard work, so the Government might convert the sempiternal deficit into a handsome surplus by exploiting on businesslike principles the railways, woods and forests, the state lands, the minerals, and the fisheries of the empire, all of which are now being managed with a degree of perfunctoriness which differs little from culpable negligence. Clever railway managers like those whose names are so well known in Great Britain and the United States would soon change the annual loss of 100,000,000 roubles into a large net profit. The colossal wealth of forests which now bring in but 30,000,000

dollars might easily be made to yield twice that sum. The naphtha wells in Baku and numerous other districts could and should be made the sources of a splendid annual revenue, whereas, at present, they enrich only a few individuals.

The fisheries, which are far and away the most abundant in the world, are at present worth no more than \$1,000,000 a year. The State mining industries are carried on at a dead loss. The financial operations of the Imperial Russian Bank do not bring in much more than 50,000,000

dollars to the state. In a word, the sources are abundant, but no one tries to tap them properly. Russia has it in her power to pay her way and prosper. But she seemingly lacks the will. The results are all the more deplorable that they could so easily be avoided.

One of these results is the enormous indebtedness of the nation. And it is increasing, not diminishing. If we compare the Russian estimates for 1909 with those of previous years, we shall find it hard to shake off the conviction that the ordinary expenditure is growing out of all proportion to the growth of the ordinary revenue.

The yearly excess of ordinary revenue over ordinary outlay has been in millions of roubles in :

1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909
148'8	111'5	99'3	145'9	146'5	74'4	4'8

Between the years 1903 and 1909 the annual income of the state went up from 2,031,080,000 roubles to 2,447,000,000, while the expenditure rose from 1,883,000,000 to 2,472,020,000. The total Budget of 1907 showed a deficit of 52,770,000 roubles; in the following year an internal loan of 200,000,000 was required to cover the deficit; and in 1909 a foreign loan of 450,000,000 was floated.



TWO CELEBRATED RUSSIAN AUTHORS
 Count Leo Tolstoy and Maxim Gorky, two novelists whose portraits are given above, took the side of the poor and endeavoured to bring about better social conditions, though the latter has not the religious enthusiasm which characterises Tolstoy's writings. Tolstoy, having resigned all privileges of rank, died in 1910.

Russia's indebtedness is, therefore, appalling. As compared with her potentialities, it is not perhaps alarming; but contrasted with her annual revenue, and the slight wealth-creating power of the state, it is becoming disquieting. If the business management of the empire—abstraction made from politics—were in competent

Russia Blind to her Possibilities

hands, guided by resourceful heads, there would be nothing to fear, for Russia's potential wealth is reasonably believed to be immense. But as things now are, and bid fair to continue, the symptoms are not suggestive of impending prosperity. Almost one-fourth of the yearly outlay is spent on the service of the debt, which has increased since 1903 by over 40 per cent. In the year 1902 it amounted to 6,664,000,000 roubles. In 1909 it had grown to 9,175,000,000.

And this enormous total would have been utterly inadequate to the needs of the empire were it not for the unpalatable fact that about 28 per cent. of the ordinary income came from the alcohol state monopoly. This was the sale of vodka by the Government, which was conceived with the best intentions by Alexander III., but proved, according to the testimony of the most competent authorities, a curse to the Russian nation. The number of million vedros—a vedro is 2.704 gallons—of vodka consumed yearly from 1901 to 1906 was as follows:

In 1901	49.5	In 1904	71.2
„ 1902	66.0	„ 1905	75.9
„ 1903	71.5	„ 1906	85.0

One of the most gifted and best informed Russian publicists, M. Menshikoff, writes: "It must not be supposed that the alcoholic poison has infected the lower classes only. It has tainted in a like degree the petty tradesfolk, the merchants, the clergy, the bureaucrats of cities, and it numbers many victims among the higher intelligent classes."

Widespread Curse of Drunkenness

The injury inflicted by drunkenness on the physical and moral constitution of the Russian race is incalculable, and it is clear to many that degeneration is the ultimate form it usually assumes. Disease and crime are its ordinary accompaniments. Characteristic is the fact that in many places children are among its victims. In a Zemsky Council of the province of Perm the drunkenness of school children was one of the themes discussed, and the

council, having heard the report of the school inspector of the district, called for further details with a view to the adoption of repressive measures. (Cf. "Novoye Vremya," November 10th, 1908.) It is, perhaps, hardly to be wondered at that the peasantry, whose monotonous lives consist mainly of an alternation of hardship and oblivion, should seek to vary it by the artificial mirth and temporary forgetfulness bestowed by inebriety.

Against such vices as this, and the crimes to which it leads, legislation is powerless. Unless the youth of the country can be made amenable to moral influences such as will enable it to face and withstand temptation, the hope of lasting betterment is slender indeed. Religion in Orthodox Russia is doubtlessly still a beneficent force, but it seldom moulds the youthful mind or steels the tender will. And nothing has taken its place. Since the revolutionary wave passed over the land the latent symptoms of general anarchism, which long lay dormant, have been brought into the light of day. Now, therefore, there is at least hope that the hideous disease may

Schools that do not Educate

be cured, which would otherwise induce general paralysis. But by whom? The clergy of the Orthodox Church are badly educated, badly housed, underfed, and exposed to all kinds of temptations. The ecclesiastical schools where the religious shepherds are trained have forfeited the character of educational establishments in the good sense of the term. A professor of the Ecclesiastical Academy of St. Petersburg, Professor Glubokofsky, gives a description of their working in terms that make Russian patriots shudder. There is no teaching there, no docility, no obedience, and the morals are disgusting. Even the celebrated Ober Procuror of the Most Holy Synod, K. Pobedonostseff, deliberately stated shortly before his death that "the ecclesiastical school has become a low tavern." If the salt thus loses its savour wherewith shall it be salted?

The condition of ordinary secular schools is often as bad or even worse. It would, of course, be a gross exaggeration to assert that the influence of all educational establishments in Russia is the reverse of beneficial. But it is fair to say that the good schools are the exception, and one may truly add that ever since the revolution of 1905 the youth of Russia has been animated by a spirit of lawlessness and

gross self-indulgence with which those teachers who strove to discharge their duties were generally powerless to cope.

Scholars of both sexes in many parts of Russia formed secret societies for the purpose of meeting together and indulging in veritable orgies. The majority, while eschewing such uncleanness, refused obedience to their teachers, came to school or absented themselves as they liked, openly criticised their masters, and sometimes turned the school into a tavern or a gambling den. In a Moscow boarding school for children of the nobility, forty scholars struck work in 1908 because they were dissatisfied with the conduct of the director. The head-master, it appears, had demurred to those boarders who failed to come home before one o'clock a.m. The indignant young gentlemen first complained of the head-master to the marshal of the nobility, and, having received no redress, quitted the school.

In one of the educational establishments at Kharkoff the boys were allowed to have their own smoking-room; but they turned it into a gambling hell, and drove away the inspector who came to see what they were doing. In Tiflis a schoolboy, having received bad marks for his lesson, protested. His comrades supported him energetically but vainly. At last they ordered the school council to expunge the bad marks and put good ones in their place, threatening unless this were done to throw bombs. And the school council complied.

In the city of Kutais the governor-general received an anonymous letter condemning him to death. Very shortly after this it came to his knowledge that the missive had emanated from the state grammar school, and that one of the fifth form boys had been deputed to kill him. His excellency, repairing to the educational establishment, entered the fifth class during a lesson, and exclaimed abruptly: "Master G., you were chosen by lot to kill me. Eh?" The boy curled up with fear and muttered: "Pardon, your excellency, pardon, I—I—can—you know—decline—refuse—to do it." "Oh, well, it doesn't matter. I'll forgive you this time," was the astonishing reply, and, so saying, his excellency walked away majestically. And the lad was not even rebuked!

None of the very distressing phenomena that characterised the Russian revolution have challenged such widespread attention

or occasioned such serious misgivings as the vicious precocity of Russian youth. Not content with aping the vices of their elders, they strove to outdo them. Even virtue and innocence, which were happily well represented during that period of unbridled licence, generally paid the toll of self-disguise to vice. The revolution,

**The Vicious
Precocity of
Young Russia**

however, merely brought out a disease that had long been latent. For many years previously the fermentation of ideas produced by the germs of revolutionary literature had been proceeding unchecked. Maxims and principles were instilled into the minds of children which were strong dissolvents of traditional morality, and, if pushed far enough, of the basis of social life.

In elementary schools the old ideals were methodically dethroned. Vice and virtue were made to derive their changeful character from the social and political views of the individual. Thus, to rob or steal was a good action if undertaken for the purpose, say, of despoiling the rich and succouring the poor man. Killing was not murder if the assassin's motives were politically or socially revolutionary. Religion and traditional ethics, which taught doctrines the reverse of these, were envisaged as a set of social shackles from which mankind could not be too soon emancipated. In a word, the baleful influence of these "educational" currents, felt for nearly forty years, cannot easily be over-estimated.

When the Press censorship was removed the sluice gates of this reservoir of turbid nihilism were suddenly burst open. For months the sphere of journalism and literature was flooded with the waters of anti-religious, anti-ethical, anti-social doctrines and sentiments. Everything that had been held sacred by former generations was anathematised as degrading or held up to derision by this. Parental affection,

**Reservoir
of Turbid
Nihilism**

conjugal fidelity, and respect for the convictions of others when those others happened to be conservatives in politics or religion, were scoffed at as irrational and antiquated. To revealed creeds, to patriotism, ethics, clean living, no quarter was given by the leading iconoclasts, who hypnotised the young generation. Free love was preached and practised by the youth of the intermediate schools, who founded "free-love leagues,"

drew up by-laws which members were bound to observe, and utterly ruined many youths of both sexes. At last the Press drew attention to the evil, and the Minister of Public Instruction endeavoured to uproot it. But the mere surgery of administrative measures was unavailing. "The roots of the disease must be treated,"

The Mirror of Literature

wrote one of the most widely-spread journals. "And these," it added, "are to be found in ourselves, in the whole social

organism, in the decay of the family, in the depravity of fathers and mothers." Whether the cure will be successfully accomplished, it is unhappily certain that the young generation will come to the front morally and intellectually enfeebled by the ravages of one of the most malignant diseases that can befall the social organism.

The morbid feelings and subversive notions which are among the symptoms of this fell malady are necessarily mirrored in the popular literature, which therefore throws a strong light on latter-day Russia. But the Russian literature of to-day is much more than a mirror. Some sections of it might, perhaps, be aptly likened to a laboratory where noxious germs are carefully cultivated which warp the mind, disfigure the soul, and produce the monstrous shapes that excite our disgust. Characters which Wycherly and Congreve would have shuddered even to contemplate are not only described in latter-day novels and stories with artistic talent and undisguised sympathy, but they are associated with the highest of the new ideals held up to the Russian nation. To say that many of the literary productions which characterise the revolutionary epoch are public outrages on morals and religion is to put the case with studied moderation.

The British public knows something of Maxim Gorky and Leonid Andreyeff, but one may doubt whether it has ever read the works of Artsybasheff, whose

Russian Writers, Good and Bad

"Sanyin" would have been confiscated by the police of Great Britain, Austria, or Germany; of Kuzmin, Sollogub,

Kamenski, and a host of others. It is only fair to add that many of the works of these writers are quite free from the taint of immorality. Sollogub's "Little Devils" is a powerful story, and Kuzmin's verses are technically perfect. But such tales, for instance, as "Four," or "Leda," by A. Kamenski, or "Sanin,"

by Artsybasheff, cannot be too severely condemned, whether we view them from the ethical angle of vision or the æsthetical.

Wrought upon for decades by disintegrating forces such as those enumerated above, Russia's vital powers could not but be seriously impaired. And the present plight of the nation moves one to pity. An ardent friend of Russia, himself a Slav patriot, has put his impressions frankly upon record as follows: "What I am going to say has a paradoxical ring about it, but it is none the less true. There is no Russian nation. With an Orthodox Russian people we are indeed acquainted, a people numbering 88,000,000, whose religious convictions offer them a substitute for everything in the nature of national ideas possessed by other peoples. But we look in vain for a compact Russian nation permeated with identical interests. And the most amazing trait of this phenomenon is the circumstance that this gigantic mass of people speaks one tongue, cherishes one faith, and yet in spite of it all shows so little understanding for the common ties that bind it to the State.

Solvents of Russian Society

It is no satisfactory explanation to say that lack of culture and geographical conditions are answerable for this. The fundamental causes lie deeper: it is that egotism peculiar to all Slav peoples which finds it so hard to make sacrifices for the common weal, either in the narrow or the broader sense of the term."

These are some of the solvents of Russian society with the effects of which on concrete men and women, and doubtless on the whole Russian organism, the rising generation will soon be confronted. Happily there are also several powerful factors on the other side—religious sectarianism, partial revivals in the Orthodox Church, strenuous efforts by Russian Lutherans, and even the reforming zeal of ordinary citizens who, having cultivated the moral sense, would gladly rescue their youthful compatriots from the abyss that now threatens to engulf them.

From the Orthodox Church, with its atrophied organs, its demoralised schools, and its good-natured, half-starving clergy, no miracles in the social sphere can yet be expected. The essence of Russia's religious creed—one of the facets of the trinity of which Panslavism was once composed—lies in the life to come, the world beyond

the grave. Death is the starting-point of everything worth knowing, worth possessing, and therefore worth striving for. Hence, strange though it may seem, death is the central point of the orthodox faith; life is dull, grey, repellent; it is only the sunset of existence that tinges everything, not, indeed, with its own splendour, but with the ineffable glory of the world to come. It is no exaggeration to assert that of all Christian creeds and churches, there is not one that contributes less to the equipment of its adherents for the stern life struggle here below than the contemporary Orthodox Russian Church.

Panslavism, of which orthodoxy was one of the three bases, has thus been thrust from the foreground of the scene on which Russia is now playing her part. Belief in her heaven-sent mission among the effete nations of two continents may still perhaps linger on in the breasts of the veteran contemporaries of Khomyakoff and Aksakoff, but it is no longer a stimulating or an active force in the community. Had it been otherwise, it would have aroused the nation in 1908. The anti-Slav policy then

**Thwarting the
Balkan
Confederation**

struck out by the Austro-Hungarian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Baron von Aehrenthal, when he annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, thwarted the scheme of a Balkan Confederation, and buried the last hopes of the Southern Slavs, would have unchained an irresistible popular outburst. The Government, however firm its resolution to keep the peace, would have been driven to resist, and, if needs were, to fight, as in 1877. For the issues were

vital; the moment was critical; the choice of alternatives would be final. But nearly everything turned out as the Austrian statesman had expected. Russia's defence of her kith and kin was verbal. Bound by secret treaties to remain an inactive spectator of the incorporation of the Slav provinces, she accepted the inevitable.

**Russia's
Doubtful
Future**

She could not well begin a diplomatic campaign against a measure, however far-reaching, to which she had already deliberately given her assent. And the condition of her army, as well as the state of her finances, agriculture, and industry, forced her to eschew a disastrous military conflict, which would have been the sole alternative to any attempt at evading her treaty obligations.

From whatever angle of vision we contemplate the Russia of to-day, we are struck with the contrast between her boundless potentialities and the sordid reality, and with the vast distance between promise and achievement, which are divided by a seemingly infinite abyss. One might aptly liken the Russian nation to a very complex mechanism, forged by some latter day Vulcan, and then taken to pieces.

Properly put together, set in motion, and guided by a genial engineer, it might prove one of the main factors in the latter-day history of Europe and the human race. But of this there is no sign. The pieces still lie scattered about, half corroded with rust, and the most optimistic feeling they arouse in the minds of Russia's friends who contemplate them is a vague hope.

E. J. DILLON



TYPICAL RUSSIAN PRIESTS AND MILITARY OFFICERS

LATER EVENTS IN RUSSIA

THE revolutionary movement in Russia, so active in the nineteenth and in the early years of the twentieth centuries; practically ceased after the failure of the risings of 1905 and the establishment of the first Duma. But Liberalism continued to spread, and is still influencing the urban populations of the middle-class, whilst in the factories unions and associations have been formed by the workmen. The policy of the Duma to improve the educational opportunities of the great mass of the people was discouraged by the Government of the Tsar in 1913, but in spite of the official censure on the Ministry of Education in that year, some advance can be shown. In 1911, the total number of elementary schools stood at 100,295, with 6,180,510 pupils, while 80 per cent. of the population were still illiterate. In the ten universities of Kazan, Kiev, Kharkov, Moscow, Odessa, St. Petersburg, Saratov, Tomsk, Yunev, and Warsaw, about 40,000 students were enrolled in 1913.

With the lack of education, and the unwillingness of the Government to attempt any great measure of national and compulsory education, drunkenness remains an appalling curse to Russia. But as some slow improvement is visible in the matter of schools since the beginning of the twentieth century, so there are signs that drunkenness may be lessened by legislation. A Drink Bill was passed by the Duma and strengthened by the Upper House (the Imperial Council) in 1914 for the reduction of the drinking shops, and many petitions went up from numerous villages for the total closing of these places of temptation, and for more aggressive action on the part of the Government against the illicit drink traffic. The trouble is that the sale of spirits is a Government monopoly, and an important source of imperial revenue. Moreover, the production of spirits is a powerful vested interest. Enormous sums are invested in the cultivation of potatoes and rye for the distilling trade, and in Russia, as elsewhere, this trade is not prepared to accept legislation that will mean heavy losses to those concerned in its maintenance.

Hope lies in the possibility of fostering and developing the use of spirits for heating and lighting purposes, and the fact that the production of mineral oil is insufficient for these purposes, is some justification for such a hope. The Tsar in his letter to

M. Barck, the newly appointed Minister of Finance, January 1914, made a special point of the need for dealing with the evil of drunkenness, alluding to the "melancholy picture of popular weakness, household misery, neglected business" as "the inevitable consequences of an intemperate life." The Imperial rescript also added: "It is not meet that the welfare of the exchequer should be dependent upon the ruin of the spiritual and productive energies of numbers of my loyal subjects." But noble words and excellent intentions on the part of the Imperial Government have, for more than a century past, too commonly been divorced from relative action in Russia to give confidence of any immediate temperance reform.

Agrarian reforms, or at least agrarian changes, have been taking place since 1909. The Imperial Ukase, ordained in celebration of the Romanoff tercentenary in 1913, that, amongst other matters, \$25,000,000 should be appropriated to found an inalienable fund for improving the lot of the peasants, and this expenditure is part of the Government's agrarian policy—a policy directed at the abolition of communal ownership and the establishment of small peasant proprietorships. Two other items in the Government's land programme are: (1) the removal, of small holders from thickly populated districts to districts favourable to agriculture where there are fewer people; (2) the settlement of peasants on valuable areas at present unoccupied, and yielding no revenue to the State.

Although in the matter of elementary education the percentage of girls in the primary schools is only about 30, the political and social outlook for women in Russia has steadily widened with the growth of the twentieth century. Women have been allowed to graduate in medicine in Russia, and to practise as fully qualified physicians since the Russo-Turkish War of 1876-77; but in 1914 they were still excluded from the higher Civil Service and from the Bar, though permitted to study law and pass all the examinations that qualify for the legal profession. Teaching, and employment in the lower branches of the Civil Service and under the municipal councils, are the occupations of many women in Russia, while others find employment as trained chemists, architects, civil engineers, surveyors, and electricians.

EUROPEAN
POWERS
TO-DAY



II
TURKEY,
GREECE AND
THE BALKANS

THE BALKAN WARS OF 1912-13

TO understand the history of the political reconstruction of the Balkan Peninsula and the causes of the wars that brought about that reconstruction, we must go back to the year 1908 and note how matters then stood in Turkey and in the European States on her frontiers—states emancipated from Ottoman rule in the nineteenth century.

The Sultan Abdul Hamid II. had reigned since 1876. He had seen Bosnia and Herzegovina taken under the protection of Austria, Bulgaria become a practically independent state, and Crete given autonomy. Starting with a movement in favour of constitutional government, he had soon tired of that, and after showing some soldierly qualities in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, he became a recluse, obsessed with fears for his own safety and dominated in his domestic policy by this obsession. As a ruler and administrator he had utterly failed, centralising the power in his own hand, and then failing to come to a decision on issues of first importance. Shut up within the Palace of Yildiz Kiosk, refusing to go out except to the most necessary religious services, Abdul Hamid brooded in fear over the violent deaths of earlier Sultans, and distrusting all his officials, let the affairs of State remain unsettled until he reasonably could attend to them.

Postponement and delay, delay and postponement were the rule of the Porte, while Armenian massacres horrified Europe, and unspeakable outrages in Macedonia called for immediate redress. Under the rule of Abdul Hamid II., Turkey went into hopeless decay, and when the war came, went quickly to pieces. While the Sultan was deciding whether or not bicycles should be permitted in Constantinople, the Turkish ironclads were rusting in the Bosphorus. While he was considering the regulations for a café chantant in Pera, the Powers were demanding reforms in Macedonia. All liberty vanished in Constantinople under the most ingenious and the vilest spy system. Free speech and a free press were not to be thought of even in the

The Sultan's Terror

twentieth century. Taxes were largely farmed, and the abuses that the farming of taxes always brings were conspicuous. The peasant was often obliged to cut down his date tree to pay the tribute demanded of him. Trade suffered heavily, and towns and cities once centres of prosperity dwindled in population and sank into poverty.

In Macedonia in 1902 came a great uprising against the misgovernment, and the revolt of the Macedonians, who had for years hoped to become part of a greater Bulgaria, was ruthlessly stamped out by Turkish troops.

Macedonian Atrocities In 1903 Macedonia again was in revolt, and the revolt was suppressed, as before, with horrible results to the people of that unhappy province. Whole countryside were destroyed. Disease and famine followed, and hundreds of thousands, men, women and children died under the sword or from sickness and starvation. To make matters worse in Macedonia, Greeks and Bulgars were violently opposed, and their rival bands engaged continually in mutual slaughter. Revolutionary "Committees" added their executions upon enemies to the common stock of crime. From time to time the Powers called on the Sultan to effect reforms in Macedonia, but nothing happened save the inevitable delay. In Albania from time to time open resistance was offered to the Sultan's rule, and revolt and massacre alternated. But the Albanians were never really conquered by the Turks.

Thus things stood in the summer of 1908. Anarchy, massacre, hopeless collapse in administration and growing weakness in the army were the chief features of the Ottoman Empire. While in his palace of Yildiz Kiosk, the Sultan still busied himself over a thousand and one trifles, becoming in his deadly fear of a violent death more and more pitiable and dangerous "He trembled at his best troops," wrote a member of the Sultan's Court, "shrank from trusting his elder sons, his sons-in-law, brothers-in-law—who were worthy generals—and the officers who had inclination to

serve him strengthened by strong personal and family interests.

"For some months before the revolution the troops had only blank cartridges for their rifles. This step was taken from a fear that cartridges fully charged might be used against the Sultan himself. Likewise, all the guns in the forts that could be turned against the Yildiz had been spiked. Electricity was laid on in the palace. But the Sultan, fearing that it might be turned against him for regicidal purposes, had the wires cut, and candles exclusively used. These lights were stuck on circular pieces of cork that floated on wooden buckets of water. The water would be available to

cope with fire should the crime of burning down the palace or any of the Sultan's numerous sleeping kiosks be malignantly attempted."

It was at this time of fear and general misery, in the summer of 1908, that the "Young Turks," fresh from Paris, where they had formed an association, called later the Committee of Union and Progress, accomplished their "revolution" in Constantinople, which, for a brief moment promised, in the eyes of Europe, the regeneration of Turkey. The revolution was carried out quite peacefully. Important officers in the Turkish Army opened up negotiations with the Young Turk leaders.

Their pay was in arrears, they saw their army being ruined and their country destroyed piecemeal under the rule of Abdul, and they resolved to make common cause with the reformers. Army corps after army corps was won over to the Young Turks, whose headquarters were at Monastir in Macedonia, and at Salonika, without the Sultan apparently getting any inkling of what was happening. The Turkish governor at Monastir—Hilmi Pasha—given the choice of joining the reformers or being shot, promptly went over to reform, and then departed for Constantinople to explain to the Sultan that the only way to deal with the revolution was to yield to it. Abdul finding that all his elaborate precautions for his own safety were of



ABDUL-HAMID OPENING THE TURKISH PARLIAMENT

The early years of Abdul-Hamid's reign were full of promise. In 1877, as shown in an earlier chapter, he granted a constitution, and in person, opened the new Parliament. But the Assembly was short-lived, reaction setting in and overcoming the liberty from which so much was expected. In 1908, yielding to the pressure of the reformers, the sultan granted another constitution to Turkey, and in December opened the Parliament elected by the people.



KING FERDINAND ANNOUNCING THE INDEPENDENCE OF BULGARIA

In 1878, at the Treaty of Berlin, the Powers of Europe created Bulgaria an autonomous principality under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey; and in 1908, when Turkey underwent such a marvellous change, Bulgaria feared that the nominal suzerainty might be made a real one. To this she was unwilling to consent, and in October, at Tirnovo, Prince Ferdinand solemnly proclaimed Bulgaria an independent kingdom, taking for himself the title of king.

no avail, that his army had failed him, and that without his army he was powerless, accepted the situation philosophically. He gave in to the Committee of Union and Progress, regranted the constitution he had cancelled, and allowed himself to become subject to the men who had planned and carried out the revolt.

For a few happy days the highest hopes for a new spirit in Turkey were entertained. In the fervour of the revolution, universal brotherhood became the order of the day in Constantinople and in Salonika, to vanish all too soon when disillusionment set in. The Committee of Union and Progress had come from Paris full of certain French notions of progress. The leaders were freethinkers and political freemasons, bent on establishing a centralised democracy; as rulers and administrators they were inexperienced and utterly unable to meet the needs of Turkey, and out of touch with the faith of

Mohammedans. Macedonia remained in anarchy, whilst the efforts to bring Albania into subjection resulted in the devastation of that country. Abdul was formally deposed in May, 1909, and Mehmed V. proclaimed Sultan, but the weakness and incapacity of the Government were unlesened.

In the meanwhile, the Balkan States, Bulgaria, Servia and Montenegro, and Greece were already beginning to make preparations for the dismemberment of Turkey, for considerable alterations in the map of Europe, and for the enlargement of their territories.

The civil and economic progress made in these states—largely unrealised in Western Europe before the war—must be noted. Bulgaria, formerly a land of massacres, oppression, poverty, and wretchedness, had been transformed by 1908 into an exceedingly prosperous state, and that despite furious internal political agitations.

HISTORY OF THE WORLD

Before 1878, there were not more than sixty schools in the whole country, at the beginning of the twentieth century there was an elementary school in every village, and a secondary school in every town of 10,000 persons. Sofia, the capital, with its university and its streets full of busy and contented people gave proof of the new condition of things. But the glaring contrast between Bulgaria free and her neighbour Macedonia, inhabited so extensively by her kinsmen, under the rule of the Turks, was always present to the Bulgarians. And there was still one drop of bitterness in the Bulgarian cup—the suzerainty of the Sultan. To end this suzerainty and release Macedonia, the Bulgarians gradually built up a strong modern army—with an available fighting force of 380,000 men out of a total population of 5,000,000.

Servia was under a cloud for some years after the murder of King Alexander and his queen in the royal palace, and the placing of King Peter on the throne by the regicides in 1903. But the rural life of the nation was healthy and the peasantry prosperous, each man owning his own land and each household free from famine and want. The one great ambition of the Servian people had been, since its liberation in 1878, to make Servia a great kingdom by an alliance with Montenegro, and by absorbing the old Serb provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the province of Novi-Bazar—a strip of land between Montenegro and Servia. Austria destroyed these hopes, as far as Bosnia and Herzegovina were concerned, but the rest of Old Servia, including part of Macedonia, were still under Turkish rule, to be conquered by Servian arms, when Servia was strong enough to take the field.

Montenegro was always a nation of warriors, from the time when an old remnant of the Servian nobility established itself there in 1389 to escape the Turkish yoke. Prince Nicholas, its ruler, had never yielded to the Sultan, and his daughters, married in the royal families of Russia, Italy and Germany, helped to maintain the goodwill of Europe to this tiny state of 500,000 people.

Greece had failed so lamentably in the war of 1897, that few realised the advance it had made, and the re-awakening of national spirit within its borders in the

twentieth century. How much the change had been due to its Prime Minister, M. Venizelos, can never be told, but it is certain the debt is considerable. The wretched rule of the Turks in Epirus, the sufferings of the Greek population in Macedonia, and the desired union of Crete with Greece were a constant spur to military activity, for clearly only by force of arms could union with their kinsmen in these regions be established. A British naval mission, invited by the Greek Government, did much for the re-organisation of the Greek navy, and French naval officers gave valuable assistance. As for the army, in a little more than ten years its character was changed as the war was to prove. But the old, long-standing feud with Bulgaria had to be ended before Greece could enter with any hope of success on a war for the liberation of Epirus and Macedonia.

The revolution of the Young Turks with their Committee of Union and Progress at Constantinople, so far from bringing new health and strength to Turkey, simply hastened the break up of the Ottoman

Empire in Europe, and brought curtailment of its dominions in Africa. No sooner had

Abdul Hamid given his approval to the revolution than Austria-Hungary formally annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the Berlin Treaty of 1878, and Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed himself Tsar of his dominions, and declared his country an independent kingdom. In 1910, Prince Nicholas of Montenegro followed the example of Ferdinand, and also proclaimed himself king. In the same year that remarkably able man, M. Venizelos, the Prime Minister of Greece, sounded Bulgaria as to a joint alliance for the pacification of Macedonia, and for the ending of the old hatred between Greek and Bulgar. The weakness of Turkey was demonstrated to all the world in 1911, when Italy seized Tripoli, and by March, 1912, Servia and Bulgaria had formed an alliance, which was speedily followed by the much needed alliance between Greece and Bulgaria. Servia not only wanted to bring the Serb population in the district of Novi-Bazar and in Macedonia under its authority, but it was also anxious to gain an opening on the Adriatic. Bulgaria, apart from the liberation of Macedonia, was determined to win Thrace and extend its borders to Salonika.



KING FERDINAND JOINING HIS ARMY AT THE SIEGE OF ADRIANOPLE



KING FERDINAND OF BULGARIA CONFERRING WITH GENERAL IVANOFF ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Greece was longing to wipe out the memories of the war of 1897, and to drive the Turk out of Epirus. Montenegro was always ready to strike a blow at its old enemy, and all four countries believed they had much to avenge, and felt ready to do battle with their common foe.

In August, 1912, relations were strained nearly to breaking point between Bulgaria and Turkey over the condition of Macedonia, where the unfortunate people were faring no better under the Young Turks than they had fared under Abdul, and between Montenegro and Turkey over the oppression of Albania by Turkish troops. Finally, at the end of September, the Balkan League of Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece was in working order, and in all four countries troops were mobilised, and active steps taken in readiness for war. In vain the Turkish Government tried to detach Greece from the League. In vain the Powers of Europe endeavoured to preserve peace by impressing the necessity of reforms in Macedonia on Turkey, and by warning the Balkan League that no annexation of Turkish territory would be permitted. Turkey was as impotent as ever over Macedonia, and Lord Crewe's solemn declaration in the House of Lords (October 8) "in no circumstances would the Great Powers agree to any change in the *status quo* in South-East Europe" was unheeded. (In fact, within a month—November 8—Sir Edward Grey was admitting that "No one will be disposed to dispute the right of the Balkan States to formulate when they please the terms upon which they will be disposed to conclude peace.")

King Nicholas of Montenegro began the war on October 6th, and at once threatened Scutari, while Greece proclaimed her sovereignty over Crete. Serbia and Bulgaria, a week later, presented an ultimatum to Turkey demanding the immediate establishment of autonomy under European Governors in Macedonia. On October 15th this ultimatum was rejected, and Turkey, having made peace with Italy, withdrew her representatives from the Balkan States, and the dogs of war were loosed.

As far as can be told, the military strength of each country at the outset was as follows:—Turkey had 198,000 men in Macedonia and 170,000 in Thrace.

Bulgaria had 320,000 men—of whom 100,000 were to assist her allies in Macedonia, while the rest of the army operated in Thrace. Serbia had 190,000 men for the conquest of Old Serbia and a passage to the Adriatic. Montenegro had 37,000 men for the taking of Scutari and the assistance of the Servians in Old Serbia. Greece had 110,000 men for the conquest of Epirus and the Ægean Islands. Greece also possessed a navy, which kept the Turks from sending reinforcements to Macedonia through the Ægean Sea, while the Turkish fleet—such as it was—was constrained to stop in the Dardanelles. The Bulgarian army was led by Generals Savoff and Dimitriev—the former glorified in the first war as the "Moltke" and the latter as the "Napoleon of the Balkans" (and if Dimitriev failed in the second war, it was for much the same reason as Napoleon ultimately failed). But General Savoff was in many ways but Tsar Ferdinand's deputy. The main army of the Greeks was under Crown Prince (later King) Constantine, with General Sapundzakis commanding in Epirus. The best of the Turkish commanders were Djavid Pasha, Zekki Pasha, Hassan Tahsin, and Mahmud Mukhtar. The Servians were led by Crown Prince George, and Generals Stefanovich and Yankovich. The Montenegrins by Crown Prince Danilo, and Generals Martinovich and Vukovich.

Victory was with the Balkan Allies from the first, and on every side the Turk was beaten. The Bulgarians swept all before them on their march to Adrianople, winning important victories at Selihlu and Kirk Kilissi on October 22nd and 23rd. The Servians gained an equally important victory at Kumanovo on October 23rd and 24th, and by November 2nd the whole district of Novi-Bazar was in the hands of Serbia and Montenegro, and the Turkish authority had given place to Servian Civil Government.

On November 5th came a decisive defeat of the Turks at Monastir by the Greeks and Servians; and four days later Salonika surrendered to the Greek arms, to be claimed by Bulgaria as her property on the following day. At the end of November Adrianople was closely invested and the Bulgarians had defeated the Turks at Lule Burgas and were at Chatalja.

But the Bulgarians were now over 200 miles from their base, and were, owing to

**The
Balkan
League**

**Strength
of the
Armies**

**Declaration
of
War**



KING NICHOLAS OF MONTENEGRO WITH THE CROWN PRINCE OF SERVIA



GENERAL SAVOFF, THE BULGARIAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, WITH HIS CHIEF OF STAFF

the utter neglect of sanitary precautions, weakened by disease. Winter was upon the land, proposals for an armistice were welcomed, and on December 3rd an armistice was signed between Turkey, on the one hand, and Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro on the other. Greece remained outside the armistice and by means of her

**The
Winter
Armistice**

fleet proceeded to occupy a number of the Ægean Islands. This fleet had not only kept Turkey out of the Ægean Sea, it had carried Bulgarian troops to Thrace from Salonika, Greek troops to Epirus, and provisions to the Servians on the Adriatic coast. The signing of the armistice saw Thrace and Macedonia and Epirus in the hands of the Allies, save for the Turkish garrisons in Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari, all closely besieged. On the question of the fate of these cities turned mainly the peace negotiations which followed the armistice. Bulgaria demanded possession of Adrianople and refused to hear of compromise. Constantinople became restive at the thought of surrendering Adrianople to the enemy, and Kiamil, Sultan Mehmed V.'s Prime Minister, was driven from office. Once more the Young Turks, with their Committee of Union and Progress, effected a revolution, Nazim Pasha being murdered in the process. The popular clamour in Constantinople was for war rather than an ignoble surrender of Adrianople, the armistice was fiercely denounced, and on February 3rd, 1913, war was again renewed.

In the second and last stage of the war of the Allies against Turkey, hostilities were restricted to the sieges of Adrianople, Scutari, and Janina and the Bulgarian advance on Chatalja—fifty miles west of Constantinople. Adrianople was the first to fall. In spite of an active resistance on the part of the besieged, marked by frequent sorties, the Bulgarian troops, reinforced at the end of the armistice by a

**Renewal
of
War**

large number of Servians and thousands of reservists, made their preparations for a grand assault on the city. The attack began early on February 24th, the Servians pressing forward on the west, the Bulgarians on the north-east. The Turks fought fiercely, but were hopelessly over-matched, and before nightfall on the next day Adrianople capitulated. Shukri, the Turkish commander, with 50,000 men and 600 guns, surrendered, and Adrianople was

in the hands of the Bulgarians. This taking of Adrianople is probably the only case in modern warfare of the capture of a great fortress by open assault.

It is estimated that at the armistice the Turks had lost 15,000, and the Bulgarians 10,000 men over the siege of Adrianople. Apart from the capture of this important city, the Bulgarians made little progress towards Constantinople, and the Turks fought with more energy in the defence of their capital than elsewhere.

Janina was taken by the Greeks on March 5th—the main army directed by the crown Prince (now King Constantine), and brought round by sea from Salonika, cutting the defences asunder. The Turkish Garrison, under Essed Pasha, numbered some 30,000 men when they surrendered. The Greeks, in the midst of rejoicing at the success of their arms, were shortly to be engloomed. For on March 18th, 1913, King George, an exceedingly popular monarch, was assassinated in Salonika by a dipsomaniac—to the great distress of the nation.

Scutari was not surrendered till April 22nd. The Turkish commander, Hassan Riza, who had put up a defence which had cost the besieged Servians and Montenegrins thousands of lives, was murdered in the middle of February, and his place had been taken by Essed Bey, an Albanian chief, with aspirations to rule Albania. King Nicholas, as the siege drew to its close, was warned by the Powers of Europe that he would not be allowed to incorporate Scutari in Montenegro, and on April 10th an International Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir C. Burney, blockaded the coast. In the meantime secret negotiations were taking place between King Nicholas and Essed Bey, and on April 22nd the latter capitulated, leaving the town with all the honours of war when the Montenegrins entered. The siege of Scutari cost Montenegro nearly a third of its army, for the total casualties amounted to 10,000 men, but the Powers, decisive and agreed for once, insisted that the town must belong to Albania, about to be made an independent country, and on May 6th, King Nicholas withdrew his troops.

Before Scutari fell a second armistice had been made between Turkey and the Allies, and on April 7th, the peace delegates again met in London, as they had done in the early truce in December.



KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE



KING PETER OF SERBIA



WILLIAM, THE FIRST MPRET OF ALBANIA



KING FERDINAND OF BULGARIA

Negotiations now turned on the question of frontiers. Turkey had lost all territory in Europe save a small area west of Constantinople, and there could be no question on the part of the allies of any of that territory being once more placed under Ottoman rule. By the Treaty of London, May 30th, 1913, Bulgaria retained Adrianople and Kirk Kilissi, and part of Western Thrace; Serbia, Macedonia to Monastir, including

Partition of Turkey Old Serbia; Greece, Epirus, Southern Macedonia, and Salonika; Montenegro, an extension of territory on the east and south-east. Albania from Scutaria to Chimara was declared an autonomous state—to the disappointment of Greece and Montenegro, who had hoped to divide that country between them. The exact delineation of frontiers on the east between the Allies was not conclusive, and but a few weeks elapsed after the signing of this Treaty of London before war had again broken out in the Balkans, and now the recent allies, but ancient enemies, were at each other's throats, Bulgaria threatened by Roumania on the north, engaging with Greece and Serbia for the territorial spoils of Turkey.

The intervention of Roumania encouraged Serbia and Greece, and finally forced Bulgaria, badly worsted, to make peace. But the causes of this second war were deeper than the hostile attitude of Roumania to Tsar Ferdinand.

Very serious discontent existed in the Governments of Greece and Serbia at the policy of Bulgaria in the recent war. The success of the Bulgarian arms had overshadowed in the European press the deeds of her allies, and the predominance of Bulgaria was not only a source of irritation, but to Greece, it seemed, a positive danger. Moreover, the original stipulation had been that Bulgaria should send 100,000 troops to assist the Allies in Macedonia, and this promise Bulgaria never kept. With the utmost

Balkan League Dissolved

secrecy was the extent of the Bulgarian army in Thrace concealed from public knowledge, and while Bulgaria hastened to claim Salonika—which the Greeks had taken—the fact that 45,000 Servians had gone to the assistance of Bulgaria in the taking of Adrianople, was held of no account in the eyes of the conquering Bulgarians. So, at the end of May, Bulgaria, flushed with its triumphs over the Turks, and confident

that its armies were more than a match for those of Serbia and Greece, was ready to decide by battle the question of the settlement of frontiers and the boundaries of the three kingdoms. The districts desired by Bulgaria were in the hands of Serbia and Greece—who had already contracted a military alliance—and it was evident that their conquest necessitated aggressive action. But Tsar Ferdinand and his military staff rashly assumed that their late allies (whom they held in contempt) would give way before a fierce onslaught, and that this second war would quickly end in victory for Bulgaria.

Speedy success was of the utmost importance to Bulgaria. For Roumania had formulated demands for a rectification of frontier between Silistria and the Black Sea, the Turks might at any time take up arms for the recovery of Adrianople, and the Powers might intervene as they had done at Scutaria. If Bulgaria's claim to possess Salonika was the merest expression of confidence in the power to take and hold that city against Greece, the intervention of Roumania for the enlargement of its borders at the expense of Bul-

The Second War

garia had no higher ground of justification than the belief that its neighbour was too exhausted to make successful resistance. Roumania for years had been content to foster its trade and increase its population without indulging in international disputes. Since 1861 it had been an independent kingdom, and its King, Charles I., and its Queen (known in literature as "Carmen Sylva") both of German royal families, were popular.

But the Roumanian army had never been neglected, and while the population had increased 50 per cent. in the fifty years preceeding 1912—when it stood at 7,248,000—the increase of the army had also preceeded, so that it was ready to mobilise 650,000 men when required. King Charles had adopted neutrality when the Allies were at war with Turkey, but he had declared in his speech from the throne to the Roumanian Parliament, in December, 1912, that Roumania was an important factor in the European Concert, and that when "the questions raised by the Balkan crisis come to be finally settled, her voice will be heard." The time had come, King Charles decided, in July 1913, when the voice of Roumania was to be heard—in its guns if needs must—for in that month it

THE BALKAN WARS OF 1912-13

was evident that Bulgaria was making no headway against her enemies.

It was of the utmost importance therefore to Bulgaria, at the outset, to prove her superiority over Serbia and Greece before Roumania could come to their assistance; and no less before the Powers should intervene. For, with the exception of Scutari, the Powers had sanctioned spoils to the victor. But when, on June 30th, the Bulgarians under Dimitriev (Savoff had retired from the

command owing to differences with the Government) attacked the outposts of the Servians and Greeks in Macedonia, they only succeeded in driving them back to the main armies, and two days later it was the Bulgarians who were on the defence. The Servians under Marshal Putnik, and the Greeks under King Constantine, steadily advanced, and the Bulgarians no longer fought with the spirit they had displayed against the Turks. In vain the Bulgarians attempted an invasion of Serbia, and strove for some

signal victory that would give them influence when peace was made. Serbia and Greece were too strong to be overpowered.

On July 4th the Roumanians were in Bulgaria, and a week later had occupied Varna. By the 20th of July, Servians and Roumanians were converging on Sofia, the Bulgarian capital. To make matters worse for Tsar Ferdinand, the Turks had taken the opportunity of reasserting themselves, and in complete defiance of the

Treaty of London, had calmly re-occupied Adrianople and the surrounding country. Bulgaria had no armies to withstand either Roumanians or Turks. Her ruler had staked all on the hasty overthrow of Serbia and Greece, and lost. A last attempt was made on July 25th to defeat the Greeks at Semitli, and when, after two days' hard fighting, this failed the Bulgarians withdrew across the frontier. The Roumanians were now at Philippopolis on the south east,

the Turks were at Adrianople, Serbia and Greece were on the west and south-west frontiers. Bulgaria invaded by Roumania, and surrounded on all sides, was compelled to seek peace, and on 31st July an armistice was signed. Peace delegates met at Bucharest, and there, on August 10th, 1913, the Treaty of Bucharest ended the war. By this treaty Bulgaria ceded additional territory to Roumania, south of Silistria, and retained a portion of Thrace with a coastline on the Aegean Sea. Turkey resolutely declined to give up



Sebah & Jailler

MEHMED V., SULTAN OF TURKEY

Adrianople and the adjoining country, in spite of the remonstrances of the Powers, and Bulgaria was in no condition to begin a third war to regain her former conquests. No difficulties arose over the frontiers of Serbia and Greece, both of whom had added substantial territories to their dominions. Bulgaria, to whom in the first place had been all the glory of the war against Turkey, and who at one time threatened, it seemed, Constantinople itself, emerged from this second conflict

with but slight advantage on its original position, and with all its former military prowess eclipsed.

It is estimated that the total number of casualties, killed, wounded, and death of soldiers from disease, amounted to no less than 352,000; and this in two wars of very short duration. The

Defeat of Bulgaria Bulgarians were the heaviest sufferers, for their casualties amounted to 140,000. The Turk-

ish casualties are put down at 100,000, the Servians at 70,000, the Greeks at 30,000, and the Montenegrins at 12,000. It is impossible to state the number of killed and wounded with complete accuracy, but these figures may be accepted as approximately and proportionately true. As to the cost in money, it has been estimated at the huge sum of \$1,229,000,000. And here again the heaviest drain was on Bulgaria, whose expenditure is figured at \$450,000,000. Turkey comes next with \$400,000,000, Servia with \$250,000,000, Greece with \$125,000,000, and Montenegro with \$4,000,000.

The Cost of the War The Powers, having decided from the first that Albania was to be an independent state, lest falling under Slav influence it should be a source of danger to Austria, or if Greek, a possible offence to Italy, an International Commission, consisting of representatives of Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia,

was appointed to control the country and to determine the frontiers until a ruler could be found for its people. The inhabitants who number between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000, are hardy and independent tribesmen, many of them Mohammedans, in spite of their oft-repeated revolts against Turkish rule, others Roman Catholics and Orthodox Greeks. The Albanians proper, claiming descent from the conquering soldiers of Alexander the Great, are estimated at 1,200,000. The land devastated by the Turks, ravaged by Montenegrins and Servians in the recent war—for the Albanians were in arms at the

The New Albania thought of being made subjects to King Nicholas or King Peter—even now that it is independent has no immediate prospect of enjoying peace within its borders. Although it is mountainous, a good deal of grain is grown, and cattle raising is an important industry. The chief towns are Scutari, population 30,000, Durazzo, Valona, and Koritza. The area of the country is about 12,000 square miles, and extends from the Adriatic (Scutari to Chimara) to the valley of the Black Drin. In November 1913, a Sovereign was found for Albania in the person of Prince William Frederick Henry of Wied. Proposed by the Powers, he was willingly accepted by the Albanians, and on his accession, in 1914, Albania was plainly to all the world an independent state.

EUROPEAN
POWERS
TO-DAY



III
AUSTRIA-
HUNGARY

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY IN OUR TIME

AN EMPIRE OF MANY NATIONALITIES AND CONTENDING RACES

By Henry W. Nevinson

FROM its history one can see that the monarchy of Austria-Hungary is not so much a result as a residue. It embodies no conscious purpose or intention, like modern Germany. After its long and varied annals we can hardly speak of its growth, for it remains rather as a shapeless and almost accidental collection of pieces than an organic and vital whole. It is still encumbered by the tradition of former greatness in days when it stood before Europe as the Holy Roman Empire, whose monarch was equally the successor of the Cæsars and the representative of God's temporal power here on earth. It would be hard for any empire to live up to such a part as that, and the memory of an obsolete grandeur which could not be maintained has prevented the country hitherto from developing along fresh lines of progress.

We can, indeed, hardly speak of Austria-Hungary as a country at all. It lies sprawling in the middle of Europe, without natural limits or frontiers; and it has no natural character of its own, though the parts of the empire are in touch; and it possesses no colonies or foreign settlements. Almost every kind of scenery may be found within its boundaries. In the south-west are the Alpine peaks of the Tyrol; in the south-east the great ranges and forests of the Carpathians. North, in Bohemia, and south, in Bosnia, are

Austria's Varied Scenery

regions of pleasant hills and valleys, interspersed with plains. The Alförd, or central flat through which the great rivers of Hungary run, is one of the largest plains of Europe, and the outlying province of Galicia, beyond the northern Carpathians, is a vast plain of Russian character. As a complete contrast to such scenes, you may pass down

one of the most beautiful and varied coastlines in the world, from the top of the Adriatic to the Mouths of Cattaro, and still you are in Austrian or Hungarian territory, for Austria stretches out an arm to reach the sea at Trieste, Hungary

does the same at Fiume, and **Mixed Races in Austria** the narrow length of rocky shore and mountain, called Dalmatia, is Austria's again.

This diversity of scene makes Austria-Hungary one of the most beautiful and interesting parts of Europe for the traveller, especially as it is also one of the least known. But the diversity of scene is even surpassed by the diversity of race; and though this also affords the traveller a further interest and charm, it adds considerably to the problem of government.

In fact, it is the problem of government, and without realising the diversity of race, it is impossible to understand what the contemporary history of the empire means. There are eight easily recognised races within the frontiers, and the list might be extended to eleven. Of the eight at least five are not merely different from each other; they are strongly nationalist, and from time to time display violent hostility towards one or all of the other races with whom they are supposed to share the glory and government of the same empire. That is the worst of an empire which has not grown by natural energy from the inside, but has been thrown together bit by bit as occasion served, often by the accident of dynasty or marriage. One remembers the well-known ironic line:

Ella gerant alii; tu, felix Austria, nube.

Or, in English:

By others let the wars be waged;
Thou, happy Austria, get engaged.

Such marriages were successful in adding territory, not in adding power. To

form a picture of the result, you might imagine small portions of the British Empire all clustered together in the same country, so that English and Irish, French Canadians and Boers, New Zealanders and Manxmen were living side by side, without the sea to keep them comfortably tolerant and apart. Such a

**Disunion
in the
Empire**

variety of peoples, all dwelling within a small space—Austria-Hungary is a little smaller than the State of Texas—adds much to a traveller's interest. Indeed, to the student of men, no part of Europe, not even the Balkan Peninsula, is so full of varied knowledge as Austria-Hungary.

Almost every stage of European civilisation is found existing there in full vitality—the scientific and highly educated German of Vienna, the mountaineer of the Tyrol, the gipsy of the Hungarian plain, the ancestral Moslem of Bosnia, the Roumanian descendant of old Roman colonists in Transylvania, the progressive Czech of Bohemia, the unchanging Jew of Galicia, the unhappy Pole, and, finally, isolated almost in the centre of them all, unrelated to any of them, and only very dimly related to far-off Turks and Finns, stands the Magyar, surrounded by Slavs of various names, and almost continually at strife with the Emperor of Austria, who happens to be also his own king. In the whole Austrian Empire, almost the only European stock which you will not find is the Austrian. It would be hardly too much to say that such a being as an Austrian does not exist.

We may, however, use the word roughly still for the large German population which forms the centre of Austrian society and boasts itself, with some justice, the most civilised and advanced of the many nationalities. These Germans are the natural successors to the eastern province of Charlemagne's old Teutonic Empire—the East Mark, which warded off the Mag-

**Advanced
and Civilised
Germans**

yars—and they number some 9,000,000, or about a third of Austria's population, and something over 2,000,000, or about a ninth part of Hungary's. Till quite lately no one would have hesitated to call them the predominant race. German was the language, not only of the Court, society, and literature, but of all official and legal business throughout the empire. It was taught in all schools and used in every department of the army. No one would

have thought twice in describing Austria as a German Power, and it is naturally the desire of the German-speaking population to keep things as they were or to extend the German culture and influence.

But in recent years the Germans have seen themselves checked, and even driven back, not only by the Magyars of Hungary, but by the various branches of Slavs in Bohemia and the lesser states, such as Styria and Carinthia. The surprise has only intensified their Teutonism. Many have embraced the so-called Pan-German ideal, which tries to regard the cause of all the Teutonic peoples of the world as one, and would gather the Teutons, not only of the German and Austrian Empires, but of Russia, South America, South Africa, including the Boers, and of Holland and Belgium into a single fold. A favourite scheme of Pan-Germanism for some time past has been an extension of German influence throughout the old Turkish provinces to the port of Salonika, or even by way of Constantinople itself, where Germans already number some 40,000, to Asia Minor, and by a German

**Enemies of
the Austrian
German**

railway to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. By this route they hoped to find an outlet for the German increase in lands where they would not lose their nationality, as they do in the United States. At the moment events are against the scheme, but it is a thing to be remembered in estimating the probabilities of Austrian politics. It is the ultimate goal of the "Drang nach Osten," of which we have heard so much.

For the time, however, these more ambitious designs have been checked, and the Austrian German is fighting for existence in his own country rather than for distant Pan-Germanism in the Balkans or Asia Minor. For some ten years past he has been brought into sharp and continual conflict with Czechs, Magyars, and Italians, in turn or together. It is partly a religious quarrel, and the cry of "Freedom from Rome"—"Los von Rom!"—is one of the party's watchwords. But many good Catholics belong to the movement, too, and the conflict is, before all things, a matter of race or nationality. For some years past the section that looks to Germany rather than Austria as its national fatherland has been growing, and allegiance to the Hohenzollern of Berlin rather than to the Hapsburg is openly

expressed. To unite the German part of Austria to the rest of Germany is an obvious though futile device. But for the position of Bohemia, perhaps Bismarck might have tried to realise it. But he knew that Bohemia made the thing impossible. Probably an equal obstacle lies also in the very different nature of the South German from the Prussian. For the South German of Austria, if less painfully educated and disciplined to a certain kind of capacity, has far more freedom and charm of nature, and far more imaginative power. Nor does his neighbour, the South German of Bavaria, find life under Prussian leadership exactly enjoyable.

So the Pan-German of Austria is now standing in opposition to the chief forces at work in his country. Perhaps the strongest, as well as the most recent, of these forces is Pan-Slavism. It is a similar movement, but less conscious, less wealthy, and devoid of organisation and practical aim. It is a dream of distant unity, like the Russian movement of the same name—a feeling of common brotherhood rather than a policy with a programme. Certainly it has the strength of numbers, for, taking the Austria-Hungary monarchy as a whole, the Slavs probably outnumber all other races by at least two millions. But, as usually happens among Slavs, they are weakened by division. The Czechs of Bohemia, the Croats, the Serbs, the Ruthenians, the Slovenes, the Slovaks, the Dalmatians, and the Poles, though all of Slav origin, now in many cases form separate nationalities, and even in language they are often unintelligible to each other, though their languages are akin.

They are also divided by religion. The great majority, such as the Czechs, the Croats, and the Poles, are Catholic; while the Serbs and many of the Southern Slavs remain Orthodox, following the same rites and doctrines as the Greek and Russian Church. The Pan-Slavist ideal in Austria-Hungary is the formation of the empire into a kind of confederacy of states in which the Slav would predominate. At one time, like all Pan-Slavists, they looked forward to a Slav empire under the suzerainty of Russia.

But this ideal has been dimmed by the overwhelming defeat of Russia in the East and by the cruel reaction of her own government against liberty. At the present time the Slav claims are for separate nationalities. The Croats,

gathered round their old capital of Agram, live in violent protest against the dominance of the Magyars in the kingdom of Hungary, to which they belong. They are nearly all Catholic; in fact, the name Croat is used among the Southern Slavs for Catholic just as the name of Servian signifies Orthodox or Greek Church. They boast a fine history, claiming to be the only Southern Slavs, except the Montenegrins, never subdued by the Turks. Indeed, they are the only Slavs in Austria-Hungary who have established some right to nationality, except the Czechs of Bohemia, and, in quite recent years, perhaps the Roumanians of Transylvania, who have become an even more painful thorn in the side of the Magyars, because there is always a danger that Roumania may adopt their cause.

But of all the Slavs in the empire, the Czechs are by far the strongest and most advanced. Their civilisation is historic, and their nations long held a high place in Europe. But the Germans have been their foes from the beginning, and the feud continues with violence to the present day. Till some thirty years ago there seemed every chance that their nationality would become absorbed under German language and manners. The national movement began with the revival of the national language, as also happened in Hungary, and is happening in Ireland now. It is strange that a literary and academic beginning should have taken so deep a hold on the populace that German is now a language under a ban and the contest between the peoples is perpetual.

As long ago as 1886 Bohemia won the privilege of special law courts and universities, together with the recognition of her language as official, though this right was again withdrawn in 1899, when the Czechs were endeavouring to introduce Czech words of command into the army. This feud against the Pan-Germans has,

in fact, continued ever since, breaking out with especial fury in 1902, again in 1904, when the Vienna University was closed on account of it and the Germans retaliated by smashing up Kubelik's concert-hall at Linz; and again towards the end of 1908, when martial law was proclaimed in Prague at the very time of the emperor's Diamond Jubilee. The Czechs now demand a restoration of the old separate kingship for Bohemia

Feuds of Czechs and Germans

The Slavs Weakened by Division

Bohemia Demands a Kingship

on the same terms as Hungary's kingship, and it is very probable the concession will be granted by the coronation at Prague either of the present old emperor or of his successor. The estimated number of Czechs in the Empire

Hungary's Disputes with Austria

is about six million, or nearly a quarter of the population of Austria proper. But more serious for Austria even than Bohemia's nationalism has been the prolonged disagreement with Hungary.

We need not go back to the cruel repression of Hungary under Heynau after the revolutionary chaos of 1848, when the present emperor came to the throne; nor to the restoration of the constitution in 1861; nor even to the "Ausgleich," or Compromise of 1867, by which Beust hoped he had arranged a workable system of unity in separation. In 1897 the struggle was renewed, chiefly on the Hungarian demand for a separate tariff and separation in commercial affairs. It resulted in a complete block in the constitution existing between the two countries.

By that constitution there is an Austrian Parliament of two Houses — the Upper House, largely hereditary, and a Reichsrath of elected representatives; and there is a distinct Hungarian Parliament of a House of Magnates, chiefly hereditary, and a House of elected representatives, in which the Magyars have hitherto secured a majority, though they are not a majority of the population. Both Parliaments send "Delegations" of sixty members each to sit alternately at Vienna or Budapest, for the arrangement of the common financial burdens. The Delegations may vote together; but they sit separately, and do not debate together. The emperor can personally veto all Bills passed by either Parliament; and he appoints the Ministers himself, apart from the will of the majority. Such a system may obviously lead to a deadlock on any

serious question, and on the questions of the tariff and the army the deadlock lasted year after year. In 1900 the emperor threatened to suspend the constitution. In 1902 Kossuth, son of the famous Hungarian liberator of 1848, and leader with Count Apponyi of the Magyar Nationalists, demanded absolute separation, except for the bond of the crown. In the next year a complete disintegration of the empire seemed probable, and the Kossuthites insisted on the use of Hungarian words of command and the employment of Hungarian officers in the Hungarian regiments of the regular army, not merely in the Honved, or local Hungarian militia, corresponding to the Austrian militia, or Landwehr. The

emperor conceded the appointment of Hungarian officers and the use of national emblems, but steadily refused the use of the Hungarian word of command as destroying the unity of the army. So the deadlock on the tariff and army continued, the Hungarian Parliament going so far in 1905 as to refuse taxes and recruits. The emperor summoned the so-called Coalition to Vienna, but no terms could be arranged. In the following year, 1906, the Coalition was allowed to take office on condition that it did not

oppose a measure for manhood suffrage, all males over twenty-four. This was carried largely by the emperor's personal influence, acting through the premier, Baron von Beck, an honourable statesman, who also succeeded in ending the ten years' quarrel over the tariff by a commercial treaty with Hungary, in 1907. Under this treaty, each state was granted a separate tariff; but Hungary was to pay 36 per cent. of the expenses for war, defence, and foreign affairs. A court of arbitration for future disputes was also instituted. The question of the word of command in the army was held over, and was not definitely settled till a later time. The Magyars are, in part, very much



FRANZ FERDINAND OF AUSTRIA
The Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of the Austrian Empire was assassinated by a Servian anarchist June, 28, 1914.

End of a National Quarrel

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY IN OUR OWN TIME

occupied by the Slav movements directed against them in Croatia and Transylvania, and by their own endeavours to retain a majority in their Parliament by one device or another under manhood suffrage. With this object they framed a Bill in 1908 by which a fairly rich Magyar's vote will count as about thirty to one against the Slav peasant's. It is significant that in the Austrian Reichsrath the first appeal to the people under manhood suffrage produced a Parliament of twenty-six groups, the two largest being the Social Democrats—90, largely Jewish in tendency, and the Christian Socialists—65, largely anti-Semites.

The year 1908 was for many reasons one of the most remarkable in Austria's history, and much future history is likely to spring from it. For some years past Austria had

they were not intended to work. Nothing was further from the thoughts of the two most interested Powers than a reformed and resuscitated Turkey. They were only waiting for Turkey to rot till she dropped, and in the meantime they opposed any genuine reform on the ground that the integrity of the Turkish Empire must never be infringed.



A SCENE IN THE AUSTRIAN CAPITAL

The Schottengasse and Währingerstrasse, two of the chief thoroughfares in Vienna, the leading city of Austria, are shown in the above illustration.

been watching the decline of Turkey into apparent ruin with peculiar attention. As one of the "two most interested Powers," she had combined with Russia to impose various schemes of reform upon the sultan, especially in regard to Macedonia, where the wretchedness and persecution of the populations had become a scandal to Europe. But the schemes of reform did not work ;

entered Turkey herself. It was a daring proposal, but Russia countered it by suggesting another railway, from the Danube, through Servia, the Sanjak and Montenegro, to Scutari and the Adriatic, thus binding together the Serb states and giving them egress to the sea independent of Austria. To such a scheme, after her own proposal, Austria could only assent with a

THE HEART OF VIENNA

The real value of this phrase was shown in the early summer of 1908 when Count von Aehrenthal, who had lately succeeded Count Goluchowski as Foreign Minister in Austria, suddenly proposed to extend the Austrian, or rather Hungarian, railway from the frontier of Herzegovina through the Sanjak of Novi Bazar to the Turkish frontier town of Mitrovitsa. By this line Austria would at once open for herself a route to Salonika without quitting territory under her own control till she

sardonic smile, and so the matter rested. But suddenly all deep-laid plans and dark designs of Austria, as of other Powers regarding the Near East, were overturned by the Young Turk Revolution of July, 1908, a revolution conducted with skill and moderation, that won a brief and quiet impermanent success. Unhappily success was just the last thing that the two most interested Powers desired in Turkey. They had long looked forward with apprehension to a terrible combat in sharing out the Turkish Empire, but it would be a still more terrible thing if no one was to get a share.

Austria's Thwarted Designs

The details of the arrangement are, naturally, obscure. We only know that there were meetings between Baron von Aehrenthal, M. Isvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister, and Signor Tittoni, the Foreign Minister of Italy, and that in September, Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria, an Austrian by birth and education, visited Budapest and was received with royal honours. On October 5th, Prince Ferdinand, almost certainly at Austria's suggestion, proclaimed himself tsar of an independent kingdom, owing no fealty to Turkey and no tribute for Eastern Roumelia. On the following day, Austria formally annexed the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which she had been allowed to occupy and administer by the Treaty of Berlin since 1878.

"The rights of our sovereignty," ran the proclamation, "are extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Among the many cares that surround our throne, care for your material and spiritual welfare shall not be the least." At the same time, a share in the legislation was promised, together with equal rights before the law, and equal protection for religion, language, and race. The Austrian troops which had been allowed to police the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, a long, Turkish strip of land lying between Serbia and Montenegro, were also withdrawn, nominally as compensation to Turkey. The concession was valueless, for if those Serb states on either side of the Sanjak were hostile, Austria could not hold it; and if they were friendly, she could re-occupy it without effort. But by the annexation of the two provinces, Austria tore up the Treaty of Berlin, insulted Turkey, and exposed the Young Turk government to

Annexation of Turkish Territory

extreme danger from the probability of war, besides irritating Serbia and Montenegro almost beyond endurance.

There are nearly 2,000,000 Servian Slavs in the annexed provinces. Less than half the population is Orthodox—the rest being Catholics or Mohammedan descendants of Serbs early converted by the Turks; but all of them are Servian by race, descendants from subjects of the old Servian Empire that was destroyed by the Turks at the end of the fourteenth century. The annexation cut the Serb race in half, and absorbed about a third of it. Servia saw herself also cut off hopelessly from the sea and from her heroic kinsmen in Montenegro. The Servian army was at that time very small, probably not more than 200,000 of all arms, though Servia had lately been purchasing new batteries from France.

Austria, in the three previous years, had also spent very large sums in re-armament, and she could probably put over a million men in the field, including the Hungarian Honved. But her troops are admittedly ill-assorted and split up by nationalist feeling, and in the year 1909 it seemed as though Servia might declare war any day. At the worst she could only be absorbed into Austria, and form the nucleus of a great Servian province, gradually becoming as independent as Hungary. At the best she might bring Russia into the contest as protector of the Southern Slavs.

Servia's Fate in the Balance

In its ulterior aims of embarrassing the Reform Party in Turkey by war and of restoring the sultan's corrupt government, Aehrenthal's coup completely failed. If there was a secret bargain between him and Isvolsky, it certainly came to nothing, because Sir Edward Grey took strong steps to demonstrate Britain's friendship to the Young Turks, and the Pan-Slavists in Russia raised an outcry against any possible bargain which would secure some advantage like the opening of the Dardanelles to the Russian fleet at the price of betraying the Southern Slavs to "the German." Isvolsky, it is true, addressing the Duma on Christmas Day, 1908, definitely refused to support Servia against the Power which had broken the Berlin Treaty, but any future designs that may have been plotted against Turkey were soon left in abeyance. Internal friction followed the annexation, especi-

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY IN OUR OWN TIME

ally on the question of concessions. No international conference was held to give sanction to the arrangement, and Austria lost very heavily in her large Turkish trade owing to the indignant boycott of Austrian goods by the Turkish people. In 1910 a constitution was given to the annexed provinces appointing a Diet of 92 members.

It is possible that the annexation was in reality a further step towards the conversion of Austria into a Slavonic rather than German Power. At all events, that will probably be its result, and it is believed to have been favoured by the Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand, who had strong Slavonic sympathies. On the other hand, we must remember that, whatever

Moslems, began to leave the country in large numbers as soon as the Turkish Revolution gave them hope of security on Turkish soil. There has always been great dissatisfaction because the recruits from the provinces are taken to serve their time in far-distant parts of Austria, while troops of other nationalities are quartered among the Bosnian villages.

Perhaps even stronger discontent has been aroused by the large numbers of Catholic churches erected by Government throughout the country, though not much more than 20 per cent. of the population are Catholic. Jesuits and Franciscans are continually spreading their propaganda, and it is an open secret that



THE HUNGARIAN HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT AT BUDAPEST

the Pan-Slavists may say, it is all of a piece with the familiar German "Drang nach Osten," and that the annexed provinces are already largely Germanised. They are filled with German officials; all newspapers, except the German, are so rigorously censored that they often appear with blank columns; the forests, which are a chief source of wealth, are sold to German contractors; many Slav schools have been suppressed; the Archbishop is an Austrian nominee, and even the Orthodox Servians refuse to accept the rites of their Church from anti-national hands.

The Bosnian Mohammedans, who number about 35 per cent. of the population and are Slav by race, though very strict

they were encouraged by the Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand, who, perhaps, aimed at converting Austria-Hungary into a Catholic Slav Power as a counterbalance to the Orthodox Slavs of Russia.

Thus, Germanism and Catholicism have been thrust upon Bosnia and Herzegovina with almost equal persistence, and the inhabitants naturally looked for protection to their kindred in the neighbouring states of Servia and Montenegro, or even to reorganised Turkey, which they still claim as their suzerain. It must be remembered that when Austria was permitted to occupy and administer by the Treaty of Berlin, she had to mobilise 200,000 men, so strong was the opposition

of the inhabitants to a purpose which she called her mission, though the provinces had but recently freed themselves from Turkish misgovernment. English travellers have often pointed to the advantages of Austrian rule—the police, the growing commerce, the excellent roads, and other signs of advancement under Baron von

The Aged Emperor Franz Joseph

Kallay, who administered the provinces for twenty years with great appearance of success. But English travellers

generally take their information from the German-speaking officials, and it is also a common mistake of that race to suppose that man lives by bread alone. The hostility to Austrian rule is at the present time probably as strong as it was at the time of the occupation in 1878.

With Prague in open riot, the Italian provinces deeply disturbed, the Poles violently indignant at the treatment of their countrymen by Austria's German ally, Croatia and Transylvania restless under Magyar injustice, the Magyars themselves insisting on further demands for independence, and with Bosnia-Herzegovina in a state of siege, the celebration of the aged emperor's Diamond Jubilee, in 1908, could hardly be called an auspicious occasion. Yet, in all Europe there was probably no man more widely respected than Franz Joseph. It was not merely that he had reigned for sixty years without open scandal. A man of no great intellectual power or gift of foresight, he had, within the rigid limits of Austrian Court life, devoted himself to the tasks that lay before him with an obstinate tenacity that failures and disasters made tragic, but could not shake. The mysterious death of his son and the

The Emperor's Grievs and Disasters

assassination of his wife cast a deep gloom over his private life, while the loss of nearly all his Italian possessions, the annihilation of his forces by Prussia, and the collapse of Austria's old leadership among the German States, were public disasters that few dynasties could survive. Yet neither grief nor disaster turned him from the fulfilment of duties which destiny laid upon him, and long experience had endowed him with a kind of

instinct for discerning the right moment to yield or to remain firm. How far he was aware of his Foreign Minister, Baron von Aehrenthal's, sudden action that convulsed Europe with apprehension in the autumn of 1908, we cannot yet say. The stroke was so unlike the emperor's habitual restraint and moderation that it encouraged the belief in his temporary retirement from affairs and his delegation of authority to his successor. That report has been contradicted, and it is a pity that the probable end of a long and worthy career will be marked by the great European War which Austria's action chiefly contributed to bring about.

What will happen at the aged emperor's death has long been a central problem of international politics. M. Milovanovitch, the Servian Foreign Minister, while protesting against Austria's attempt to shatter the Serb nationality by annexing the provinces, said in January, 1909: "Austria-Hungary is not a Father-

Problem of the Future

land, but rather a prison of numerous nationalities all panting to escape." The description is singularly apt. As I have tried to show, the empire is hardly even a geographical expression. Never was a great Power less homogeneous or more savagely torn by contending races. It is natural to suppose that with the departure of the man who has so long held the component parts together, however loosely, a general disruption will ensue and the whole fabric of the empire collapse. But it would be unwise to prophesy any such fate. Austria-Hungary has survived so long that in all likelihood it will go on surviving, if only by habit. Besides, a disruption would imply the isolation of many enfeebled nationalities.

Patriotic as Czechs and Magyars and Serbs and Germans may be, when it came to the point they might very likely prefer to hang together rather than enjoy a short-lived separation at the cost of ultimate and perpetual absorption under the grinding imperialism of one or other of their powerful neighbours.

HENRY W. NEVINSON



LATER EVENTS IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

IN spite of much internal agitation over the question of the franchise in Hungary, and of repeated turmoil in the Hungarian Chamber, the dual monarchy in later years had enjoyed an era of peace, and the Emperor Francis Joseph I., whose reign began in that year of revolutions, 1848, had long outlived the troubles that once beset his throne. In 1914 the Emperor, then in his 84th year, had to suffer the loss of the heir apparent, Prince Franz Ferdinand, who, with his Consort, was shot dead by a Serbian assassin at Sarajevo on June 28th. This crime was associated with the unrest prevailing amongst the various races and kingdoms that made up the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary. How wide and numerous were these differences of race may easily be understood when some statistics of 1914 are grasped. According to these statistics, the people of the dual monarchy included in Austria 9,000,000 Germans, 6,000,000 Bohemians and Moravians, 4,250,000 Poles, 3,380,000 Ruthenians, 1,200,000 Slovenes, besides smaller numbers of Italians, Croats, and Servians; while in Hungary there lived 10,000,000 Magyars (Hungarians), 3,000,000 Roumanians, 2,000,000 Germans, 2,000,000 Slovaks, 1,500,000 Croats, and 1,000,000 Servians; besides a certain number of Italians. With so mixed a population there is naturally considerable variety in religion. While the Roman Catholic Church embraces about 80 per cent. of the people of Austria, and just over half of the people of Hungary, and its numbers are estimated at more than 37,000,000, there are also 3,500,000 of the Greek Church, over 4,300,000 Lutherans, Calvinists, and other Protestants, more than 2,000,000 Jews, and in Bosnia - Herzegovina 500,000 Mohammedans. To a large extent the electoral districts for the return of members to the Lower House of the Reichsrath at Vienna are formed on the basis of race; and as the franchise was extended in 1907 to every male citizen who has resided for a year in his district, and is not disqualified by crime or poverty, the number of parliamentary groups, in addition to the Social Democrats, who admit no racial distinctions and are international, includes German Liberals, National Liberals, German Conservatives, Anti-Semites, Poles, Ruthenians, Young Czechs, Old

Czechs, Independent Czechs, Clericals, Slavonians, and Serbo-Croats, Bohemian Conservative Feudalists, Moravian Central party, Italians, and Roumanians—the main conflict for years raging between the Czechs and the Germans. Hungary, with its Reichstag (Upper House of Magnates and Lower House of Representatives) has also its own racial difficulties. Croatia and Slavonia, though part of the kingdom of Hungary, have their own Diet, presided over by a Ban, or Lord-Lieutenant, and 43 members of this Diet are sent to the Hungarian Reichstag, where, invariably, they sit in opposition. Another group in permanent opposition was the Independence party, led by the late M. Francis Kossuth—a son of the revolutionary leader of 1848—whose death took place in May, 1914. These national parliaments have the fullest powers in internal matters, but on questions of foreign policy and for the organisation of the army and navy, the Delegations, or Joint Committee, of Austria-Hungary, consisting of 60 members, are alone responsible. Three executive departments are concerned exclusively with the foreign affairs and finance of the dual monarchy and with the War Office. Each state makes its own separate provision for the imperial expenses, and the proportion to be contributed is fixed by mutual agreement, renewable every ten years. A Customs and Commercial Treaty between Austria and Hungary, signed in 1907, and ratified by the Parliaments of both states in 1908, renewed and confirmed the agreement first made in 1867, whereby the two states are a common territory for commercial and Customs purposes, and possess the same system of coinage, weights and measures. A Court of Arbitration for the settlement of differences between the two states was also established by this treaty. In spite of extensive emigration to America from the rural districts, the population of Austria increased from 27,496,712 in 1906 to 28,826,000 in 1911, while that of Hungary increased from 19,254,559 in 1900 to 21,030,000 in 1911. The total population in 1910 was estimated at 51,340,603. Next to Russia, Austria-Hungary, with its area of 675,887 square kilometres, is the largest empire in Europe, though in point of population it is beaten by Germany with its 65,000,000 people.

Racial Differences



THE KAISER AND KAISERIN REVIEWING PRUSSIAN STAFF OFFICERS AT POTSDAM



GERMAN ARTILLERY IN THE MANŒUVRES ON THE FRENCH FRONTIER, OCTOBER, 1903



FOOTGUARD RECRUITS REVIEWED BY THE KAISER: NOTE THE "GOOSE-STEP"



CROWN PRINCE, IN THE FOREGROUND, AS AN OFFICER OF THE IMPERIAL CUIRASSIERS

GERMANY'S GREAT CONSCRIPT ARMY: SOME SCENES OF MILITARY LIFE

EUROPEAN
POWERS
TO-DAY



IV
GERMANY:

GERMANY IN OUR OWN TIME

THE EMPIRE'S PLACE AMONG THE WORLD POWERS & ITS MILITARY & NAVAL STRENGTH

By Charles Lowe, M.A.

BY far the most conspicuous and momentous event of the nineteenth century was the rise of the new German Reich on the ashes of the Second French Empire. The victories of the great Napoleon will shine for ever in the pages of history, though the results of those victories have all gone to dust. The Corsican was a man of tremendous, but of negative, power. He shook all Europe to its foundations, but out of its ruins evolved no new political structure to survive his own fall. He was essentially a destroying demon, while Bismarck, on the contrary—who was to succeed him as the principal wielder of one-man power in Europe—proved the genius incarnate of creation.

Napoleon had only escaped from Elba and reached the Tuileries with intent to make one more gigantic effort to crush united Europe when Bismarck was born—seven weeks exactly before Waterloo—All Fools' Day happening to be the birthday of the wisest man of his time. Little, certainly, did the Titanic Corsican then think that, far away, in an obscure hamlet of the sandy Mark of Brandenburg, a man-child had on that First of April been born, endowed with the power of building up again what he had cast down, and of shivering his upstart dynasty to atoms. All the seas of blood which flowed at the

call of Napoleon had been shed in vain; whereas the German Empire stands, and promises to stand, a solid result of the three wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870, which Bismarck found necessary to wage in order to unify the German people. Hence he has come to be known as the statesman of "blood and iron," as if, forsooth, omelettes could be made without eggs, or states cemented without the sacrifice of human life. If any empire more than

another, after that of Rome, has been built up by a policy of blood and iron, surely it is the British, for the long reign of Queen Victoria was one of almost continuous war in one part or another of her world-embracing dominions. It might easily be shown that without this policy of "blood and iron" it would never have been

possible to point to the new German Empire as the most momentous creation of the nineteenth century. It was

after the Franco-German War of 1870 this mighty empire took the place of vanquished France as the leading, because the most powerful, nation on the Continent of Europe; for, after Sedan, the centre of political gravity passed automatically from Paris to Berlin. Yet even now there are but few Englishmen who have a clear and just notion as to what sort of a thing this new German Empire really is.

It may, therefore, be said at once that it is unique of its kind; and that it is *not* an empire in the Cæsarian or Tamerlanian, or Turkish, or Russian, or Napoleonic sense of the term. It would be much nearer the mark to describe the German Empire as the "United States" of Europe, with the King of Prussia as their perpetual president, under the title of "Deutscher Kaiser," or "German Emperor," for "Emperor of Germany" he is not. That would imply sovereignty *over* the German people, but William II.'s sovereignty is confined to Prussia. It is for this reason that neither he nor his grandfather, the first kaiser—in, not *of*, a united Fatherland—was ever crowned, as coronation would carry with it the idea of imperial sovereignty, which is not an attribute of the German Emperor. Nor are all Germans the "subjects" of the kaiser, as

Germany's
Imperial
Solidarity

they are so often called. Every German is the subject of his own Landesvater, or native sovereign. Thus the only immediate "subjects" of William II. are his own honest Prussians, while the Saxons, the Württembergers, and the Badeners, etc., own similar allegiance to their own respective rulers, but all enjoy the superincumbent status and privilege

**The Kaiser's
Loyal
Prussians**

of imperial German citizenship. Another point to be noted is that the kaiser does not receive from the empire a single penny of his Civil List—about \$4,000,000—which is exclusively Prussian, and all the ceremonial expenses entailed upon him as emperor are drawn from his copious stipend as King of Prussia. The imperial dignity is an honorary title in the strict sense of the term, but the cost of maintaining it is cheerfully borne by the kaiser-king's special Prussian subjects for the honour of the family, so to speak, "et pour les beaux yeux du roi de Prusse."

It is ignorance of these and other facts essential to a clear comprehension of the subject that has caused the German Emperor to be represented as a kind of Frankenstein monster, bearing no resemblance to any man or monarch in the universe. It cannot be truthfully maintained that William II. is an absolutely autocratic ruler without any check upon his powers. The best way of realising his character as a sovereign is to remember that the German Empire is but the European analogue of the United States of America, a confederation of twenty-five sovereign states—of which three, the Free Cities of Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen, are republics—under the title of "Deutsches Reich," with the King of Prussia, ex-officio, as its perpetual executive chief or president. Just as each State in the American Union enjoys its own legislature for the transaction of purely state affairs, so a similar system prevails

**Germany's
States and
Sovereigns**

in Germany, where each federal state has its own bicameral diet, or Landtag, for legislating on affairs not reserved for the Reichstag or Imperial Parliament. The Kings of Saxony, Bavaria, and Württemberg, and the Grand Dukes and Dukes of the other federal states are just as much sovereigns in their own territories—just as much "kings in their own castles," so to speak—as the King of Prussia, with the title German Emperor, is

in his own special Hohenzollern monarchy. The depth of popular ignorance on this head in England was revealed when the Duke of Edinburgh succeeded to the throne of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, by the death of his uncle, and when he was written of as having now "taken an oath of allegiance" to the German Emperor, as if he had become his imperial nephew's vassal.

On the contrary, the duke became just as much of an independent sovereign in Germany as the King of Prussia himself, who is only "primus inter pares" among his fellow sovereigns in the Reich. Outside of his own particular kingdom of Prussia, William II., as German Kaiser, has no more power of interference in the civil affairs, say, of Saxony, Bavaria, or Baden, than the Khan of Tartary. Even in the Free Cities of Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen, the emperor cannot step in to exercise the prerogative of mercy, one of the symbols of sovereignty.

To talk about the kaiser as a despot, an autocrat, an absolute ruler, an irresponsible monarch, is not quite correct. The truth is that both as King of Prussia and as German Emperor William II.

**The Limited
Powers of
William II.**

is a constitutional sovereign—if of a peculiar kind. When Englishmen speak of "constitutional" government they mean government by party, whereas the German conception of the same thing is government, whether it includes party see-saw or not. The trouble with England's "glorious constitution" is that it is in the nature of a "lex non scripta," so that they never really know where they are; whereas, the Germans always enjoy the immense advantage of knowing, so that in cases of dubiety or dispute they simply have to turn to the "Reichsverfassung." And the same remark applies to the Prussian constitution, the outcome of the revolution of '48, when the respective powers of crown and crowd were very carefully defined; though, on the whole, the balance of power is in favour of the king in his right of absolute veto.

But as kaiser he has no such right, so that in this and some other respects, he is not so powerful as the president of the United States. The legislative body of the empire may be said to consist of two Chambers—the Reichstag, or National Assembly, representing the German people and returnable by manhood suffrage;

GERMANY IN OUR OWN TIME

and the Bundesrath, or Federal Council, representing the Federal Sovereigns and Free Cities of the Fatherland. Each of these Chambers has on some questions co-equal powers. The assent of both is essential to the passage of an imperial law, and any Bill would be blocked by the veto of either. Apart from these two bodies the kaiser himself, as President of the Union, has no power to veto an imperial law; and as Prussian member of the Federal Council he can only command seventeen votes out of a total of sixty-one.

It will then appear that, even in the Federal Council, the Prussian president might easily be outvoted on any question: as he was, for example, in the case of the Supreme Court of the empire, which was located at Leipzig instead of Berlin. A Bill which is passed by the Reichstag and approved by the Federal Council becomes law whether the emperor, as King of Prussia, has voted for it or not; and then the imperial president has no separate veto power, no choice but to execute the combined decision of the German people and German princes. But now a word

Functions of the Reichstag as to the Reichstag, or National Assembly, of which, by the way, the members are now paid, and which is often described as a mere "money voting and law-assenting machine." This has seemed rather close to the truth. The power of the Reichstag to reject measures placed before it by the Imperial Government is absolute in theory, but the Government has usually had its will. True, the kaiser, with the assent of his fellow sovereigns in the Union, may dissolve Parliament, but so can England's king on the advice of his premier; and to dissolve a Parliament is not to dragoon it.

Dissolutions of the German Parliament have always taken the form of a plebiscite, a referendum, a direct appeal from the party-torn representatives of the German people to the people themselves, and in nearly all such cases the reply has been decidedly in favour of the Government. Power of purse is exercised as absolutely by the German Reichstag as by the House of Commons, and the kaiser cannot put a new warship on the sea, or add a single man to the German Army without the sanction of the German people.

The list of measures which have been rejected both by the Imperial and Prussian Parliaments is a very long one, but the

Government remains in power whatever happens, seeing that the principle of government by party does not form part of the administrative machinery of any German state. Only somewhat recently is there any strong desire for it. National security is of far more importance to Germany, as a sort of "besieged fortress"

—to use the words of Moltke —than government by see-saw; and the problem ever before the German people and their rulers is how to combine the greatest degree of national safety with a workable degree of individual liberty. "Hemmed in," said Moltke, "between mighty neighbours, we are of opinion that we require a strong monarchy." Moreover, it cannot be doubted that Prince Bülow, on the eve of the General Election of 1907, spoke the popular mind of the nation when he said that "no one in Germany desires a personal regime, but, on the other hand, the great majority of the German people is most emphatically against a party regime."

But while it is quite true that though the German people do not, as is so often said of them, live under a personal regime, or anything like it, it is equally true that what may be called the personal power of the emperor is very great. In the purely civil and political field this power, as we have seen, is circumscribed by the written constitutions of Prussia and the empire, and not often has the kaiser-king ever sought to overstep or circumvent the limits set against his arbitrary will.

He cannot veto a measure which has received the double approval of the Reichstag and the Bundesrath; he cannot, without the consent of his fellow sovereigns in the Union, declare an aggressive war, and these sovereigns, perhaps, might be expected to forbid their executive president to precipitate the nation into a wanton struggle. Well, then, but what is the nature of the power

The Kaiser Master of Many Legions that the kaiser so palpably exercises? The answer is that he is the representative and spokesman of the German people to other countries; above all, that he is commander-in-chief of the army and navy; and that this "Kaiserliche Herr" also claims to be a "Kriegsherr," war-lord, or master of many mighty legions. It is the flashing of the emperor's helmet more than of his crown which sometimes tends to dazzle

the eyes and bewilder the German nation, and other nations as well. It is in his administrative capacity as "Kriegsherr" that the kaiser wields most personal power within the empire; while abroad he is also comparatively untrammelled in the domain of foreign policy. In both fields the emperor is entitled by the constitution to wield great personal power, but he has strongly denied that he sought to throw his sword into the scale either against the civil rights of his own people or the general rights of man as involved in the peace of the world.

And the sword of the German Emperor is a mighty one—none more so. The "German Michael," with his "mailed fist," is perhaps the most formidable fighting man the world has ever seen; and yet it must be admitted that he did not bare his blade for well-nigh forty years following his last great set-to with the Gauls beyond the Rhine. Whatever else may be said about Germany, it must at least be conceded to her credit that, with all her tremendous armed strength, she was for years a bulwark of the European peace.

After her war with France, Germany may be said to have become an industrial state as compared with the almost purely agricultural country which she was before; yet her greatest industry is militarism—

the manufacture of soldiers, and in this respect she easily surpasses all her rivals. Of these soldiers she keeps a standing army of about 600,000, which is just about double the strength of what it was a year or two after the Franco-Prussian war; and in time of war this force is raised to a first fighting line of about two millions.

When needed, Germany can put into the field, from her reserves of various kinds, a host of over five millions of highly trained fighting men. Her standing army is divided into twenty-three army corps, all as like each other as two pins in respect of composition and efficiency, so that after a stranger has seen the march-past of one of those superb bodies of men, he may be said to have seen the whole German army. It is, of course, a conscript army, though its size is fixed by budget law, and hence it follows that, though all Germans capable of bearing arms are liable to serve, it is only the fittest who are taken to the colours, seeing that the number of available recruits always exceeds that of the time-expired men.

It would be outside the scope of a sketch like this to detail the organisation of the German army; suffice to say that it is a machine which represents more brain-work than any other machine ever devised by the wit of man, and that it is just as

The Germans Under Conscription

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GERMANY'S PARLIAMENTARY BUILDINGS IN BERLIN



THE STATELY PALACE OF THE GERMAN EMPEROR AT POTSDAM

near perfection as any human institution can possibly be.

But, then, as to its cost? Do we not often hear of the frightfully oppressive burden of militarism under which the German people groan as compared with that of other nations? In fact the expenses of the German army were not so much greater in normal times than those of the United States. One great difference, of course, is the difference in pay. The German officer is not expected to live on his pay, and the privates get almost nothing. "Ah, but then," exclaim the

**Cost of
Great
Armies**

critics of militarism, "apart from the actual cost of the German army in positive cash, just consider the blood-tax that has to be paid by its victims in diverting two of the best years of their life from their civil occupations, and thus sterilising their productive labour!"

The answer to this is that what these victims lose in one way they gain, and more than gain, in another. For they return to civil life far better citizens than ever they were before — imbued with discipline, orderliness, respect for authority, energy, improved physique, and other qualities which soon enable them to make up, and more, for the time, not lost, but devoted to the service of their country—a citizen's first and highest duty. It is a great mistake to suppose that military service is unpopular in Germany. It may be with

some, but with the vast bulk of the nation the army is its most popular institution, and its officers are readily accorded the leading position in society. In fact, the average German officer is the most admired type of the German man.

But the worship of his uniform sometimes leads to strange results—witness the case of an old gaol-bird, called Voigt, a cobbler by trade, who dressed himself up as a captain in the Prussian Guards, waylaid a party of William II.'s finest soldiers, and commanded them to follow him to a little town, Köpenick, near Berlin. The soldiers obeyed like sheep or machines. At Köpenick, the cobbler-captain, saying he was the agent of the kaiser, arrested the burgomaster, and sent him and his lady under escort to Berlin, after which he coolly walked away with all the cash in the treasury, which he had previously demanded in exchange for a receipt. The feat would have been impossible in any other country save Germany, where there is a blind worship of every kind of uniform, beneath which no one ever takes the trouble to look.

This is one of the minor penalties of being a "Volk in Waffen," a people in arms, but that is a condition of things from which the Germans claim they cannot escape if they would continue to be secure of their national existence. It is just as essential for them to have the finest army in Europe as it is for England to

have the strongest fleet in the world. Conscription is a sheer necessity for the Germans; and each country has its own peculiar needs and problems. As in the case of individuals, what is food for one may be positive poison for another, and it would be just as preposterous for England to seek to obtrude upon the Germans their own special form of constitutionalism as it would be absurd for the Germans to insist upon England adopting their system of conscription.

The war of 1870 was exclusively a land war, and the swift, crushing victories of the Germans had this peculiar, this unique result—that they may be said to have put the French navy entirely out of action, seeing that it had to hurry off all its best guns and men to help in the defence of Paris. But such

Why Germany Built Her Navy a thing—such a victorious walk-over on land—is never likely to occur again; and that was why, or at least one of the reasons why, the Germans—knowing that if ever they had to fight again they would have to do so on sea as well as on land—provided themselves with a navy which M. Lockroy, French Minister of Marine, who was given special facilities for studying it, pronounced to be the “best organised in the world.” As the rise of the German Empire was the most momentous fact of modern times, so the most momentous thing in the history of this new empire was the creation of the German fleet. In 1870 Germany possessed but thirty-seven war-ships all told, and a very miscellaneous job lot they were; while now she has no fewer than about 260 various kinds of battle-craft, built or building, including several of the Dreadnought type. In 1888 the navy was manned by only 15,000 officers and seamen, and twenty years later the number exceeded 50,000. In 1888 the ordinary naval expenditure was only \$12,500,000, by 1908 it had risen to \$90,000,000; while the total sum to be devoted to the navy between 1906 and 1907 was voted at 166 millions sterling, though supplementary Bills tend to increase these colossal figures.

To the 260 war-ships of various kinds

built and building in 1907, add 100 of the finest liners of the great German shipping companies, which are retained by the Government as auxiliary cruisers in the event of war, and you will get some idea of the new and formidable phenomenon which may be said to

William II. Creator of the Navy have burst upon a startled and apprehensive Europe in the form of the Imperial German navy. And here it may be pointed out that while the army of the Fatherland is only “German,” its navy is “Imperial”; that is to say, that while the army is composed of contingents from the various states of the Union, each with its own peculiarities and privileges, the navy—recruited from the seafaring population on the same conscript principle as the army—is an imperial institution pure and simple, and is much more of a rivet to the unity of the Reich.

The difference may be further accentuated by saying that while there is no Imperial Minister of War, there is an Imperial Chief of the Admiralty. In its present form the Imperial navy may be said to be the creation of William II., and, if for nothing else, he will always be remembered for this achievement. To the eagle on the escutcheon of the Hohenzollerns he may be said to have added a swan. William I. taught Germany how to march, and it remained for his ambitious grandson to show her how to swim.

“As my grandfather,” the latter said, “reorganised the army, so I shall reorganise my navy, without flinching and in the same way, so that it will stand on the same level with my army. and that, with its help, the German Empire shall reach the place which it has not yet attained.”

Other utterances of the emperor show that he was the first of his race to grasp the meaning of sea-power—the struggle for which promises to be a marked feature of the present century—utterances such as “Our future lies on the water”; “Germany, too, must have her place in the sun”; “without the consent of Germany’s ruler nothing must happen in any

part of the world"; "may our Fatherland be as powerful, as closely united, and as authoritative as was the Roman Empire of old, in order that the phrase 'Civis Romanus sum' may be replaced by 'I am a German citizen'"; "Neptune with the trident is a symbol for us that we have new tasks to fulfil since the empire has been welded together. Everywhere we have to protect German citizens, everywhere we have to maintain German honour; that trident must be in our fist."

These and other utterances of his clearly showed that William II. had been bitten by the new-born passion for sea-power, though in this respect he was but acting as the spokesman of the vast majority of his people. The voice of that people found vent in the creation of a Flottenverein, or Navy League, which now numbers almost a million subscribing members, and which has an annual income of about \$250,000 for the purpose of agitating in favour of an ever stronger navy. But even previous to the formation of that league the Reichstag, in response to the same popular voice, had willingly voted 40,000,000 dollars for the construction of a sixty-mile long and twenty-nine feet deep canal between Kiel Harbour and the mouth of the Elbe—a work which, begun in 1886 and inaugurated in 1895, practically doubled the value of the German fleet by enabling it to concentrate in either the North Sea or the Baltic without incurring the various risks of going round by Denmark.

A few years later it was decided to deepen and broaden this Kaiser Wilhelm Canal to admit of the passage of battle-ships of the Dreadnought type. Moreover, the Reichstag voted 7,500,000 dollars for the fortification of Heligoland, which England surrendered to Germany in 1890 in exchange for Zanzibar. Otherwise the Flottenverein—under the patronage of some of the highest personages in Germany, including the emperor's sailor-brother, Prince Henry—played a prominent part in preparing the public mind for successive demands of money to

increase the navy. The large naval programme of 1898, providing for seventeen new battleships, coincided with the Spanish-American War; while soon after the outbreak of the Boer War the Reichstag again voted, in 1900, something like \$500,000,000 for the carrying out of a naval programme extending over sixteen years; though on two subsequent occasions, 1906 and 1907, supplementary Bills in the direction always of bigger battleships were presented to Parliament.

There was the less opposition to the immense Government demands in 1900, as the German public had been highly irritated by the seizure of several of their mail steamers, and the unloading of them at Durban in search of contraband—an incident to which the emperor thus alluded in a telegram to the King of Württemberg: "I hope the events of the last few days will have convinced ever widening circles that not only Germany's interest, but also Germany's honour must be protected in distant seas, and that to this end Germany must be strong and powerful on the sea also." At the same time it was stated, *not* in the preamble, but in the memorandum of motives attached to the Bill of 1900, that "Germany must have a fleet so strong that even for the greatest naval Power a war with it would have such risks as to imperil its sea supremacy."

And then the fat was on the British fire. For these words were regarded as a clear warning, if not a threat, to England, and there were many who then prophesied that a war between the two countries was only a question of time. For over a quarter of a century—or from 1884-85, when Germany, in spite of much irritating obstruction from England, first started on her career as an oversea Power—the relations between the two peoples had been anything but cordial, and during the Boer War their estrangement reached a climax. But, truth to tell, there were faults and jealousies on both sides.

The German Empire was a political fact to which Englishmen were long in reconciling themselves, and there were but

The Kaiser's Passion for Sea Power

Germany's Great Building Programme

Britain's Relations with Germany

few who could lay their hands upon their hearts and call themselves its well-wishers. These feelings of coldness and suspicion were only intensified when Imperial Germany shot ahead and became her most formidable rival in the world of commerce. "That England," so Bismarck once said, "looks on in some surprise when

Germany's Progress on the Sea

we, her landlubberly cousins, suddenly take to the water too is not to be wondered at." But the Germans had not merely taken to the water. In the opinion of the Teutophobe alarmists, it was also their aim to wrest from England the trident of Neptune and destroy her tyrannical supremacy on the sea. As one writer said: "A mighty longing for larger sea power, a determination to brook no longer the overwhelming and resistless supremacy of England on the main, has seized upon the soul."

But while thus striving to make encroachments on the sea, the Germans at the same time had not been neglecting the air, and in the latter respect their most successful inventor, Count Zeppelin, was hailed by the emperor as "the foremost man of his century." For his conquest of South Africa, Lord Roberts received \$500,000 from a grateful country, and that is precisely the sum which was also voted to Count Zeppelin by the German people for his conquest of the air. The degrees of these two acts of victory were very different, but still the Germans were entitled to claim that they had advanced further on the path of air-conquest than any other nation. Heine had sneered at them as a nation of dreamers, whose thoughts were always in the air, but his words had now acquired a wonderfully new significance: The French and the Britons now lord it on land.

In the ocean the Britons are rooted; To the Germans remaineth the region of air, Where they domineer undisputed.

With Count Zeppelin's achievements the time, however, had now come when the most hot-headed and visionary among the Germans began to regard their partial conquest of the air as a long step in the direction of the possible conquest of Great Britain, which would thus no longer enjoy the advantages of being an island if the sky could be darkened with aerial navies.

But it is a far cry from Lake Constance to the cliffs of England; and, on the other hand, in a country like Germany,

there is not always perfect identity between popular aspirations and Government aims. The emperor himself disavowed all deliberate hostility to England; while his chancellor, Prince von Bülow, was still more emphatic. Replying to the charge of some Socialist speakers in the Reichstag, that the increase in the German navy was rightly regarded as directed against Great Britain, the chancellor said, December, 1905: "That we are pursuing no aggressive plans against Great Britain I have said a hundred times. I have said a hundred times that it is nonsense to father such schemes on us."

To a Press interviewer some little time after, the prince said: "I admit that we have made great strides in shipbuilding; for, like other nations, we require a fleet in proportion to the extent of our commercial interests all over the water. But, as a matter of fact, our navy is still very small in proportion to our oversea commerce—judging their relative dimensions by those of other nations. To argue, however, that Germany thinks of ever competing with England for the mastery of the sea is tantamount to accusing us of wishing to build a railway to the moon, including rolling-stock, sleeping-cars, etc. It is sheer nonsense, and I for one deplore that anybody should deem me capable of entertaining such a fantastic idea."

In the Reichstag also the chancellor said: "In our construction of a fleet we are not pursuing aggressive aims. We only desire to defend our own German coasts, and to uphold German interests abroad. It is, moreover, the wish of by far the greater portion of the German people that we should not be defenceless on the sea. . . . The saying, 'Our future lies on the water,' is not in any way pointed at other Powers. . . . We have not the slightest intention of driving another Power from the sea, but we have just as good a right to sail the seas of the world as other nations have. That right the Hansa had centuries ago, and that right the new German Empire also possesses."

Apart from all question of England and her sea supremacy, it must be owned that Germany had reasons enough for justifying herself in the eyes of other nations in the building of a navy commensurate with her population (63,000,000), the extent of her coast-line, the size and number of her colonies, the volume of her marine trade—

GERMANY IN OUR OWN TIME

which is far superior to that of France—and her dignity as the leading Power on the Continent. Where was the logic of England grudging to Germany, with marine interests greater than those of France, a navy at least equal to the French one? Surely every country may enjoy the right of determining the means and manner of its self-defence; but human nature is a strange thing, and often prompts to the remark: "Cet animal est très méchant; quand on l'attaque, il se défend."

Since the year 1848 Germany has seen her coast blockaded on three separate occasions, including the war of 1870, when she was practically powerless at sea. Again, in 1907, the value of her sea-borne trade was 1,860,000,000 dollars. Of this total, \$1,470,000,000 was carried by German merchant vessels of over

England the blue ribbon of the Atlantic, until this was recovered for her by a couple of colossal Cunarders. The value of German trade done with the British Empire alone was over \$545,000,000 annually. Besides, Germany was becoming more and more dependent on foreign supplies of food and raw material for the industrial portion of her



GERMAN WARSHIPS: THE KAISER KARL DER GROSSE

One of the greatest of Germany's ambitions is to possess a navy that shall be unrivalled by any other Continental Power, and under the present kaiser, William II., distinct advance has been made in this direction. The two warships illustrated above, which are shown sailing through the great waterway, the Kiel Canal, are typical examples of Germany's naval strength.

3,000,000 tons register, valued at over \$200,000,000, and manned by 60,000 seamen. Ten per cent. of the world's commerce and 79 per cent. of German sea-borne trade was carried in German bottoms, while the liners of the Hamburg and Bremen companies were the finest that crossed the sea, and had even taken from

THE WARSHIP FRAUENLOB

people, and in the event of those supplies being interrupted, she would be faced with a serious economic crisis. It would be difficult for her to withstand a Continental coalition unless she could count upon a free sea, and so for these, if for no other reasons, it was imperative for her to have a navy commensurate with her interests—a navy which nevertheless began to fill the minds of Englishmen with apprehension and alarm.

But the popular passion for sea power was still more deeply rooted. The desire for national unity had been followed by an equally strong craving for national expansion. For several years after the establishment of the empire, Bismarck and others worked hard at its internal consolidation—witness, among other things, the codification of all the conflicting laws of Germany, a gigantic work lasting nearly thirty years, to which only German heads were equal. And no

sooner had the imposing edifice of the Reich been fairly riveted within and without than the national energy began to seek an outlet in the creation of a Germany beyond the sea. For years Bismarck had been indifferent, and, indeed, positively averse, to colonial adventure; but at last he could no longer resist a popular

Colonies of the German Empire

impulse which was rapidly growing in strength. The result was that, within a year or two of this new departure, in 1884, Germany found herself included in the ranks of the colonial Powers, with territories in Africa, New Guinea, and the Pacific Archipelago aggregating an area five times the size of her empire in Europe, though nine-tenths of this area is in Africa.

To this, some years later, in 1897, Germany added a ninety-nine years' "lease" of a 200-square mile foothold at Kiaochau, on the coast of China, whither the kaiser's sailor brother, Prince Henry, was despatched as the menacing apostle of the "mailed fist," with this sentence from his Majesty ringing in his ears: "Imperial power means maritime power, and maritime power and Imperial power are mutually interdependent, so that one cannot exist without the other."

Germany may thus be said to have become an oversea Power without becoming a colonial one in the British sense. It was wittily and truly said that France had colonies but no colonists; Germany, colonists but no colonies; while England had both colonies and colonists. It was too late in the day, as indicated by the world's clock, when Germany entered the colonial field, for by this time all the available waste spaces of the earth had already been appropriated by other Powers, especially England. What she wanted was to found a new Germany, a new Fatherland across the sea for the accommodation of those vast numbers of her surplus sons who had hitherto migrated to America and other

Vain Search for a New Fatherland

Anglo-Saxon lands; but it soon became apparent that none of the African territories which had now fallen to her were at all suitable for this purpose.

They were all sub-tropical, and fitted only to be plantation, not agricultural, colonies. Very small was the total number of Germans who went to seek their fortunes in Germany's "colonies," and even of these a large proportion were govern-

ment officials employed to administer the protectorates without having first learned carefully the very necessary art of ruling native races. The brusque manners of Prussian policemen and the brutal methods of some German drill-sergeants were unsuited to the black tribes of the Kamerun and Damaraland. Rebellion was frequent, and even the German army, which boasted itself to be the best in Europe, was for several years powerless to put down a native rising in South-West Africa involving the loss of thousands of German lives and millions of dollars.

After this experience, shame and remorse overtook those Germans who had sneered at Britain's protracted struggle with the Boers. Attracting few or no colonists in the ordinary sense of the term, those German protectorates on the whole have never ceased to be a financial burden to the Imperial Government, and yet their existence and the necessity of defending them continued to be one of the chief arguments in the logic-armoury of the Chauvinists and the Pan-Germanists for the strengthening of the Imperial fleet.

Germany's Bid for First Place

These Pan-Germanists deserve more than a passing notice, seeing that, in a sense, they play that part in German political thought which the advocates of a united Germany did during the period between 1815 and 1870. Their organisation, the "All-Deutscher Verband," or Pan-German League, corresponds to, and is the complement of, the "Flottenverein." According to its statutes, it "has for object the revival of German nationalistic sentiment all over the earth, preservation of German thought, ideals, and customs in Europe, and across the ocean, and the welding into a compact whole of the Germans everywhere." The official anthem of these Pan-Germans is:

"Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles,
Ueber Alles in der Welt."

In charging down on the French at Waterloo, the Scots cried: "Scotland for ever!" In charging down on the whole world after Sedan, the Germans shouted: "Deutschland everywhere!" Prince Bülow once gave the toast: "The King first in Prussia; Prussia first in Germany; Germany first in the world!" And, saying so, he pretty well expressed the creed of the Pan-Germanists. The emperor, too, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Reich, delighted their hearts by declaring: "Out of the German Empire a world-

empire has arisen. Everywhere, in all parts of the earth, thousands of our countrymen reside. German riches, German knowledge, German activity, make their way across the ocean. The value of German possessions on the sea is some milliards of marks. Gentlemen, the serious duty devolves on you to help me to link this greater German Empire close to the home-country, by helping me, in complete unity, to fulfil my duty also towards the Germans in foreign parts."

But while thus voicing the splendid aims of the Pan-Germanists, the emperor and his Government have never recognised their activity to the same extent as in the case of the "Flottenverein," and for the reason that the propaganda of the "All-Deutscher Verband" is still beyond the pale of practical politics.

There are now over 80,000,000 of German-speaking men in the world, and of these only 61,000,000 live in Germany itself. The rest are divided between Austria-Hungary, 12,000,000; Switzerland, 2,320,000; Russia, Baltic Provinces, etc., 2,000,000; various other European countries, 1,130,000; United States and Canada, 5,000,000; South America, 600,000; Asia, Africa, Australia, 400,000.

Proposals of Teutonic Utopians

But how, then, do the Pan-Germanists propose to bring all these widely-scattered Teutons into a common fold? In what respect does Pan-Germanism differ from Zionism, which aims at the repatriation of the Jews, or, at least, at their collection from all the countries of Europe and agglomeration into a new Semitic nation with a Rothschild or a Hirsch for their ruler? Broadly speaking, the Teutonic Utopians proposed:—

First, an economic alliance with all countries in Europe inhabited by Germanic peoples, such as Austria, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg. This economical alliance to lead to political union for defensive and offensive purposes.

Secondly, the formation of a Central European Customs Union, aimed primarily against England and the United States, and secondarily against Russia.

Thirdly, the union of all the Germanic peoples—Low and High Germans—in one central Germanic Confederation. As part of this policy, Deutschthum across the seas was to be reclaimed. Out of transmarine Deutschthum a greater Germany was to arise. The only way in which the

Government had hitherto shown its practical sympathy with the aims of the Pan-Germanists was to pursue a root and branch policy of Germanisation within the empire itself—with the French of Alsace-Lorraine, the Danes of Schleswig, and, above all, with the Poles of Prussian Poland, where, by a merciless

Dangerous and Unpractical Dreamers

process of expropriation and other forms of compulsion, the Slavs were placed under the Teutonic steam-roller. Otherwise, the Government held aloof from the agitation of the Pan-Germanists as from the propaganda of unpractical and dangerous dreamers, though it has been said that what the professors think to-day will be espoused by the practical politicians of to-morrow.

At the same time, it is well to remember that both the "All-Deutscher Verband" and the "Flottenverein" are rooted in the undeniable fact that the limits of the present German Empire are too narrowly drawn for the size of its population as well as for its importance and its aspirations. In fact, both these propagandist leagues may be said to incorporate that restless spirit, that ever-growing passion for national expansion, that hungering after "fresh woods and pastures new," which can scarcely fail to bring the German people into fierce struggle-for-life competition, if not, perhaps, into actual conflict, with other nations.

Those nations have to reckon with the fact that Germany, which, up to 1884, merely was a Continental Power, has now become a Colonial one, and aims at also being a "Weltmacht," or World-Power, in the sense that Great Britain is such.

"Without the consent of Germany's ruler," said the kaiser proudly, "nothing must happen in any part of the world"—and thus he explained what is meant by saying that Germany has become a "Weltmacht"—a Power that must be

Germany as Britain's Rival at Sea

consulted before the other European Powers can come to any agreement with regard, say, to Morocco, China, or other oversea "spheres of interest." It was to lend emphasis to her voice in such consultations, and protect her dealings with the markets of the world, that Germany thought it necessary to create a navy commensurate with her interests as a "Weltmacht"—a navy which, though at first merely intended for

coast defence, gradually assumed a battleship build for offensive warfare if need be, and at last grew to such formidable proportions that the British Government of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, at the second Hague Conference in 1907, felt compelled to propose to Germany a mutual arrest of naval armaments and their restriction to the ratio of two to one. It is needless to say that this proposal was negatived by Germany on the ground of the inexorable "logic of facts." The truth is that Germany has become England's most formidable naval rival because she had in the meantime also become her most dangerous commercial rival. Her supremacy on the sea, which she had won at Trafalgar, was still undisputed; but, on the other hand, her monopoly of the markets of the world had begun to crumble soon after Sedan.

Having vanquished the French in the field of war, the victors of Sedan set themselves to outstrip the British at the arts of peace, and it was not long before the cry arose in that country that they were beginning to do so. Ten years after Sedan, Germany adopted a moderate protective tariff, and, whether as a consequence or not, in a few years the country became transformed. From being one of the poorest of Continental states, Germany became the richest, and, in some respects, richer even than England. Let us take a few facts and figures.

In 1882, two years after the adoption of protectionism, British shipping through the Suez Canal was over 4,000,000 tons; in 1906 it had risen to 8,500,000, or a trifle over 100 per cent. increase. In 1882 German shipping was 127,000 tons; in 1906, 2,250,000, an increase of about 1,700 per cent. In 1882 England owned 81 per cent. of all shipping passing through the Canal; in 1906 the percentage had sunk to 63. In 1882 Germany owned only 2½ per cent., but in 1906 this had risen to over 16 per cent.

Again, the Germans proudly point to the fact that one of their shipping lines—the "Hamburg-America"—became the greatest in the world, far surpassing the nearest of its British rivals in the extent of its operations and the number and tonnage of its ships. The capital of the company exceeds \$50,000,000, its employees exceed 18,000, and its ocean-going fleet numbers

over 200 vessels, with a tonnage of over 725,000. In addition, there is a swarm of river vessels and tugs, with a tonnage of nearly 150,000. The entire fleet is valued at \$35,000,000. Before the great European War there were fifty regular passenger and cargo liners, calling at over 300 harbours. In the United States alone the company employs 2,000 agents. Furthermore, ships of the Hamburg Line were trading in waters which until quite recently were regarded as British preserves—for example, in Indian, Chinese, and Australian seas, and even in the Persian Gulf.

According to a British consular report for 1906, the general economic improvement in Germany had continued steadily, and "attained a hitherto unprecedented height." In "most trades the only subject of complaint was the scarcity of workmen."

The excess of Germany's exports over her imports grew rapidly. Dividing the last twenty-five years into five-yearly periods, the average excess of exports over imports of manufactures, as shown in this return, is given for each period in the following table:

NET EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES FROM UNITED KINGDOM AND GERMANY.

	United Kingdom Million £	Germany Million £	Excess of U. K. over G. surplus Million £
1882-86	136.5	51.2	85.3
1887-91	138.4	57.3	81.1
1892-96	110.5	57.5	53.0
1897-01	110.5	77.6	33.9
1902-06	138.1	113.1	25.0

Thus it will be seen that the lead of \$426,500,000 previously enjoyed by the United Kingdom steadily dropped till it amounted to no more than \$125,000,000. But corrected estimates tend to show that, as an exporter of manufactured goods, Germany was within \$75,000,000 of the United Kingdom.

It is on the strength of these official figures that the Hohenzollern Empire has been pronounced by an expert writer—Mr. Ellis Barker, author of "Modern Germany"—to be "at present by far the wealthiest state in Europe. Germany and the individual states composing it have a very large national debt, but against that debt they possess very considerable assets. Of these the Prussian state railways alone, which earn a profit of from seven to

eight per cent., would suffice to pay off the whole of the indebtedness of the empire and of all the individual states." Another indication of national wealth and prosperity is the fact that between 1885 and 1905 the German state insurance societies paid to about 19,000,000 workers, male and female, about \$1,280,000,000 on account of illness, accident, infirmity, and old age.

In this connection be it remarked that no other country has attempted by legislation so much for the welfare of her working classes as Germany. Under the old emperor she took the lead in the attempt to solve modern social problems by means of state legislation, thus inaugurating a sort of state Socialism in some beneficiary fields; while William II. also hastened to make his mark as a saviour of society by summoning an international labour conference, and in Germany itself full effect was given to its recommendations by a measure for the amendment of the Industrial Code.

All this is true. Under Protection—in consequence of it, as some maintain; in spite of it, as others aver—Germany has grown to be the wealthiest country in Europe. In the opinion of many she is also the best governed country in Europe, in the sense that she enjoys a government best adapted to her special needs and circumstances; yet one is confronted by the puzzling facts that for every Socialist in England there are four in Germany, and that social democracy, the party of extreme discontent, is stronger in Germany than anywhere else in the world.

At the election to the first Reichstag in 1871 only three per cent. of the total votes had been given to the Socialists, and by 1881 this percentage had risen to 6.12 with a poll of 312,000. By 1890 the percentage had further bounded up to 19.74 with a poll of 1,427,300; while at the election of 1903 the percentage was 31.71, or well on to a third of the whole—the Socialists having secured 3,010,771 out of a total poll of 9,495,586—a percentage of 37.71. Numerically, they were thus by far the strongest of the eight or ten parties among which the 397 seats in the Reichstag are divided. Of these seats they only secured 82, but according to the law of strict proportional representation they ought to have had about 130. The development of social democracy belongs to the history of the empire

proper, but here at least it may be said that its members—formerly, in 1903, nearly a third of the whole electorate—are the men whom the emperor has repeatedly denounced as "a band of fellows not worthy to bear the name of Germans," and "enemies to the divine order of things; men without a Fatherland."

Socialists Routed at the Polls It was with the help of these "Vaterlandslose Gesellen" that the Clericals, in 1907, threw out a demand for \$2,000,000 for the perfection and development of South-West Africa, and on this issue the Government appealed to the German people, who were told that the new General Election was to decide whether Germany was to remain merely a Great Power in Europe, or whether she was also to become a World-Power. The reply of the people was decisive, and the Government got a working majority. The Socialists suffered a sort of *débâcle*. They returned to the Reichstag shorn of about half their strength—with 43 seats instead of 82, although, out of a total of 11,262,800 votes—the highest number ever yet given in the empire—they had polled 3,259,000, or only about 29 per cent., instead of their previous 32 per cent.

Nevertheless, the election was held to furnish clear evidence that the ambition to make Germany a "Weltmacht" and an oversea Power was no longer confined to the emperor, the "Flottenverein," and the Pan-German League, but that it had also permeated the great mass of the German people. It was held to show that the working population of Germany had deliberately and emphatically endorsed the economic policy which benefits the producer.

It was further held to prove that, however bad the general state of agriculture in Germany, it was at least decidedly better than in Free-Trade England. The German people had begun to grow tired of a party which was in the main one of mere opposition and negation—a party as innocuous as it was noisy. The Socialists now appeared in the light of those who, the more they get, the more they want. "What do they want?" inquired the Birmingham brassworkers, when they went over to inquire into the condition of the German workman. "They seem to have everything cheap, and we don't know what they are agitating for." It was seen that the poor in Germany

Stronghold of Social Democracy

The Greed of the Socialists

were not becoming poorer but richer. Socialism was being overcome by social prosperity. Its decrepitude was held to be due to the fact that Germans are guaranteed high wages by their tariff, that Germany is advancing with giant strides in wealth, comfort, and prosperity, while surrendering none of the noble ideas of

A Period of Intellectual Stagnation

duty, faith, and obedience upon which the old emperor and Bismarck built up the empire. In fact, the material prosperity of Germany—side by side with, and partly as a result of, her militarism, which supplied her trade, industry, commerce, and agriculture with labour at once disciplined and intelligent—had begun to assume such proportions as to throw all the other phases of the national life into the shade. Militarism and money-making and materialism have absorbed all the best energies of the nation, and left it thus comparatively poor and unproductive in the various intellectual walks of life.

An American writer of German origin, Wolf von Schierbrand, is pretty near the mark when he says: "There is an astonishing uniformity of mediocre ideas in modern Germany, with little of that daring flight of thought, that love of speculative philosophy, little of that poetical sentiment, which the world was wont to consider a special province of the German mind. There has been at work a process of mental levelling down. This prevailing sameness, this dearth of genius—although it cannot be denied that it is coupled with a great increase in hard common-sense and a practical turn of mind—can be traced all through German literature, art, and science of to-day. Since the close of the Franco-German War no really great poet, author, artist or scientist has arisen in Germany. Nearly all her great names antedate that war. This, I believe, is in part owing to the influence of military training on the

Politics Before Intellect

mind of the nation at the formative period of life." But, apart from this, the mind of the nation is absorbed in its material development, its expansion, and is far more concerned with the problems of politics than with those of intellect and art. It was the same with England during her Civil War and Commonwealth period, when her literature was only saved from being one exclusively of political pamphlets by a "Paradise Lost." But the

German of the empire has not yet produced even a Klopstock, not to speak of a Milton, and as for Goethes and Schillers they are sadly to seek.

In an up-to-date "History of German Literature," by Edward Engel, he pronounces this to be "the first literature in the world," a judgment which can only be described as springing from the madness of national self-conceit wilfully blind to the fact that a literature with a Shakespeare at its head can never be relegated to a second rank. And then, as regards France, Germany has supplanted her as the leading, because the most powerful, nation on the Continent. The centre of political gravity has now been shifted from the Seine to the Spree. But Berlin is still far behind Paris as a "ville lumière," a centre of intellectualism, literature, art, and all the social graces; and one capital can still securely smile at the clumsy efforts of the other to add to the oak-leaves of a frowning Mars the laurels of an effulgent Apollo. Imperial Germany has now become a "Weltmacht," but it has not yet produced a "Weltliteratur," or anything like it.

Germany in the Field of Literature

During the last thirty years the number of new books published in Germany has, in round numbers, increased from 10,000 to about 30,000 per annum, but very few of these were ever heard of outside the Fatherland. It is useless for the Germans themselves to contend that this is more owing to the ignorance and indifference of outsiders than to the comparative worthlessness of their books, because literature is a ware, like any other commodity, which will readily find its level and its market wherever there is a desire—and it is a universal one among civilised nations—to enjoy the newest masterpieces of the human mind. In the field of literature, Germany's imports far exceed her exports, and, indeed, the latter are almost nil.

As between England and Germany, the balance of literary trade is immensely in favour of the former, and the same may be said of France. Shakespeare alone is far more frequently staged in Germany than any other dramatist, native or foreign. Imperial Germany has certainly produced some talented playwrights, and men like Sudermann, Hauptmann, Blumenthal, Von Schönthan, Heyse, Hirschfeld, Lubliner, Halbe, and others; but most of them have sought their inspiration from the mysticism of Tolstoi, the pessimism of

Ibsen, the pruriency of Paris, or the rowdy-dowdy romanticism of which Herr von Wildenbruch, who may be described as the Bard of the House of Brandenburg, is the most stilted exponent. For the rest, the German drama of to-day tends to be heavy in ethical, political, and other aims, at the expense of pure art. At the same time it must be conceded that the theatre, which is a subsidised institution in all German states, has an educational value hitherto denied to the British people.

What has been said of the drama must also be applied to fiction in general, and also to poetry, of which the quality is almost in inverse ratio to the volume of its output. History has always been a congenial subject in Germany, but few of her historical writers have a style; and of them in general—though there are some exceptions—it may be remarked what Macaulay said of Niebuhr, that he was “a man who would have been the finest writer of his time if his talent for communicating truths had borne any proportion to his talent for investigating them.” In the field of

**Religion's
Place
in Germany**

Germany is far ahead of England with its criticism and its development of dogma in the light of science, while the religious life of the nation might be summed up by saying that in no country of Europe is there so much natural piety and belief in God, combined with so little church-going, as in Germany, especially among the educated classes. It is true that the kaiser himself sets an example of the straitest Lutheran faith; but then his Majesty has, on countless occasions, committed himself to the doctrine of divine right, of his being the German vice-regent of the Almighty, “our Ally at Rossbach,” and he has had to live up to it.

Asserting himself to be intimate with the counsels of the Almighty, the emperor claims to be no less acquainted with the canons of art, and hence it is interesting to learn from him, in his capacity as “Kunstherr,” as distinguished from “Kriegsherr,” that German sculpture is ahead of the rest of Europe. Perhaps the greatest museum of plastic art in Berlin is the open-air Siegesallée, in the Thiergarten, which is now lined on both sides with two and thirty marble statues of his Majesty's heroic Hohenzollern ancestors, as chiselled by the leading German sculptors under the general direction of their chief, Reinhold Begas. This imposing

display of historical statuary is known to the caustic Berliners as the “Sea of Marmora,” but is well worth seeing for all that. “This I can already tell you,” the kaiser said when feasting all these creative artists after the inauguration of their work, “the impression which the Avenue of Victory makes upon foreigners

is quite overpowering; on all sides a vast respect is manifested for German sculpture. . . .

The Kaiser as an Art Critic It shows that the Berlin school of sculptors can hardly have been excelled in the time of the Renaissance.” But if we take the emperor as our critical guide through the present realms of German pictorial art, the judgment is much less favourable.

The newest tendency is towards realism, as represented by the “Secessionists”—from routine and the old regime, from the old and accepted schools of painting in Germany. Drawing their inspiration from Arnold Boecklin, a Swiss by birth, these “Secessionists”—who point to Lenbach as an exponent of their principles in the domain of portraiture—have aimed at creating a new and distinctive school of German art, freed from the mannerism of the past—serious, sincere, truthful.

This they aim at, and yet to the kaiser they are an odious, degenerate race, whose productions merit only proscription at the hands of the Government. “If civilisation,” said the emperor, “is going to fulfil its entire mission, it must penetrate down to the lowest classes of the people. This it can only do when art bears a hand, when art elevates, instead of herself descending into the gutter.” As gutter-artists, the kaiser, in his capacity of “Kunstherr,” denounces the “Secessionists.” What his Majesty wants is not realism, but idealism—as well in art as in literature, and even the present tendency of the latter is in a direction fatal to reverence for traditional ideals, divine

Germany First in Science right claims, and all the rest of it. German literature is at present in a very troubled, transitional state, and therefore it bulks not largely before the eyes of Europe. But it is otherwise in the field of science, where Germany easily holds foremost rank. From their very nature and mental composition the Germans are far more fitted to shine as scientists than as litterateurs—their very language being against them in the latter respect—and

even their soldiering draws its strength and brilliancy from the fact that it is of the scientific kind. Scientific students from all countries, who used to crowd for illumination to France, now flock to Germany, where a world-wide reputation was won for her by sons like Helmholtz, Haeckel, Virchow, Buelow, Koch, Langenbeck, Tirkel, Czermak,

**The Germans
Not a Nation
of Thinkers**

Bergmann, Bunsen, and a host of others. In fact, it may be said that science and soldiering are the only two things that a Briton may study better in Germany than in his own country—those two subjects, and also music, in respect of which the Germans retain their proud pre-eminence both as creators and performers, though Imperial Germany has not yet produced another Wagner, whose genius was rooted in the period preceding the rise of the Reich.

As for the Press it may truly be described as poor and paltry by comparison with that of other nations—lacking in independence, influence, enlightenment, and political power. A daily newspaper is by no means so necessary to a German as it is to a Briton, a Frenchman, or an American.

In no country of Europe are there so few illiterates or so much book-learning as in Germany, and yet the average

**Germany's
Educational
Standard**

Englishman or American may be said to be a better educated man than the average German. On a peace footing Germany's standing army is about 600,000 men; while the standing army of German educationalists of all kinds numbers no less than 300,000. Germany has now twenty-two universities, which teach about 40,000 students, or more than three times the number of thirty years ago, so that she is now suffering from academic over-production—what the emperor deplored as an ever-increasing and useless "proletariat of passmen." And all their professors are so omniscient.

Gott weiss viel,
Doch mehr der Herr Professor;
Gott weiss Alles,
Doch er—Alles besser!

While it may be owned that Germany is the *most* educated nation in the world, it is, nevertheless, a long way from being the same as *best* educated. To cram the head does not carry with it that development of character which is perhaps the primary, and certainly the higher, aim of English education. It all lies in the

difference between *wissen* and *wollen*, between *kennen* and *können*. The general tendency of education, military training, etc., in Germany is to make machines of men, and the thinking power of machines is not high.

Germany is far ahead of England in technical education; and yet, says an expert: "It is not without cause that the

**Where Great
Britain Leads
Germany**

best engineers in the world are the practically trained English engineers, although their theoretical knowledge is small as compared with their inferior German competitor." According to the same authority "the chief practical value of the German schools consists, not in the knowledge disseminated, but in the discipline instilled. . . . It cannot be too often and too loudly asserted that Germany has become great and powerful—not through her education as synonymous with knowledge, but through her discipline. National co-operation, the co-ordination of all the national forces, which is developed to a greater extent in Germany than in any other country, has proved stronger than individualism, which squanders the national forces in constant internecine warfare."

War is anything but a civilising agency, and the Germans hitherto may be said to have always been at war. The Germans have generally had to submit to the devastation and depopulation of their own country. It was a frequent remark of Bismarck that Germany had not yet recovered from the effects of the Thirty Years' War, which is said to have reduced her population from 16,000,000 to less than 5,000,000. And then her other principal war waged within her own borders—the Seven Years' War—the wars with the French kings and Napoleon, and the campaigns with Denmark and Austria, only afford us matter for astonishment that the civilisation of Germany should be so high as it is. But her years' period of peace and material prosperity since her great struggle with France has already done wonders for her. The German race is still almost original in its vigour; the Germans declare that the race is unique and say that its good qualities—its bravery, piety, sincerity, intelligence, perseverance, energy, and idealism, only require the setting of a higher civilisation, resulting from circumstances of a kindlier and more emollient sort than ever

GERMANY IN OUR OWN TIME

blessed it before, to make it the leading nation on the Continent of Europe, and the one most devoted to the arts of peace.

So far, the highest expression of the German character, since the disappearance of Bismarck, is to be found in the man who had the tremendous courage to sign the warrant for his dismissal—William II., one of the most puzzling individuals in his country's history. No two students of his character agree in all points. He has great power of fascinating those with whom he comes in contact,

and of making them see only the side of his nature he desires. Naturally different men disagree concerning him. He claims to be a lover of peace, and yet speaks of the "mailed fist" and of the bloody deeds which Germany will do. He glories in being a soldier and yet dabbles in art, literature and music and claims to be an authority on all three. He is a realist and an idealist in turn; a realist in everyday affairs, but an idealist in art and religion.

CHARLES LOWE.



KLEBER SQUARE, STRASSBURG, WITH THE CATHEDRAL RISING IN THE BACKGROUND Fritb

LATER EVENTS IN GERMANY

THE expectation, so fully and freely expressed, that the decrease of the Socialist vote in 1907 was the beginning of a Socialist débâcle, to be followed by the disappearance of the followers of Marx from German politics was soon seen to be without any real foundation. In 1912 the General Election brought the Socialists

The Socialist Advance

back to the Reichstag in larger numbers than ever. In that year, for the first time, the Socialists, with 110 members, were the largest party in the Reichstag, and at by-elections in the years that followed, additional victories were won, not only in the Imperial Parliament, but in the Parliaments of Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, Saxony, and Wurtemberg. In fact, the Social Democratic Party, with its multitude of daily and weekly newspapers, throughout Germany, and its perfect organisation, continues to grow at the expense of the Radicals and Liberals, and its only serious rival in the State is the Catholic Centre Party, which returned 90 members to the Reichstag in 1912, as against 105 in 1907. The failure of Bismarck's policy of repression is seen in both these cases, for the "Iron" Chancellor did his best to crush the organisation of the Catholics as he exerted himself later to destroy the rising power of the Socialists. It yet remains to be seen, however, whether the Socialists could preserve their unity should the Reichstag become a governing body, for with the responsibility of legislative power has gone discussion and schism amongst the Socialists in most European countries of importance.

The large falling off in the membership of the established Lutheran churches in Germany has been a remarkable fact for many years. This decline has been most noted in Berlin and in the chief cities of the empire, and has occasioned much comment and discussion. Several reasons are alleged in explanation of the number of persons who each year decline any longer to register themselves as members of the Lutheran Church, and the main grounds seem to be: (1) to avoid payment of a tax required of all such members; (2) the spread of rationalism encouraged by the "higher criticism" of the German Protestant theologians. This decrease of membership in the State Church has not,

Lutheranism Losing Ground

however, affected the general adhesion to Protestantism. For out of a total population close upon 65,000,000 in 1910, Protestants claimed nearly 40,000,000, as against 35,600,000 in 1905, out of a total population of 60,000,000. The Roman Catholic Church in Germany in the same period enlarged its membership from 20,327,913 to 23,721,453.

The steady and continuous increase in the expenditure on armaments was emphasised by the Defence Bills of 1913. While the Navy Estimates for that year showed no startling advance, the Army Bills raised the peace strength from 544,211 to 661,176, and added 4,000 officers, 15,000 non-commissioned officers, and 117,000 men to the Imperial Army. The changes in organisation were to be completed in 1915, and involved the huge expenditure of between \$260,000,000 and \$265,000,000 non-recurring, and \$45,000,000 recurring. Altogether, the Budget for 1914 demanded \$300,000,000 for the Army. No less than 5,400,000 fully trained men are available for the field in 1915. An ugly feature of the expenditure on armaments in Germany was the charge made in the Reichstag in 1913, that Krupp's and other firms had their agents in Berlin whose business it was to bribe officials in the English Admiralty and the War Office in order to obtain secret documents, and thereby gain advantage in competition over rival firms by the anticipation of orders. The charge was met by the appointment of a committee of inquiry, and following the report of this committee, a number of officers were brought to trial and convicted. Amongst those thus convicted were the Secretary-Superintendent of the Ministry of War, and two directors of the firm of Krupp.

The advance in manufactures in Germany in recent years must not be overlooked. In 1905 the total value of exports was nearly 1,500 million dollars, and of exports to the United Kingdom 250 millions. In 1912 the exports were of the value of \$2,500,000,000 and the exports to the United Kingdom \$350,000,000. When the growth of population in those years is considered, it is also to be noted that the growth has been in the urban districts. The number of towns with more than 100,000 inhabitants went up from 41 to 48 between 1905 and 1910.

Expenditure on Armaments

EUROPEAN
POWERS
TO-DAY



V
HOLLAND
AND
BELGIUM

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM IN OUR OWN TIME

LIBERTY & PROSPERITY IN THE SMALL STATES

By Robert Machray, B.A.

A REVOLUTION in Brussels, not at first sight of a very formidable character, but symptomatic of a deep, widespread, pervasive feeling of dissatisfaction with existing conditions, brought about in 1830 a movement which, assuming a national aspect, resulted in the forcible dissolution of the union between Belgium and Holland. The Flemish people, who inhabited the North of Belgium, belonged to much the same branch of the great German family as the Dutch, and might be supposed to have greater sympathy with them than with the Walloons, who occupied the south of the country, and were of closer kin to the French than to the Teutons. But they were Roman Catholics, and the Dutch, for the most part, belonged to the Reformed Church—in itself a pronounced line of cleavage. Besides, the Dutch had not been politic; they had treated the Flemings with as little consideration as the Walloons. In fact, they had regarded all Belgium as inferior to Holland, and looked upon it as if it had been theirs by conquest.

If they had acted in a different spirit, Belgium and Holland might have been one country to-day. But the separation took place soon after the rising in Brussels, although the independence of Belgium was not acknowledged by Holland till nine years afterwards. Sometimes the union

of countries has proved a great benefit, as in the case of England and Scotland; at other times their divorce has been followed by real good to both, and this is what has happened with respect to Holland and Belgium. They are small states, yet they can show, area and population considered, a prosperity, a condition of general well-being, which can hardly be matched

in the history of the world. It is extremely doubtful if this could have been said if they had remained united. The religious antagonism would alone, in all probability, have prevented it. Holland is a country with a history of which any nation might well be proud.

Holland's Brave Struggle for Independence

It is a little country, yet a great one. As is often pointed out for the example of mankind, the Dutch have fought through several centuries a finer struggle for civil liberty and national independence than has been made by any other people.

The story of their long struggle against the might of Spain is so full of a stormy grandeur, an invincible heroism, a prodigal heaping-up of the elements which are best and noblest in human character, that the mere memory of them moves the heart and fills the soul with passionate emotion. The expression, the "soul of a people," is often used, though, perhaps, not always quite accurately; but if there is a people of whom it may be said truly, it is of this people of Holland. And as the soul of Holland was in days bygone, so it is to-day—hard and proud, money-loving and money-getting, no doubt at all, but above and beyond everything instinct with the spirit of patriotism, for which no sacrifice can be too great.

The supreme desire of the Dutch is to preserve their independence, to have their Holland their very own. It is this ideal which dominates their national life, and equally inspires the two parties, Liberals and Anti-Liberals or Anti-Revolutionists, which divide its political life. They have good reason for cherishing this ideal, and never more so than at the present time. For, from the international point of view,

the position of Holland was not a happy one. There was the interesting question of the succession to the throne—interesting rather than difficult, for even if Queen Wilhelmina had had no child a successor to the throne could have been found in a prince, with the blood of the glorious House of Orange in his veins, who might be in sympathy with Dutch aspirations. The danger to the independence of Holland goes much deeper than this.

The most marked feature of the history of these first years of the century was the growing antagonism between Britain and Germany. However much or little the fact may be realised, the fact remained, deplorable, menacing, incalculable as to result upon the world. The hope of all men of good will was that a struggle might be averted. No one can regard the question without the deepest anxiety; but the Dutch have special reason for fearing its results; for Holland stands between England and Germany. But it is not Britain that Holland has any need to fear. The irritation produced in Great Britain by the expression of the pro-Boer sympathies of the Dutch during the South African War has passed away, most fair-minded Britons feeling that the Dutch could hardly have acted otherwise than they did in supporting to some extent their kin. Britain has no wish that Holland should be other than independent for ever.

But the same cannot be said with equal truth of Germany. Holland holds the mouth of the Rhine, the greatest German river—"the Rhine, the Rhine, the *German Rhine*," as the song puts it. There has long been a school of German political thought which maintains that the possession of the whole river, particularly of its outlets, is necessary to Germany, and never ceases to urge that, seeing also that the Dutch are of Germanic stock, Holland should be occupied by Germany. Holland, too,

holds the great ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, arguments that further reinforce the German claim. With this extended sea front, what might not Germany become! Does not "manifest destiny" point this way? The bulk of Germans, it should be said, listen to these flattering voices as if they heard them not, but the Dutch are hearing them always, and are haunted by them. If they have no serious fears, for the time being, of an

unprovoked armed annexation of their country by Germany, they dread the employment of subtler methods, commercial and diplomatic, which would bring about its gradual Germanisation. And again, at a crisis in European history, when the sacredness of treaties has been shown to be a fiction, and a war has broken out between Britain and Germany, what guarantee has Holland that her territory might not suddenly be seized by Germany as a base for operations against Britain? It is questions like this, arising out of the present international situation, that disturb Holland and cause great searchings of heart.

The Dutch were never more determined than at the present time to preserve their identity as a people, and apart from the menace which hangs over them they go about their business at home and abroad in their quiet, easy, immemorial way. They remain, as they have been for many generations, great men of business; their wealth and commerce now grow from year to year; they have got their vast colonial empire well in hand, but their money flows into many lands—it was the capital they supplied that in large measure built the railways of the United States. Amsterdam is one of the banking centres of the world, besides being its diamond mart. The country, with its 2,000 miles of canals and 1,800 miles of railways, presents a pleasing spectacle of well-ordered life, with features of its own which differentiate it from that of every other land.

There is a spirit of peace, of rest, of quiet about it, especially in the interior, that is looked for in vain elsewhere. The old order changes in Holland as in other countries, but with a measured tranquillity all its own. Its windmills, its level, highly cultivated fields, its dreamy homesteads, the picturesque dress of its slow-moving, much-smoking peasants still endure—the delight of the contemplative and such as love not the fret and fuss and hurry of these times of ours, and the joy of the artist. In its great cities, such as The Hague, Amsterdam, and Rotterdam, the old-world atmosphere is scarce to be found save in some old houses and in the churches; in them the modern spirit prevails, as might be expected. Yet, speaking generally, the peace of the land is so great that nothing could have been more appropriate than the building of the world's Palace of Peace, where arbitration takes

**Danger to
Holland's
Independence**

**Holland
the
Peaceful**

**Holland
in Fear of
Germany**



THE TOWN OF UTRECHT SHOWING THE OLD CANAL



VIEW IN LEYDEN, WHICH STANDS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE OLD RHINE



ROTTERDAM, THE CHIEF SEAPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS

SCENES IN THE TOWNS OF THE NETHERLANDS

the place of war, in the midst of this people. Holland is a land of liberty. Though predominantly a Protestant country, any Dutchman is free to worship God according to his conscience. Commercially, Holland believes in Free Trade, and has fattened upon it. Nothing, perhaps, gives better evidence of its prosperity than the fact that it has doubled its population since the middle of last century. Its population is now considerably over six millions, in 1849 it was about three. Another notable fact which witnesses to the same thing is that there is no poor rate in Holland. Of course there are poor people, but they are cared for, as a rule, by religious societies and private charities.

Its political system is simple. At the head of the State is the sovereign; then there are two Chambers for legislation. The monarchy is constitutional and hereditary; the Parliament, known as the States-General, consists of a First Chamber of fifty members elected for nine years—one-third retire every three years—by the provinces; and of a Second Chamber of 100 members, elected for four years by all male citizens of twenty-five and upwards who pay a direct tax to the State, or are householders, or own boats of twenty-four tons, or have a salary of about \$115 yearly, or show evidence that they can support their families. This means that about one-third of the male citizens have votes.

For many years Dutch politics were largely influenced by questions arising out of their colonial empire, but this phase has passed away. Recently the most important measure passed into law is the Electoral Reform Law of 1896, which regulates the franchise as mentioned above. The Dutch attach great importance to education, which is compulsory for children from six to thirteen years of age. Their schools and universities are well organised; their primary schools are practically free. The Dutch are fine linguists, perhaps because their own language can take them but a little way in Europe or elsewhere.

Holland's Up-to-date Education is quite a common thing for Dutchmen of any position at all to speak fluently and correctly French, German, and English.

Belgium thought it enjoyed great advantage over its northern neighbour, for its neutrality was guaranteed by the Treaty of London, November 15th, 1831, by Austria, Russia, Great Britain, and Prussia.

No country has made greater strides during recent years than Belgium in wealth and industrial development, thanks to its natural resources, but thanks also to the fact of its neutrality being guaranteed—a fact of which the Belgians sometimes are inclined to lose sight. During the Franco-German War, Britain prevailed upon both combatants to affirm afresh the neutrality of this little country, which otherwise might have been affected very adversely.

Under the ægis of the protecting Powers, Belgium had full opportunity for self-development, and it must be admitted that it took every advantage of it. No one could visit Belgium without being struck by its prosperity, whether as regards the purely agricultural section, with its vast number of small holdings all in the highest state of cultivation, or as regards the manufacturing part, the centre of which lies about Liège, with its huge ironworks and other highly successful industries. And it must not be forgotten that infected as Belgium is with the modern spirit, it is a country with a rich historic past still living and actual in

Franchise Liberties in Belgium such cities as Ghent and Bruges, and that, in the Ardennes, it can show scenes of loveliness and rare charm that appeal to all. Its magnificent cathedrals, with their splendid pictures, will always exercise some influence on Belgian life and character, though not, perhaps, in the exact direction its "Clericals" would prefer.

Belgium came into existence, as has already been stated, on its secession from Holland. By its constitution, framed in 1831, it is a constitutional, representative, and hereditary monarchy, legislative power being vested in the sovereign and two Houses of Parliament, the upper being known as the Senate, the lower as the Chamber of Deputies or Representatives. Several changes have been made in the constitution with respect to the franchise, the last being introduced by the law of December 29th, 1899. By this law the principle of manhood suffrage has been established, qualified, however, by the *suffrage universel pluriel*, and the proportional representation of minorities founded upon a somewhat complex system.

All citizens over twenty-five who have lived for one year in any given commune have one vote. But this is not all. They have an additional vote if, first, they are thirty-five years of age, married, with

legitimate offspring, and pay a tax of five francs (\$1) to the State; or, second, are twenty-five years of age and own immovable property to the value of \$400, or have a corresponding income, or for two years have received \$20 a year from Belgian State funds or from the national savings bank. But the Belgian can have yet another vote if, being twenty-five years old, he possesses a diploma of higher education, or has filled some public or even private position which implies this higher education.

No Belgian can have more than three votes. Both Houses of Parliament are chosen by this electorate. Senators are elected for eight years, most of them being elected by the general body of voters, and the rest by the provincial councils. The Deputies are elected for four years, in the proportion of one member to every 40,000 of the population, and number 116, one-half of whom retire every two years. The members of Parliament are paid indemnities, and get free passes over the railways.

Though Belgium has of recent years become an intensely democratic country, it is still, as will have been seen, a long way from the "one man, one vote" principle. Its present franchise is the result of a long and sometimes embittered struggle which, apart from the Congo, practically includes the whole political history of the country. For a lengthy period after the foundation of the kingdom under Leopold I., power was held alternately by the Clericals, or Catholics, and the Liberals, or Anti-Catholics; it was much the same during the first twenty years of the late king, Leopold II. But 1886 saw the rise of a new party, that of the Socialists, and it is this party which has made Belgium democratic; though it did not become formidable much before 1893, it has since become a great power in the land. The state of parties may be best shown by quoting the election returns for 1912, when the Chamber was increased from 166 to 186 members. The Socialists won three seats and numbered 38, the Liberals lost two seats and numbered 43, while the Clericals came back with 101 instead of 87 seats. One Christian Democrat was returned as before. In the elections to the Upper House, in 1908, the Liberals lost five seats, of which the Socialists gained three, leaving the Catholics with 63 votes against the 47 of the combined opposition, or "Left." In 1895 the Catholics had two-thirds of the

votes in the Chamber. It is thus apparent that the "Right," or Catholics, are steadily losing ground; they draw their strength mainly from the Flemish provinces, while the parties forming the "Left" derive theirs from the Walloon provinces. The Catholics support religious education in the schools and universities, and the Church, paid by the State, is yet outside its control. The Liberals belong to the middle class and the industrial portion of the community, and are, as it were, between two stools. The Socialists preach and uphold the doctrine of collectivism, and are strongest among the working classes. All parties of the Left unite against the Clerical control of education. But the battle wages most fiercely, as for many years past, round the franchise. In 1904 M. Feron, the leader of the Left, moved the abolition of "plural" voting in favour of universal suffrage, but was defeated. In 1906 all sections of the Left combined on a common programme, the two chief "planks" in it being reform of the franchise and compulsory education free from Church control. And the end is not yet.

Perhaps it should be said that almost the entire population of Belgium belongs to the Roman Catholic faith, but full religious liberty prevails, all denominations receiving grants from the national funds. The two racial divisions, Flemish and Walloon, continue to be marked by a difference of language. Nearly 3,000,000 in the north, the country of Flanders, speak Flemish only; while rather more than 2,500,000 in the south, the Walloon area, speak French only. About 1,000,000 Belgians speak both languages.

But it is the South chiefly that is industrial, that has the greatest wealth, that has made, and is making, Belgium what it is, and in the end it can hardly fail to establish its influence as supreme over the national life. In Southern Belgium the standard of education is, on the whole, higher than in the North, as might be expected from the pressure of industrial competition. The higher branches of education are well provided for throughout the country; it is with respect to the primary schools that the trouble comes. Primary school education is compulsory in a way, but it is too much in the hands of the priests, who, naturally, are more or less reactionary.

Belgium a Stronghold of Socialism

Clerical Control of Education

Belgium A Catholic Country

But the chief fact in the contemporary history of Belgium is its wonderful industrial development; this has been helped by technical education, which is in an advanced state.

Belgium has now taken upon itself the responsibilities of a great colonial empire. In 1908 the Congo Free State ceased to be independent, the sovereignty over it being transferred from the King of the Belgians to the country. The area of the Congo is estimated at 802,000 square miles, and its population at from 14,000,000 to

30,000,000. The Congo State was constituted a sovereign country under Leopold II. in 1885 by the Berlin Conference. It was declared neutral, with free trade, and the natives were protected under special rules—rules which, there is only too much reason to believe, were not observed in actual practice.

As the Congo has been thrown open to all the world, there is little ground now to suppose that there will be a continuance of the atrocities perpetrated on the natives which shocked the conscience of mankind.

THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBURG

THE great world nowadays knows very little about this small country, but rather more than forty years ago its name was on the lips of everyone; for after the war between Prussia and Austria in 1866—

which resulted in the decisive defeat of the latter and a fresh grouping together of the German states—Napoleon III. sought "compensation" to France for the increased power of the former by attempting to buy the Grand Duchy from the King of Holland, who also was Grand Duke of Luxemburg. Prussia, however, stoutly resisted this scheme, and for a time the "Luxemburg Question," as it was called, filled the mind of diplomatic Europe with apprehensions of war. But the matter was finally settled by a conference of the Powers held in London in 1867, when it was agreed that the garrison Prussia had for many years maintained in the city of Luxemburg should be permanently withdrawn from its fortress, that the fortress itself should be dismantled and destroyed, and that the Grand Duchy should henceforth become in every sense an independent and sovereign State, with its neutrality guaranteed.

Another consequence, though not immediate, of this war was that a prince of the illustrious House of Orange-Nassau, from whom Prussia had taken the Duchy of Nassau, became Grand Duke of Luxemburg. His son, William, was the reigning sovereign from 1905 till his death in February, 1912. A nice point arose as to the succession to the throne, for the Grand Duke's children were all daughters, and, according to the Salic Law, the Grand Duchy should pass away from his family at his death. It was by this law that Luxemburg had ceased to belong to the

sovereigns of Holland, the older branch of the House of Orange, when Queen Wilhelmina succeeded William III. Like the Dutch, the "Luxemburgeois" have the fear of Germany before their eyes; they have no desire to lose their national identity in the German Empire, though they are willingly included in the German Zollverein for commercial purposes. Therefore, in July, 1907, their Parliament, or Chamber of Deputies, became a law unto themselves by solemnly declaring that the succession should devolve on the reigning Grand Duke's daughters and their descendants in order of birth, the Salic Law notwithstanding. This repeal of the Salic Law enabled the Grand Duchess Marie Adelaide to ascend the throne on the death of her father, Grand Duke William.

It is a very tiny state, this Grand Duchy, its area being just a trifle under 1,000 square miles, and its population in the year 1910 was 259,889. It is well governed by its Chamber which consists of fifty-three members, half of whom are elected every three years; it has no army to speak of, and its debt, mostly incurred in railway building, is a mere bagatelle. It is a prosperous little country, its mining and smelting industries bringing in much grist to the national mill; it is a happy little country, for its inhabitants, now that the German spectre is laid, are well content

with their lot; it is a beautiful little country, especially the northern half of it, which forms the south-east portion of that lovely land known as the Ardennes. There is no more interesting or romantic city than the capital, also called Luxemburg, which is remarkable alike for its natural beauty and strategic importance.

ROBERT MACHRAY

LATER EVENTS IN HOLLAND AND BELGIUM

HOLLAND

FEW things have happened in the Netherlands since 1909 to distract the inhabitants from their peaceful industry. An heir to the throne—Princess Juliana—was born on April 30th, 1909, to the common satisfaction of the nation; since the absence of any legal heir to the crown was regarded as a danger to the country. The general election of 1913 was of considerable interest, because of the Tariff Reform proposals on the part of the Conservatives. The result of the election showed a quite definite opinion in favour of retaining Free Trade, the Conservative Ministry was defeated, and the new Second Chamber consisted of 37 Liberals, 18 Socialists, and 45 Conservatives. Dr. Bos, the leader of the Liberals, was at once invited by the Queen to form a Ministry, and he offered three portfolios to the Socialists. But the latter, after consideration, refused to accept any posts in a Liberal Ministry, on the ground commonly taken by the Socialists throughout Europe, viz., that Social Democracy cannot be identified with any government alien or opposed to collectivism, and must wait till itself becomes a government. Dr. Bos, therefore, being unable to count on the support of the Socialists, felt constrained to give up the idea of forming a ministry, and M. Cort van der Linden became Prime Minister with a Cabinet of Civil Servants.

BELGIUM

KING ALBERT succeeded to the crown of Belgium on the death of his uncle, Leopold II., December 17th, 1909.

Politically the campaign for universal suffrage—or, rather, for an amendment of

the existing franchise laws so that the votes of all classes should be equal, and the additional academic and property franchises abolished—has been the chief interest since 1906; and 1914 saw the Conservatives still in power and the existing law unaltered. A general strike, for no industrial end but solely for the political purpose of obtaining universal suffrage on equal terms, was organised in 1913; but it failed to accomplish its object, chiefly because the Catholic trade unionists declined to take part. The Government, however, so far recognised the significance of the strike by appointing a general commission to consider the whole question of electoral reform.



ALBERT I., KING OF THE BELGIANS

The reorganisation of the army on the basis of universal compulsory service, commenced in 1909, and was carried a step further by the law of June, 1913. This law put the peace footing at 57,886 men, and the war footing at 340,000. Compulsory training was fixed at fifteen months or two years, according to the branch of the service, with two later periods of training, each one month, and five years in the reserve. The total expenditure on the Army for 1913-14, was estimated at \$14,000,000. In 1909-

10 it stood at \$13,500,000. But it yet remains to be seen whether this increase of expenditure will suffice to meet the demands that follow universal military training.

The prosperity of Belgium up to the beginning of the great war, ascribed to the industry of its people and the high standard of technical education, is evidenced not only by the population—seven and a half millions on 11,373 square miles—but by the trade returns. In 1907 the imports were valued at \$755,000,000, the exports at \$570,000,000. In 1912 the imports were \$950,000,000, and the exports, \$800,000,000.



GENERAL VIEW FROM MONT BLANC BRIDGE, SHOWING ROUSSEAU'S ISLAND



THE HANDSOME PLACE NEUVE, WITH EQUESTRIAN STATUE OF GENERAL DUFOUR



ANOTHER VIEW, SHOWING THE MONT BLANC RANGE IN THE DISTANCE

SCENES IN THE FAMOUS SWISS TOWN OF GENEVA

EUROPEAN
POWERS
TO-DAY



VI
SWITZERLAND

SWITZERLAND IN OUR OWN TIME

THE FREEST COMMUNITY IN THE WORLD

By Robert Machray, B.A.

THE general impression of Switzerland is coloured far too much by the notion that it is an ideal country in which to spend a most delightful holiday, be it for a long or short period, whether the season be summer or winter. Switzerland undoubtedly stands for all this, but there is a tendency to forget or lose sight of the fact that it stands for much more. This outside point of view, largely based in England on such beguiling announcements as "A Week in Lovely Lucerne for Five Guineas, or a Fortnight for Nine," is scarcely, if at all, modified when the tourist finds himself actually on the lake and sees its beautiful mountains around him or mirrored in its blue waters. Satisfied with his excursion and his experiences, he returns home, nor stops to think of, far less ponder, the story that lies behind all this enchantment.

He has heard of Tell and the tyrant Gessler, and the apple placed on the boy's head and pierced by the shaft from the father's bow; he has heard, probably, of one or two incidents in Swiss history of a romantic sort; but he catches scarce a glimpse of the truth that the smoothly gliding life of this land, no matter what aspect of it be considered—social, educational, political, religious, racial or commercial—is the result of some seven centuries of conflict and change. Indeed, it is a life so well ordered, so sweet in the working of all parts of the machinery that goes to complete it, so easy in its touch—the expression "pressure" in this case is quite inapplicable—on the individual, whether citizen of the republic or stranger within its gates, that our tourist is as serenely unconscious of it as he is of the "gentle influence" of a star.

**What the
Tourist does
not Learn**

The fault is not to be charged altogether to the tourist; it must be laid, in large measure, at the door of the Swiss

themselves, though from their point of view it is no fault at all, but rather their way of playing the game. They do everything they can to encourage the belief that their land is veritably the Playground of Europe, and so great is their success in this effort that vast numbers look on Switzerland as the land of the charming tour, of the delightful holiday, rather than as the country of the Swiss, one of the most interesting peoples in the world, with a civilisation more highly developed, from the political standpoint, than that of any other nation on the planet. With the Swiss, business is business, and business with them takes on the form of the admirable exploitation of that marvellous beauty with which Nature has so richly and abundantly endowed their land. So they give the casual observer the impression that they are a nation of innkeepers and waiters who understand the art of "running" hotels in the most perfect manner possible, and that their sole aim in life is to act as showmen to the wondrous natural attractions of their country.

In one of the most amusing books of pure humour ever written, "Tartarin sur les Alpes," Alphonse Daudet makes his hero, the inimitable Tartarin of Tarascon, come to the conclusion that the whole of Switzerland is the concession, so to speak, of a gigantic and enormously clever and capable catering company who, commercially, take the utmost advantage of everything at their disposal—the rosy peaks of the great mountains, the white calm of the glaciers, the green slopes of the upland pastures, the deep blue of lakes, the rolling masses of cloud, the grandeurs of sunrise and sunset, the pretty châteaux and picturesque peasants—all "worked" to perfection, apparently for the benefit of the sightseer, but in reality in the interests of the concessionaires, who

have skilfully brought to their aid the services of railways, steamers, guides—and the best hotels in existence, take them all in all. This conceit is certainly a pardonable one, for the exploitation of Switzerland by the Swiss is very well done indeed. Before passing from this phase of the Switzerland of our own time, a few facts

respecting the hotel "industry" may be quoted. In 1880 Switzerland possessed, in round figures, 1,000 inns with some 58,000 beds; in 1890, about 1,500 inns with 70,000 beds; in 1900, nearly 2,000 inns, with 105,000 beds, representing a capital of about 600,000,000 francs, or \$120,000,000.

It must be remembered in this connection that the total area of the country is less than 16,000 square miles, of which almost a third is unproductive. The profits of successful hotel-keeping are notoriously large, and the stream of gold that pours into Switzerland annually, and all the year round—for somewhere in Switzerland it is always the "season"—cannot easily be measured, but it must be very great; though, of course, it varies from year to year owing to circumstances. For instance, the attractions offered by the Franco-British Exhibition held in London in 1908 sensibly reduced the volume of tourists into the country, as they did everywhere outside of England.

The Swiss are highly intelligent, particularly as to getting the most money out of anything; they have a keen eye to the main chance. This is especially true of their hotel-keeping. As an example of this, there may be noticed what has taken place with regard to their winter resorts, such as Davos, and other places of the same kind. Originally they were introduced to the world as specially suitable spots for the residence of consumptives, and great numbers of those suffering from lung affections did live in them with beneficial

results. But such places are no longer the exclusive abodes of such people. On the contrary, many hotels now announce that they will not admit consumptives. So soon as the Swiss grasped the fact that Davos, and resorts like it, could be made extraordinarily attractive as a field for winter sports, such as skating, tobogganing, skiing, and so on, to the strong and the hale, they turned their attention

forthwith to the strong and the hale. So the consumptive client takes a lower place. This is not altruism; but it is business—as an American might say. However, this is not to say that there is no place remaining for the consumptive, for there are admirable sanatoria at his command. Outside of them he is not "wanted" as he used to be.

Having said so much on this aspect of the Swiss, it is time to consider another, which has already been suggested. This little nation, with a population in 1911 of 3,788,900, drawn from three races—German, French and Italian—with different languages and religions, has developed the most perfect example of a pure democracy in being to be found on the globe. This is what the ordinary tourist does not know, for it does not press itself upon him. Never was or is there a land in which government was and is so little obvious. There is hardly even a policeman to be seen, nor are there any decorations worn by the citizens—a small point, but on the Continent significant of much. In this typically democratic state there are no classes, no caste, no nobility, no exclusive privileges. Even the president of this republic is not the head of the State in the same sense as is the President of the United States or of France; he is hardly more than *primus inter pares*, and his headship, such as it is, endures for a year only.

As has been well pointed out, the dread of the supremacy of any single man is one of the governing factors in the Swiss character. This is a country in which every man has as good a chance as another, though, to be sure, natural ability tells here as everywhere. All this has only come about gradually, and after long struggles, both external and internal. But it remains nothing less than the most extraordinary thing in the political history of mankind that this small state, with its mixture of rival races and religions, perched upon the mountains of Central Europe, hemmed in on all sides by great nations, should have become both in ideals and in fact the freest community in the world. Something of this it owes to the neutrality of the country, as indispensable to the general interest of Europe, having been guaranteed by the Treaty of Vienna, 1815, something, also, to the high state of education everywhere

prevalent, even elementary education being excellent. But the explanation, in the main, lies in the history and the character of the Swiss people, history and character acting and reacting on each other, as always. Though the story of Tell and the apple be a myth, like other stories of a similar kind resolved into fictions in the crucibles of scientific research, it has a heart of truth which survives all destructive scientific processes. It stands for the Swiss character; it expresses the soul of this people better than anything else. When the Forest Cantons came together against the Hapsburgs and the might of Austria, their struggle was for freedom—the right to live out their lives in their own way. Battle after battle did they fight, and battle after battle did they win, consolidating all the while their national character, which was based on patriotism, and fusing themselves incidentally more and more into one people.

They were, and long were, great soldiers, and not in Switzerland only; as has been finely said, they were willing to sell their swords, but never their freedom. The Helvetic Republic of 1798

grew out of the old defensive league of the cantons, as oak from acorn. Present-day Switzerland, however, begins in that year of European unrest, 1848; but this beginning included all that had gone before in Swiss history. In that year the Swiss Confederation, then consisting of nineteen entire and six half cantons, was united for federal purposes under a constitution. A revised constitution came into force in 1874, and continues, with little change, in force at the present time. In 1900, when the principle in elections known as "proportional representation" was before the country, the nation decided against it.

Since the close of the Napoleonic epoch the struggles of Switzerland have been entirely internal. There was, at the close of the first half of last century, what may be called the War of Religion, in which the Protestants triumphed over the Catholics, and caused the dissolution of the Catholic league known as the Sonderbund; and, forty years later, there was a fight between the rival Churches in the Italian canton of Ticino—Tessin. But these are merely noted in this article to bring out the point that to-day Protestant and Catholic live at peace—there being

complete religious liberty—on the patriotic basis that Switzerland is greater and dearer than any Church. Apart from the religious conflict, and more important as determining the life to-day of the country, is the political struggle. The chief parties in the State are: the "Right," or Conservatives, whether Protestant or Catholic; the "Centre," or Liberals; the "Left," or Radicals; the "Extreme Left," or Socialists—divisions of political belief and opinion which now obtain more or less in all modern communities. In one aspect the great question before the Swiss for the last sixty years has been whether Switzerland is to be one federal state or a confederation of states—cantons—each of them a sovereign state; the same question, in fact, which the Civil War settled in the United States.

From 1848 to 1872, the main political preoccupation of the Swiss was the establishment of a federal state which yet left a large amount of self-government to the cantons, a problem which was satisfactorily solved. The Federal State is supreme in matters of peace and war, in the making of treaties, in army affairs, posts and telegraphs, money issues, weights and measures, revenue, public works, patents, and other matters that affect the country as a whole; no canton can break away from the rest, but still each canton retains the power of making its own laws, apart from such subjects as appertain to the domain of the Federal government. From 1872 to the present time, the dominant note in Swiss politics is the direct rule of the people as distinguished from government by elected representatives, and as expressed by what are styled the "Referendum" and the "Initiative."

Under the Constitution of 1874, supreme legislative authority in the confederation is vested in two Chambers: a State Council of 44 members elected by the cantons—two for each canton and one for each of the half cantons, irrespective of their size or population; and a National Council of 167 deputies or delegates chosen by the whole Swiss people by manhood suffrage, one representative for every 20,000 of the population; these deputies are elected for three years. The two Chambers united form the Federal Assembly, which elects a Federal Council of seven members, who are not members of either Chamber, to

The Great Problem of the Swiss

Switzerland's War of Religion

How the People are Governed

whom is deputed the chief executive authority. The President and Vice-President are selected from the Federal Council, which sits at Berne, the headquarters of the administration, and, by the way, the financial centre of the country. The Radicals have long controlled the government. At the elections to the

**Safeguards
to National
Liberty**

National Council in October, 1908, they were returned by a large majority, but their power has been tempered by the voice of the people as given through the media of the Referendum and the Initiative.

One of the astonishing things about Switzerland is that, though the Radicals are always in the majority at the elections, yet the people have often rejected Radical measures, thus showing a certain innate and invincible conservatism. As a matter of fact, the Conservatives, though in a minority, constitute a very large proportion of the population. By the Referendum any law passed by the legislature must be referred to the direct vote of the nation if a petition to that effect is presented by 30,000 citizens, or by eight of the cantons, and the law must be altered, or even abolished, according to the result of the plebiscite. The liberty of the people is still further safeguarded, and the power of the legislature curtailed, by the Initiative, which signifies the right of any 50,000 citizens to demand a direct popular vote on any constitutional question. Taken together, the Referendum and the Initiative are the last and highest expression of the democratic spirit, and furnish an example to the rest of the world.

It must be admitted that these two political principles, or devices, if the phrase is preferred, have acted very well; but it is manifest enough that they could not be safely employed in a country where the mass of the people were not so highly educated and intelligent as are the Swiss.

For instance, they could hardly be expected to act well in Russia. When they were introduced into the Swiss political system, many of the Swiss themselves thought the result would be bad, but this has not by any means been the case.

A large part of the population follows agriculture; there are 300,000 peasant proprietors in Switzerland, the land being pretty equally divided amongst them, and all work very hard. The Swiss peasant is

a very thrifty person, and manages to live on wonderfully little. The French and Italian Swiss are more lively than the German Swiss, who is apt to be a somewhat phlegmatic individual, but they are all as one man in patriotic feeling.

In the matter of education the Swiss, as Sir Horace Rumbold has put it, exhibit a "veritable passion." The Constitution of 1872 made education free and compulsory, though each canton makes laws for itself with respect to the way in which education is imparted. All schools make gymnastics an integral part of their curriculum, having in view the fact that the gymnasium is the nursery of the soldier; the schools teach manual labour and industries; girls are taught dressmaking.

A few words in conclusion should be said about the Swiss military system. In a sense, and a very true sense, every Swiss is a soldier. The hotel-keeper and the waiter can handle the rifle; their soldierly education begins with the gymnastic training at the school, and continues in the cadet corps. So excellent is this preparatory work that Switzerland, protected, in any case, by her guaranteed neutrality,

**The Swiss
a Nation
of Soldiers**

has no regular standing army, but she has the finest militia in Europe. So good is it that the new British Territorial System is largely modelled upon it. When the Swiss lad has left the cadet corps, he joins the Auszug, or Elite, for some years, next the Landwehr for a further period, and finally is drafted into the Landsturm. He has to put in so many days each year with the colours. It is a real army, and its total strength is about half a million.

So much importance do the Swiss attach to it that one of the few changes in the country brought about by the Referendum in November, 1897, is the increase in the number of days' service each recruit must put in, in his first year. In the cavalry the recruit now serves 92 days; in the artillery, 77 days; and in the infantry, 67 days, with repetition courses of 13 days each year, instead of every second year. The recruit has been so well trained before joining the army that he makes rapid progress, and develops immediately into a fine soldier. Not the least wonderful thing about this wonderful little country is that it maintains its wonderful army for a good deal under \$10,000,000 a year.

ROBERT MACHRAY

EUROPEAN
POWERS
TO-DAY



VII
ITALY

ITALY IN OUR OWN TIME

THE NEW KINGDOM VIRILE AND PROSPEROUS

By William Durban, B.A.

AGAIN and again the question has been asked, what is the perennial charm of Italy, that land which reckons itself the special favourite of the sun? The best answer is that the secret of Italy's enchantment lies not in its atmosphere, delightful though the climate may be; nor in its antiquity, fascinating though its countless historic relics truly are; nor in its art, even though the whole peninsula is one incomparable picture gallery; but in that perpetual renaissance which gives irresistible impression of constantly renewed youth. The Italy of to-day has amazed the world by its virility, its rejuvenation since that memorable day, March 17th, 1861, when the new kingdom sprang into being with the proclamation of Victor Emmanuel, "Il Ré Galantuomo," as king of that "Italia Unita" which had been the dream of patriots—a dream at last materialised by the policy of Cavour, the fiery crusade of Garibaldi, and the enthusiasm stirred by Mazzini and Gavazzi.

The young kingdom is one of the Great Powers. Its people are the most prolific in Europe, increasing even more rapidly than the population of Russia, and pouring forth such streams of emigrants that in Brooklyn alone is a colony of 60,000 Italians, with a great quarter to themselves, while Argentina is rapidly becoming a South American Italy. In every age Italy has renewed its youth, but never with anything like the splendid vigour displayed during the present generation. No other land so thoroughly captivates the imagination with a multitude of monuments grey with age, but surrounded by all the evidences of youthful and irrepressible life in its most eager and strenuous demonstrations.

Though this favoured peninsula has been the subject of elaborate cultivation through all historic ages, and has from time immemorial supported teeming populations,

yet it is, as we see it, even more redundantly fruitful than ever. Loveliness of aspect here blends with superabundant fertility, the land overflowing with oil and wine, from Chiasso, on the northern frontier, down to Girgenti, on Sicily's southern coast. The whole vast coastline is a delightful sea-front where oleanders, tamarisks, stone-pines, and countless evergreen shrubs form a verdant frame for the variegated and brilliant picture of the interior landscape. Italian topography is a study of Nature in every one of her artistic moods. This unspeakable beauty of the whole country renders Italy more than ever a favourite playground of Europe.

Each successive year, increasing numbers of tourists visit the Italian Alps, dominated by Monte Rosa, the wonderful Dolomites, the Tyrolean valleys, the resorts round Lakes Maggiore, Como, Garda, Ticino, Orta, Lugano, and Iseo; the Etruscan hill-cities, described by delighted visitors as occupying the most wonderful region in the world; the fairy villages nestling in hundreds of nooks in the Apennine chain of hundreds of miles; the Lombardian plains, sheeted with blue-blossoming flax and intersected by lines of mulberry trees on which silkworms thrive by millions; the Riviera, with its semi-tropical vegetation; the Venetian larch forest of St. Mark, and the groves of Vallombrosa; the classic scenes of Baïæ and Capri, and the insular paradise of Sicily. With her head crowned with a diadem of Alpine snow, Italy bathes her feet in the central waters of the blue Mediterranean, and her citizens draw an ever-growing revenue from crowds of seekers after health and pleasure from lands near and far.

When, in the middle of the nineteenth century, Italy was welded into one nationality, she was steeped in poverty. But, to give a quaint little illustration of the

financial revolution that has been accomplished, whereas the English Christmas markets used to be stocked with immense numbers of delicious little Italian maize-fed turkeys, these are now missing, for the simple reason that "the people are rich enough to afford to consume their own poultry." That simple fact speaks volumes

An Era of Social Regeneration

of the change that has come about in material conditions. There is still much poverty, but it is no longer general and deplorable. Italy has declared war on the slum, and the change effected is marvellous. The social regeneration that began in Piedmont has spread over the whole land.

At Turin a beggar is rarely seen, and in Naples, where, when Victor Emmanuel was proclaimed king, he found 90,000 professed *lazzaroni*, including criminals of every grade, with thieves, loafers, and drunkards, both beggary and squalor have been drastically dealt with. Fifty years ago the common people were almost wholly unable to read. The new regime has reduced illiteracy, until now less than one-third of the adult males, and one-half of the adult females are illiterate.

Notwithstanding that Italy lacks two indispensable elements, coal and iron, and is compelled to spend every year \$40,000,000 on coal, so sturdy is her modern enterprise that her native industrial companies have \$300,000,000 of paid-up capital, while foreign companies have about half that amount. The manufacturing expansion in the north has been marvellously rapid. The output of the paper-mills has more than doubled in twenty years. One of the phenomenal advances has been in applied electricity. From Volta down to Marconi, Italy has had a leading part in great discoveries in electricity. It was an Italian patriot, Antonio Meucci, who really invented the telephone; Pacinotti constructed the first machine for the application of electro-magnetism; and Ferraris

Triumphs of Italian Inventors

achieved the magnificent discovery of electric dynamic rotation, generated by means of alternate currents. Professor Righi, by his wonderful experiments on electric waves, paved the way for Marconi's introduction of wireless telegraphy, the most marvellous victory over time and space ever celebrated by science. And gradually the Italians are utilising the immense hydraulic forces of their country for producing so much of the "white coal,"

as they call electricity, as shall help them to reduce the import of coal from England. The electricity derived from the Alpine and Apennine streams will, in time, yield enormous wealth, for the number of useful falls in Italy is 34,837. Electrical establishments have turned many dull and idle towns into busy hives of industry, with rapidly increasing populations. This is the case at Maniago, near the fall of the River Cellina, whose waters are now being used to carry torrents of life and light to Venice and to other cities on the way to the beautiful "Bride of the Sea." This colossal work cost 10,000,000 francs (\$2,000,000) and occupied 3,000 labourers in its installation.

The first trial of the great discovery of Ferraris was made in Rome by engineer Mangarini, who conveyed the force of the famous fall of the River Aniene at Tivoli, a classic spot, over the Campagna to the city. The magic light that at evening illumines the streets and houses of Rome, and the force that impels trams and mechanism of all kinds, come from the lovely cascade so admired by travellers, near which Augustus held his tribunal,

Mæcenas had the villa where he used to entertain Horace, and the Emperor Hadrian built his magnificent rural palace.

Italy is a land of agriculture, but this industry has passed through a crucial crisis at the close of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Methods were miserably bad, and a train of diseases struck one crop after another. The magnificent vineyards were terribly damaged by the peronospera and the phylloxera, those parasites which passed into Italy from France, which in twenty years lost thus \$2,000,000,000.

The silkworm disease, the orange-tree blight, and the fly that fatally perforates the olives have simultaneously during the present generation inflicted immense mischief. Men like Signor Solari and Signor Bizzozero have revolutionised Italian farming, as thoroughly as England's was revolutionised in the eighteenth century. And as Italian emigrants love to return home after a long absence, many of these have come back with the progressive ideas they have acquired in America, France, or Switzerland. In 1898 over 30,000 agricultural labourers returned and landed at Genoa alone, and hundreds every year cross the Atlantic for the great Argentine harvest, where they are highly paid, and



REFUGEES AMONG THE RUINS



THE DAMAGED POST-OFFICE



TWO VIEWS OF THE DESTRUCTION IN THE CORSO VITTORIO EMANUELE



SCENE IN THE TORRENTE CARTALEGNI



RUINED CHURCH OF SAN GIOVANNI



IMPROVISED HOSPITAL IN THE OPEN AIR



RUINS IN THE FINE VIA GARIBALDI

MESSINA AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE ON DECEMBER 28th, 1908

then return to reap their own harvests. Small peasant farmers and labourers have all alike awakened to the new order of things. Village banks have entirely revolutionised the position of the peasants, who formerly could make no progress for want of capital with which to attempt small farming successfully. Signor Wollemborg, a Lombard village doctor who has since been Minister of Finance, founded the first Italian village bank on the model of those which Herr Raiffeisen had established broadcast in Germany.

There are now nearly 2,000, with a membership of nearly 200,000. These institutions have rescued thousands of the diligent and persevering contadini, or peasants, from the terrible grip of the usurer. And likewise of late years the artisans and small shopkeepers have built up the huge organisation of the People's Banks, with their capital of \$25,000,000 and their yearly business of \$250,000,000, while \$350,000,000 has been accumulated in the Private Savings Banks, institutions very similar to the People's Banks. The various banks lend money on very easy terms, and by their aid

**Prosperity
of the Rural
Labourers**

immense new areas have been planted as vineyards or cultivated in other ways, with profit to the worker never before possible. The rural labourers have succeeded in working out their own salvation. Out of the old sordid despair the contadini have been lifted into fair prosperity.

The favourite system of land tenure and cultivation which still prevails is the famous *mezzeria*. On this plan the estate is divided into a number of *poderi*, or fields, half the produce of which is retained by the peasant who cultivates the soil, and the other half goes to the landlord as rent. The *poderi* average about thirty-nine acres each. The *contadino's* house is on the *podere*, and is no mere hovel, for it provides ample accommodation for a large household. The agricultural system adopted provides occupation for the peasant-farmer for the whole year without intermission, for on the same *podere* he grows wheat, or maize, or rye, wine, oil, and flax, according to the qualities of the soil.

These labourers are exceedingly intelligent, and they toil indefatigably, but with the utmost cheerfulness. The women of the family rear silkworms and often make money by plaiting the beautiful straw produced in the

sunny clime, and also by spinning from the fine flax. The farmer not only gives to the landlord as rent half the produce of the *podere*, but also a stipulated number of eggs, hams, poultry, etc., while his wife or daughter, called the *massaia*, or housekeeper, may, by agreement, have to wash for the landlord's household. The new prosperity

**Secret of
Italy's
Progress**

of this agricultural community, the backbone of the nation, is the real secret of Italy's marvellous recent progress, as the land is mainly an agricultural one. At the beginning of the new century the attention of the whole world was drawn to a series of crucial labour troubles in Italy, which had been coming to a head for several years. A vast change came over the condition and also the spirit of the working classes during the last decade of the nineteenth century, for during that period great numbers of the peasantry became artisans, and thus a very great new industrial community arose. But very quickly discontent was propagated amongst these by the spread not only of socialism, but also of anarchist ideas. Disastrous and riotous strikes took place amongst masons, miners, and railway workers.

The peasants caught the contagion and organised a league, but this was immediately met by the formation of a landowners' league. In Rome the masons employed on the monument to Victor Emmanuel II. organised a labour league and tried to compel every workman to join it, but parliament vigorously intervened for the protection of the men who refused to be coerced, and the leaguers were defeated. The only important industry in Sicily besides agriculture is sulphur-mining in the wonderful "solfatara" district in the south of the island. The miners, many of whom are very quarrelsome, given to the use of

**Armed
Workmen on
Strike**

the knife and revolver, and to gambling, revolted against what were truly hard conditions in mines fearfully hot and reeking with poisonous sulphur fumes. But when the marble quarrymen at Carrara, far away in the north of Italy, got up a sympathetic strike, they quickly resorted to violence, forming armed bands, which scoured the mountains and threatened to raid the town itself; great alarm was caused amongst the peaceful

ITALY IN OUR OWN TIME

inhabitants. Martial law was proclaimed, the province was placed under the rule of General Huesch, and the wanton insurrection was speedily quelled. Great improvements have of late effectually ameliorated the lot of the toilers, and the Employers' Liability Bill has had an excellent effect. It should be noted that

The Italian's Genius for Engineering

the Italian is a born engineer. He inherits the Roman faculty for construction of public works, and many of the great Continental railways, the marvellous Alpine tunnels, and our own Forth Bridge, were mainly made by operatives from Italy. It is computed that there are always about 500,000 of these frugal Italian workers scattered about Europe. There is an Italian quarter in every great city in Europe whenever important public works are being executed.

Amongst this fascinatingly interesting people political problems are perpetually challenging solution. The typical Italian delights in litigation, and in these new days of genuine constitutionalism he becomes an ardent political partisan. The Italians are a nation of orators, and their parliamentarians revel in rhetorical declamation. Manhood suffrage was established by the Electoral Reform Act of 1912—only those who at the age of thirty have neither performed military service nor learnt to read and write being disqualified from voting. By this same act each member of the Lower House receives an annual salary of \$1,200. Parliamentary institutions are peculiar, for the Senate, or Upper Chamber, is composed of members nominated by the king for life on the advice of the Premier. Thus the legislation is exceedingly democratic, yet the people feel that in emergency the Senate might be relied on to prevent reckless enactments.

In the Lower House the proportion of professional men amongst the deputies is extraordinary, for these constitute two-thirds of the deputies. Only

Middle-class Members of Parliament

a very few working-men have ever found their way into the Italian Parliament. Nor have very many of the aristocracy been elected. The members are mostly of the middle class. Modern United Italy has produced a succession of really great statesmen, of whom the nation is proud. The names of Cavour, Sella, Ricasoli, La Marmora, Minghetti, Depretis, Cairoli, Crispi, Di Rudini will live, and the doings of the

Premiers who have succeeded each other since this century began: Saracco, Pelloux, Zanardelli, Sonnino, Fortis, and Giollotti, are fresh in European recollection.

In Italy, as the seat of the venerable Papacy, religion and politics have for ages been inevitably entangled. But the separation of Church and State under Cavour's administration, and the dissolution of the vast number of convents, wrought a most radical revolution. The quarrel with the Vatican is still in process. The late Pope, when he was Archbishop Sarto, of Venice, was esteemed for his simplicity of life and his pastoral assiduity. But as Pius X. he was constrained by the Catholic Curia to assume the same attitude of intransigent Ultramontanism which was maintained by his predecessor, Leo XIII., and before him by Pius IX. But the struggle of late years has been not so much between the Vatican and the monarchy as between the College of Cardinals and the Modernists within the Catholic Church. These ecclesiastical Liberals within Catholicism had their head-centre in France; but in Italy the famous Abbate Murri was long engaged in a dispute with the Curia.

Famous Waldensian Church

before Modernism was formally condemned by the Pope. Protestantism is comparatively feeble in Italy. It is mainly represented in modern growth by the young Chiesa Evgangelica, founded by the eloquent Padre Gavazzi in the middle of the last century, but in more ancient phase by the denomination which is the oldest Protestant communion in the world, the famous Waldensian Church, which was born in the romantic valleys of the Cottian Alps, their home being called by Michelet "that incomparable flower hidden amid the sources of the Po."

The missions of the Waldenses are dotted about all over Italy and Sicily, and of late years they have steadily multiplied. Monsignor Merry del Val, who was born in London of Spanish parents in 1865, and educated in England, has been a conspicuous figure in Italy since 1907. This dignitary was indefatigable in conducting the conflict between the Vatican and the French Government over the Separation Law. He visited England as Papal Envoy on the occasions of Queen Victoria's Jubilee and King Edward's Coronation. He was created a cardinal, and succeeded Cardinal Rampolla as Papal Secretary of State.

This exquisitely lovely land has in our time suffered from the convulsions of Nature more than any country has ever done in the whole history of the world. The closing weeks of 1908 will be marked in its annals by the record of the earthquake which visited Calabria and Sicily, destroying Reggio and Messina, wiping out Scylla, and wrecking many other towns and villages. This appalling catastrophe created unspeakable consternation throughout the world, for it was estimated that 300,000 lives were lost.

Through all the struggles, difficulties, troubles, and vicissitudes of the brief history of the young kingdom of United Italy the royal family have not failed to win deepening esteem and affection. Thus the republican ideal of Mazzini seems forgotten. The nation was plunged into impassioned grief by the tragedy enacted at Monza on July 29th, 1900, when the beloved King Humbert I. was assassinated by the anarchist Bresci. His son and successor, Victor Emmanuel III., had as Crown Prince gained abundant popularity.

He and his wife, the beautiful Princess Elena of Montenegro, are considered "the handsomest royal pair in Europe," yet the king is the smallest of Continental sovereigns, being only five feet three inches in height, while the queen is very tall, so that when seen together they present a most striking contrast. Throughout their marriage service the king stood, while the queen knelt on a cushion, and thus they were just of a height. "The only time she was able to look up at me," says King Victor, quite good-humouredly. So immense has been his services already to his country that he has been styled, and not without reason, "The Saviour of Italy."

Europe was startled in the late summer of 1911 by the announcement that Italy had declared war on Turkey and had invaded Tripoli. For some time past complaints had been made to the Porte that the Italian residents in the town of Tripoli were harassed by local misgovernment and vexatious laws, to the serious interference with Italian commerce and the considerable annoyance of Italian business firms; but no redress came from Constantinople, the Sultan and his advisers being naturally quite impotent to deal with grievances in a province so far off as Tripoli, since they could not even

**War
against
Turkey**

accomplish reforms in Macedonia. On the declaration of war the Italian Government made it plain to all the world that hostilities were to be confined strictly to Africa, and that no attack would be made on Turkish dominions in Europe or Asia, and that no disturbance of the peace of Europe was contemplated. The capture of the town of Tripoli presented no great difficulties to the Italian warships, but the conquest of the interior was another matter. For the Arabs preached a "holy war" against the invader, committed the usual unspeakable atrocities of Eastern warriors, and were practically invincible on retreating a sufficient distance inland.

Italy formally annexed the province of Tripoli in November, 1911, but the war went on without any change. The fighting was intermittent. The Sultan had no means at his disposal for any serious attempt to expel the Italian invaders—his authority had long been merely nominal—and the Arabs were as powerless to effect any reconquest of the towns on the coast as the Italians were to enforce the capitulation of their enemies in the desert.

Not until the Balkan League made war on Turkey in October, 1912, did the Sultan seek peace with Italy, and agree to the surrender of Tripoli and Cyrenaica to the Italian Government. This new North African addition to the colonies of Italy stretches from Tunis and Algiers on the west to Egypt on the east, and its area of, approximately, 400,000 square miles is bounded on the south only by the Sahara. The population in 1913 was estimated at 1,000,000, mostly Berbers, with a considerable minority of Jews, while the town of Tripoli then numbered 40,000 persons.

Doubtless commercial advantages may accrue to Italian business firms by the conquest of Tripoli, for a great trade—partly a caravan trade with the Sudan—passes through Tripoli and Bengazi, but political considerations were certainly not overlooked when the annexation by force of arms was decided on at Rome. With France in possession of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis, and the British Protectorate obviously a permanent institution in Egypt, Tripoli alone remained under Ottoman rule in Africa; and as it seemed eminently undesirable to the Italian Government that this last remnant of the once mighty Turkish Empire should be

**Conquest
of
Tripoli**

swallowed up by France, and as Italy had long wanted a strip of African territory on the Mediterranean, the best and only plan appeared to be a war of conquest. The war was long and costly in human casualties and money expenditure, but it was approved generally in Italy, only a section of the Socialists dissenting from the national verdict, and it had the merit of bringing together, at least temporarily, old political antagonists divided on the question of Church and State. The Papacy and the Crown were never nearer together since the Union of Italy than they were at the close of 1911. Even when the Sultan had formally ceded the last of his African dominions to the King of Italy and war between the two countries was officially at an end, peace was by no means guaranteed to the conquerors. The Arab tribes of the desert,

led by Barni Bey, who had been Tripoli's representative in the first Turkish Parliament at Constantinople, were in open revolt in 1913, and, though defeated in battle by the Italian troops, their resistance had been a heavy stumbling block to the pacification of Cyrenaica.

While the conquest of Tripoli has been the chief event in the history of Italy in recent years, it has also laid a heavy tax on the conquerors. Italy looks for recompense for the drain of life and treasure in a new and fertile province, a land largely peopled by Italians, who with their characteristic industry and patience may rebuild in Tripoli and on the shores of the Mediterranean the civilisation long destroyed. There is no reason in the nature of things why Italy should not populate Tripoli and make of that land a valuable and important territory.

THE REPUBLIC OF SAN MARINO

ONE of the minor events of the year 1907 was the conclusion of a fresh treaty of friendship between the Kingdom of Italy and the Republic of San Marino, and in the arrangements and discussions which preceded this settlement, as in the treaty itself, the republic, which has only an area of 33 square miles, and a population well under 12,000, appeared as a sovereign and independent state, although its separate existence is maintained solely by the benevolent protection of its big friend, Italy. Of all the numerous independent states into which the Italy of the Middle Ages was divided, San Marino alone survives to the present day; and as long as Italy, by a sort of good-humoured forbearance, permits it to remain as it is, so long, and no longer, will its name be seen on the roll-call of the nations. It is situated some ten miles or so from the historic Italian town of Rimini, and is to all intents and purposes as Italian as any part of the country. But it claims to be the oldest state of Europe, dating its pretensions as far back as 855, though its independence is of a much later date. From the point of view of age, it regards the modern kingdom as something of an upstart.

It undoubtedly can boast of being the smallest republic in the world. When the devastating presence of Napoleon passed over Italy in blood and flame, San Marino was spared. "Let it remain," said the great conqueror, "as a model of a

republic." In those days it was more democratic, perhaps, than it is to-day. The eight parishes of which the republic consists return sixty members to its Parliament, called the Great Council; twenty of these representatives are drawn from its nobles, twenty from its townsmen, and twenty from its peasantry; two of them are appointed every six months as Regent-Captains with executive power. There is, besides, a smaller council, which regulates all matters pertaining to finance, law, education and war; its duties must be tolerably light, for San Marino has no debt; and, of course, it cannot go to war, though it has an army of about a thousand officers and men. Its capital, also called San Marino, has a population of 1,500, and is situated on the top of Mount Titano, a termination in that direction of the Apennines. The government Palace, rebuilt here in 1894, is a fine edifice. There is much that is interesting and picturesque about the town, and, indeed, about the whole of this small republic.

The meetings of the Council, with the "Noble Guard" in their fanciful uniforms in attendance, partake of something of the character of a pageant instinct with the suggestion of old-world romance and charm. But it need hardly be added that nobody regards this little republic very seriously; there is, in fact, a good deal about it which smacks of a Gilbertian opera.

ROBERT MACHRAY

THE ANGLO-FRENCH "ENTENTE CORDIALE"



The "Entente Cordiale" between France and England, so strongly fostered by the late King Edward VII., has been further encouraged by King George V., who, in April, 1914, visited Paris, and, with Queen Mary, was the guest of President Poincaré. The presence of their majesties at the Opera in Paris in company with the President and Madame Poincaré is the subject of the above picture.

EUROPEAN
POWERS
TO-DAY



VIII
FRANCE

FRANCE IN OUR OWN TIME

A SURVEY OF THE NATION'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LIFE

By Richard Whiteing

WE have followed the history of France among the nations of Europe down to our own day. Where does this great country stand at the present time?

In regard to politics the answer is simple enough. France has established the Republic after more than a century of effort, and has put it on the footing of the institutions that are taken as matters of course. This means, not that the present system is free from the liability to error and to great economic and social change, but simply that a reversion to either of the earlier forms, of monarchy or empire, is unthinkable. For good or ill the old parties have, and can have, no hope of a governing majority. The monarchy is associated with the tradition of misery; the empire with that of defeat and humiliation. The disasters of 1870-1 had precious results on the temperament of the people; it is unlikely that the war drum will ever throb again in France in any cause but the defence of her territory, or unless, as in the case of the great European War, her obligations to an ally compel her.

The new political ideal is the welfare of the nation as a whole, the making life better worth living for every unit of the mass of population. In his latest survey of the whole situation, M. Jaurés boasts that the country is now in full political democracy. In other words, the French people are at last in sole charge of their own destinies.

**The New
Political
Ideal**

The constitution has been fashioned into a perfect instrument for the work in hand. Its provision of the second ballot ensures the predominance of the popular will; the deputies are paid as servants of the State, not as servants of any section of the electorate. The suffrage is universal, and no man has more than one vote. The electoral machinery is of

ideal simplicity. The Senate, composed of 300 members, will wholly represent the principle of popular choice in the second degree when its few surviving life members have passed away. The president is but the most eminent servant of the nation. This is not to say that none but Republican parties exist. There is a Monarchist

**What the
Republic
Represents**

party which, as Nationalist or Conservative in name, harps on the string of military glory, and still keeps a kind of sentimental hold on a section of the peasantry, and makes some figure in the social life of Paris. But the peasant proprietors in the mass are for the Republic, because they believe that it is for order and stability, and that they have nothing to fear from it, and a good deal to hope.

The urban masses, again, are bound to give it their support as the progressive movement in being, though the workmen as a whole are overwhelmingly Socialist and anti-capitalistic. In the decisive election of 1906, of some 9,000,000 voters who went to the poll, nearly 6,250,000 cast their votes for Republican or Socialist candidates, without counting another million or so who represented Liberals well affected to the existing system. The poor remainder stood for all the forces of reaction. The majority were all Republicans of one shade or other, whatever else they were not, and were ready to coalesce for the defence of Republican institutions.

The Socialist section of the Republican party now includes much of the highest intellect of France, and exemplifies nearly all the varieties of that school of politics throughout the world. The racial mind has a wide range, from the utmost poise and precision of scientific thought to the most passionate enthusiasm for the idea. The Commune is the classical example.

It was a system on the one hand, and, on the other, a delirium of utter self-sacrifice. Its members died by thousands for a social millennium. The outbreak would have ruined the democratic cause for ages in any other country; in France it only gave the cause a set-back that has already become but an incident of its career.

A Great French Socialist

The darkest hour found a man capable of stemming the current of disaster, and effecting the salvage of the proletarian idea. This was Jules Guesde. He had laid the causes of failure to heart, and he gradually taught his countrymen to abandon the old methods of sterile insurrectionary agitation, and to rely on organised propaganda to a definite end.

He opposed the desperate measure of the general strike, and in due course achieved the miracle of sending forty deputies to the Chamber pledged to a Collectivist programme, and to the saving idea of unity of all sections of the advanced party in the common cause. They were not, however, to co-operate with the Government; they were to convert it to Socialism, and his union of parties was still to be only a union among the elect. The thought of common action with men who were Republicans, and nothing else, was repugnant to his soul.

Then came Jaurès with the wider outlook of a scheme for union among all the supporters of the Republic. He was, and is still, a professor of philosophy, and, as such, a distinguished member of the academic body and a servant of the State. A man holding that position in France must be deeply versed in the history of nations and the history of thought, and the studies of Jaurès had taught him that practical persons with a sense of give and take always win in the long run. He urged his brother Socialists to spread their doctrines among the people in the old way, but meanwhile to work with the constituted authorities, and in Parliament for all that Parliament was worth.

The Butcher of the Commune

He entered warmly into the Dreyfus agitation, on the side that ultimately triumphed, and he finally sent one of his lieutenants into the government as member of a Ministry that contained the hated De Gallifet, "the butcher of the Commune."

This proceeding scandalised the Socialists of Europe, and it led to a Titanic debate between Jaurès and the German Bebel, at the International Congress of

Dresden. Bebel triumphed by carrying a resolution to the effect that Socialism should have a policy strictly independent of all other political parties, and should take no part in a "capitalist" government. Jaurès frankly accepted the vote, and, by his submission to the idea of party discipline, did much to maintain his position, and to lead his very antagonists to more practical courses. His followers are not a solid phalanx; it is his proud, though perhaps rather premature, boast that "outside of the united party" there is none deserving of the Socialist name.

Jaurès is still strictly a party man, and he constantly uses his energies as a spur to prick the sides of ministerial intent. In the summer of 1906 he held another Titanic debate with M. Clemenceau, as the head of the Government, on the great question of the rate of progress in democratic reform that still separates the labouring class of France from the middle class. There had been serious strike riots, and the Government had been compelled to intervene to preserve the peace. "Order is the Republic's first law," M. Clemenceau seemed to say. "Give us the

Order the Republic's First Law

opportunity to be your friends. All that you want will come, if only you have the patience to wait for it." He carried the point by a vote that expressed the confidence of the Chamber. "You are not the Almighty," cried the defeated champion in a moment of petulance. "You are not even the Devil," was the retort.

In the elections of 1906 over 26 per cent. of those who went to the poll cast a Socialist vote, yet this was regarded as a Socialist defeat. Socialism is powerful enough to influence legislation, though not to control it. It now elects mayors by the hundred, and municipal councillors by the thousand. Its chief supporters are found among the workmen, and the "intellectuals" of the professorial group.

Trade Unionism in France, as such, is rather "on the fence" in being not frankly Socialist though in strong sympathy with the movement. It has long been political and speculative in its tendencies, and for a simple reason. Many of the benefits in higher wages and the like, which in England were the exclusive concern of such organisations, are, in France, secured by the personal thrift of the workman, and by the help of the State. The French Unionists often prefer

to save for themselves, and this leaves them fancy free for the dream of a beneficial revolution which is to settle everything. Many of their comrades, however, are still for the English method of trade funds for purely trade purposes—the raising of wages, and the benefits. The first would make the unions a branch of a sort of labour party, rejecting the co-operation of all other classes but their own, and working by means of a class war. The others have the powerful support of the miners, the printers, the textile workers and the engineers.

According to Miss Scott, the latest historian of the movement, the only important unions that are distinctly revolutionary are those of the building trades. One of their spokesmen utters a warning cry against “the development of a fourth estate composed of trades economically privileged, with the unskilled and unemployed left on one side.” It is no easy matter to arouse French enthusiasm for any idea of a purely utilitarian character. The tendency is always to look before and after to the complete regeneration of the race. This tendency has hindered the progress of French Co-operation. It has attained to nothing like the same rate of development as the British movement—even in the manufacturing branch, which has always been peculiarly its own.

The net result is that the French workman has, on the whole, a better lot than the British. He has more of the joy of life. His government, state and municipal, does more for him, and takes care that he shall be abundantly supplied with simple pleasures—seats in the shady thoroughfares for the summer evenings, where he may smoke his pipe and see his children at play; well-kept woods, forests and parks, where he may ramble on Sunday with his wife and family; cheapened services of tram and train—all with ludicrously cheap holidays as the general result. If his hours of labour are longer, the pace is nothing like so hard. His home life abounds in the solid and substantial comfort of the neat and cleanly dwelling, the well-filled clothes-press and larder, the well-cooked meal, and the well-stocked market as its source of supply.

For most of these blessings, no doubt, he has to thank his admirable wife, herself a product of the most careful cultures, domestic, educational, and religious. He

eats “like a prince,” both in quality and in the quantity for his need. On this point the comparative statistics as to the prices of provisions in the two countries which are published in England from time to time are wholly illusory. With the French workman, two or even three courses and dessert are not the exception, but the rule. His children have the best of elementary, and often of advanced education—the former entirely free, with free meals at need—and over and above this, free access to magnificently appointed technical schools, where they may learn their trades.

The spontaneous help of his comrades rarely fails him in misfortune. He is less frequently haunted by the spectre of a submerged tenth than his British brother; indeed, that class is practically non-existent in France. “Wherever you go,” says a recent observer, “you will find less evidence of poverty, of idleness, of misery than will force itself on your attention almost anywhere else in the world.”

Thanks to all this, the French workman is generally content to remain in his class. It is by no means, however, the content of acquiescence. His class hatreds are strong, and, with his sense of equality, he is disposed to have “no use” for the bourgeoisie or for the aristocrats. In so far as he is a workman of the towns, he is generally socialistic and anti-capitalistic to the backbone. He belongs either to the French Working Class party, which is opposed to any sort of co-operation, political or other, with society at large, or to the Socialist Revolutionary party, which is disposed to accept such co-operation in politics, on conditions, but in each case with a view to the final triumph of equalitarian ideas. Finally, he hates war, partly on general principles, but mainly because he hates the blood tax of the conscription. Then, for the balance of power in public

affairs, the workmen are effectually held in electoral check by the peasantry, whose large share of the ownership of the land gives them little liking for Socialism, and no taste for farming under the State. These are the more potent as a check, because they have all but completely rallied to the Republican idea. Successive Governments have wooed and won them by standing firmly for the security of

**Happy
and Contented
Workers**

**France the
Workman's
Paradise**

**Peasantry
Opposed to
Socialism**

property and for public order, and by making them objects of peculiar care in other ways. Their technical schools for farming, for instance, are on the same high level as the schools for arts and crafts.

Liberty, Equality and Fraternity are still the watchwords of the Republic, but the French are disposed to take them not exactly in this order.

Watchwords of the Republic Equality is the passion of the people, and the goal of all their strivings and of all their hopes. Fraternity is a sentiment of only less strength, but as yet it has got no further than fraternity by classes. Among the workmen, for instance, the sense of brotherhood is a positive affection of the soul, only to be realised by those who have lived in close touch with them and witnessed its countless manifestations of courtesy, charity, and active help.

It is the same among the professional and the other classes who are the brain and nerve of France, and here fraternity finds its strongest manifestation in the strength of the family tie. The family constitutes a vast insurance society for the mutual guarantee of all its members against the ills of life. Few fail to respond to the appeal, even when the claim extends to cousinships of the remoter degrees. The whole scheme of collective well-being is that in emergencies no single member of the "clan" shall have to stand quite alone. The uncle who looks after his graceless nephew as a matter of duty, and almost without expectation of gratitude, is a familiar figure of French comedy.


This, in itself, with the obligations it entails, involves a certain sacrifice of liberty, since you can hardly have it both ways—dependence, and a perfectly free course. Liberty, therefore, while it has made huge progress under the Republic, is still hampered by intolerance. The Press is free to the point of licence; but personal freedom, especially that of public meeting, still leaves much to be desired. The Government, in its passion for public order, is fretful and meddling, especially as it works through the agency of the police. It regulates strikes and public meetings to the point of exasperation, and compromises the "order of the streets" by a fussy anxiety to preserve it. The ordinary prefect of police simply loses his head at the sight of two or three gathered together for public discussion. The very

Weaknesses in the Government crowd is at fault in the same way; and in psychological moments every man's hand seems to be against his neighbour's coat-collar in the act of arrest.

For all that, the Republic is by far the strongest French government of modern times if only for the classic reason that it divides Frenchmen the least. The vast and powerful middle class no longer stands aloof. The people, in the conventional sense of the term, are not and never have been enough to make a governing system. The power may come to them when they have all the qualifications for it; but by that time they and the nation will be one. At present the middle class, with its backing of the moderates of all shades, is as strong as ever in affairs and in knowledge.

In all times the vast majority of the governed, as distinct often enough from their governors of the moment, have constituted a sort of natural force of conservation. They are at once eager for change and fearful of its effects; and their very inconsistencies serve to determine the pace for progress, and to compel a due regard to the adjustments between old interests and new claims. It may be no more than the force of habit, but a force it is, for their mass makes them the predominant partner in politics. No party, however advanced, can touch the actual experience of administration without swaying to the side of this moderate norm, which represents the working mean between movement and stagnation, and which exists by no accident but by a law. When that central and all-powerful body swerves in momentary aberration to either extreme, progressive or reactionary, it begins to diminish in numbers, and to lose control. A government of abstract justice and of revolutionary upheaval, if it could be established to-morrow, would pass like the dream of a night. The chronic infirmities of human nature would still assert their rights.

Predominant Partner in Politics The Republic is now in the safe keeping of the whole nation. Like every other government in the world, it will, of course, undergo enormous changes, but these must be gradual, and must still conform to the law of human affairs. The moderate man will ever be master in the long run. Much of the abuse of the "middle class" is due to the sense of



THE INTERIOR OF THE SENATE IN THE LUXEMBURG PALACE



EXTERIOR OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES



INTERIOR OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

OUTSIDE AND INSIDE THE FRENCH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT

their irresistible might. They captured the old revolution, they have already captured the new. In many respects France is fortunate in being rooted in institutions that make for stability and social peace. Her wise laws of inheritance provide for a beneficent diffusion of wealth throughout the whole of the body politic. No man may leave all his property exactly as he likes. A considerable share of it must go to his wife and children, and not to any one of them to the detriment of the rest. In this way there is an automatic check on the growth of large fortunes, and a constant diffusion of wealth, which irrigates the whole field of national well-being with a fertilising stream.

There are few French citizens, men or women, who are without "expectations" of a kind. Consequently there is no huge landless, moneyless class, filthy, feckless and forlorn, answering to the abject poor. The flower and product of this system is the national habit of thrift, which is an effect of wise legislation rather than a mere peculiarity of the national temperament. Opportunity has made the French the thriftiest people in the world. Having the means of saving, they naturally save.

This, and this alone, accounts for the enormous recuperative power of the nation as a whole. "Whereas Great Britain," says Mr. W. L. George, in his "France in the Twentieth Century," "has but just recovered from the depression following on the South African War, a comparatively cheap contest which did not entail the destruction of a single English home, France, within four years of 1870, had regained her position, after paying an indemnity nearly equal to our total Transvaal expenditure, and enduring six months' devastation of her soil." French literature is naturally best understood by a study of the French character, of which it is the necessary outcome. The Frenchman has two natures in marked contrast. In one he is

The Double Nature of the Frenchman

the child of the joy of life—all impulse, whim, and go-as-you-please; in the other, he is the most staid, orderly, respectable being in the universe. In the first he follows the wayward law of his moods and his intuitions; in the other he is almost the victim of a rigorous logic which compels him to keep his mind as tidy as his

person, and to put every idea in its place. The latter is his normal state, and it has produced his classic literature; the former has prompted him to all the revolts of reaction towards Romanticism, Naturalism, Idealism, and all the other schools that are characterised so much by the final syllable of their names. Ronsard, apart from his services to the good government of the language, came to bring life and the joy of a free course in the beauty of nature. The rather miscalled age of Louis XIV. brought discipline, law and order; our good *bourgeois* of the muse was now intent on a return to the proprieties. This mood ran its course until he made holiday again with the Romantics. "Tempted of the Devil," wrote the wrathful Nisard, of Hugo the leader of the band, "he is begetting new schools every day."

It was not to last for ever. The rebels in their turn came to repentance with the Parnassian group. The poetic mind is now once more in a state of lawlessness, or, at any rate, of unrest, which bodes another return to the righteousness of form. Banville, who succeeded Hugo as the master poet of his day, was still the Romantic movement, but that movement chastened by its sense of the need of flawless workmanship and of spiritual restraint. His "Petit Traité de la Poésie" was merciless in its insistence on the clearness, precision, and minute finish of detail so dear to the French mind. Leconte de Lisle was classic in spirit, call him what else you will, though a classic with a wider outlook on life than the men of the grand period.

Banville, the Successor of Hugo

Sully Prudhomme, the next great name, has been called, and not unhappily, a French Matthew Arnold in his sense of the good breeding of an Augustan ideal, and sometimes a Lucretius, or even a Darwin, of poetry. Coppée was the same sort of man working in a medium of scenes of humble life, a French Crabbe, touching the butcher, the baker, and the candlestick-maker, not as one of themselves, but as the Puritan of a rigorous law of art.

Sully Prudhomme died but the other day. Where is he now—at any rate, in regard to his status in this world? Before the breath went out of his body an advanced school had come to regard him as a fogey. It has yet to wreak its vengeance on Heredia, the last of the Parnassians, for the crime of popularity,

but no doubt he, too, will have his hour of the wrong sort. His goldsmith's art in the fine chiselling of the phrase has carried their system to perfection; and perfection palls, to say nothing of the fact that the younger men are waiting, and that youth will have its day.

We are still with the Decadents, though in new manifestations. Beaudelaire rules our spirits from his urn; so does Verlaine, and it is estimated that at least a hundred of his pages may reach posterity. They should do so, for he at least restored the personal and the human note which had no place in the baggage of the Parnassian band. Mallarmé, sometimes coupled with him as a neo-Decadent, is far inferior.

It is now a riot of schools, if the word is not inappropriate to systems that are little more than exaggerations of the personal note. Some sing the all-importance of the *ego*, others the emptiness of life. They pass across the illuminated disc of popularity, from nothing into nothingness again, like the figures in the cinematograph. The Polychromists, who hold that the word is not merely the symbol of colour, but the thing itself, are still to

**The Modern
Poetic
Movement**

be found, though you have to look for them. The Realists yet honour Jean Richepin for his "Chanson des Gueux,"

and another composition in which he has written with much appreciation of the Devil and all his works. Maupassant shaped well in this school of verse at the outset of his career.

Foreigners have largely influenced the modern poetic movement. Maeterlinck is perhaps the most distinguished case in point. But there is now a promising cult, which places Whitman at the head, of Poe, Emerson and Thoreau as the four men of universal genius that America has given to the world.

The general result is that the old French prosody, the result of centuries of critical labour, has gone all to pieces, and that its chief law—one word, one vote for signification—has been repealed. Even the venerable figure of syntax has been plucked by the beard. Impression has taken the place of logic, assonance of rhyme. The reaction will follow in due course, probably in a new classical movement with larger and more generous bounds.

The same tendencies are observable in French fiction. It is a time of unrest, but the outlook is most promising. The old

Naturalist school of Zola, as a school, is gone, but it has left abiding traces, most of them for good. The good ones are in the direction of respect for the facts and of a faithful rendering of detail; the bad, in sheer pornography, though this is not the founder's fault. Bourget, though no

Naturalist, in regard to the observation of the things of the flesh, follows that method in regard to the things of the spirit. There is another trace of Zola in the fact

that the new school is overwhelmingly purposeful. In no former time has French fiction been so much occupied with the study of social facts. This is the main line of the new departure. Even the revived study of local manners and customs, local types, is not free from the laudable suspicion of a purpose of natural regeneration. If some still write in the old way, for the pure love of story as story, and of character in and for itself, they form but a minority, though a minority with a right to their welcome.

The revival of religion has its apostles, but every one of them takes care to let you see that he is a patriot rather than a saint. The wide, wide world is not forgotten, and it has a school to itself, with Loti as its master. His work has the study of foreign race types and exotic peculiarities for its means, and a suggestion of the greater glory of France for its end and aim. That perfectly equipped writer has ever been the best of patriots; and when he writes of "India without the English," we may easily divine his regret that Providence did not vouchsafe the blessing of its being "with the French."

The social studies embrace every variety of the *genre*. Most of them have this peculiarity, that they deal with groups rather than with individuals, in the older way. Where they are historic in their setting, we have no longer the splendid personalities of the past, the heroes of the

world movement through the ages, but, instead, the masses of humanity, dim, but by no means dumb, who are struggling towards the light. Paul Adam and Paul and Victor Margueritte are the chiefs of the school. Their books are of races and nations, all in movement on the epic scale.

The fiction that has narrower limits of place or time has made a new departure under the leadership of M. Rod, who is not a thinker only, but a man of letters, with

all the restraints that belong to the French ideal of the character. The miseries of the people, the bankruptcy of faith, the internecine struggle between capital and labour, the self-seeking of the professional politician, are among his more striking themes. M. De Vogüé has taken this last subject as the motive of his powerful work "Les

**A Writer
of National
Romance**

Morts qui Parlent." For him the parliamentarians of to-day are but the delegates of the Convention in a new part. He is a polemist of great force, with a keen sense of actuality, which, however, does not prevent him from casting a longing, lingering look towards the past. Rod, too, is not without this tendency, but he can see good in both sides, and sympathy is his dominant note.

The note of sadness and of protest against a too insistent present is found again in much of the work that has provincial France for its subject, and particularly in that of M. Bazin, who stands at the head of a school. M. Bazin has written novels of great power—on the work-girls, on the exodus of the peasantry from country to town, on the religious persecution involved in the present quarrel between Church and State, on the problem of the lost provinces. The last, a mixture of history, patriotism, and philosophy, aspires to the dignity of a national romance, and as such it has been acclaimed by the most educated readers in France. But their suffrages are not enough for this writer. He has studied provincial life in all its aspects with a success that has enabled him to realise the sane and sound ambition of a wide popularity. Bordeaux is another remarkable writer of the same class.

The writers who are most read in France are Paul Bourget and Anatole France, of the earlier school, and Maurice Barrès of the new. Paul Bourget is now, whatever he was not in the past, the eloquent apologist of marriage, of the authority of the family as a social organism, of monarchy and aristocracy, and, above all, of religion. He brings to their support a delicacy and a suppleness of mind, and a perfectly equipped literary talent, which compel the attention of many who have no sympathy with his views.

These, however, have their antidote ready to hand in Anatole France, that "august Nihilist pamphleteer," as somebody has called him, who stands supreme

in literary power, and especially in eclecticism of style. He is the champion of the new ideas that seem pressing forward to victory. They could hardly do without him, for in France, as elsewhere, the cause is often of less importance than the skill of the advocate. His "sober elegance, his neat limpidity"—to translate perhaps too literally—compel the admiration of all. In a series of well-known works of fiction he stemmed the torrent of prejudice in the Dreyfus case far more effectually than even Zola, to whom his detractors have ever refused the title of a man of letters.

At any rate, what Zola did for the country at large Anatole France did for educated opinion, which still counts for much in matters of taste. He takes a side in seeming to take none, and to be wholly devoted to a detached and caustic observation of contemporary ideas. "L'île des Pingouins," one of the latest of his works, is also one of the best examples of his method, and with that, unfortunately, of a certain superfluity of coarseness that hardly deserves to be called a defect of his qualities. He is

**A Novelist
of the
New School**

a precious asset of the cause of progress, since most of the writers who are most read stand for a sort of reaction against the ideals of the popular party. It is easier to get a hearing in that way, among the select few—still large enough to make a considerable public of themselves.

Maurice Barrès is perhaps the most widely read of the three. He writes, often with a strong conservative bias, in all the genres, and he has identified them with successive stages of his own development. He is a patriot, an ardent "regionalist," in his love of the character and colour of provincial life, an historical novelist of the new school, in his keen sense of the nations as makers of history, and his comparative indifference to their masters of court or camp. He is also a psychologist of the first order, with a deep insight into the souls of races, as distinct from the merely individual growths. The newer tendencies of cultivated thought are to be found in his pages, and especially in his strong insistence on the belief that no people can afford to forget its past. "Our individual conscience comes from the love of our country and of its dead."

Is there no place, then, for the novelists who write merely for the love of character and of incident, and especially for the love



BORDEAUX, VIEWED FROM THE TOWER OF ST. MICHAEL'S CHURCH



PANORAMIC VIEW OF LYONS FROM THE PLACE BELLECOUR



THE IMPORTANT NAVAL HARBOUR OF BREST



CHERBOURG, AS SEEN FROM THE FORT DU ROULE

SCENES IN THE GREAT CITIES AND PORTS OF FRANCE

of telling a story without any other prepossession? Assuredly, or M. Henri Regnier would not be read. He is a subtle spirit born out of his proper time, which was the eighteenth century, and prevailing by the force of his irony and his wit, and especially of that variety of the latter which is known as the "esprit gaulois."

French Apostles of Feminism But the remorseless obligations of the subject compel us to return to another class of writers with a purpose—the apostles of "feminism." The subject looms largely in the literature of France, as distinct from the propaganda by the deed and by the platform to which it is almost wholly confined in England. Marcel Prévost led the way with "Les Demi-Vièrges"; but, as a rule, the women have now taken the matter into their own hands.

Their studies of passion leave little to be desired, except sometimes a sense of restraint; and the freedom for which they plead is less that of the representative assembly than of the home and the heart. Gérard d'Houville—Madame de Regnier for her familiars—writes with remarkable literary power. Madame de Noailles follows on the same side, and is much in vogue. With these are Madame de Coulevain, the author of "Ève victorieuse," and especially of "Sur la branche," and Madame Marcelle Tinayre, whose "Maison du péché" was one of the most widely read books of its year.

All of these have not only something to say, but they have learnt how to say it by the most serious reading in literature and history. They differ from earlier writers of their sex, and even from George Sand, in having a distinctly feminine point of view. They write as women, and not as women who hope to be taken for men. Such a method has its dangers; and it must be confessed that some of their feminine followers have run into the grossest licence, as though to proclaim their independence of the precept that want of decency is want of sense. The late

Imagination's Place in Literature Madame Bentzon, though woman to the finger-tips and a champion of women, had in perfection the qualities that must always go to the making of good literature, and especially reserve.

Imaginative work is not the all in all of a literature. There are thinkers who work for thinking's sake, as there are artists who work only for the sake of art. But the

peculiarity of modern France is that the apostles of ideas tend more and more to express themselves in poetry, fiction, and drama. They naturally wish to have a hearing, and they find that the average reader prefers to take even his philosophy in object-lessons. Some of them fare ill in this attempt, and succeed only in showing that they have missed their vocation. Most of the vital thought of France is enshrined in its fiction, and that fiction is so good because it is expected to be so much more than the amusement of an idle hour.

In history there has been a change from the prophetic and picturesque and the essentially literary method of Michelet to that of the minute and exhaustive study of facts with the object of leaving them to tell their own story, or, at best, of grouping them with a little malice aforethought. M. Sorel is the leading representative of this school, and he may be described as the French Stubbs. M. Lavissee, and, above all, M. Fustel de Coulanges, stand for the older and the more attractive method. But their work is still governed by a rigorously methodic purpose

A Brilliant History of France and treatment, which at least seems to obtain its effects of the picturesque by accident rather than by design. The last-named, however, though it may annoy him to hear it, is very much of a great writer. M. Gabriel Hanotaux may be said to unite the two schools. His history of contemporary France during the period of reconstruction that followed her last great war is at once one of the most brilliant and solid works of the time. Apart from these, we have any number of writers of the memoirs in which the French have always excelled. M. Bourget has entered the domain of travels in a manner characteristic at once of himself and of the new school, with his quite descriptively named "Sensations d'Italie." In criticism—philosophic and literary—M. Brunetière, though he has recently passed away, still rules, with M. Lemaître and M. Faguet.

In philosophy and science proper the French are for the moment largely dependent on the foreigner—exception made of such names of the illustrious dead as Pasteur and Claude Bernard. Darwin, Spëncer, Buckner, Haeckel, Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and Nietzsche call the tune.

The French drama shows precisely the same tendencies as French literature. It is given over almost wholly to the problem

and the social question. As M. Faguet has observed, there is in every age the formula in vogue; and, in a certain sense, all the theatres of France have ever, at any given period, played the same piece on the same night, the same sort of piece being understood.

In the eighteenth century the inevitable thing was a classic tragedy or a comedy of so-called character derived, not from the life, but from La Bruyère. In the nineteenth there was another variety of choice—Hugo, with the alternative of Augier, Dumas, or Sardou. To-day, in the drama as in the novel, writers are pushing out in every direction in search of the spiritual interests and preoccupations of their time. In the new comedy of manners, the lawyers, the doctors, the financiers sit to the artist, and not merely as individuals, but as members of a social group—the “world” of Bench and Bar, the world of medicine, and so on. What playgoer of us all can have forgotten the “Business is Business” of Mirbeau in its English dress? The French stage, usually in advance, has not been so closely in touch with the

Reward of the French Dramatist

realities of life for many a year. It is the spirit of Molière, who dared to plunge right into the realities of his day, in bold disregard of the conventions of the old Italian comedy which then ruled the stage. There is no more intrigue for intrigue's sake. The modern French dramatist has simply opened his eyes to what is going on around him, and has reaped his reward in no longer being reduced to “faire du Scribe” or even “du Sardou” for a living. The English are still, or were but yesterday, in the old rut; and, though they have escaped from Scribe, they are still hardly out of the toils of Sardou, with “The Scrap of Paper” and “Diplomacy” as their most successful pieces of the immediate past.

When that truly eminent hand in stagecraft died, it was but as a writer who in his own country had survived his own school. But Mr. Shaw and Mr. Galsworthy, with others of their band, have shown us the way to better things, especially now that the younger men have improved on one of their leaders by leaving themselves and their own personal idiosyncrasies of theory out of the cast, and by working purely in a medium of the actual concerns of their day. Mr. Pinero, the only one of the veterans who is always marching on, caught up with at least the rear-guard of the

French host in “His House in Order,” and has had his reward in the honour of adaptation for the Paris stage. And Mr. Barrie has made an attempt to extend his empire in the same region. He would have done better to begin with the “Admirable Crichton.” The play so named, however, is rather German than British in its method;

and something as much like it as one pea is like another has long been played in Germany. The French move faster. In the art of acting, for instance, while we are yet agitating for a school on the old lines of the Conservatoire, M. le Bargy is well on his way with a new method of rendering the passions of the scene, which is founded more directly on the study of nature.

The Théâtre Libre and the Théâtre Antoine are striking examples of the present methods of writing pieces, of mounting, and of playing them, all immediately from the life. The less ambitious Grand Guignol, and even the amateurish Théâtre Social, must be mentioned in this connection, if only as signs of the times. The French stage is, in some instances, gradually leaving the realism, to which ours is yet but gradually working its way, for a symbolism which is still true to the spirit of the universal quest in being a symbolism of the real. The names of Curel, of Portoriche, of Brioux, and of Donnay have yet to become household words on our side of the water; but we shall hear more of them, no doubt, in the course of the next quarter of a century. M. Lemaître, M. Lavedan, and M. Rostand, in the higher ranks, have already been brought to our notice, and, no doubt, all the rest will come in good time.

M. Rostand apart, no aspect of our modern life is indifferent to the newer writers. They seek their subjects on the stock exchange and the racecourse, in the religious conflict and the decay of faith, in the home, in public life, and in

Socialism as in all the reactions—in fact, wherever men's hearts beat with the passions of their age. Criticism follows them, as it always does a bold and successful lead; and, where it still ventures to disagree, it has to find some less hackneyed term of derision than “problem” and “tract.” The big battalions of the playgoer are now with the problem; and naturally all is changed. The passion for experiment, for the eternally new,

The New Role of the Stage

Themes of Modern Writers

not as a mere bid for notoriety, but as research forward, as exploration, is equally characteristic of France in other arts. It is especially so in music. The new school, led by Debussy and d'Indy, with Bruneau, Charpentier, and Dukas—as composers or as critics—for captains of the host, are men for whom Wagner is already but a grey-beard. They are as different from the great German master in their methods and aims as he was from Gluck; and they have come to regard both as follies of the past. "That animal Gluck!" cries Debussy. "I know only one other composer as insupportable, and that is Wagner. Yes; this Wagner, who has inflicted on us the majestic, vacuous, insipid Wotan!"

"And what do you think of our Berlioz? He is an exception, a monster. He is not at all a musician; he gives one but the illusion of music, with his methods borrowed from literature and painting."

The new school borrows from literature, too, but only for the spirit, not for the method. Its art is sensuous, not to say sensual, and dreamy, and it aims at the rendering of states of emotion rather than of the emotions themselves. Debussy, for instance, after learning his accidence at the Conservatoire, and winning the Prize of Rome there by an orthodox academic composition—just to show he could do anything he liked—went straight into the work of his choice as soon as he had shaken himself free of academic control. He had served in the army, like every other Frenchman, and he found his first call to something new in "the blend of sonorities" produced by the barrack-yard call for "lights out" and the long-continued vibrations of a neighbouring convent bell. He sought to do in music what Verlaine and Stéphane Mallarmé were doing in poetry—the latter especially in his "Afternoon of a Faun." The verse was imitative of impressions of natural effects, and

Debussy tried to render these in music in the same subjective manner. "In the midst of a dream," says Bruneau, "murmuring violins rustle, and tinkling harps; pastoral flutes and oboes sing; and they are answered by forest horns," all in "an exquisite fairyism" of general effect.

Rossetti next took his turn of inspirer in chief with "The Blessed Damsel," rendered by the musician so as to give all the dreamy witchery of that

masterpiece of fancy and imagination. Maeterlinck's "Pelléas and Mélisande" was inevitable after that, with its "ideas of fatality, of death, its atmosphere of sorrowful legend, its poor kings, poor people, poor inhabitants of unnamed lands whom fate leads by the hand"—fate and Maeterlinck. It is the music of people who do nothing, but feel everything, whose souls are instruments on which Nature plays in all her moods.

No wonder such a composer should ignore melody, with its beginning, middle, and end; its story, in a word. "I have been reproached," he says, "because in my score the melodic phrase is always found in the orchestra, never in the voice. Melody is almost anti-lyric, and powerless to express the constant change of emotion or life. It is suitable only for the song which confirms a fixed sentiment."

Debussy visited London in 1909, and conducted several performances of his own music. Vincent d'Indy, a Frenchman, but a pupil of the Belgian composer Franck, visited New York, and expounded similar views in a lecture at

Harvard University. He met with an interested though not an enthusiastic reception; but critics of note predicted that the future was with the music of the school. French art has undergone a thorough revolution in the course of the last fifteen or twenty years, with Claude Monet and Rodin for its prophets, and Mauclair for its expositor. The last is the Boswell of both of these great men, and he has taken down their theories from their lips. The common note of it all, in music as in painting and sculpture, is the discovery that there are new effects of Nature to render, effects not always dreamt of in the philosophy of the modern classical schools. So the art of the day imports a revolt against the academical system in France, though not necessarily against the ancients. Its aim is the more faithful rendering of light. The new painters paint light on the presumption that there is really nothing else to paint. For them colour is but an effect of light, and they try to produce it by the very methods of Nature.

Their point of departure is the truism that in Nature no colour exists of itself. As a reality pertaining to objects, colour is a pure illusion. It is simply an effect of light in its impact on objects. The light does not illumine the colour; it

**France's
New School
of Music**

**Revolution
in
French Art**

**Music's
Exquisite
Fairyism**



A REGIMENT OF INFANTRY ON THE MARCH



OFFICERS STUDYING THE ELEMENTS OF BIG GUN FIRING



A COMPANY OF SOLDIER CYCLISTS ON THE ROAD

SOLDIERS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

brings the colour in its train. Objects are of no colour; or, rather, of all colours, as they absorb or reflect these from light. The academic system starts from the heresy that colour is something that can be laid on in compact masses, mixed for the purpose on the palette. Nothing of the sort; it is

Passion for Reality in Painting

but an effect of far more artful adjustments. The earlier masters had some instinctive perception of this great truth, though they had not reduced it to a science. There are traces of it in Watteau, in Ruisdael, in Poussin, and especially in Turner, Constable, and Delacroix. The school is called Impressionist; but Mauclair gives good reason for thinking that the noun chromatism might suggest an adjective more to the point. And since colour is but light, so light is but form in every mode of definition. Why, then, take the trouble to paint anything else, since in this you have the all in all?

This is the principle of the revolt against mere subject in the picture. Why paint history, or symbol, or anything else that is so purely human and secondary in its source? Why not paint what is alone real? This passion for reality leads logically to the search for truth in mere human characterisation, for character is but truth in one of its forms. If you paint man, let it be man as he is, not as he should be in some fantastic theory of the ideal. Courbet must be mentioned here as a precursor, though the principle has been carried far beyond him by later men.

Claude Monet leads them all. His way of painting a landscape is to take, say, a dozen canvases, and to devote each to one particular aspect of the scene as the light marks the true hours of the painter's day. So the one landscape, after the patient labour of many days, comes out as twelve quite different scenes, according to their degrees of illumination. To

Monet's Artistic Methods

plant yourself with but one canvas before a constantly changing scene, and in protracted sittings jumble all its effects together, is but the childishness of art. Monet uses only the so-called primaries, though he is not very strict in the definition of them, and he never mixes the pigments on his palette to get a special combination. He simply lays them on in such a way as to produce by optical suggestion the effect of the combination

he seeks. Hence, when we are near them, his pictures are apt to look quite unintelligible, as an assortment of primitive colour stains without aim or purpose.

But see them at the right distance, and this confusion subsides into a perfectly ordered work flooded with light, and therefore with colour, and abounding in true form and drawing everywhere—not in the drawing of outline, of which Nature knows nothing, but in the drawing of colour, than which she knows of nothing else. The revolution, both in aims and methods, is extraordinary, and is not to be made intelligible by any description; it has to be seen. To be fair to a man almost forgotten, it dates at least from Couture, who, as any of his pupils still living might testify, often painted in this way.

Degas, another great Impressionist, shows the same solicitude for truth in regard to figure and to movement. He, too, has the horror of the crude outline, and holds firmly to the belief that form is but light and shade. He finds movement, by preference, among the ballet

Impressionist School of Painters

girls, and he has painted them by the hundred in all the incidents of the daily practice of their art. Here, we have them at their lessons; there, waiting for their turn; and there again "on" in their fairyland of scenery, gauze, and coloured rays. He is quite pitiless in his passion for truth. Sometimes his nymphs look hungry, sometimes even quite ugly—a lower depth, no doubt, in the professional inferno—as they squat for repose, or writhe in the tortures of the gymnastics of their trade. But by-and-by we shall see them in their appropriate setting, and then all defects of detail will be lost in the illusion of the perfect scene, as their tremulous contours play hide-and-seek with the light from which they spring.

Renoir, another great painter of the Impressionist school, finds his favourite contrasts not so much in light and shade as in light against light, which is, after all, but the expression of the same truth; for shadow itself, as artists know it, is not blackness, but only another degree of light.

The school is a large one now. It has passed its apprenticeship of calumny, poverty, neglect, and it influences all the French painting of the day. It has produced great illustrators—Raffaelli, Forain, Renouard, and Cheret, who has done such

wonders for the art of the poster. It is now on its way to the nirvana of absorption into the light of its origin, to make room for the incarnation of neo-Impressionism in the artists of the Pointillist group. With these, the effects of light, instead of being rendered as in Claude Monet's work by irregularly disposed blobs of colour, if one may use the phrase, are obtained by a sort of mosaic of it, composed of small touches of equal size, and of spherical form. This, in a way, is an attempt to paint the very atoms whose vibrations produce the light itself.

Rodin is Impressionism in sculpture; and he, too, like the painters, works mainly for effects of light, and for character, and so is in full revolt against the academy. Yet he still proclaims his allegiance to the Greeks, who, he declares, managed their statuary on precisely the same principles as his own. He is for new truth in one word, and his new truth is that we do wrong to treat sculpture as a mere glorified study of still life. It is emphatically, even in its most statuesque pose, a thing vibrating with movement, a movement that comes from the play of light on its different masses. These, as they catch the ray, or lose it, form a great harmony; and the statue is to be wrought entirely to the end of the harmony so obtained.

For him there is no such thing as the one view, sole and single, of a piece of statuary. It has to be seen in all its parts, and to be judged by the entire disposition of its masses in regard to the everlasting play of light. His "Age of Bronze" was so much a conceivable thing of life, as distinct from the merely inert thing of the older school, that he was accused of having cast it bodily from his model, and he was compelled to take extraordinary pains to show that he had done nothing of the sort. After this came the "John the Baptist Preaching"—marvellous again in precisely the same way. It is a real man speaking to his fellows, and so wholly absorbed in his message that the whole body of him is in utterance with movements conformable to the working of his soul. He is not thinking of how he stands, or how he walks, for walking he is, but simply of what he has to say; and the last thing of which he is to be suspected is the consciousness of what he is doing. It is almost ridiculous in some of its

sincerities, ridiculous in its suggestion of the utter absence of the sense of effect. The "Burghers of Calais" came later, as another revolt. The revolt might have counted for little with the general beholder, but the note of sincerity was manifest to all. The mythical child of Nature might have judged the work and found it good—the burghers defiant in their dejection, dejected in their defiance, with the hanging lips of scorn and of despair. Think how such a subject might have fared in a studio of the Beaux Arts, and we shall realise the immense advance.

With the Balzac that came long after, Rodin reached his present manner, which is but the old one perfected in the sense of character and freedom of handling, in the deeper learning of the relation of masses, and withal in the profound sense of the symbol, and of the majesty and the greatness of life. He is now a sort of mystic sketching with the chisel as others sketch with the crayon, a Dante, a Blake, a Maeterlinck, dreaming in marble or in bronze. He loses himself now and then, but such misadventure is inseparable from the finding of any new thing. He has enlarged the bounds of sculpture; that is the main point.

Is this to say that he has destroyed the old idealism of the real classic schools or even of the academies? Nothing of the sort. That was, and is, a real thing, too, in its search after one kind of perfection of proportion, and of the perfection of line. He has only shown that it has not exhausted all other possibilities of the quest. The Laocoon, with its divinely restrained anguish and its perfect beauty in distortion, is no less true to one conception of great art than Rodin's famished Ugolino, with the light almost shining through his ribs, is true to another. The point of interest in the new art of France is that it is one with the literature

Results of Experiments in Art in being experimental, and something beyond it, in the sense of nature and in the sense of life. Expression of character now stands in the forefront, as distinct from the expression of mere ideals. All the reactions are still possible in all the arts; and the next one in painting and in sculpture may be in the direction of the old classic repose. The good of each successful experiment is that it still leaves some precious addition to the stock of

ideas. There is no finality in anything, simply because there is none in the aspirations of the human spirit. The legend of Eden is still a valid one: we are ever trying to walk as gods.

If France has been less active than of old in science, as generally understood, it is perhaps only because her present quest is for science in all the arts. Everything in France turns on the religious question; it goes straight to the roots of the national life. In a sense there are only two parties in the country—believers and unbelievers. All others are merged in these. You are a clerical, an agnostic, or an atheist, in the first place; the political badge comes after, as it may.

The quarrel between Church and State dates from the Revolution—to go no further back. The Church estates were confiscated after the great upheaval, and parcelled out among various owners, mainly the peasantry. There was no undoing that; but when Napoleon I. came to restore the fabric of institutions, he found a way out of the difficulty. He frankly recognised all the religions—Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish—gave them the right to acquire fresh property, and paid the salaries of their priesthood from public funds as a sort of compensation for the loss of their former income. The State acquired certain privileges of control in return, needless to mention here.

This concordat, as it was called, worked fairly well until our time. Then it was found that the Church was in a way to become as rich as ever by the offerings of the faithful, and to take itself seriously once more as the censor of thought. She was at the same time suspicious of popular government, and was held to be a secret agent of reaction. Hence came a revival of the old and ominous cry of "the Republic in danger," and with it a determination to destroy the concordat, to reduce Catholicism to the status of a mere pious opinion, and to deprive that and the other faiths of all official support. This policy was found to unite all the discordant elements of the Republican majority. The popular party—as its strength was measured by votes—was opposed to all religion, as such; the professorial and the middle class generally were scandalised by the claims of the Church to the censorship of ideas.

So the war broke out, with the result of disaster after disaster to the clerical power. The teaching orders, which had a sort of monopoly of the elementary schools, were broken up. Much of the wealth of the Catholic body began to go the old way of confiscation, though a good deal of it was saved by its confidential transfer as private property to the hands of the faithful. The Church was disestablished, the State salaries to the priesthood were withdrawn, while a pension scheme, offered as a sort of compensation for them, was rejected with contumely at the bidding of Rome.

The Protestants and the Jews readily accepted the new state of things, and undertook to make the support of their systems wholly a matter of private and voluntary concern. The Catholics, against whom these measures were really directed, resisted from first to last. But the measures were so acceptable to the governing majority, ruling through the ballot box, that all active resistance was vain. Successive Ministries lived on the policy of suppression. M. Waldeck Rousseau kept his Government together by this means; so did M. Combes, and M. Clemenceau after him. No matter what the state of the game in party politics, each held this trump card in reserve for emergencies, and won with it. Right or wrong, it is unquestionably the policy of the masses that hold the mastery in France.

Meantime the Church was not idle; and the war was transferred from politics to literature. M. Rod has given us an interesting history of this new clerical reaction in his "Idees Morales du Temps Présent." The movement found "the classes" very much under the sway of that genial sceptic, M. Renan; it left them largely in the hands of M. Brunetière, the Catholic devotee. Renan was scepticism absolute and self-satisfied, scepticism as a dogma, and sufficient to all the needs of the intelligence, if not exactly of the soul.

When his disciples began to look for something more, they found it in the pessimism of Schopenhauer. The reaction against this doctrine, with its revolutionary implications, led straight to the reverence of tradition as the convenient depository of the results of human experience and the only sure guide. M. Brunetière, a sort of pontiff of criticism and literature, boldly proclaimed Catholicism as at once a polity and a system of faith. With this, the

**The Quarrel
Between Church
and State**

**Renan
the Genial
Sceptic**

**The War
Against
Religion**

more cultivated thought of France reached its positive current; and at the present time of writing it has irresistible attraction for many minds. M. Bourget, as a thinker, is of that school. M. Jules Lemaitre has made a new departure; and, while insisting on the necessity of the religious idea, has found its true source and its authority in our "most distinguished sentiments." It reads like the end of a letter; it is meant for a confession of belief. But the literary reaction is nothing as compared with the solid force of custom that makes for the old cult. The mother of the family in France is, as a rule, Catholic and pious, whatever the father may be; and this in all classes, and in town and country alike. There are two to reckon with in marriage, and when one of them insists on the blessing of the Church, the other has generally to give way.

The children thus get their Catholic teaching, no matter who gives it to them—the mother or the priest—and they make their first communion with all the modest pomp and ceremony that attend the rite. Many of the boys, no doubt, will grow up forgetful of it as they pass through the workshop; with the girls its effects are rarely lost. And even among the urban masses and the politicians, the very ultras of infidelity often consent to have their daughters brought up in the Catholic faith. One other tribute to the force of custom must not be forgotten: the churches are open still and as thronged as ever, just as though nothing had happened. Probably, if Rome could be induced to abate half her claims to the absolute direction of the human spirit, her opponents would abate more than half their hostility. The conflict in its acute stage is the result of a natural intolerance and of an incapacity for give and take, of which neither side has the monopoly.

All sorts of attempts were made, both within the Church and without, to establish a basis of agreement between the disputants. The French bishops, or many of them, lent a favourable ear to schemes of compromise, but were overruled from Rome. The Liberal, or modernising Catholic party, represented if not exactly led by the Abbé Loisy, pleaded eloquently for a reconciliation with modern thought, and for an abatement of the Papal claim to supremacy in this domain. But this writer was peremptorily ordered

by the Church to lay down his pen, or to write only in defence of ecclesiastical tradition. The Abbé long protested against the deliberate opposition of Rome to the whole rationalist and scientific movement of the age. "Suppress," he says, "this policy of ideas, and cease to attempt the impossible." In saying this, however, he

**Rome's
Methods with
its Critics**

claimed to be a true son of the Church. So did the late Fr. Tyrrell, whose name is mentioned in this connection only to show that the movement of modernism was by no means confined to priests of French nationality. He demanded not a brand new Catholic theology, but simply one under the progressive influence of that "spirit" of Christianity which was the original principle of life and growth. Rome, however, has dealt as roundly with these individuals as it dealt in the past with the Gallican and all the other Churches claiming an organic life of their own.

The philosophers, of course, have not been able to keep out of the *mêlée*. M. Goutroux, a member of the Institute, has made an attempt at reconciliation in his "Science et Religion." He tries to show that the conflicting forces are not so much concretes as tendencies, and that each is a complement of the other. They do wrong to strive for victory; they should strive for harmony. He is entitled to be heard, if only for the breadth and range of his survey, which includes Comte, Spencer, Haeckel, Ritschel, and William James.

But the greatest of all the apologists of free thought is M. Guyau, who, in a series of brilliant works recently brought to a close by his death, has tried to sketch a "morality without obligation or sanction"—to translate the title of his most famous book. This, like much else that appears in France nowadays, is an implicit abandonment of all attempts to find a common understanding with revealed religion in any of its forms, and an effort to discover the basis of a new faith in the nature of man. The known defect of agnosticism is its want of the categorical imperative for conduct and for life. It is negative at the best; and a positive concept is the only one that can afford a foundational base.

M. Guyau accordingly offers a formula for morals which asks no support from revelation, from tradition, or from ecclesiastical authority, and which derives

**Claims of
the Church
of Rome**

**Where
Agnosticism
Fails**

its ideal from the realities of existence and its ethic from the constitution of man. His point is, to put it quite briefly, that the altruism which is our higher principle of being is in no wise dependent on theology, commonly so called. It is just as much an essential part of us as the egoism which is supposed to be the lower principle. It

**Education
the Battlefield
of Religion**

belongs to man's nature, on its expansive and dynamic side, as distinct from the merely self-preserving instinct of the other part of him, and is a force which carries with it the authority of a vital function. In this way he claims to have solved the problem of egoism and altruism, hitherto the philosopher's stone of speculation, for the benefit of the moralists. We could not, he argues, be completely egoist, even if we tried. To live is to spend ourselves for the good of others, and is at least quite as much a law of biology as to store and acquire for our own good. Pleasure may be a consequence of altruism, but it is not necessarily the end. The end is the sheer necessity of living according to the law—the law of our being, not of any deliverance from any messenger or any mount of God.

In France, as in England, education is the battlefield of religion; and one section is eagerly in search of a system that may replace the teaching of the old faith. Some think that moral teaching should be given in the schools, others that it should be rigorously excluded from them. M. Compère, a member of the Institute, and a general inspector of public instruction, offers a complete treatise on education, intellectual and moral, in which all the sanctions are derived from laws which are not religious in the conventional sense of the term. Another writer, M. De Monzie, who has held high educational rank, urges the banishment from the schools of ethical teaching in every shape and form. "No more scholastic idealism," he says, "no

**Conflict of
Church
and State**

more lay instruction, no more moral catechism; let us apply the school and the school-teacher to their essential and unique function—education." So the war goes on, and Rome is still unyielding as ever. It can hardly be otherwise. It is bound by its traditional claim for uniformity, as distinct from unity, and is perhaps too deeply pledged for the possibility of change. Policy might suggest the wisdom of compromise, but consistency

forbids. In the voting masses of France, largely alienated from all faith, with whom the issue rests, the Church has encountered a power as implacable as itself. They, too, seem incapable of compromise, and their infidelity is an aggressive force. The same stern necessity is laid on both sides, and they advance to the onset under the impulsion of fate. The conflict now belongs, not so much to the history of a nation as to the history of religion itself. Here, for the first time in the course of human affairs, is a triumphant majority determined to give form and body to a new policy which is nothing less than the complete emancipation of the human spirit from the religious idea.

It is a difficult thing to take a bird's-eye view of a nation, more especially as the results must very much depend on the eye of the bird. France is described as at the height of her greatness, or in full decadence, according to the observer. Some think that with her declining population, heavy taxes, her disordered Budget, with its immense allocations for all sorts of fanciful schemes, and its annual estimates of something like 800,000,000 dollars,

**Triumphant
Legions of
Free Thought**

she cannot possibly long keep her place in the van of civilisation. Others rejoice in the fact that the Republic has won the goodwill of all the nations but one, founded a huge colonial empire, and enormously increased her trade with Britain and with the world. The present system is, at least, fully entitled to give itself the benefit of the doubt, and to boast of its contribution to the national prosperity. One thing is certain—the nation is now quite self-governing for good or ill, and in the full enjoyment of the privilege of suffering for her own mistakes.

The dynastic conflict is at an end; the religious conflict alone threatens domestic peace. It is serious—that is not to be denied. Both sides are to blame, for both have yet to learn the lesson of intellectual toleration.

But, as commonly happens in such cases, the one that wins least sympathy from the beholder is the one that has the upper hand. The triumphant legions of free thought have everything to fear from a reaction. A powerful minority of the peasantry, with the women, who are nearly a majority of the whole people, will not patiently consent to be hindered in the exercise of an old faith while a new one

is still in the making. Religion is an institution, as well as a matter of private concern, and it must naturally have immense claims on the veneration of millions of struggling souls. The United States form a stronger Republican government than even France, and, with them, religion is as free as the air. No doubt they are happily exempt from some of the peculiar difficulties of the sister polity. France has had to disestablish a Church; they never made the mistake of establishing one. Confiscation would seem to be an indispensable agency of government, since it has gone on all through history; but it is still a two-edged sword whose cut is apt to be quite as deadly in the swing as in the stroke. There would be sound policy in sending the Church on her way contented, even at the cost of pecuniary sacrifice, and thenceforth in leaving her severely alone.

In education the Republic has made immense strides. The best teaching is now accessible to every citizen, high or low, according to the measure of his powers. The communal school has become a sort of starting-point of social equality; there is no great distinction of classes under its roof, and the humblest pass with little pecuniary difficulty to the higher grades.

The "Lycée," corresponding roughly to our grammar and high schools, is incomparably superior to these in regard to its cost and to the technical quality of the instruction. Here, too, all classes study side by side. Beyond these are the schools for the army, navy, engineering, and other specialised callings. Beyond them, again, is the university, equally accessible to all, but in practice mainly reserved for students of law and of the teaching profession, since the other establishments provide for all ordinary needs.

The whole system has but one defect—it still leaves a good deal to be desired in regard to the culture of character. It is far better than the English as a preparation for careers; not so good as a preparation for life. But it is greatly improving in the sense of the educational value of sports and games, though, in that respect, its faults have been exaggerated. The British system still aims at training a select class for the work of government and administration; the French, with its strong equalitarian bias, insists on giving a chance to all. Here, again, the religious difficulty has been the lion in the path. France has been

driven by the force of circumstances to resist the clerical claim to supremacy in education. The starting-point of this movement of revolt was the law on the composition of the superior council of education. The famous Article VII. of that measure declared that no one belonging to a "non-authorised" religious congregation should take part in the management of public or free education. At that time, the public schools were in the hands of over 30,000 members of a teaching brotherhood of the Church entirely free from secular supervision. The new law brought the lay teachers into the work, and established training colleges in each department.

France has not escaped a "feminist" question, though her difficulties have not reached the same acute stage as our own. One reason is that socially the French woman holds a position with which she is fairly satisfied. She keeps much more in her class, and shares the class sentiment, and the class ideals. She is fully occupied, and with the substantial aid she gives her husband in business—and is expected to give—she escapes all risk of becoming the inhabitant of a doll's house.

This state of things can hardly be said to apply to the purely industrial classes. Here we find that, while the women count something more than as one to two of the men in numbers, they are paid something less than as two to one. It was a professional humorist rather than a strict logician who pleaded that, although he came to business later, he invariably went away earlier than his brother clerks.

The most satisfactory note of progress for the foreign observer is that the country is now wedded to the idea of peace. It has not lost the old spirit of resistance to aggression, but it has unquestionably parted with the old love of fighting for fighting's sake. The embarrassments of the French Government in Morocco have

really been due far less to German diplomacy than to the extraordinary unwillingness of the French people to enter into a war of adventure. The yearning for peace is shown by the very excesses of the demand for it, for some fanatics would abolish the army altogether. M. Jaurès, however, who best represents the entire French democracy, has declared that a war in defence of the country would unite all Frenchmen able

to bear arms. He draws the line at aggression, and he would go so far as to compel all governments to submit disputes to arbitration, at the peril of being regarded as enemies of the human race.

Enough has been said to show that France is strong, prosperous, bold in experiment in literature, science and the arts, alive in every sense.

RICHARD WHITEING.

LATER EVENTS IN FRANCE

SERIOUS political opposition from Royalists or Imperialists has long ceased to threaten the stability of Republican Government in France, but the religious question and the social question remain unsettled, and have been a source of danger to the internal peace of the nation in the twentieth, as they were in the nineteenth century. The religious question has turned mainly on the education to be provided in the schools, and the anti-clerical majority in the Chamber has steadily supported the Government in its policy of complete lay control. All the Socialist groups in France, however strongly opposed to the Government on other matters, agree with the Radicals in the demand for complete secular education, and as the Socialists secured over a hundred members in the Chamber at the elections of 1914, and thus became the strongest of all the parties, the Government, relying on their support, safely continued its campaign against the teaching of Christianity in the schools. In fact, the anti-clerical policy has been the one policy the French Government has been able to pursue without coming into conflict with the Radical financiers in the Senate who so largely influence and control the direction of politics in France. At the same time, even so prominent an anti-clerical as M. Combes has suggested that the time has come to call a halt in the attack on religion, and more than one public man has expressed a doubt whether the suppression of religion in the schools is not responsible for the increase of juvenile crime in France.

The social question has been aggravated indirectly by the anti-clerical campaign, for by the Government neglecting or failing to carry all legislation for social reform, and concentrating on the struggle with the Catholic Church, the belief has gained ground amongst numbers of workmen that Parliament is impotent to change things for the better where the working class is concerned. This belief is mainly responsible for the growth of revolutionary Syndicalism, and the popular advocacy of "direct action" by strikes and sabotage

in place of political action by legislation. France is indeed the cradle of Syndicalism, and while the revolutionary tradition dates from the great Revolution of the eighteenth century, it is the France of recent years that has brought Syndicalism to the front and made it a living faith amongst thousands of workmen in France, Italy, and Spain.

Philosophically, Syndicalism insists on the ever-changing character of human life and all its institutions, denies permanency in the social order, and insists that the future of society must be developed as it will on the break up of the existing fabric, and cannot be guided by the past or foretold. On the last point comes the difference from the Socialist philosophy of Marx and his disciples, the Socialist prophesying the coming ownership and direction of all collective industry by a democratic State. Practically, the Syndicalists enjoin industrial action in place of political action, and look to the trade unions to cease from taking part in politics and to devote themselves to becoming guilds owning and guiding each particular industry—the old idea of Robert Owen, and in its peaceful form bearing fruit in co-operative enterprise.

But the real danger to society from the Syndicalists, especially in France, where revolutionary violence has a tradition, is the essentially anarchist doctrine at the root of their propaganda. Proclaiming the destruction of existing institutions as a necessity for the freedom of the labourer from wage service, and insisting on the reality of "the class war" between capital and workmen, Syndicalism deliberately encourages in France all attacks on the property of capitalists that may diminish their possessions or alarm them into yielding to working-class demand. The strike, according to the Syndicalist, is a weapon of offence, to be sprung suddenly on the capitalist, to be extended indefinitely and to culminate in a general strike of all labour for the coercion of the rest of the nation. The strike is also to be accompanied by any damage to property (sabotage) that may help to weaken the

THE PRINCIPALITY OF MONACO

employer's position or arouse attention in the country.

The Confédération Générale du Travail has been more than once the exponent of Syndicalism in France in recent years. The popularity of Syndicalism has fluctuated. The Socialists increased their strength in the Chamber at the General Election of 1914, and the trade unions of Catholic workmen in France have also added considerably to their membership. Besides the religious and social questions, the passing of an Act in 1913, restoring the three years' service in the Army

—given up in 1905 in favour of two years—is notable as a reply to the German Military Laws of 1911, 1913. In January, 1913, M. Raymond Poincaré, then Prime Minister, was elected to the Presidency of the Republic, and his accession to this office was regarded as a victory for moderate principles and stable government. The State visit of King George V. and Queen Mary to Paris in the spring of 1914 was an occasion of the friendliest demonstrations, and further evidence of the cordial friendship existing between France and Great Britain.

THE PRINCIPALITY OF MONACO

GEOGRAPHICALLY, this tiny principality, with its area of eight square miles, and resident population of some 22,000, is at present an "enclave" of France, as the French Department of the Alpes Maritimes surrounds it on all sides, except to the south, where it borders on the Mediterranean. It may be said to owe its present political existence and independence to the goodwill of France, though its language and traditions are Italian. In the days of the French Revolution it actually did belong to France, but its independence was restored by the Allies in 1814, who, in the following year, placed it under the protection of the King of Sardinia. Up till 1861 the principality included Mentone and Roquebrune, but in that year the

reigning prince, Charles III., ceded his rights over them to France for nearly £200,000. The present ruler, Prince Albert, came to the throne in 1889, and in 1911 established a National Council of 21 members elected every four years by manhood suffrage. There is also a Council of State. The principality consists of three towns—Monaco, Condamine, and Monte Carlo. It is through the last named that Monaco is known to all the world, for Monaco simply means Monte Carlo, and Monte Carlo simply means gambling.

Monte Carlo, which is a few miles from Nice, the beautiful town on the Riviera sprang into notice with the building of its famous—or infamous—Casino in 1858, though gambling had begun there two years



MONTE CARLO, THE BEAUTIFUL PLEASURE RESORT

earlier. In 1861 Charles III. granted a concession for fifty years to run the place as a gambling concern in a highly elaborate way, the concession eventually passing into the hands of a joint-stock company, taking care at the same time to do everything that was possible to add to the great natural attractiveness of the site; for there is no doubt that Monte Carlo is one of the most charming and delightful spots in Europe, with an almost perfect winter climate. The company, which is called the Société Anonyme des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Étrangers de Monaco, was given an extension of its privileges in 1898, and this new contract does not expire until 1947.

Practically the whole cost of the government of the principality is borne by this organisation, which, in addition, pays

Prince Albert an annual sum of \$350,000 up to 1917, when the sum will be increased to \$400,000; in 1927 it is to rise to \$450,000, and in 1937 to \$500,000. Besides these sums, the company paid a bonus to the prince in 1899 of \$2,000,000, and another bonus of the amount of \$3,000,000 in 1913. The company has a capital of \$6,000,000, and its shares are valuable. These facts are eloquent testimony that the "tables" pay their proprietors, but nobody else, save the prince and a few others; yet there is little or no diminution in the volume of gambling from year to year. The truth is that the principality is a vast gambling hell, and it is this, and not its beauty, that mainly attracts to it many thousands of visitors every year.

ROBERT MACHRAY

THE REPUBLIC OF ANDORRA

PERCHED amongst the high mountains of the Eastern Pyrenees, with one foot in France and the other in Spain, this small commonwealth—for that term really describes it better than republic—has existed for something like a thousand years. Its area is no more than 175 square miles, and its population about 6,000; it has never been any larger or more populous; yet for all this length of time it has been an independent and autonomous state, undergoing practically no change—a fact which finds no parallel in history save in the somewhat similar instance of the Republic of San Marino, in Italy. It is a patriarchal and even primitive little country, with only one good road through it, and that available only in fine weather, the other means of communication being mere hill tracks more suitable for goats than human beings. The most exciting event which has occurred in Andorra since the days of Charlemagne, who is said to have given it its first charter of freedom, was its connection with France by a line of telegraph in 1893, an innovation to which not a few of its inhabitants were bitterly opposed.

Though independent, Andorra is under a sort of joint suzerainty of France, whose influence is steadily increasing in the country, and of the Bishop of Urgel, a Spanish ecclesiastic, in whose diocese it was once included; the frontier of Andorra is some sixteen miles from the town of Urgel, in Spain. The republic

consists of six parishes, each of which sends four members to a council; the council elect from themselves two syndics to preside over the destinies of the land. There are two criminal judges, called *viguers* (vicars), one of whom is appointed by France and the other by the Bishop of Urgel. A civil judge is also elected alternately by France and the Bishop of Urgel. The Andorrans, however, remain indifferent to these symbols of authority, and imperturbably preserve their immemorial independence; but of late years the children of the better classes are being sent to France for their education. The postal and telegraphic arrangements, too, are under French control. On the other hand, the money in circulation is Spanish, and the language is Catalan.

The people themselves are a cheerful and sturdy race of mountaineers, chiefly concerned with their flocks and herds—when they do not happen to be engaged in smuggling, for which Andorra affords unique opportunities. Taxation is, to all intents, nil; but a sum of \$200 is paid for "protection" each year to both France and the Bishop of Urgel, and the raising of this sum constitutes the main feature of the Andorran Budget. Perhaps nothing could more clearly show just what the country is than to say that while the first floor of its Palacio is occupied by the Council Chamber, the centre of its government, the ground floor is a stable for the horses of its executive and members of Parliament.

ROBERT MACHRAY



SPAIN IN OUR OWN TIME

THE NATION'S NEW ERA OF PROGRESS

By Martin Hume, M.A.

THE revolution of 1868 in Spain, profound and disintegrating as it looked for a time, was almost purely political in its direct results. The already recognised right of private judgment in religion was, it is true, slightly extended, but in every other respect the national life was barely affected by the violent outburst which expelled Isabella II. from her throne and country. There was no radical change effected in social relations, in the organisation and compensation of labour, in the basis of taxation, or in the relations between Church and State.

The entire rearrangement of political parties, which was the principal outcome of the revolution, prepared the way for far-reaching changes which are now operative or impending. The accession to the revolutionary ranks of the "Union Liberal," or Moderate Liberals, ensured the success of the revolt, but it also involved the disappearance of the party itself as a separate entity; and on the restoration of Alfonso XII., in 1875, a new division of political parties was practically complete. The old purely Conservative party had disappeared as a governing factor, and the new Conservatives, who had brought about the restoration, were evolved as a separate political group from the moderate elements of the revolution itself. Thus Spain turned her back upon the past, and since then has been governed by parties, which, whether

they call themselves Liberals, Conservatives, or Democrats, are all essentially Liberal in their dependence upon popular sentiment and their acknowledgment of the supremacy of the national will. For many years of the long regency of Queen Christina, 1885-1901, politicians of both parties chivalrously abstained from action likely to disturb or excite the public mind, the Liberal party especially

postponing its convictions, both on religious and social problems, to the need for consolidating the throne of the child-king by the support of Spaniards of all opinions. The attitude of the official Liberal party led finally to the formation of a strong new group of Democrats pledged to far-reaching social reforms and to antagonism to the influence of the clergy, but on each occasion that this Democratic party—led with conspicuous ability by Señor Canalejas—coalesced with the traditional Liberals under Señor Moret for the purpose of forming a government, the coalition was unable to withstand the strain imposed by divergent opinions, mainly on the question of the Church and the conventual orders.

The accession to effective kingship of Alfonso XIII., amidst the universal goodwill of his people, did not to any considerable extent alter the situation created and fixed by his wise and prudent mother during her long regency. The political parties alternate in power as before, the real differences between their respective policies in office being extremely slight, however democratic may be the professions of the Liberal party when in opposition, since both groups of politicians have agreed to rule constitutionally and accept the principle of popular government.

Both parties, it is true, are equally ready to manipulate the elections in the most unblushing manner in order to secure power and office for themselves; but to the people at large it matters little which political combination rules them, since the effect in either case is practically the same. The main aspirations of the country, indeed, are less towards political than towards social change, as the people have already lost faith, as a result of experience, in the efficiency of political convulsions to remedy the ills of which

they complain. In the meanwhile the Socialist party in the country has increased enormously, especially in Catalonia and Biscay, where the manufacturing activity is most marked; and, as a consequence, projected legislation, under the guidance of either of the two great political parties, has mainly taken the form of Factory Acts, the limitation of the hours of labour, the restriction of the industrial employment of children, and other measures directed towards the social amelioration of the working classes. A remarkable instance of this is given by the Act for the compulsory Sunday closing of all business establishments, except those devoted to the sale of prepared food, and the legal enforcement of a weekly day of rest in all trades.

In this both Socialists and Clericals have co-operated, although it forms a revolution in the traditional habits of the people; and has only been rendered operative at the cost of considerable friction. Another demand persistently made by working-class politicians, but hitherto unattained, owing to party dissensions, is the regulation of the monastic establishments with the object of suppressing the unfair industrial competition with regular workmen arising out of the extensive manufactories carried on by some of the conventual houses.

The most striking change, however, in the position of Spain in the last few years is to be seen in the re-entry of the country into active participation in the concert of European nations. This had been traditionally difficult, as the mutual jealousies of France and Britain had usually stood in the way of a close co-operation between Spain and both of those countries simultaneously. The exigencies of European politics having drawn together Britain and France, the principal obstacle to the resumption by Spain of an important part in international politics was removed,

and the situation, particularly as regards Mediterranean problems, was profoundly affected thereby. It had been an article of faith with Spaniards for centuries, and especially since their successful war with Morocco in 1860, that when the inevitable break up of the Moorish Empire in North-West Africa should take place Spain must inherit a considerable share of the country opposite her own shores, in addition to the places of arms she already held at Melilla

**Establishing
A Weekly
Day of Rest**

and Ceuta. Unfortunately for her, when the Anglo-French agreement was signed on April 8th, 1904, recognising on the part of Great Britain the future preponderating influence of France in Morocco, Spain was unready and badly served diplomatically, and her traditional interests were to a great extent ignored, as indeed were those of England. But the subsequent Act of Algeciras to some slight extent recognised Spain's right to take part in the civilisation of the neighbouring Moslem country, by conferring upon her jointly with France the mandate of the Powers to police the ports in the interests of the world generally.

Spain has therefore had to sacrifice many of her hopes and dreams in this direction; but it is evident that however much French dominion may in time extend over Morocco, the proximity and long-standing intercommunication between the latter country and Spain will ensure that the predominating ethnological and civilising element will be Spanish. Nor has the sacrifice been entirely without compensation. The cordial friendship both with Britain and France, cemented in the former

case by the auspicious marriage of King Alfonso XIII. with an English princess, not only ensures, as far as is humanly possible, Spain's own immunity from attack, but very greatly increases the probability of continued European peace. The reconstruction of the Spanish navy, destroyed in the Spanish-American War, has in the opinion of Spaniards become a necessity of the new international importance of their country, and several proposals with that object have been made to successive Parliaments. The financial sacrifices necessary for the purpose, however, prevented the adoption of any large naval scheme until late in 1908, when the difficulties were overcome and a large shipbuilding programme was definitely adopted. On the fulfilment of this, in the course of three or four years, Spain will once more enter into the circle of important maritime Powers.

Although the agricultural and viticultural districts of the country are still suffering much poverty and hardship, Spain has in several unexpected ways greatly benefited by the loss of her great colonies in the West Indies and the Philippines, in addition to the relief afforded by the cessation of the drain of men and money which had continued for so

**Spain's Large
Shipbuilding
Programme**

**Spain and
the Moorish
Empire**

SPAIN IN OUR OWN TIME

many years in her effort to hold them. The sudden disappearance of the protected colonial markets for Spanish goods threw the Catalan manufacturers into a panic of fear for the very existence of their numerous industries, but matters in this respect have righted themselves in an extraordinary manner. The adoption of a protective fiscal policy, in 1892, by Spain had caused a great increase of activity in Spanish manufactures for home and colonial consumption; but it also resulted in a restriction of foreign trade and heavy liquidations, causing a depletion of currency with the issue of quantities of small paper money, the international exchange being thereby raised to the ruinous rate of thirty-three pesetas (£1 6s. 1½d.) to the pound sterling, instead of twenty-five, which was the par value.

Although this entailed great hardship upon those, including the Government, who had to pay sums of money abroad, or who consumed foreign goods, and it made the cost of living considerably higher than it had been, it greatly stimulated Spanish manufactures, especially for export, since the low value of the Spanish currency caused the productions of Catalonia and other manufacturing centres to appear very cheap when compared with their foreign gold value. In 1899, for the first time in fifty years, the balance of trade turned slightly in favour of Spain; and in 1906 the exports considerably exceeded the imports, the former having been 1,018,387,000 pesetas (over \$200,000,000) in value, and the latter 884,800,000 (\$180,000,000). Though this has produced an improved exchange, and a return to the long projected rehabilitation of the gold currency and equalisation of international exchange, it tends in the near future to bring its own antidote in a restriction of exports as money values in Spain and abroad are the same.

In the meanwhile, the purchasing power of wages being much reduced, and the demand for the commoner wines being diminished by the French protective duties, the condition of the

working classes generally in Spain is deplorable to the last degree. This is seen in many ways, especially in the great growth of mendicancy, and in the constant increase of emigration to South America, which is fast draining whole districts of their best peasantry. The number of emigrants from Spanish ports in 1900 was 63,000, and in 1904, 87,300; whilst in 1905 no less than 126,000 Spaniards abandoned their homes in search of better conditions of life abroad, and in a recent voyage the present writer saw sixty Spanish stowaways on a single steamer. This poverty amongst the peasantry is contrasted sadly with the enormous increase of luxury and expenditure of the higher classes in the towns, and especially in Madrid, owing in great

measure to the return to Spain of rich colonials when Spain lost her dependencies, and also to the large fortunes made by the manufacturers and capitalists since the protective tariffs were reimposed in 1892.

Throughout the history of Spain the predominant desire of the people has been for continued separate provincial existence, and most of the unrest of the country has had this desire for its origin. The demand for continued or increased local autonomy

was in times past the principal support upon which the hopes of the clerical Don Carlos depended; but in the last few years the cause of provincial home rule for Catalonia, Biscay, Galicia, etc., has turned from Carlism, which is recognised as a dying force, and has largely allied itself to the advanced Socialist party. In Catalonia, where the demand for complete autonomy has always been strongest, the cry for home rule, now almost unanimous, is bound up with the powerful provincial interest in maintaining a protective policy for the whole of Spain.

The Catalan party in the Cortes are united, active, and able, but they have naturally against them the whole of the representatives of the poorer agricultural provinces—the greater part of Spain. In the direction of literary activity



KING ALFONSO AND HIS HEIR

The posthumous son of Alfonso XII., he was proclaimed King on the day of his birth, May 17th, 1886; ascending the throne in 1902, he married Princess Ena of Battenberg in 1906, and in the following year the heir was born.

Spain has shown a remarkable change of tendency in the last few years. The more serious writers are directing their attention almost entirely to studies of sociology in its various forms, with a view, apparently, to discovering the causes and remedies of Spain's continued adversity. This constant introspection on the part of

Cause of Spanish Unrest Spaniards at the present time to some extent provides a solution to the problem they set themselves. Whilst they are minutely discussing their national shortcomings and peculiarities, other nations are working; whilst they are doubting and despairing, other peoples are pushing ahead in hope; whilst they are waiting upon Providence, others are forcing Providence to wait upon them. The national character is a strange mixture of exalted idealism and utilitarian worldliness, and it has become so much afraid of its own ideality, which it calls Quixotism, as to shrink from enterprises that demand a measure of imagination and faith in the future.

A great deal of the listlessness which characterises Spanish life springs from this national lack of faith in action, unless the result to be attained is visible and immediate; and although the sociological experts, who for the last few years have written of little else in Spain, formulate many diagnoses of the maladies of their country, there is a general consensus of opinion that the main evil that afflicts the body politic is Spain's want of that ardent belief in her own destiny which in the days of her greatness constituted the secret of her success amongst nations. The introspective note is manifested as much in the works of the modern writers of fiction in Spain as in those of the professed sociologists. The school of romantic writing which flourished in the mid-nineteenth century and drew its inspiration from France and England has now disappeared, and the modern Spanish novel deals almost

Spain's Literary Activity invariably, in an analytical and psychological spirit, with the contrast between the fervent religious belief of old Spain and the rationalistic tendencies of to-day, between the proud Spanish traditions of grave deliberation and the bustling activity of the present age, between the patriarchal conservatism of the soil and the vociferous demands of labour for a due share of the richness and sweetness of life. The education of the people of Spain

still lags behind that of other European nations, although compulsory education was decreed as far back as 1857. The schoolmasters have always been wretchedly underpaid, and too often not paid at all, by the provincial and town councils, upon whom they depended, and the compulsory clauses have been almost entirely disregarded. Recently, however, a distinctly better spirit is being manifested in this respect, a special Ministry of Public Instruction having been formed, and the State having assumed authority over the schools. The present percentage of total illiterates is about 65 per cent. of the population, as against 75 per cent. fifty years ago. The total cost of primary education is not less than \$5,000,000 dollars per annum, mostly falling upon the local authorities, the whole country being divided into ten educational districts for purposes of inspection and control of the 25,340 primary schools, the number of scholars upon the books being 1,620,000, whilst the whole population of the country is approximately 19,500,000. Spain still suffers from the lamentable

Madrid's Rapid Advance lack of enterprise of its rural and provincial populations outside of the great industrial centres of Catalonia and Biscay.

The land is still cultivated listlessly and on methods long since obsolete elsewhere. The area planted with vines is about 3,600,000 acres, the produce of which, in 1905, was 3,079,925 tons of grapes, yielding 389,482,116 gallons of wine. The area under olive trees is about 3,250,000 acres, producing on an average 39,500,000 gallons of oil; these two products, with mineral ores and fruit, form the bulk of Spain's exports to foreign countries, England being now by far the largest consumer of Spanish produce, and the largest supplier of merchandise to Spain.

The change that within the last few years has brought Spain once more into the family of European nations of the first class has also profoundly affected the social life of the capital. Madrid has grown enormously both in size and population, the inhabitants now numbering nearly 600,000, and some of the thoroughfares and trading establishments are as handsome as any in Europe. The attachment of the present king for everything English, and the natural influence of an English-born queen, have greatly increased the adoption of English manners, fashions, sports and

SPAIN IN OUR OWN TIME

taste amongst the upper classes, by whom the English language is being studied very widely; whilst the large number of English visitors and the ever-growing relations between the two countries, are already to a great extent leading Spaniards of the middle class to adopt new standards of comfort, well-being and hygiene.

The last few years, moreover, especially since the accession of Alfonso XIII., have seen a considerable diminution in the social and political power of the clergy, and Spain can at the present time in no sense be called a priest-ridden country. In the great industrial centres, and particularly in Catalonia and Valencia, free thought in religion to a great extent accompanies the advance of political Socialism, and a perfect freedom of expression on matters relating to religion is indulged in.

The bulk of the population, nevertheless, in Castile and the south, are faithful in their observance of the dictates of the Church, and an unsuccessful attempt of the Liberal Government in 1907 to pass a measure for regulating the monastic orders led to the fall of the Ministry and the accession of the Conservatives under Señor Maura to power. The number of religious houses now existing in the country is 3,253, of which 597 are for men, and the rest for women, there being still over 10,000 monks and 40,000 nuns in the cloisters. The relations between Rome and the Spanish Church are still those settled by the concordat of 1851, and all attempts to rearrange them in a more liberal spirit have failed before the strong Catholic feeling still prevalent in the country and Parliament. Similarly, the scanty concession granted to Protestants and other non-Catholic religious bodies after the revolution of 1868 is still the largest measure of liberty granted, non-orthodox worship being licit, but no outward sign or announcement of it being allowed.

The constitution which rules the country is still in substance that which was adopted in 1876, after the restoration of Alfonso XII., with some modifications of secondary importance. The main principle of this charter is contained in the formula: "The power to make laws resides in the Cortes and the king," the Cortes consisting of two co-legislative bodies of equal power. The popular Chamber, or Congress of Deputies, consists at present of 406 unpaid

members, representing one for every 50,000 of the population of the country, the election being by secondary vote of boards elected on manhood suffrage in one-member districts, with the exception of 98 deputies, who are chosen by twenty-eight large districts where minorities are represented. The Upper Chamber, or Senate,

consists of 180 elected members, and a lesser but indefinite number of nominated and ex-officio members. Of the elected senators, 130 are chosen by 49 provinces, the electoral body being co-opted from the provincial councillors, town councillors, and largest taxpayers, whilst the remaining thirty elected senators are chosen by Archbishop Chapters, universities and chartered learned and philanthropic societies.

The Senators nominated by the Crown must fulfil certain stringent conditions of position, age, and annual income, whilst those who sit by right are *grandees* of Spain, possessing an income of at least 60,000 pesetas (\$12,000) per annum—field-marshal, archbishops, sons of the sovereign, and the presidents of the Councils of State, Navy, and War, and of the Supreme Court.


The machinery of government is, as will be seen, democratic, as befits a nation in which social distinction is less marked than in any other in Europe; but the invariable corruption of the elections, and the apathy of all those who are not politicians, place in the hands of the executive almost unrestrained power. That, as a rule, they do not abuse it greatly to the detriment of the governed is due mainly to the tolerant democratic spirit which pervades all classes of Spaniards, and so long as the members of each political party can in alternation enjoy the privileges and profits of power there is no danger of any attempt at oppression of the people who pay. On the

other hand, the mass of the population go their way with little regard for politicians of either persuasion, content if the powers that be will improve the well-being of those whose hard lot it is to live for ever on the brink of want, forming the great majority of the nation, ill-housed, ill-paid, ill-fed, ill-taught, a patient, hopeful and long-suffering people, who deserve a better fate than misgovernment in the past has brought to them. MARTIN HUME

Spain's Religious Problems

The Hard Lot of the Spaniards

EUROPEAN
POWERS
TO-DAY



X
PORTUGAL

PORTUGAL IN OUR OWN TIME

THE FATEFUL RISING AGAINST THE MONARCHY

By Martin Hume, M.A.

PORTUGAL of to-day presents a typical example of a state wherein, the representative institutions being in advance of the general standard of enlightenment, a comparatively small class of politicians has been able, owing to the apathy and ignorance of the mass of the people, to corrupt and stultify a governing machinery ostensibly democratic. As happened in Spain, the dynastic rivalry led to the granting of a constitution on modern lines to Portugal in 1836 by Dom Pedro IV., who immediately afterwards abdicated in favour of his infant daughter, Maria da Gloria, with his Conservative and Clerical brother, Dom Miguel, as regent.

Such a combination could offer no permanency, and the dynastic struggle that ensued followed the same course as in Spain, the young queen representing the parliamentary party, and Dom Miguel the reactionaries. As a consequence of the final triumph of the former, the extremely guarded constitution of Dom Pedro was reformed on several occasions in a democratic sense; and, although the royal prerogative was maintained in legislation and administration to an extent unexampled in other modern parliamentary states, the ostensible form of government became in the end essentially democratic.

Up to the year 1884 the House of Peers, whose legislative rights were equal to those of the elected Assembly, consisted entirely of nobles unlimited in number, chosen for life by the sovereign, and this in conjunction with the operative right of veto by the king gave to the latter practically uncontrolled power over legislation, no matter how democratic the Lower House might be. The constitutional struggle therefore turned for many years past upon the attempts of Democrats to reduce the royal prerogative over legislation, administration, and finance, the last

subject being that which appealed most strongly to an overburdened, poor, and laborious agricultural people. In the course of the struggle the sovereign was, of necessity, brought into opposition with the more advanced section of his subjects; and, as a consequence, a very powerful Republican party steadily developed, and the relations between the Crown and the nation at large often became strained, notwithstanding the personal popularity and earnest good intentions of the king, Dom Carlos himself. The complete apathy of the mass of the population allowed the rival political parties to alternate in office mainly for the benefit of their partisans, and with little regard for the public interest; the late king, Dom Carlos, being made, with lack of magnanimity, the scapegoat for each party in turn whilst it was in opposition.

His own patriotism and desire to serve the best interests of his country were unquestionable; but his position became intolerable in view of the corruption of the administrative and electoral machinery by politicians, and the ungenerous attitude of each parliamentary opposition towards him. He had abstained from exercising to the full the powerful prerogatives he possessed under the constitution, and interfered as little as possible with the acts of his administrators.

He had acquiesced in the considerable extensions of the suffrage, and in the strict limitation, and provisions for the eventual extinction of, hereditary legislative peerages; but, unlike other constitutional sovereigns, he found the political parties unwilling to present a bulwark between him and the popular discontent aroused by oppressive taxation and administrative corruption, for which he was not responsible. Upon the king, most unjustly, was cast the onus of unpopularity

Rise of
Republicanism

Unlimited
Power of
the Peers

PORTUGAL IN OUR OWN TIME

caused by the inevitable submission of Portugal to the British ultimatum with regard to the encroachments in East Africa in 1890. The accusation was levelled against him that he had allowed his Anglo-phil tendencies to override the interests of his own country; and when, as a sequel to this agitation, a dangerous Republican revolt was suppressed in Oporto early in 1891, the king was again held personally responsible for the repressive measures that followed, and for the delay in granting an amnesty to the revolutionaries.

The main source of discontent has always been financial. Portugal, being in the main agricultural, is a poor country, and past mal-administration and present-day jobbery have burdened the people with a taxation out of proportion to their means. It was found that however great were the promises made by politicians in opposition, no relief to the taxpayer was afforded by either party when in power. In this respect, too, the king was made the scapegoat. The whole administration was wasteful and corrupt; but upon the

The Royal Family Criticised expenditure for the royal establishment most of the criticism was directed. The Civil List amounted to about \$560,000 per annum, and although this was comparatively modest for a nation whose annual revenue was some \$65,000,000, it formed the basis for constant attacks upon the sovereign and his family, who found it quite insufficient for their needs, and the king had consequently incurred heavy indebtedness to the State.

The position had thus become intolerable. The elective Chamber of Parliament was unblushingly manipulated by both parties in succession, and was representative only in name, notwithstanding the existence of universal manhood suffrage limited only by the ability to read and write. The public offices were crowded by idle parasites of politicians, and the pension list was full of scandalous abuses. In these circumstances a coup d'état was effected by the Prime Minister, Senhor João Franco at the end of 1906, with the co-operation of the king. Representative institutions were suspended, and the king and his dictator declared that until an uncorrupted and independent parliament could be summoned they would govern Portugal by royal decree.

The bold step naturally aroused the violent opposition and protest of all classes of politicians, thus deprived of their

unholy gains. Protest was met by prosecution and further measures of repression, and the country was deprived of all pretence of representative government, both in national and local affairs. The avowed policy of Senhor Franco and the king was to purify the administration and establish economy of the national resources, and the new broom swept with devastating effect into the dark corners of the government service. Unfortunately, the maintenance of such an open violation of national rights and traditions, however salutary this might be, entailed the keeping of the armed forces in a good humour, and money that was saved in one direction was squandered in another.

The Civil List, whilst ruthlessly reduced in some of its items, was increased in the aggregate to some \$685,000, and the indebtedness of the king to the State, a sum of \$770,000, was extinguished by a piece of financial jugglery which reflected little credit upon either the sovereign or the Minister. The great mass of the people had long since lost faith in the efficacy of political action to redress the evils of poverty and backwardness under which they suffered; the king personally was genial, kindly, and popular, and, although politicians of all shades denounced the dictatorship in unmeasured terms, the country at large went on its laborious way without audible or visible protest against the deprivation of its liberties—liberties which they recognised had not to any extent remedied the hard conditions under which the majority of the people lived.

Attempts were made by the regular dynastic parliamentary parties to use for their ends the heir apparent, an amiable young prince, called after his great grandfather, the King of the French, Luis Philip, and in his name to form a parliamentary cabal against King Carlos. The queen, also, a gifted and popular lady of singularly noble character, was understood to be opposed to the dictatorship, which she considered endangered the stability of the throne and the life of her husband. The young Crown Prince Luis Philip was removed for a time from the intrigues of the constitutional parties by sending him upon an extensive tour of the Portuguese African colonies, and after his return to Portugal he stood aloof from all attempts to estrange him from his father.

Intrigues Against the King

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Thus matters stood in January, 1908, when the royal family passed a few weeks at the ancient Braganza possession of Villa Viçosa, in the Alem-Tejo, east of Lisbon. In their absence from the capital the opposition to the dictatorship became more pronounced and active, especially amongst the Republican party, always ready to profit by the dissensions amongst the dynastic groups. The Press organs of Senhor Franco, the dictator, announced that a widespread republican conspiracy had been discovered, and a great number of arrests of political opponents of the dictatorship were effected as a precautionary measure on the eve of the king's return to Lisbon, whilst on the day previous to his expected arrival, January 31st, 1908, a decree was published suspending the personal guarantees, and declaring the right of the Government to imprison or expel citizens without form of law.

The state of affairs was known to be critical on the day fixed for the arrival of the royal family in Lisbon, February 1st, 1908, but Senhor Franco was confident of being able to preserve order, as the army and police were known to be faithful, and the great mass of the population were

apathetic, knowing, as they did, that the king meant well by the nation, and that the evils that he and Senhor Franco were endeavouring to remedy by unconstitutional means were real and great.

It was in the waning light of early evening when the king and queen, with their two sons, Luis Philip and Manuel, landed at the quay on the Praça de Commercio at Lisbon from the railway station on the other side of the Tagus; and in an open carriage they traversed the great


square at a foot pace between the lines of respectful and loyal people assembled to greet them. The way of the cortège towards the Necessidades Palace on the face of the hills overlooking the river lay by the Street of the Arsenal, a somewhat narrow thoroughfare turning sharply out of the end of the Praça de Commercio towards the left. Just as the horses of the king's carriage were about to take the turn, a signal shot was discharged in the crowd, and there leapt from behind the pillars of the arcade that forms the footway several assassins, who precipitated themselves upon the royal family. One miscreant, mounting the back of the carriage, shot

Assassination of King and Crown Prince

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THE ASSASSINATION OF PORTUGAL'S KING, DOM CARLOS, IN THE STREETS OF LISBON
 The dastardly act pictured in this illustration occurred on February 1st, 1908, when the king was driving through the streets of his capital to the royal palace of the Necessidades. Seated in the carriage with the king were the queen, the Crown Prince, and Prince Manuel, and when the fatal attack was made Queen Amelie heroically threw herself in front of her sons. But her brave act was too late, as both the king and the Crown Prince had received fatal wounds.



The Crown Prince

Dom Carlos

King Manuel

THE MURDERED KING AND CROWN PRINCE OF PORTUGAL, AND THE EX-KING MANUEL

the king in the neck, whilst another shot, which was mortal, struck him in the spine, and Dom Carlos sank bathed in blood upon the floor of the vehicle. The queen, standing and striking at the murderers, sought to protect her husband and elder son at the risk of her own life, and, although the target of many bullets, she miraculously escaped. The heir-apparent, a youth of twenty-one, was mortally wounded by two shots, and died within a few minutes when the carriage had been driven for shelter into the gates of the arsenal near by. A

Fate of the King's Assassins cry of horror and grief went up at this unparalleled crime, and the murderers, or such of them as could be identified, were cut to pieces by the police and the onlookers. The dynastic opposition parties, which had led the protest against the dictatorship of Franco, were as much dismayed as his friends at the turn of affairs, since the agitation which they had stirred up had thus gone far beyond their calculations or desires, and they at once rallied unanimously to the throne, now to be occupied by Prince Manuel, the younger son of the murdered king.

The Republican party, the extreme members of which were generally accused of the regicide, found no public support to the crime. The populace, struck with

detestation of so dastardly an act, were deaf to all appeals to them to rise against the new king, a young sailor lad of eighteen, whose unaffected geniality had already made him popular. But when it was said in Lisbon, the day after the crime, that the shots that had killed Dom Carlos had killed the republic, too, the prediction was not fulfilled.

A coalition Cabinet, chosen from moderate men of all parties, was formed. Franco for a single day only endeavoured to stand firm by the aid of the armed forces he had conciliated; but, finding now everyone against him, he incontinently fled into hiding, and eventually to foreign lands; whilst the Government that replaced him abrogated most of the decrees of his dictatorship, and provided for a prompt return to a constitutional government. Time alone would show whether the spirited but rash attempt of the lamented Dom Carlos and his minister to remedy by unconstitutional means a great constitutional evil would bear fruit, notwithstanding the terrible crime that cut short the experiment.

Portugal could hardly, after what had passed, revert entirely to the bad old system of party alternation of political plunder; but it was to be feared that, as in the case of Spain, no great

and permanent improvement could be expected by legislative action alone. In each case the statute books contain most of the enactments needed for the prosperity and happiness of a progressive state.

It is not the laws that are in fault so much as the general lack of a sense of responsible citizenship and the lamentable prevalence of illiteracy which render possible a lax administration and corrupt evasion of laws of themselves good and sufficient. Portugal, though naturally a poor country, has nevertheless ample resources to ensure the comfort and prosperity of its citizens, if the government were economical and honest. The people, especially in the north, where the land is mostly held by peasant proprietors, live hardly, it is true, but not miserably. They are laborious, frugal, honest and sober, and it is safe to say that when the present proportion of complete illiterates—78 per cent. of the population, notwithstanding so-called compulsory education—is reduced, as it might be considerably, no peasants in Europe will have more of the elements of happiness at their command than the Portuguese.

The revenue of the country steadily increased from \$14,000,000 per annum in 1889 to \$28,000,000 in 1907; but the wasteful finance and political corruption cause the expenditure to exceed the revenue in each recurring year. The funded debt grew with depressing regularity from about \$300,000,000 in 1896 to \$320,000,000 in 1905; and after a declared suspension of the payment of interest in 1892, an arrangement was arrived at with the Council of Foreign Bondholders in London by which the service of the debt was to be managed by a council sitting in Lisbon, to whom special funds were allocated to cover the three per cent. then being paid. The political constitution of the State before the king was dethroned consisted of the sovereign, whose veto upon legislative enactments was fully operative if notice was given on his behalf within thirty days of the submission of a Bill, of a House of Peers consisting of a strictly limited number of nominated peers alone, with a few hereditary survivals, the elective element having been eliminated, and a Congress of Deputies elected on practically universal manhood literate suffrage. The deputies were unpaid, but

were disqualified unless they possessed a small minimum private income. The country, which covers an area on the continent of 90,000 square kilometres—34,254 square miles—with a growing population of over 5,500,000, is divided for local government purposes into twenty-one districts, of which seventeen are in Portugal proper and three in the islands. These are subdivided into 306 arrondissements, and again into 3,961 parishes. A governor appointed by the Ministry presides over each district; the arrondissements being also presided over by an administrator appointed by the central government, aided in each case by elected councils.

Both in national and local administration the principal evil is the multiplicity of underpaid and often corrupt officials appointed in turn by rival political parties; and the lower ranks of the judiciary are similarly afflicted, there being no less than 142 *juizes de direito*, civil magistrates, besides the judges of the high courts and court of appeal, in addition to 809 elected justices of the peace, thus bringing up the number of judicial authorities to nearly a thousand for a population not much larger than that of London.

Possessing a climate unsurpassed in Europe for beauty and salubrity, and a soil in many districts of great richness, the future wealth of the country must depend principally upon agriculture. The methods of cultivation are still almost as primitive as in the times of the Romans, especially in the south, which is more backward than the north in all respects; and the great need of the population is that the national resources, instead of being squandered, as at present, upon unnecessary armaments and useless functionaries, should be employed in promoting national education, improving means of communication, and lifting the burdens from industries now sorely oppressed.

Of purely intellectual movement there is little of native Portuguese origin since the death of Herculano the historian and Almeida Garrett the poet. The novels of Eça de Queiros, which promised much, have unfortunately ceased with his premature death, and beyond a few historical and sociological studies there is now little produced by the Portuguese presses but translations of foreign works.

MARTIN HUME

THE REPUBLIC OF PORTUGAL

FALL OF THE MONARCHY AND REPUBLICANISM ON ITS TRIAL

THE youth of King Manuel II. may be pleaded for his inability to deliver Portugal from a corrupt Government, but it did not save him the throne. In the two short years of his reign the Republican movement became increasingly powerful, till in 1910 it was strong enough to overturn the Crown. The revolution of 1910 was accomplished with comparatively little bloodshed. The Army and Navy had their own reasons for discontent, and, led by the majority of their officers, went over to the Republic without making any fight for the Monarchy. The King, deserted by his troops, chose flight in preference to the assassination that probably awaited him, and thus exchanged the doom of his father for a pleasant residence in England. The Republican leaders then sought out Senhor

Théophile Braga, an accomplished and high-minded man of letters, with the opinions of a French Positivist, for provisional President; and Senhor Braga accepted the post, and in exalted speech promised a reign of justice and an "austere morality" for the new republic. (It is remarkable that both the revolution of the Young Turks at Constantinople in 1908, and that in Portugal in 1910, were the work of men inspired by the free-thought of Paris, and largely influenced by the political freemasons of France.) President Braga's sincerity has not been questioned, but a literary philosopher with distinguished university attainments could be but the merest figure head of republican Portugal.

The managers of the revolution in possession of the Government, and with the authority of the army to enforce their rule, impressed favourably the constitutional governments of Europe when they

selected Senhor Braga for their mouth-piece, but the promised justice and morality were quickly seen to be as far off as ever under the new régime as they had been under the monarchy. The Provisional Government arranged for a general election in 1911, and the formal endorsement of the Republican Constitution. The electors duly returned a republican majority. Senhor Braga retired into private life, having done the part allotted to him; and Dr. Manoel Arriaga, also a man of letters, of the University of Coimbra, and a gifted writer and eloquent speaker, was elected, August 1911, first President of the Portuguese Republic. Under the new Constitution of 1911, two Legislative Chambers—a National Council and a Senate—were set up. All men over twenty-one years of age who could read and write,

or who maintained parents or relatives, were entitled to vote. But as nearly three-quarters of the population were illiterate, and this in spite of the fact that education is by law compulsory, the electorate is a good deal smaller than in most European countries where

manhood suffrage prevails. And it is still further narrowed by the exclusion of all soldiers on the active list, all resident foreigners, naturalised Portuguese, bankrupts, and proscribed persons. The wholesale proscriptions of royalists which followed the revolution got rid of any political danger at the election from the supporters of King Manuel. The payment of members of the National Council is 175. for each sitting, and magistrates, soldiers, priests and government contractors are not eligible for membership. The Senate is elected by the Municipal Councils, and half its members retire every three years. The



THÉOPHILE BRAGA
Provisional President, 1910-11



Dr. MANOEL ARRIAGA
Elected First President in 1911

Vasques

Senate and National Council together form the Congress of the Republic which elects the President, whose term of office is limited to four years. The President must be thirty-five years of age—thus making it impossible for fourteen years for King Manuel II. to seek election, as Napoleon III. did in France after 1848—and cannot be re-elected to the presidency a second time. He chooses his Ministers, though the Ministry is responsible to Parliament; but he is forbidden to be present at debates in the National Council or Senate. The Civil List of the President is fixed at £3,900.

On the establishment of the Republic, the Government at once directed its activities against the Roman Catholic Church, and in 1911 a law was passed for the separation of Church and State. Under this law the Government claimed all the property of parish churches and religious orders, but allowed the use of the churches to the clergy, and undertook to pay salaries to all beneficed priests, while all religious orders were to be expelled. The enforcement of this law was attended with grave disorders, and Catholic Royalists from time to time in 1912 and 1913 attempted risings near the Spanish frontier. The fact that the political leaders who were associated with the corruption under the monarchy quickly hastened to profess adherence to the Republic was evidence that the Royalist cause could count on scanty support amongst those who arranged the elections. On the other hand, it gave little hope that a new and better era had been inaugurated in public affairs in Portugal. The workmen in the towns, organised in trade unions largely Syndicalist and social-revolutionist in character, supported the political republicans at the first, but finding no improvement in industrial conditions, soon went into opposition to the Government, and in 1913 organised big demonstrations in protest against Government policy. But the Government, by the aid of the army, was able to put down these demonstrations, and the disturbances that accompanied them, as it put down the attempted monarchist risings, and the prisons soon held as many disaffected republicans as royalists. The horrible overcrowding in the prisons, and the large number of prisoners arrested on suspicion and never brought to trial became a grave scandal in


1913, and provoked remonstrances from friends of Portugal in Great Britain.

At the end of its first three years of existence the Portuguese Republic was still threatened by the followers of King Manuel II., but the menace of revolutionary socialism, and of anarchist propaganda by bomb and assassination, was a far greater danger. But with the army at its back, the Portuguese Government could count on beating down all enemies within its borders, and the electorate could be so managed—as it is managed in certain South American Republics—that a Republican majority was returned to the National Council and the Senate. The need for a stable and honest Government was strongly felt in Portugal in 1914, especially in the face of an increasing national expenditure and grave working-class discontent. But political rivalries amongst various sections of republicans have hindered the establishment of such a government, and time alone can show whether the Republic is capable of producing the public men the service of the State demands.

For the Republic is on its trial. It is in vain for its political champions to utter glowing rhetoric concerning justice and noble sentiments in favour of freedom while the prisons are overcrowded with untried persons suspected of political offences. If the great mass of the working class suffered under the corrupt and arbitrary régime of the Monarchy, and consented without a murmur to its overthrow, they will be equally ready to allow a restoration of monarchy on finding the Republican Government no less tyrannical.

Next to the problems of good government and wise social legislation, the problem of emigration has to be faced by the Republic. The stream of emigration from Portugal, mainly to Brazil, is a terrible drain on the industrial resources of the country, and the Government in 1913 expressed its concern at what was taking place.

But the best prevention of emigration from a country not over populated is good government, security of life, an assurance of personal liberty, and a sure means of livelihood. It is these things the Portuguese people still sought in 1914, as they had sought them before the Republic displaced the Monarchy.



THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES IN OUR OWN TIME

LIFE IN NORWAY, SWEDEN AND DENMARK

By William Durban, B.A.

OF the three Scandinavian territories, it seems natural first to speak of Norway. No country is regarded with greater pride by its people than the glorious Norse Land, on which, to describe its various attractions, a great variety of epithets has been bestowed. It is fondly styled by its loving sons "Gamle Norge" (Old Norway), for its civilisations claim a mighty antiquity. It is the "Land of the Midnight Sun," the "Land of the Vikings," the "Land of Fosses," or stupendous cascades of immense number, and the "Land of Eternal Snow." It presents with its wonderful fjords the most magnificent coast scenery in the world, and its mountains in imposing splendour approach the Swiss Alps themselves; while its glaciers know no rival, except in Alaska.

Its lakes are countless, and the sportsman finds it a veritable paradise with its salmon rivers, its elk, wild reindeer, lynxes, bears, wolves, foxes, grouse, and ptarmigan. "Beautiful everywhere!" is the frequent exclamation of enchanted visitors. Romantic "dalen," or valleys, pine-clad mountain slopes, and immense juniper-covered plateaux, like the wild Dovre Fjeld, are elements of indescribable beauty in the whole landscape right up to the North Cape. The grandeur of aspect of the Lofoten Isles cannot be surpassed. The gigantic falls—the Voringfoss, the Rjukanfoss, the Skejgedalfoss, the Vettis-

**Natural
Features of
Norway**

foss, etc.—are tremendous torrents leaping from immense heights into the grand fjords, and some of these sublime gorges run up into the interior between the mountain precipices to distances of from 200 to 300 miles, carrying Atlantic tides right into the far centre of the land. The beautiful Hardanger, the grand and gloomy Geiranger, the sublime Sör, and

the romantic Nord fjords are amongst the most marvellous of these inlets on the coast. It is impossible to become acquainted with the Norwegian people without learning to admire and even to love them. They are to-day, as they have ever been,

**A Country
of Scattered
Villages**

simple and unsophisticated, clinging with passionate fidelity and attachment to the primitive customs of Viking ages. They are given to delightful hospitality, are indefatigably diligent, and are charmingly courteous, with a natural refinement. They are not "degenerate Vikings of to-day," as some have attempted to characterise them. There are hardly half as many people in all Norway, with its vast area of 124,000 square miles, as in London alone, and of its population of 2,391,000 only about 400,000 dwell in towns; so that the country is mainly one of scattered villages, dotted along the feet of the fjords, or on the lonely wilderness jelds, or in the clearings of the immense forests.

Norway has only 740 square miles of ploughed land, so that the actual agriculture is comparatively insignificant. But immense quantities of valuable hay are cropped during the brief, hot summer on the great "saeters," or meadow farms on the broad slopes. The Norwegian landscape is of two varieties—slopes and precipices, and most ingeniously the people adapt their pursuits to natural conditions. The greatest of all industries is, as might be supposed, fishing; for Norway has a coast of 3,000 miles, and the fishermen are perhaps the sturdiest on earth.

But the backbone of the population is bucolic, consisting of the splendid rustics known as the "Bonder," or peasant farmers. Domesticity and social life in this wildest north are delightful, and the

people are as happy as any in the world. The nights of the very protracted winter are spent in study, in courtship by the young folk, in wood carving, in tending the sheltered cattle, in hunting game, in visiting, in sledging, and in the glorious sports of racing on snow-shoes and of ski-jumping, in which recreation the athletic

Norway's Intellectual Standard

young Norsemen are the finest experts existing. Many a fearless leap on skis is achieved from a height of 150 feet. The social life of the people intimately mingles with their fervent religious cult. As in all Scandinavia, the national Church is Lutheran, and the quaint and pretty wooden churches are always filled, the country sanctuaries on Sundays along the Hardanger and other fjords presenting a singular spectacle, for the costumes are truly picturesque. There are comparatively few dissenters; and though theological controversies are of course not unknown, they are not acute.

The intellectualism of Norway stands high. Indeed, the people proudly claim that in proportion to the population they have in our time produced more geniuses than has any other nation. The names of Grieg, Nansen, Ibsen, Björnson certainly suggest influences that have of late years potently affected the thought of the world in poetry, music, and geographical research. Elementary education is universal in Norway.

The political conditions in Norway are altogether unique, and have, since the dawn of the twentieth century, been cast by an abrupt and startling revolution into a shape which has marvellously materialised the democratic aspirations of the people. Since the union with Sweden never really satisfied the patriotic sentiments of the Norwegians, a constant agitation was sustained for separation. The dissolution took place by decree of the Storting at Christiania on June 7th, 1905. The overt cause of the rupture was a protracted dispute between the

Separation of Norway and Sweden

two nations as to their foreign diplomatic representation. The late King Oscar of Sweden refused to entertain the offer of the Norwegian crown to one of his own family, but the details for the repeal of the Union were amicably settled by the Karlsbad Convention. A plebiscite was held, after which the crown was offered to Prince Charles of Denmark, who accepted it under the title of Haakon VII., thus greatly

gratifying the national sentiment of his adopted subjects by honouring the venerable Norse traditions. On July 22nd, 1896, he had married Princess Maud Alexandra, daughter of King Edward VII., so that the British and Norwegian royal houses are closely allied. The heir to the throne is Prince Alexander, born July 2nd, 1903, whose name was, on his father's accession, changed to Olaf.

It was a remarkable fact that though Nansen and Björnson are Republicans in principle, as all the nation well understood, they exerted a leading influence, through their speeches and letters during the separation and plebiscite campaigns, in favour of a King of Norway. Norway being a land of peasants, the town life is not so interesting as that of the country. Christiania is a quiet and even dull metropolis, but it is beautifully built, stands at the head of its own lovely fjord, and is the centre of intellectual culture, being the seat of a great university. By far the most important town is Bergen, which is also the prettiest, a rare thing for a busy commercial city. And Trondhjem, the

The Drink Trade in Norway

ancient historic capital, is attractive with its curious quaintness. Deeply interesting is the operation of the famous Norwegian company system for controlling the liquor traffic, which is very similar to the Gothenburg system in Sweden. Licences for the sale of ardent spirits are entrusted to a company formed, not for profit, but for the benefit of the citizens. The latest legislation on the principle of local option gives all men and women over twenty-five years of age the right to vote for the exclusion of retail bar traffic in spirits from the community in which they reside.

The profits of the companies, after the shareholders have received five per cent. dividend, are distributed amongst objects of public utility, such as planting parks, sanitary improvement, industrial education, waterworks, sewers, libraries, theatres and other amusements, charities, and religious institutions. High duties are imposed on the high-grade liquors imported, and it has become very difficult for foreign distillers to sell their commodities. Formerly, in Norway and Sweden, all owners of the soil had liberty to brew and distil, and the result was that these countries had a *per capita* rate of consumption of spirits higher than that of any other nation. Sweden, with its 173,000 square miles,

THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES IN OUR OWN TIME

and its hardy population of 5,521,943 is absolutely unique in its scenery and in the manners and customs of its inhabitants. The beautiful Göta Canal, a marvel of engineering; the romantic lakes, of which Wener and Wetter are fine inland seas with noble spruce-clad islands; the magnificent forests; the glorious Trollhättan Falls; the entrancing summer landscapes; the grand mountains of Norrland—the great Arctic section—with its noble rivers; the sweet pasture-lands of Svealand, the middle region; and the romantic seaboard of Götaland, the old southern territory of the Goths, form factors in the make-up of one of Europe's most interesting lands.

No nation is prouder of its metropolis than the Swedes have reason to be, for Nature has given them an incomparable site on which they have erected a superb city. Stockholm reigns easily without a rival as Queen of the Northland. Rising gently from the many islands of the little archipelago between Lake Maelar and the sea, this city has been styled the Venice of the North, but is, with its 342,000 inhabitants, palpitating with that modern

**Stockholm,
Queen of the
Northland**

life which fails to touch the city of the Doges. Gothenburg, intersected by huge canals and doing a fine trade, reminds the visitor of a Dutch port, excepting that its quays are boulevarded with trees. With her immense forests Sweden is the greatest timber exporting country in the world. Having nearly fifty million acres of forest area, covering close on half of the land, she can and does contribute enormously to the needs of other nations in this respect. But the most valuable recent development is the manufacture of paper from wood pulp. A great factory, worked by the lovely Trollhättan Falls, makes paper from pulp. The other chief export is the famous Swedish iron. Most of the estates consist half of forest land, and saw-mills are ever at work in every section of the country. Through these grand woodlands of oak, pine, beech, and birch run fine rivers, which are one secret of the activity of the lumber trade, for they facilitate the floating in summer of the timber felled in the winter.

The Swedes are fortunate in inhabiting the healthiest country on earth, the death-rate being only 16.49 per 1,000, the lowest in the whole world, and longevity is a national characteristic. Sanitation is assiduously attended to by the municipali-

ties under central government supervision, and the salubrious climate and absence of overcrowding contribute greatly to the felicitous condition of the national health. The habits of the people, especially during the last and present generations, are exceedingly conducive to the conservation of their physique. The old and disgraceful inebriety has been successfully fought by the famous "Bolog" control of the drink traffic, known as the "Gothenburg System," already alluded to in the reference to the modification adopted in Norway. The people are intensely attached to their Lutheran National Church, in which nearly all the clergy are university graduates, their minimum collegiate course being five years. The elective system regulates the appointment of the prelates, for the clergy choose the bishops. Under the late King Oscar II., who died on December 8th, 1907, Swedish royalty was identified with the most accomplished culture, for that beloved monarch was one of the most scholarly of kings.

King Gustavus V. married Princess Victoria of Baden, a first cousin of the German Kaiser. The union was very popular, because she is a descendant of the old and revered family of Vasa. In June, 1905, the king's eldest son, Prince Gustavus Adolphus, married Princess Margaret of Connaught. There are two other sons, one of whom, Prince William, married the Tsar's cousin, the Grand Duchess Marie, in May, 1908. Sweden and Denmark took a very prominent part in arranging with Russia and Germany the momentous Baltic and North Sea agreements for the preservation of the status quo in the Baltic, Britain and the Netherlands also sending delegates to the convention at St. Petersburg. The Baltic Agreement was signed at the Russian capital on April 23rd, 1908, and a parallel North Sea

**The Land
of the
Sea Kings**

Agreement afterwards at Berlin. The documents declared that the nations concerned were firmly resolved to preserve intact the respective rights of those countries over their continental and insular possessions in the regions in question.

Denmark, so often called by foreigners who have learned to love the country and its people "dear little Denmark," has special interest for England, because of the close affinity of the people of the two

countries and the intimate alliance of their royal families. A celebrated letter written by Lord Nelson is enshrined in the archives of the Foreign Office at Copenhagen. This missive is addressed to "The Brothers of Englishmen, the Danes." Naturally, the "Land of the Sea Kings" must appeal to Anglo-Saxon hearts. Pro-

**Denmark
Rich and
Contented**

verbially the little nations are the happiest, and Denmark, one of the smallest, is one of the happiest of all. Though she has been shorn of much of her outlying territory, she has never lost her integrity, never having known subjugation, and so high a place does she hold in the esteem of other nationalities, that the representatives of mighty dynasties have been proud to enter into matrimonial union with the Danish royal family.

A late King, the octogenarian Christian IX., who passed away on January 29th, 1906, was often alluded to as "father-in-law of half Europe." Denmark is a notable example of the way in which a little kingdom, surrounded by powerful rivals, can be equally prosperous in her smaller way. Her progress in our own time is a phenomenon which has astonished the world. This cold and bleak peninsula jutting into the North Sea, with its group of insular satellites, is the home of a people who have shown the world that a little nation can become rich, contented, happy, and progressive. Year by year the sturdy Dane is taking greater advantage of the opportunities afforded by a fertile soil.

Copenhagen, the "Athens of the North," is a metropolis of which any nation might be justly proud. Its population of over 500,000 is year by year increasing, and the city grows in importance. Much of the old town has passed away, and the aspect for the most part is modern. It is a city to linger in, and its very atmosphere enchants the visitor, while its people are amongst the most courteous on earth. The famous Vor Frue Kirke—Our Saviour's Church—is

**The Country's
Pre-eminence
in Agriculture**

one of the sights of Europe, for it contains Thorwaldsen's majestic statue of the Risen Saviour, with the marble statues of the twelve Apostles by the same consummate artist. Copenhagen, being not on the mainland but on the island of Sjaelland, on the Sound, possesses a unique charm from its wild and romantic outlook on the northern sea. The beautiful city is filled with treasures of art.

Three modest animals have mainly founded the modern prosperity of this interesting kingdom—the cow, the pig, and the hen. Denmark produces an immense quantity of butter and cheese, bacon and hams, and sells them with countless dozens of eggs to Britain and other neighbours. Many of the Jutlanders, from starting as swineherds, have become large dealers and merchants. The nation has set the pace for the modern world in agricultural co-operation. This applies specially to dairying. There are over a thousand co-operative dairies in Denmark, with nearly 150,000 members, receiving milk from nearly a million cows. The State has done everything possible to promote the system. The aim has been to secure a high degree of perfection in the system of handling milk so as to ensure cleanliness and a properly controlled supply.

This system is one of the romances of modern industry. And now, as a result of the encouragement given to the creation of small holdings by the famous Act of 1899, there are fully 100,000 of these farms. The Danish "small holdings men" are singularly well-trained, capable, and

**Political
Situation in
Denmark**

enlightened, and are steadily becoming more so. Another beneficent measure, passed shortly before the close of the last century, was the Old Age Pension Act, received now by 2½ per cent. of the population. The present political position in Denmark is that of a broad, genial, practical democracy, of which the king is the popular figurehead. King Frederic VIII. died in May, 1912, and was succeeded by his son, Christian X., who fulfils his promise to reign in accordance with his father's example. Political conflicts in Denmark are restrained by the moderation and sturdy common-sense of the people, reforms being promoted in a democratic, progressive spirit, in spite of the efforts of the Social Democrats to expedite extreme radical measures. The fine system of national education is sustained under the joint influence of State, Church, and municipality, under the special supervision of the Minister for Church and Education, through local committees, in which the clergy and magistrates play the chief parts. Education is elaborately and perfectly organised. The municipal schools, the Latin schools, and the high schools cover the whole land with a complete network, and the opportunities are appreciated by all classes.

THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES IN OUR OWN TIME

While in Denmark a tendency to develop manufactures has been noticeable in recent years, it was estimated in 1914 that 37·8 per cent. out of the population still lived by agriculture, as against 31·5 per cent. by manufactures, and 15 per cent. by commerce and transport. The fact that about five-sixths of the land is in the hands of small owners or peasants—the law prohibiting the amalgamation of farms into large estates—may also be accepted as evidence of the important part that agriculture plays in the national life. Attachment to the ideas and forms of political democracy in Denmark has been further demonstrated by the Reform Bill of 1913, which gave the Parliamentary franchise to all men and women of 25 in the country who were possessed of certain modest residential qualifications.

In Norway, too, democratic principles of Government have been steadily enlarged in recent years, and in no European country is there greater political and social equality between the sexes than in Norway. The first Act in the direction of this equality was passed in 1888 when

Sex-equality in Norway the wife was given equal rights with her husband as to their common property, the right to own her own property separately, and to have a separate income. The following year women were made eligible for school boards. In 1894 they were given the right to vote on the question of licensed liquor shops. In 1900 they became eligible for juries. In 1904 they were admitted to full practice as lawyers, and in 1907 they received a limited parliamentary vote. In 1910 full municipal suffrage was granted, and in 1913 an Act was passed unanimously and without debate giving the parliamentary vote to women on exactly the same terms as it was given to men. So that in Norway every man and woman over 25, not being a pauper, a bankrupt, or an ex-convict, and having resided not less than five years in the country can vote at parliamentary elections and is eligible for a seat in the Storting or Norwegian Parliament. This Storting is divided after every election into two bodies, the Odelsting and the Lagting—the latter, chosen in the full Storting and consisting of one quarter of the members, forming a sort of Second Chamber. Any bill rejected twice by the

Lagting after passing the Odelsting by a two-thirds majority becomes law on the Royal Assent. The King has the power to veto any measure, but if three successive Stortings are against him his veto is automatically removed. The growth of Socialist opinion, though very recent in Norway, is as noticeable in that land as it is in other European countries. In 1906 the Socialists polled 73,100 votes and returned ten

The Socialist Advance

members to the Storting; in 1912 the vote had risen to 128,455 and returned 23 members. The Norwegians claim

that their country has been more alert to the needs of higher education and the demand of modern commerce since their separation from Sweden. Yet the increase of population has been very slight in the twentieth century. For in 1900 the total population was 2,240,032, and Christiania had 233,373 inhabitants in 1904; while in 1912 the total population was only 2,428,500, and in Christiania in that year the inhabitants were 250,000.

In Sweden also the increase of population has not been startling. In 1905 the total population was estimated at 5,337,055 and in 1910 at 5,521,943. Nearly one-half of this population was engaged in agriculture in 1914, and this figure includes 298,000 owners and 50,000 tenants. Proportional representation and manhood suffrage were established in 1909 and an Old Age Pensions Act was passed in 1913.

The reorganisation of the Swedish Army, which began in 1901, has been steadily effected, but the great increase in military expenditure involved encountered strong protests from the Socialists in 1914. The King of Sweden, in whom considerable executive power is lodged, has insisted on the importance of an armed nation, and the majority of his people have supported

The Russian Menace

him. The menace of Russia has driven Sweden to this course; for the Russians have not only placed huge forces in Finland and constructed military lines to the north of Finland, by depriving Finland of its old constitutional self-government, they have abolished the safeguard that existed when Finland was a free and friendly state. The Swedish Navy in 1912 consisted of 92 vessels of war—438 guns—including 23 ironclads.



Photos by Messrs. Thomson, Grosvenor Studios

KING GEORGE V. AND QUEEN MARY



UNITED KINGDOM IN OUR OWN TIME

A CONTEMPORARY SURVEY OF ITS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

By Arthur D. Innes, M.A.

THE British Empire to-day is a unique phenomenon in the history of civilised mankind, differing in essential particulars from every contemporary empire as from all that have existed in the past. In the course of 300 years the people of these islands have taken possession of vast tracts of the earth's surface. The ancient empires held their conquests by force of arms, but in her great dominions on two continents the state has no garrison at all. Wherever Rome ruled, her government was of the military type; practically it is only in India that it falls under that category. Neither her colonial nor her Asiatic dominion presents close resemblances to the empires of other European states, except so far as Russia in Central Asia and France in North Africa hold positions more or less analogous to our own in India.

The states of which the empire is composed offer—subject to the ultimate authority of the central state, to which they stand in varying relations—examples of almost every conceivable type of polity: absolute monarchies in India, where the British raj itself is that of a racial aristocracy; while all the greater colonies are democracies. Or, if we follow the territorial method of classification, the empire will supply England at one end with federated countries in Canada and Australia, and at the other with something not far removed from the Greek idea of the city-state in the Isle of Man and in the Channel Islands. In the course of this work we have watched England developing politically far in advance of all Continental states, while Ireland remained a subordinate, half-controlled province, and Scotland held fast to a somewhat lawless independence;

States in
the British
Empire

until, 300 years ago, the three kingdoms were united under one crown, and then, at intervals of a century, under one legislature—theoretically, at least, on an equality. Three hundred years ago, the only over-sea territory possessed by the people of these islands was the embryo colony of Virginia, which had existed precariously for years. The seven-

Britain's
Colonial
Expansion

teenth century saw a British expansion which was not itself permanent, because the colonies then established afterwards broke away from the mother country. But it also saw, on the one hand, the confirmation of British supremacy on the high seas and of parliamentary supremacy in the British polity.

In the eighteenth century Great Britain completely distanced all rivals in the competition for colonial expansion, in spite of the loss of the group of communities which formed the United States, and this supremacy was confirmed by the Napoleonic wars. In those wars Napoleon himself chose commerce as the field in which he would come to death-grips with the British, with the result that, after Waterloo, there was no competitor within measurable distance of them, and the lead thus gained was increased progressively during the nineteenth century. During that century, also, the colonial expansion continued; the whole of one continent was appropriated. In India the British passed from being merely the dominant power to being lords of the whole land between the mountains and the sea; and finally the most valuable portions of the Dark Continent fell also under their dominion. The expansion was accompanied by a change in the internal polity. The supremacy of parliament was unchallenged; but the gradual extension of the electoral

body transferred the control of parliamentary majorities first from the landowners to the manufacturers and the middle class, and then from the middle to the labouring classes.

A further characteristic has to be remarked on in order to understand the position of the British Empire in the world at the present day. Until the stadtholder of Holland became king of England, these islands never played a part much more than insignificant in the struggles of Continental states. In mediæval times England had fought with France on her own account; later, still on her own account, she had fought Spain, and later still Holland.

The new dynastic association with Holland, coupled with her own dynastic question, forced her into the European arena; but even then it was not the size of her armies, but the genius of her great general, Marlborough, and the wealth which supplemented the exhausted treasuries of her allies, which made her alliance valuable; and, mutatis mutandis, the same principles applied throughout the whole series of wars which were finally brought to an end in 1815. To divert the energies of her enemies she did not fight them on land, but helped her neighbours to do so. For her own hand she fought them on the sea.

It was only in the Peninsular War that she took rank as a military power, and there she was only enabled to do so because Napoleon wanted the bulk of his legions for Moscow. Moreover, in the same connection it has to be observed that, with the possible exception of 1793, Continental interests have never been the motive of her wars. In nearly every case she has fought because the interests of France collided with her own in extra-European regions. With hardly a variation, her rulers have systematically declined to intervene in foreign quarrels otherwise than through diplomatic channels.

Moulding of Britain's History That rule has been broken, or is in serious danger of being broken, only in one corner of Europe: she would fight to prevent Constantinople from falling into the hands of Russia. We may say, then, that viewing the United Kingdom of to-day as the product of the forces which we have observed moulding its history, it forms the central state of an empire whose distinguishing characteristics are an immense transmarine colonial

system, such as no other European Power possesses; an immense lead in commerce; an established maritime supremacy, both mercantile and naval; the smallest of "regular" armies, outside of India, on the historic ground that no state has ever been able continuously to maintain both army and navy in the front rank, while to the British the navy has always proved the more effective instrument both for offence and defence. Further, this state has evolved its own polity—the system of parliamentary government—as an organic growth, without revolution and without copying the institutions of other states, except in occasional matters of detail; whereas her own institutions have been consciously adopted as models, though with appropriate modifications, in the constitution of most civilised countries.

Socially, as well as politically, her people have been, and continue to be, distinguished by the combination of a marked acknowledgment of class distinctions with exceptional facility in passing class barriers; in other words, social ranks are recognised, but are not permitted to stiffen into castes, as they did stiffen in most European states. Hence "labour movements," all the movements which are apt to be labelled "Socialistic" by those who disapprove of them, are accompanied among the proletariat by a much less virulent antagonism to the well-to-do than is frequently the case in other lands.

Intellectual Record of the British Isles In the intellectual field, the British Isles claim great names in science, both in its theoretic realms, such as Bacon, Newton, and Darwin, and in its practical application. In pure literature it is somewhat curious to remark that the greatest achievements of a people which prides itself on practical common sense have been in the region of imagination, of poetry, where it is not only insular prejudice that claims a supreme position for Shakespeare. Like the Shakespearian period, the hundred years which opened with the period of the French Revolution were rich in great literary names; but it cannot be said that either in literature or in science the United Kingdom in the twentieth century is showing any marked superiority to European and American rivals.

Aspects of this empire external to the United Kingdom itself remain to be treated at length hereafter; in this chapter we are concerned with the British Isles.

THE UNITED KINGDOM IN OUR OWN TIME

The condition of affairs to-day is the product of the past, the outcome of organic development; and development means both continuity and change. Can we, then, analyse the elements which tend to change and to continuity respectively?

In the nineteenth century the United Kingdom became the great, almost the one, manufactory and carrier of the world. Among the various causes of this supremacy, the most decisive is probably to be found in the Napoleonic wars—partly because they devastated Europe and drained off the best human material for fighting, instead of manufacturing; while the people of these islands were, comparatively speaking, able to devote a much

trade that Free Trade was universally acknowledged to be the cause of the expansion, and the advocacy of Protection was regarded as at best a "pious opinion."

But it has not proved impossible either for European states or for America to develop manufactures on their own account which can compete with British goods in the market. It is, perhaps, difficult to realise from the figures produced that her commercial ascendancy is vanishing; but the monopoly is hers no more; and it is by no means clear that the country will not attempt to recover it by a reversion to pre-Cobdenite methods.

It is curious to observe that Germany's commercial advance in the last forty years



MEN OF THE ROYAL ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTING A SUSPENSION BRIDGE

larger share of their energies to peaceful pursuits; partly because the Berlin Decree practically involved that the British should either monopolise the carrying trade or lose it altogether.

Apart from the war, the British already had a long lead in the carrying trade, and were in front of other countries in the development of machinery and the application of steam. But the practical monopoly was the outcome of the artificial conditions created by Napoleon, and made it supremely difficult for any other nation to enter into competition. The development of the Free Trade programme by Sir Robert Peel and by Mr. Gladstone was attended by so marked an expansion of

is often attributed with equal confidence to her adoption of Protection for her manufactures. It is not probable that Tariff Reform, if it does come, will ruin either British commerce or, alternatively, that of its competitors, who at present rely on a Protectionist policy. Perhaps from the point of view of the historian, whose business is largely with the analysis of causation, the most remarkable feature of the economic problem now dividing the country is that it was brought out of the regions of cloud-cuckoo-land into practical politics by the action of a single individual—that but for Mr. Chamberlain the merits of Protection would probably receive to-day as little public recognition as they did in that



THE SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS ON PARADE



SQUADRON OF THE CITY OF LONDON SHARPSHOOTERS



THE ROYAL FUSILIERS ON PARADE



THE ROYAL IRISH VOLUNTEERS AT CAMP

Gale and Polden

SOME TYPES OF BRITAIN'S FIGHTING FORCES



THE 14TH-KING'S-HUSSARS PROCEEDING TO MANŒUVRES



A COMPANY OF SCOTS GUARDS

Gale and Polden

SOME BRITISH SOLDIERS ON THE MARCH

statesman's "Radical" days. Whatever school of economists prevails, it may be prophesied that commercial ascendancy will probably remain with England so long as she holds the maritime supremacy, and will pass as soon as she loses it. That supremacy is as yet unchallenged. The practical unanimity with which the doctrine of a two-Power standard for the Royal Navy is accepted—at least, as concerns the fleets of European states—would be a mere absurdity for a country not already in possession of a decisive preponderance over any other, or lacking the means to maintain such preponderance. There is no Power which dreams of challenging the mistress of the seas single-handed on her own element, though there is one which is popularly credited with having inherited Napoleon's pre-Trafalgar programme.

Have the conditions, then, so changed that what Napoleon found to be impracticable a century ago—what had been almost unthinkable since the destruction of the Spanish Armada—is practicable today? Fortresses reputed impregnable have been captured through an unsuspected entry; before Wolfe scaled the Heights of Abraham, Quebec seemed secure against any possible attack. The chances that an attempt to invade Great Britain would result only in the annihilation of the invader appear to be no less overwhelming than in the past; but the condition of security is vigilance, as the condition of successful attack is secrecy.

It can only be said that there is no present sign either that vigilance is lacking or that the secret concentration of an invading force is possible. The historic position is unaltered. Now, as always, it is the fleet which makes invasion impossible. Now, as always, a Continental army operating in the country would not

find the military forces so well organised to offer resistance as it would on invading a Continental state. Parma in 1588, or Napoleon in 1805, would have found their veterans opposed by the same half-drilled and half-trained amateur soldiery which formed the bulk of England's defence up to 1914. But there is no more likelihood of a Continental army getting the chance of operating in England than there was in the days of Parma or of Napoleon. Wisely or unwisely, the nation is content with that position; or, at any rate, shows no greater inclination than in the past to adopt the alternative policy of universal military service. It is at least probable that the recent reorganisation—with modifications which experience of its working will suggest—will produce the maximum of efficiency attainable under the purely voluntary system.

As regards the security of Great Britain, then, the historic position appears to be unchanged. But the United Kingdom is responsible for the defence of the empire, and here we must note that the conditions to-day are not quite what they have been in the past. The frontiers are not, as they were, exclusively oceanic. In the eighteenth century, the possession of America and India depended entirely upon sea-power; when English supremacy on the sea was decisively established, her rivals' successes in either continent could only be temporary.

But now the advance of Russia in Central Asia has made possible a conflict which would have to be fought out on land; and although the idea of a war with the United States is scarcely less unnatural than that of a civil war, the possibility, however remote, involves the question of the defence of the Canadian frontier. The conditions of British rule

**Is England
Liable to
Invasion?**

**Unchallenged
Mistress
of the Seas**

**Britain's
Place among
the Powers**

THE UNITED KINGDOM IN OUR OWN TIME

in India demand the presence, under all circumstances, of a large white garrison within the peninsula. At the present time, indeed, nothing is less likely than a war with Russia, except a war with the United States; but either contingency would seem to call for military operations, as distinct from naval, on a much larger scale than Britain has ever been involved in previous to the great European War. As concerns Europe itself, as with the defence of England herself, the historic position holds. Any conceivable combination of Powers would hesitate to challenge her by sea; combined fleets have always proved even more difficult to handle successfully than combined armies. But no Power would be greatly perturbed by the prospect of a British invasion.

The British alliance to-day, as in the past, would be coveted where British subsidies would be desirable; the aid of British fleets would be useful, or the hostility of British fleets would be feared; not for the sake of the battalions that could take the field. It is to be remarked, however, that the mere fact of British naval ascendancy is, and always has been, a source of irritation; it is probable that all Europe would regard any permanent enlargement of her military organisation as indicating not a defensive, but an aggressive intent, precisely as she was disposed to interpret the expansion of the German Navy. Britain is so free from aggressive desires that she can hardly believe such charges to be made in good faith; nevertheless, foreign nations find it exceedingly difficult to believe that she has annexed so large a proportion of the globe merely in self-defence.

Up to 1914, however, thanks largely to the consistency of a foreign policy, which was maintained without regard to party for a quarter of a century, the United

Kingdom was cleared, in the eyes of its neighbours, of the charge of fluctuating between peace-at-any-price and blatant jingoism. The Japanese War deprived Russian aggression of its immediate terrors, and the political reformation of Turkey which astonished the world in 1908 minimised the danger of an Anglo-Russian quarrel over the Eastern Question. Hence English relations with the great Slav Power became most cordial. With France England has reached a happy stage in which the respective spheres of interest of the two nations have become so definitely delimited that no rational cause of quarrel arising is imaginable, and a friendliness of feeling has been developed which is the best possible safeguard against a sentimental explosion.

Within its own borders, the United Kingdom presents a singular complex of nationalities. The Englishman, the Irishman, the Scot, and the Welshman, are each of them emphatic in asserting their distinct nationality, though the Englishman is somewhat apt to overlook the claim on the part of the other three when they are acting in conjunction with him, and credits their vices to themselves, and their virtues to their English connection. Except in the case of Wales, the distinction is historical rather than racial, for the Irish Kelt is not more emphatically Irish than are the descendants of Norman, English, or Scottish settlers; and the Scot of the Lowlands is as much a Sassenach to the Highlander as the Englishman. England, wealthier, more fertile, more populous, if not larger in actual area than the other three put together, has been the "predominant partner" ever since partnership of any kind existed; but a difference in her historic relations with the three remains apparent at the present day. Scotland,

Britain's Complex Nationalities

an independent state for centuries, which successfully defeated repeated attempts to subdue her, voluntarily joined England to form the single state of Great Britain, in 1707, under guarantees that her national institutions should not be altered. She has so far, at least, remained in the position of managing her own

**What Wales
Claims
from England**

concerns that it is recognised as impracticable to introduce material modifications without the assent of the majority of her representatives in the Commons. Wales, treated to some extent as a subject province from the conquest by Edward I. till the accession to the English throne of a Welshman in the person of Henry Tudor, in 1485, has formed an integral part of England since her admission to full parliamentary representation in the reign of Henry VIII., but of recent years has been claiming distinctive treatment on the ground that her people are distinct from the English in race, customs, predilections, and to some extent language, the Welsh tongue being still in popular use.

The Irish position differs from that of the Scots or Welsh. Nominally subject to the English Crown since the reign of Henry II., Ireland was treated for centuries as a subject province in which English law was more or less enforced spasmodically, and English government could hardly be described as definitely established till the beginning of the seventeenth century.

Before that time, and still more afterwards, large appropriations of the soil to Protestant English and Scottish settlers, coupled with the political disabilities attaching to Roman Catholicism—the creed of four-fifths of the population—kept the bulk of the people in constant hostility to the Government; which was intensified by the tyrannical use of their power by the Protestant oligarchy through the greater part of the eighteenth century. The Act of Union in 1800 theoretically placed Ireland on an equal

**Ireland's
Place in
the Union**

footing with England and Scotland in the United Kingdom, but the maintenance of the Catholic disabilities for another quarter of a century intensified the hostility between the Catholic peasantry and the Protestant landlord class. Hence English and Irish agree in recognising the necessity of distinctive treatment for Ireland, but from fundamentally different points of view. For the securing of justice as between landlord and tenant the economic conditions

would make the establishment of the English land-tenure a quite futile course. What is justice from the tenant's point of view, is robbery from the landlord's; and the solution England offers is to impose upon both what she considers justice, and Irishmen do not. The solution offered by the great majority of Irishmen is that they should settle the matter for themselves without English intervention—that the "distinctive treatment" should be controlled by the Irish democracy, not by the English.

The abstract justice of this claim appeals the more readily to the foreign spectator, because under the existing conditions it appears that, unlike the position of Scotland and Wales, the wishes of the Irish democracy—that is, of the majority of their parliamentary representatives—are apt to influence the judgment of the majority at Westminster in inverse proportion to their intensity—unless the Irish happen to hold the balance between the two great parliamentary parties. The process, however, of extending large powers of self-government to local bodies has recently been applied, in the hope that

**The Irish
Demand for
Home Rule**


it may remove the urgency of demands for a separate legislature. It may be affirmed with satisfaction that the virulence of popular Irish hostility to the Government has greatly abated, though the same can probably not be said of the persistence of the demand for Home Rule; just as the personal hostility between English and Irish Members of Parliament has disappeared.

In any case, it seems certain that the increasing congestion of work in the Imperial Parliament will make it more and more necessary for parts of that work to be delegated to local bodies, and it is not improbable that a solution of this difficulty will ultimately be found in the recognition of Nationalist—not Separatist—aspirations by the establishment of Nationalist legislatures with limited powers, in subordination to the Imperial Parliament. The practical difficulties of evolving such a scheme are, however, so great that there is no present prospect of such a change being introduced.


The political party in the Imperial Parliament, which, under the leadership of Mr. Gladstone, committed itself to approval of the abstract principle of Home Rule for Ireland, was retarded from taking active steps towards its realisation by the consciousness that such plans as had hitherto been formulated might create

TYPES OF BRITISH BATTLESHIPS

In this and the following pages we give a series of drawings illustrating the leading types of vessels which constitute the strength of the British Navy, including those of the much discussed "Dreadnought" class.



H.M.S. "KING EDWARD VII" AT SPITHEAD.





Lord Nelson

Dreadnought

Bellerophon

Hindustan

GREAT BRITAIN'S FIRST LINE OF DEFENCE: FOUR OF THE EMPIRE'S FIRST-CLASS BATTLESHIPS



TYPES OF BRITISH CRUISERS: H.M.S. INDOMITABLE, IN FOREGROUND, MAKING HEAVY WEATHER



IMPROVED TYPE OF SUBMARINE, SHOWING FULL HEIGHT OUT OF THE WATER



SUBMARINES ATTACKING A WARSHIP WITH DUMMY-HEADED TORPEDOES



A No. 2 SUBMARINE OF THE HOLLAND TYPE

THE SUBMARINE IN NAVAL WARFARE

Photos: Cozens and Stephen Cribb

fresh causes of friction no less serious than those they were designed to remove; while the demand for "Home Rule all round" had not hitherto been expressed by any portion of the electorate. The conception of the empire as a congeries of self-governing states, associated into federated groups according to their geographical

The United Kingdom of the Future

position, having as their apex or formal bond of union the Crown and the Imperial Parliament, in which all shall be represented—this conception has not yet passed from the theorists to the practical politicians. If ever it does so, it may be assumed that the United Kingdom will be transformed into one of the federated groups, like the Dominion of Canada or the Commonwealth of Australia.

At the present day, however, the United Kingdom has one Parliament only; and the Parliament of the United Kingdom is also the Imperial Parliament—that is to say, that in conjunction with the Crown—not independently of it—it is legally recognised as the ultimate sovereign authority, not only in the United Kingdom, but throughout the empire. Whatsoever is done or ordained by the authority of the king in Parliament is lawfully done, and is legally binding in every portion of the empire to which the ordinance applies. By this authority every colony or dependency of the empire has received its present constitution, and might lawfully be deprived of it, just as by the same authority murder might be legalised and playing bridge be elevated into a capital offence.

Its own commonsense and the moral sense of the community set a practical limit to its powers; commonsense forbids it to exercise those powers in a manner opposed to the spirit of the constitution—it will be in no hurry to repeat the blunder which gave birth to the United States of America; but the law sets no limit and recognises none. Such authority has always in Eng-

Authority of King and Parliament

land been recognised as residing in the Crown and the National Council, whether that Council was the Saxon Witan, the Magnum Concilium of the Normans and early Plantagenets, or the Parliament in which the Commons appeared by their representatives. The authority of king and Council acting together has never been in dispute except by doctrinaire maintainers of the divine and inalienable right of succession to the throne, who deny that

even the king in Parliament can alter the course of the succession. The constitutional struggles have been fought round the question how far the Crown can act independently of Parliament, by prerogative, and sometimes how far Parliament can act independently of the Crown.

The king in Parliament—the Crown and the two Houses of Parliament—are the ultimate authority. For the sake of brevity we shall use the term "Parliament" for this complete body, speaking of the Crown and the Houses when its component parts are referred to distinctively. The Houses would be fully described as the House of Peers and the House of the Representatives of the Commons, the latter being alternatively spoken of as "the Representative House," or "the Commons." While Parliament is the ultimate authority, it discharges directly only a part of the sovereign functions. Moreover, Parliament itself is subjected to a certain degree of external control, partly because the members of the Representative Chamber are dependent on the electorate for the continuity of their membership, partly from

Predominance of the House of Commons

the influence of a public opinion which may be external even to the electorate. Thus, members will hesitate to take in the House a line which will endanger their seats at a general election, and a steady demand for the franchise by a solid body of persons excluded from the electorate is tolerably certain to be met if its existence is really indubitable. Of the three powers which, united, make up Parliament, the Commons' House is theoretically predominant.

The electorate has for half a century been constructed on a democratic basis. The House of Commons expresses the will of the electorate. The Peers and the Crown must yield to the emphatically expressed will of the Commons, as also must the Executive which is responsible to Parliament though not directly conducted by it. That is the theory which locates the effective sovereignty of the United Kingdom with the democracy; a theory which does not altogether correspond with the facts.

In theory, again, the British Constitution has these two leading characteristics: it distributes political power between the Crown, the aristocracy, and the people; and it separates the exercise of the three functions of sovereignty, the legislative, the administrative, and the judicial; while the necessary unity is



LORD FISHER



SIR PERCY SCOTT



LORD CHARLES BERESFORD



SIR WILLIAM MAY

LEADING ADMIRALS OF THE BRITISH NAVY IN OUR OWN TIME

Photos: Russell, Dinham, Gale and Polden, and Russell, Southsea

secured by enabling the people in the long run to dominate the Crown and the aristocracy, and the legislature to dominate the Executive and the Judiciary. The people, it must be observed, means in any case only that portion, large or small, of the whole community which composes the electorate.

The relative political weight of the Crown, the aristocracy, and the people, has varied very greatly; with a general tendency to reduce first the preponderance of the Crown, which the Normans established, then the preponderance of the aristocracy, and then to acquire a preponderance for the Commons. It may be said that for two hundred years the Crown has exercised not control, but only influence, greater or less according to the monarch's personality. The actual control vanished when a German king of Great Britain found that his position depended on the good will of a party over whose discussions his linguistic deficiencies made it impossible for him to preside. The preponderance remained with the aristocracy, because a large proportion of seats in the representative chamber was virtually

Relations of the two Houses of Parliament

in the gift of peers, although the House of Commons carried more weight than the House of Lords. This ascendancy of the aristocracy disappeared with the Reform Act of 1832, which created a new antagonism between the Houses which has continually been intensified with the democratising of the Commons.

The character, however, of both Houses has been so materially modified since that date that our conceptions of the character of Parliament—largely derived from Burke—require readjustment. Exponents of the constitution, so recent even as Walter Bagehot, wrote before the democratic forces called into play by the second Reform Act had had time to show how they would operate. Until then the weight of the electorate had still been controlled by the propertied classes, and though the peers had lost their pocket boroughs, a large minority among them was still in accord with the advanced party in the House of Commons. But that Reform Act, that "leap in the dark," has made that advanced party much more advanced than it was before, since the electorate is no longer dominated by the propertied classes; a fraction only of the peers is in sympathy with it, since its principles involve considerable modifications in the theory of

property; and when the advanced party has a majority in the Commons, it has to reckon on the consistent antagonism of the great majority of peers to its projects.

At the same time, the House of Commons has lost its preponderance in Parliament. That preponderance was won from the Crown in virtue of the power of

The Power of the House of Lords

the people; it was assured against the peers so long as it was practically possible to bring pressure on the Crown for the creation of a sufficient number of peers to convert a party minority into a party majority. The mere threat to do so was effective when the peers were a sufficiently patrician body to feel that their social, even more than their political, character would be lost by the creation of forty new peers. The creation of forty peers would hardly affect the character of the House to-day—neither would it affect the party majority. To swamp the majority would involve swamping the House, and would make the constitution of the Second Chamber an absurdity. Hence, that method of compulsion could only be applied by a party determined either to abolish the second chamber or to construct it *de novo* on a basis already specified and accepted. On the other hand, the still older method by which the House of Commons enforced its will—the refusal of supplies—was efficacious only when the Commons were in opposition to the administration.

The effect is that the House of Lords can refuse to pass any measures distasteful to it, however emphatically endorsed by the Commons, until it feels that its refusal will ensure the decisive support of the electorate to a specific measure for its abolition or reconstruction. Whereas it can always count on the existence of a very strong predisposition, in the electorate, in favour of a Second Chamber of some sort, a conservative preference for the maintenance therein at least of an aristocratic or hereditary element, and a distracting division of opinion among reconstructors as to a practicable basis of reconstruction. Human ingenuity would never have deliberately devised such a second chamber as the House of Peers; but it has the enormous advantage of being a natural growth, not deliberately devised at all; and to dispossess it would be an experiment in constitution-making from which the political genius of the people of the

Problem of the House of Peers

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United Kingdom has an intense aversion. Thus, the constitutional position which the United Kingdom has reached to-day would seem to be this: The House of Commons—as we shall presently see—has a control over administration, and the peers, as a House, have none. The peers cannot carry legislation against the Commons; but

**The Peers a
Check on Hasty
Legislation**

they can set the legislative desires of the Commons at defiance, so long as they do not thereby rouse the elec-

torate to an overwhelming determination to be rid of them at any price. They fulfil the theoretical function of a Second Chamber as a check on hasty legislation. but only when the legislation is democratic, not when it is reactionary. Whether, and when, the democracy will discover a satisfactory solution of the problem thus presented is becoming a somewhat acute question; but it can only be said that no solution hitherto propounded has commanded anything more than the doubtful acquiescence of any large body of reformers.

In the legislative capacity of Parliament which we have had under consideration, the third element, the Crown, has ceased to have more than a formal importance. The technical right of veto remains in the background, but no one imagines that it will ever be exercised, unless conceivably in the case of some flagrant violation of constitutional practice by the Houses—in itself a sufficiently improbable event.

We come now to the relations between Parliament, the Judiciary, and the Executive. The Judiciary need not detain us long. The judges became independent two hundred years ago. A general guarantee of fitness is provided by the fact that they are removable on an address to the Crown by both Houses, but their independence is secured by the corresponding fact that it is only on such an address that they are removable. Their appointment rests nominally with the Crown, actually with

**How Judges
are
Appointed**

the Crown's legal advisers, and security against grossly partisan appointments is assured by the presumption that such appointments would provoke retaliation.

The real seat of the Government of the country is to be found only by examining the relations between the Parliament and the Executive, in "party" and "cabinet" government, affecting legislation as well as administration. The whole administration is controlled by officers technically

appointed by the Crown as the head, the Crown acting through Ministers. But the will of the people is expressed through Parliament. Before the "glorious revolution" of 1688 the king might, and very often did, choose Ministers who were antagonistic to Parliament, and Parliament could get rid of them only by the process of impeachments, or by refusing supplies—a double-edged weapon at the best of times.

The problem was to secure harmony between Parliament and the administration; which, in effect, meant the majority of the House of Commons and the administration. The solution was found in the selection of Ministers exclusively from the party which had a majority in the Commons; and the actual selection was very soon transferred, on the accession of the Hanoverians, from the Crown to the chief of the dominant party. The Crown, indeed, continued to exercise, on occasion, the technical right of declining the services of distasteful Ministers and of placing the selection in the hands of someone who was not the recognised leader of the majority; but in practice that

**Collective
Responsibility
of the Cabinet**

technical right was gradually eliminated. The principle had already been established that Ministers themselves were personally responsible for their acts, and could not take shelter behind orders from the Crown; and the further principle was gradually established that the whole group of Ministers are responsible for the acts of each individual Minister, a system expressed by the phrase "collective responsibility of the Cabinet."

It became the practice that Ministers should be selected from members of one or other of the Houses of Parliament, in which connection it is curious to note that there was for a long time a dislike to their appointment from among the Commons, on the ground that, as the king's servants, they would exercise a dangerous monarchical influence in the House. It required an extended experience to show that their membership of the House increased the power of the House itself instead of curtailing its independence.

The group of the principal Ministers selected by the chief formed the confidential committee, which came to be known as the Cabinet, meeting in secret conclave to decide the course of the policy which is to be adopted and the legislative measures which are to be submitted to

Parliament. There is no technical bar, it may be remarked, to the initiation of legislation which does not emanate from the Cabinet, but such legislation has very little prospect of being carried unless the Cabinet choose to adopt it as a Government measure; so that practically and normally the initiative lies with Ministers.

In a sense, however, the control of Ministers lies with the House of Commons, because if it is dissatisfied with their conduct, it can demand their resignation—such a demand formulated by the House of Lords would either be ignored or met by an appeal to the Commons for a vote of confidence. It has not hitherto been admitted that a Ministry supported by the representative Chamber can be dismissed by the peers; but it could not venture to defy an adverse vote in the Commons, since, *inter alia*, Ministers are human enough not to be anxious to retain office if they are deprived of salaries. On the other hand, the Crown, though having the technical authority to dismiss a Minister or a whole Ministry, would not venture to do so without being absolutely

When a Ministry Resigns

sure that its action would be endorsed by an early appeal to the electorate. In practice, therefore, it is to the Commons that Ministers are responsible, and the Commons have the power of dismissal. Up to a certain point it is the Commons, also, that have the power of appointment. An adverse vote in the Commons on a fundamental question will compel Ministers either to resign or to advise a dissolution.

In the former case the retiring chief recommends the Crown to "send for" the official leader of the Opposition, who holds that position by the choice of his party, which now is presumably—on the hypothesis that the House is composed of two parties—in a majority, or can command at least the provisional support of a majority. In the second case, the Ministry remains in office till it meets with an adverse vote in the new Parliament, when it will resign, and a new Ministry will be formed by the leader of the Opposition. In either case the Minister who constructs the Cabinet is the man whom the party which commands a majority has chosen as its leader. If he does not command a majority, he will accept office only with a view to an early dissolution. The Minister will construct his Cabinet, and select his colleagues, in

general accord with the wishes of his party; and so far it is true that the Ministry or Cabinet, the executive body, is appointed by the House of Commons—meaning thereby the political party which commands a majority in that House. Yet the real control of the House over the administration is limited. The system

The System of Party Government

is workable only on the basis of party government, the hypothesis that there are two main parties, to one or other of which all minor groups will attach themselves with some consistency. It is possible under the system for a Ministry to carry a series of measures, no one of which has the actual approval of an actual majority of members. If one of those measures is defeated, the Ministry will resign, and the Opposition will assume the government. A group of members who dislike one measure but are bent on a second, will give their support to the first rather than have the second shelved by the resignation of the Cabinet. Another group will reverse the process; and the Government will successfully carry both measures, though each would have been lost if the reluctant supporters of the Government had given their votes exclusively on the merits of the particular measure.

What is true of the House of Commons is still more true of the electorate. The electorate chooses its party, not its specific measures. The prospect of Tariff Reform or of Local Option, of Land Reform or of an Education Bill, may decide which party shall predominate in Parliament; but the electorate does not endorse beforehand all the measures which that party may see fit to adopt before another General Election. Different projects may be the decisive factors in the choice of different constituencies which unite to bring the same party into power; and it is possible that neither project has the direct approval of a majority of constituencies, or of a majority of mem-

Decisive Factors at Elections

bers, and may yet both be part of the avowed programme of the Ministers whom the victorious party will support in passing both. It may be noted in passing that the resignation of the Cabinet does not necessarily involve the formation of a Ministry from the Opposition. If it is the outcome of dissensions within the Cabinet, the leader of the revolt, or someone in sympathy with the revolt, may be given the opportunity of reconstructing the



INTERIOR OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, AS SEEN FROM THE THRONE



INTERIOR OF THE CHAMBER, LOOKING TOWARDS THE THRONE

GREAT BRITAIN'S UPPER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT



INTERIOR OF THE HOUSE, LOOKING TOWARDS THE STRANGERS GALLERY



INTERIOR OF THE HOUSE, LOOKING TOWARDS THE SPEAKER'S CHAIR

SCENES IN THE BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS

Government. But the fundamental fact is that the House of Commons will not formally attack Government measures or administration merely because it disapproves in particulars, so long as it sees in the defeat of Ministers the prospect only of an alternative Government, of which it disapproves more strongly in general.

How the Party System Works

Hence we arrive, not at the predominance of the House of Commons as a whole, nor exactly at a predominance of the Cabinet, but at a balance between the Cabinet and the majority of the party from which it is drawn. Unless some such vital question arises as Home Rule or Tariff Reform, the minorities of the party will support the majority, and the majority will support the Cabinet. The Cabinet can go its own way so long as the threat of resignation will keep its majority solid; but the Cabinet cannot defy a majority which is ready to demand its resignation if it does so. But beyond the House of Commons there is the House of Lords, which can render the legislation—though not the administration—nugatory so long as it does not endanger its own existence by so doing. The peers have been not infrequently threatened, but threatened men live long. It cannot well be maintained in the circumstances as expounded that a supremacy can be definitely located.

The will of the majority of the House of Commons is not necessarily, at least in particulars, that of the electorate. The vote of the majority does not necessarily express the wish even of that majority. The Cabinet is powerless unless it can command that vote, and the vote itself may be rendered nugatory by the peers. It may be seen that the system is decidedly remote from any logical ideal, and this will be further emphasised by two considerations. The first of these is the structure of the Cabinet, which conducts administration. The logician

Paradoxes in the State Departments

would set an expert at the head of each Department of state; the system provides in each a board of expert advisers, but sets at the head someone who, as often as not, is entirely without experience in the work of that department. There may be a bookseller at the Admiralty, a metaphysician at the War Office, a war-correspondent at the Board of Trade, a country gentleman in charge of Finance,

and an untravelled attorney in charge of India or the Colonies. Experience teaches that the practice has very high merits, but it is supremely paradoxical.

The second point is that the whole system rests on the theory that one or other of two parties can always command a majority in the Commons. Yet there is nothing in the nature of things to ensure that this shall always be the case; on the contrary, a third party has been in existence for many years, and once at least neither of the two great parties could have conducted the Government while the third party refused its support. A fourth party has already come definitely into existence; it can no longer be regarded as in any way certain that one party will be able to command a majority of the House.

It will be necessary for two, or possibly for three of the parties to come to terms of alliance, and the programme, or part of the programme, of a small minority may be forced on Ministers as the condition on which their own particular programme can be carried through. Our point is that democratisation seems to tend of itself to the multiplication of parties, and the multiplication of parties tends to produce legislative deadlock and extreme instability of administration. And it appears at the present moment by no means improbable that the group of questions here indicated may be rendered additionally complicated at an early date by the appearance of the women's franchise in the sphere of practical politics.

Nevertheless, we may take heart of grace. Britain's political constitution has always and everywhere presented an abundance of paradoxes and inconsistencies, which ought by rule to have prevented progress by locking the machinery; yet the machinery has never been brought to a standstill, nor have the works been kept going by destroying the old machinery to replace it with a brand-new article. It has always been found possible to adapt the old machinery to the new work it had to do; and we may confidently expect that the process of adaptation will continue, the machinery will still work without revolutionary reconstruction, and the population of these islands will not cease yet awhile to hold a foremost place among the free nations of the world, of which nations not a few will be the brothers of the British Empire. A. D. INNES



The Prime Minister, Mr. H. H. Asquith, introducing the Home Rule Bill in the Session of 1914.

LATER EVENTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

THE preceding chapter has explained the working methods of the British Imperial Parliament; here we may rightly sketch the application of those methods to certain problems in recent years. The relations of the House of Commons and the House of Lords had long been unsatisfactory when a Liberal Government was in power, for the simple reason that while the Lords invariably passed any Government Bill when Conservatives held office, it

was their common practice to reject, or revise drastically, important Bills sent up by a Liberal Ministry. It was in vain that Liberal peers were created in large numbers from 1830 to 1909 by every Liberal Prime Minister—with but few exceptions the receipt of a peerage sent the recipient over to the Conservatives. In 1909 a crisis was reached when the House of Lords rejected the Finance Bill, which Mr. Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the

Exchequer, had seen safely through the Commons. Now all questions of national finance were from of old in England the special province of the House of Commons, and to admit the right of the Lords to interfere in any way with financial measures seemed to the Liberals a dangerous precedent. The House of Lords rejected

General Election 1910

the Finance Bill—on the ground of its revolutionary character—on November 30th, 1909, and Mr. Asquith appealed to the country early in January, 1910, at a General Election. The result of this election brought the Liberals back—with their allies the Irish Nationalists and the Labour party—with a majority of 124 over the Conservatives; the main issues of the election having been the Lords' veto over House of Commons Bills and Mr. Lloyd George's Budget; while the Conservatives had put forward Tariff Reform as a counter programme. In April Mr. Asquith brought in his Parliament Bill for the restriction of the veto of the House of Lords. By this bill the House of Lords was disabled from rejecting or amending any financial measure sent up from the Commons, and it further declared that any Bill that had passed the House of Commons in three successive Sessions, and had been sent up to the Lords at least one month before the end of each Session, having been rejected by the Lords in each of these Sessions, should become law without the consent of the House of Lords on the Royal Assent being declared, "provided that at least two years shall have elapsed between the date of the first introduction of the Bill in the House of Commons and the date on which it passes the House of Commons for the third time."

The Bill also limited the duration of Parliament to five years. The death of King Edward VII., in May, 1910, and the accession of George V., had a moderating influence on the dispute, for the leaders on

Death of Edward VII.

both sides were averse from involving the new King in a grave constitutional controversy before he was fairly settled on the throne. Conferences took place between Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Birrell, and Lord Crewe representing the Liberals, and Mr. A. Chamberlain, Mr. Balfour, Lord Cawdor, and Lord Lansdowne representing the Conservatives, in the summer and autumn of 1910, with a view to arriving at some basis of agreement between the

two Houses, and on the failure of these conferences Mr. Asquith again appealed to the country at a General Election—December, 1910—and was once more returned to power, this time with a coalition majority of 122. The Parliament Bill was at once, in 1911, re-introduced and passed through the House of Commons, and in August the Lords accepted it, Lord Morley—formerly Mr. John Morley—announcing that if the Bill was rejected "his Majesty would assent to the creation of peers sufficient in numbers to guard against any possible combination of the different parties in opposition by which the Bill might again be exposed to defeat."

To preserve the Upper House from the addition of 500 new Liberal members, the Conservatives agreed to let the Bill pass, though it meant an end to their long exercised veto over Liberal legislation. The full effects of this Parliament Bill were not seen till May, 1914, when both the Home Rule (for Ireland) Bill and the Welsh Disestablishment Bill passed through the House of Commons for the third time, and were sent to the Lords in the knowledge

Lords' Veto Ended

that their rejection by that House could no longer delay their passage into law. Thus the Home Rule Bill and the Bill for the Disestablishment of the Church in Wales, after a delay of twenty years from the time of their first acceptance by the House of Commons, were ensured a place on the Statute Book. This bill for the Disestablishment of the Church in Wales was a measure for dispossessing the Church of England of its property in the Welsh speaking counties—while leaving the actual ecclesiastical buildings to their present occupiers and making provision for present incumbents—and placing that property in the hands of the secular and local authorities. As the majority of the Welsh members of Parliament had for over twenty years been advocates of this disestablishment, and as the Nonconformists in Wales were a particularly active body in politics, the Liberals, on their principle of respecting the rights of nationalities, felt obliged to pass such a measure. If there was but little enthusiasm for Welsh Disestablishment outside the ranks of Liberal Nonconformists, there was still less interest in the opposition to the proposal, save amongst members of the Church of England. The passing of the Home Rule Bill did not promise a final settlement of

LATER EVENTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

the Irish question. For in 1912 that section of the Ulster population which is aggressively Protestant and violently hostile to the Roman Catholicism of the majority of the rest of Ireland began a vigorous campaign against Home Rule. Led by Sir Edward Carson, M.P., a distinguished lawyer, the Ulster Unionists signed a covenant, of September 28, 1912, that they would not recognise an Irish Parliament if it were established in Dublin. Although the Government asserted they had taken every precaution in the drafting of the Home Rule Bill to ensure protection of a Protestant minority from possible hardships at the hands of an Irish Parliament with a Catholic majority, and while both Mr. Asquith and Mr. John Redmond, the leader of the Irish Nationalists, expressed a willingness to meet the demands of the Ulster Unionists, Sir Edward Carson and the covenanters continued their campaign, and organised a large body of volunteers for the purpose of resisting by force of arms all attempts at coercion. In this declaration of forcible resistance they were supported by the English Conservatives, but the Liberal Government ignored the enrolling and drilling of Ulster volunteers until May, 1914, when the landing and distribution of a large quantity of arms for these volunteers convinced Mr. Asquith that the covenanters were in earnest in their determination to resist the authority of an Irish Parliament in Dublin. In order to avoid any violent disturbance in Ireland and to prevent the possibility of civil war, Mr. Asquith, though he denounced the importation of arms as an outrage, not only refrained from all prosecution of Sir Edward Carson and from all attempts to interfere with the drilling of the Ulster volunteers, but promised that before the Home Rule Bill became law an Amending Bill should be introduced for the purpose of allowing those counties of Ulster that desired to be exempted from the authority of the Irish Parliament to contract out of Home Rule. Besides Home Rule and Welsh Disestablishment the Liberal Government was responsible for an Act passed in 1911 setting up for the first time in Great Britain a system of national insurance, and, in addition to a large number of other laws enacted since 1910, the House of Commons passed a bill allowing trade unions, under certain con-

ditions, to spend a portion of their funds on political purposes—an expenditure deemed illegal by certain judges a few years earlier.


The question of Parliamentary votes for women, which had been discussed from time to time with academic interest since John Stuart Mill's advocacy in 1870, suddenly became acute shortly after the return of the Liberals to power in 1906. By considerable majorities a Women's Suffrage Bill passed the House of Commons in 1910, 1911, and 1912, but on each occasion the Government refused to allow any facilities for the further progress of the measure, Mr. Asquith announcing that a Reform Bill would shortly be introduced by the Government and that such a bill could be amended by a women's suffrage clause. When this Reform Bill was about to be introduced, in January, 1913, the Speaker stated that such an amendment would be out of order, and the Reform Bill was dropped. While the great body of supporters of women's suffrage continued to conduct their agitation on strictly constitutional lines, a comparatively small but extremely desperate society, known as the Women's Social and Political Union, led by Mrs. Pankhurst and her daughter, Miss Christabel Pankhurst, adopted what were called "militant" tactics. These tactics consisted at first in deputations to Parliament, which were refused admission, and resulted in many hundreds of women being sent to prison. In 1911 and 1912 window smashing, first at Government offices and then at important West End shops, were carried out. In 1913 and 1914 the attack on private property was extended, and empty mansions, racecourse stands, and other erections were burnt to the ground.

The chief difficulty in the way of women's suffrage becoming law was the opposition of Mr. Asquith to the proposal. While the majority of the Liberal and Labour parties supported the claim for the Parliamentary enfranchisement of women—a claim also supported by many Conservatives, including Mr. Balfour—the Liberal Prime Minister remained its steadfast opponent, and the loyalty of his followers prevented their pressing for legislation in the matter.

**Votes
for
Women**

**The
Ulster
Covenant**

**The
"Militant"
Campaign**



BRITAIN'S MARITIME ENTERPRISE: MAP SHOWING THE ROUTES TAKEN BY THE EARLY VOYAGERS
 To the sailors who left her shores on voyages of discovery, beginning at the close of the fifteenth century, Great Britain owes a heavy debt of gratitude, for in most cases their discoveries increased the nation's territory and laid the foundations of the present day. The routes followed by these early voyagers are illustrated in the above map.



THE BRITISH EMPIRE

FROM EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY ITS EFFECT ON WORLD HISTORY

By Sir Harry Johnston, G.C.M.G.

THE EMPIRE IN THE MAKING AND THE WONDERFUL PROGRESS OF TWO CENTURIES

BEFORE considering in detail the evolution of the British Empire, and the effect of that empire on the British people and on the world at large, it may be as well to glance at the elements which have formed the present tribes of English and Keltic-speaking people of Great Britain and Ireland, who from the point of view of the extent, population, wealth, and civilisation of their empire in Europe, America, Asia and Africa have been up to the present the first among ruling races.

The people now inhabiting the British Islands are, so far as investigations go in history, archæology and palæontology, the result of many layers of humanity, belonging in the main to the white, or Caucasian, sub-species, which have inhabited England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland for the last hundred thousand years or so. Man, of a Neanderthaloid type, that is to say, a creature resembling most, of all existing races, the black Australians or the Veddahs of Ceylon, probably entered England when Great Britain, and even Ireland, were eccentrically shaped peninsulas attached by isthmuses one to the other and to the north of France and Belgium. A calvarium—

The First Inhabitants of Britain

upper part of the skull—has been exhumed in Sligo, North-west Ireland, and is now in the British Museum of Natural History, which offers some resemblance to the Neanderthaloid crania found in Belgium, the Rhine Valley, and the Carpathians.

This early and generalised type of humanity, which some anthropologists think should be classified as a separate species of humanity, was, at any rate, near the basic stock of *Homo sapiens* before this last became differentiated into the

Men of the Early Stone Age

Negro, Mongol, or Caucasian sub-species. The Man of Neanderthal, I believe, bore a strong resemblance to the lower types of black Australians of to-day, and these last offer considerable analogies in skull form and in culture to the early palæolithic men of Britain. Whether man continuously inhabited the British peninsulas during the changes of climate which marked the Pleistocene period, with its glacial interludes of Polar conditions, is not yet clearly established. The recurring cycles of extreme cold which covered Scotland, Northern England, and the greater part of Ireland with an ice sheet may have killed out the Australoid men of the Early Stone Age; or these latter may have gradually accustomed themselves to the cold and have survived to more genial conditions.

Or the Palæolithic people, with their projecting brows, retreating foreheads, long arms and shambling legs, were perhaps exterminated not by climatic changes, but by the inrush of the first definitely "white" people of the Caucasian stock. These, it is surmised, were more or less akin to the Iberian people of Mediterranean Europe, Western (and far

North-eastern) Asia and North Africa—white men with dark hair and brown eyes. Then parts of Europe, and perhaps Great Britain, were invaded by a round-headed people, probably of Asiatic origin, who seem to have brought with them a greater number and variety of domestic animals and improved arts. Mongoloid tribes of short

**Britain
Three Thousand
Years Ago**

heads, or long-headed types like the Eskimo, may also have reached Great Britain from the north-east across the ice sheet, and have penetrated to Ireland. The Iberians of prehistoric days probably spoke a language allied to modern Basque or to the Berber tongues of North Africa. Some three or four thousand years ago the islands were conquered and overrun from the East by the first Aryans—long-headed Northern Europeans, with red or blond hair and blue eyes; early Kelts, in fact, who grafted their Aryan speech on to the Iberian stock, and so brought into existence the Celtic languages—the two very distinct modern branches—Scoto-Irish (Goidhelic), and Welsh (Brythonic).

This amalgam of people—the earlier tribes of which resembled very much, no doubt, the modern Ainos of Japan, the Lapps of Northern Europe, the Auvergnats of Central France, the Finns, and the modern Belgians—warred, inter-married, compromised, and co-existed in innumerable tribes under petty chieftains, quite outside the history of the civilised Mediterranean world—though not out of touch with its commerce—until some five hundred years before Christ; when the coasts of Southern England may have been reached by Phœnician trading ships, who later brought back some news of Britain and even Ireland to the Greek geographers of Alexander's day and kingdom.

Then came the extension of the Roman Empire, the invasion of England by Cæsar—because the Brythonic Kelts made common cause with their Gallo-

**Cæsar's
Invasion of
England**

Belgian kinsmen—and the beginning of the historical period in Britain. Still, the islands continued to receive, and not to export, humanity. In the centuries that followed the Roman Conquest a few Irish missionaries, or British refugees, found their way into Northern France, where the Bretons constituted the first of British colonies. But the islands of Great Britain, Ireland and Man still attracted colonists from the outer

world. Hordes of Germanic people occupied England and Eastern Scotland, coming from Scandinavia and the Western and North-western parts of modern Germany. Denmark and Norway between the ninth and thirteenth centuries must have contributed quite two millions of immigrants—tall, fair-haired, blue-eyed, but also occasionally tall and dark-haired (from Denmark, where an anterior Iberian people had left its traces)—to the population of Eastern England, Eastern and Northern Scotland, the Isle of Man, and all the coast regions of Ireland.

The Norman Conquest brought in its train and as its results several thousands of Frenchmen—tinged with Norse blood. The French kings of England, the Plantagenets, planted many colonies of Flemings from Belgium, or Germans from the lower Rhine; also occasional settlers from South-west France. A few Spaniards came and remained with Philip II. of Spain, or were stranded on these shores as prisoners during the wars of the sixteenth century. Gipsies had crossed over to England at the close of the fifteenth

**Britain's
Age of
Maturity**

century and had rapidly penetrated, several thousand in number, to the wilder parts of East Anglia, the Welsh Borderland, and Lowland Scotland, contributing a picturesque attenuated element of the Dravidian to a populace mostly pink and white and blond-haired.

In the wonderful Tudor period, the sixteenth century, the great race movements which had colonised these islands ceased for a time; and Britain, having reached maturity, was ready to send its superfluous and, above all, its adventurous sons to seek new homes and found new nations. It is true that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there came a few thousand French refugees from religious persecution—invaluable as individuals; and that in the nineteenth century there has been an immigration of Germans, of Jews from Eastern and Northern Europe, and of Italians. These aliens—most of them desirable, a few undesirable—though not reaching to the sum total of a million, still have made and will make their mark on the future type of the British population, especially in the towns. But for the purposes of our survey it may be stated that the colonisation of Great Britain and Ireland ceased at the end of

THE STORY OF BRITISH EXPANSION

the fifteenth century; and that at this period began the wonderful outpouring of energy which was to create not only the largest empire that the world has ever known, but probably the biggest congeries of states under the rule of one monarch that the world will ever know until the complete federation of mankind under one earthly head is accomplished.

This résumé of the race elements in the British Islands has been necessary in order that we may arrive at some appreciation of the type of humanity which has conquered and colonised the British Empire. It is a breed retaining strains of the Iberian, even of the earliest of the prehistoric peoples of Northern Europe, but is nevertheless an amalgam in which the blond Aryan type predominates; the type which is chiefly associated at the present day with the speaking of Low German dialects. To this group English belongs. The people who founded the British Empire in the days of the Tudors and Stuarts were mainly Teutonic and Scandinavian in descent, though tinged with the Iberian in the seamen of Devon and Cornwall. The British colonisers and adventurers of the fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries were almost entirely drawn from Southern Scotland, England and Wales. Ireland during these centuries was itself a "champ d'exploitation" on the part of the ruthless ancestors of the larger island, though occasionally in the seventeenth century some hundreds of rebellious Irish were deported to the West Indies.

It was not until the nineteenth century that the union of Ireland with England—however unjustly it was brought about—threw open to the sons of Ireland all the advantages of the British Empire. Since then, during the nineteenth and the first few years of the twentieth centuries, the Irish, proportionately, have done more in colonising the daughter states of the empire and in administering India and the Crown colonies than the people of Great Britain.

England was the first amongst the arbitrary sub-national divisions of the now United Kingdom to think of colonising. This movement began after the European revival of learning, known as the Renaissance. As already mentioned, however, the English were not the first colonisers to leave these islands; for in

the period that immediately followed the extension of Roman civilisation in Britain, the Irish—who, though they were never actually under the sway of Rome, had become, through the Church, one of the most Romanised peoples of Western Europe—had been stirred by a strange spirit of adventure, which first took the

form of missionary travels in Scotland, France and Germany, and then linked on with Norse maritime discovery; so that from Ireland came one of the first mysterious hints of a New World beyond the Atlantic. It is doubtful whether the seafaring monks or fishermen of Western Ireland ever reached the North American continent, even by following the Norse route to the Faroes, Iceland, Greenland and Newfoundland; but it does seem possible that the Irish may have sailed south-westwards past the coasts of Portugal to the Azores or Madeira, or even as far to the north-west as the once larger island of Rockall. Their more than half legendary adventures deserve mention, since they became the germ that inspired the English and Welsh raiders of the Plantagenet centuries with the idea of oversea discovery.

The Danish and Norwegian invaders of England were colonisers of the most successful type. They were looking for homes beyond the inclement lands of Scandinavia—inclement under ancient conditions—and they brought to the Anglo-Saxon civilisation of Alfred much knowledge of Northern geography. Through these, and through the civilised Franks of France, Alfred, the Saxon king of Southern England, was linked up (Rome helping) with the Byzantine Empire; and there is an actual tradition of Alfred having despatched, in 883, Sighelm of Sherborne as a pilgrim, via Rome, to the shrine of St. Thomas, in "India." Though Sighelm may have got no further than the Nestorian churches of Mesopotamia, still even a journey to India was quite possible in the days before the Seljuk and Ottoman Turks had raised barriers of fanaticism between Christian Europe and Mohammedan Asia.

Commerce brought the England of the Plantagenets into touch with Venice—Venice which had already revealed to the world, through such travellers as Marco Polo, the existence of Asiatic

**Founders
of the British
Empire**

**Ireland's
Seafaring
Pioneers**

**England's
Commerce
with Venice**

kingdoms, islands and peninsulas as far as China, Sumatra and Java. Venetian maritime explorers turned their attention to the discovery of Ultima Thule, possibly as the result of some news having reached Venice of the Norwegian settlements in lands across the Northern Atlantic, also because of the important fisheries in the

Beginnings of Maritime Adventure far North-west. In Plantagenet times, however, the British lust for conquest and colonisation was slaked by the attempts to conquer and settle Scotland, Ireland, Northern and Western France. The idea of maritime adventure did not dawn on the English people till after the Wars of the Roses and the establishment of the Tudor dynasty; in fact, until the very end of the fifteenth century. Even then the mass of the people thought of no such thing. The impulse was first given by the far-sighted though stingy monarch, Henry VII., the father-in-law of an Aragonese princess, through whose relations he had heard of the conquest and settlement of the Canary Islands and Madeira, and of Spanish, Portuguese, Majorcan and Genoese adventures along the West Coast of Africa.

To the court of Henry VII. came an adventurous but disappointed Venetian mariner, John Cabot, whose famous son, Sebastian, was probably born at Bristol. In the minds of this and other Venetian navigators may have lingered the semi-legendary voyages of Nicolá and Antonio Zeno in the fourteenth century—perhaps founded on Norse traditions—which led them to habitable lands on the other side of the North Atlantic to the Vineland (Rhode Island), where grew wild grapes in profusion. Henry Tudor committed himself as grudgingly to maritime discovery as did the father-in-law of his son, Ferdinand of Aragon. John and Sebastian Cabot, however, led British crews to the discovery of Newfoundland and other points of North America, with

The Early Voyages of Discovery

no very immediate results. But when the Englishmen of Devon and Cornwall, of London, Bristol, Pembroke, Cardiff, Swansea, Poole, Southampton, Tilbury, Lowestoft, and Yarmouth built better and bigger ships in imitation of, or under the teaching of, the Norman French—who, in all probability, had sailed to West Africa as early as the middle of the fourteenth century—the Dutch, Venetians, Genoese, and

Spaniards; and when, disdaining further foreign pilotage, they started forth in their own bottoms, guided by their own navigators and financed by their own capitalists, they did not for the moment turn their attention to America, but devoted themselves eagerly to the West African trade.

As I have related in other chapters, it was the longing for pepper, the desire to make money by carrying slaves, and finally the thirst for gold, that drew the British to West Africa during the reigns of Edward, Mary, and Elizabeth. At first the British adventurers hired themselves as mariners to the Portuguese, and so found out their way to the Guinea coast. Later, they would engage a Portuguese as captain or supercargo. But by the year 1554 they were sufficiently sure of themselves to undertake an all-British venture to West Africa under the command of Captain John Lok, with whom travelled Sir George Barn and Sir John York. The two ships under Captain Lok's command visited the coast of Liberia and reached the Gold Coast in 1555. In 1585 and 1588, Queen Elizabeth issued two

Royal Patron of English Trade

patents, or monopolies, for trade with the Atlantic coast of Africa. The earlier dealt with Morocco; the second with the region between the Senegal and the Gambia. A third charter, or patent, issued in 1592, covered the Guinea coast between the River Nunez and, approximately, the Sherbro district.

The transportation of negro slaves from West Africa to the West Indies and Spanish America—first undertaken by Captain (afterwards Sir John) Hawkins in 1562—initiated the British into the wonders, the wealth, and the attractiveness of these lands of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea.

Though they never lost their grip on, or their interest in, the West African coast, the national enterprise of England during the last third of the sixteenth century and the hundred years that followed was mainly directed to the New World. Whilst Elizabeth was on the throne they snatched at many an isolated city, here and there at a promontory or an islet. But though they possessed inconceivable daring and courage, they had not the means or the national force with which to hold on to their conquests. Elizabeth, before the unsuccessful attack of the Armada, feared to take any direct government action for the founding



THE ACQUISITION OF NEWFOUNDLAND BY SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT, IN 1583

In 1578, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, a soldier and navigator, received from Queen Elizabeth a charter for discovery, to plant a colony, and be governor; but, owing to the difficulties which beset him, it was not till 1583 that he achieved his purpose, taking possession, in the queen's name, of the harbour of St. John's, and two hundred leagues every way for himself, his heirs and assigns for ever. The illustration shows Sir Humphrey among the rough fishermen and sailors.

From the drawing by R. Caton Woodville

of British colonies which might give umbrage to Spain, but had no wish unduly to check British maritime adventure so long as it cost her nothing but documents, messages of good will, or gilded figure-heads.

Accordingly, Sir Humphrey Gilbert—an elder stepbrother of Raleigh, who had distinguished himself by his valour in

Gilbert's Ill-Fated Expeditions one of the wars for the subjugation of Ireland—received a vague charter for the discovery and colonisation of lands beyond the seas in North America “not already in the possession of any other Christian prince.” This was granted in 1578, but the expeditions, financed mainly by Gilbert and Raleigh, proved to be ill-starred. Even before the first of them started, a certain Knollys, who should have served under Sir Humphrey Gilbert, treated his commander with insulting contumely, alleging that he, Knollys, being of the blood royal by descent, could not be invited to dinner by Gilbert, a simple knight.

The defection of Knollys crippled the expedition, which, though it reached the coast of Virginia, left behind a poorly equipped little colony to be starved out or killed by Indians in the course of twelve months. Sir Humphrey Gilbert made a fresh attempt in 1583, on the return from which he was drowned at sea, his vessel foundering during a gale. In the interval between the two expeditions Raleigh, with his characteristic optimism, concluded that his brother would found a great state which, in anticipation, he named Virginia, a name which was to be revived and permanently affixed to the map twenty-four years later.

As a matter of fact, Sir Humphrey Gilbert was an unsuccessful Columbus. Like Columbus, he had great ideas, but he was no coloniser or administrator. Gilbert was really bent on discovering a trans-American route to India. India, as I shall show later, was behind most men's ventures at this period as the ultimate goal in all oversea

English Trade Expansion adventure. The idea of a chartered company to deal with the trade of India arose at the end of the sixteenth century, born of Elizabeth's notion of monopolies. Companies had been formed to trade with the Levant and Turkey; that Turkey which had opened up friendly relations with the Virgin Queen, to the great, and perhaps legitimate, disgust of the Catholics of Southern and Western Europe, who felt,

all too truly, through Pope, emperor, knightly orders and the descendants of crusading kings, that Turkey was blasting civilisation and wrecking the fairest portions of the Mediterranean world.

By 1579, Thomas Stephens, a Catholic priest of New College, Oxford, afterwards rector of the Jesuits' College at Salsette, near Bombay, had visited India, and by his letters home had excited a great interest in England in the commercial possibilities of trade with the Far East. Trading adventurers—thanks to Turkish protection—in spite of Hispano-Portuguese opposition, had reached India overland in 1583. By 1600, the English East India Company had been incorporated by Elizabeth's Royal Charter as “the governor and company of merchants of London trading to the East Indies.”

Early trade relations with India had grown out of Elizabeth's alliance with the Turk, and followed an overland route through Egypt or Syria; but it was obvious that they could only be continued on a grand scale and at great profit by taking the all-sea route of the Portuguese round the West Coast of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, and Madagascars. The Dutch mariners led the way in 1596, and from 1601 onwards the great sea route was followed in preference to that of the Mediterranean and Red Sea. The Dutch, after three years' undisturbed monopoly of the Indian trade, 1596-9, had raised the price of pepper against us from three shillings to six, or even eight, shillings a pound. This was the immediate cause of the foundation of the first (and chartered) East India Company.

Although the Stuarts have been much and justly censured by historians for the defects of their home policy and the deceit which characterised their foreign dealings, they cannot be accused of indifference to the creation of an empire abroad; indeed, in this respect they showed themselves much more imperial than the vaunted Elizabeth, cautious and mean as she was in her dealings and ventures. It was really under James I., the beholder of Raleigh, that the transmarine empire of the British Crown was actually founded. The first and oldest colony, so far as continuous possession goes, is the West Indian island of Barbados, taken by an expedition in the ship *Olive Blossom*, in 1605, though not really occupied till 1625.



THE BRITISH IN BERMUDAS: SIR GEORGE SOMERS WRECKED ON THE ISLANDS IN 1609
One of the chief promoters of the South Virginian Company, Sir George Somers sailed in 1609, with a body of settlers, and was wrecked on the then little known islands in South America called after Juan Bermudez. In the name of King James I., he took possession of the islands, which he at once colonised, and died there in 1610.

From the drawing by R. Caton Woodville

HISTORY OF THE WORLD

The next oldest is the state of Virginia, definitely founded in 1607 by the building of Jamestown on May 13th of that year. The Bermuda Islands were accidentally rediscovered and occupied in 1609; the Bahamas in 1629. In 1606 an important charter was granted for the eastern coast-lands of North America, between North

**Britain's
Earliest
Colonies**

Carolina, Maine, and Nova Scotia. This allotted to a London company of adventurers the regions between 34° and 38° N. Lat.; to the Plymouth Company of Devonshire, the area bounded north and south by the 45° and 41° of N. Lat.; while the intervening space was to be open to the operations of either company. It was this hesitancy about the fate of the North American coast between 38° and 41° which made it easier for the Dutch to come in a little later—1609-1621—and create a colony on the site of New York. A portion of Newfoundland was first settled in 1623; in that year, also, was first occupied the little Leeward island of St. Christopher, which was to be the point of departure and the rallying place of so much British colonising enterprise in the West Indies during the seventeenth century.

In 1610, Henry Hudson, a navigator who, two years previously in the Dutch service, had sought vainly for a direct sea-passage to China round Siberia or across North America, was despatched by a strong joint-stock company, in which Prince Henry of Wales interested himself, to search for the China passage and incidentally to annex territories of value. Hudson penetrated through the Hudson Straits—really discovered twenty years earlier by John Davis—into Hudson's Bay.

A mutiny on board his ship on his return caused him to be cast adrift by his crew in the Hudson Straits, and he was never more heard of. But his work of exploration was continued by William Baffin and other English seamen-adventurers in the three succeeding years. The

**The Fate of
Two Great
Discoverers**

marvellous energy and ubiquity of Elizabethan and Jacobean seamen are exemplified in the fate of John Davis—the great Arctic explorer and discoverer of the Falkland Islands—and William Baffin, the discoverer of Baffin's Bay and Western Greenland. Davis was one of the officers serving under the piratical Sir Edward Michelborne in the Malay Archipelago (China Chartered Company), and was himself killed by Malay

pirates off the modern British colony of Malacca; and Baffin was killed at the siege of Ormuz, when an allied Anglo-Persian force took that island from the Portuguese. Owing to the death of Prince Henry, the work of the nascent Hudson Bay Company was not vigorously prosecuted for some years, though the growing whaling and fur-getting industries kept British interests in these regions alive.

So much for Jacobean America; the Asiatic enterprise of the British people under the same monarch was simply marvellous. In 1603 a factory had been founded at Bantam in Java, near the exit from the Sunda Straits. By the following year, the British had got possession of the Banda and Amboina Islands on the very verge of New Guinea, a foothold from which they were dislodged by the Dutch in 1623 by that "Amboina massacre" which so long rankled in the minds of the English, and was only atoned for under the reign of Cromwell. In 1606, James granted a licence to a company of merchants to trade with Cathay, China, Japan, Korea, and Cambaya—probably the first time

**Portuguese
Defeated by
the British**


that Japan and Korea were ever mentioned in any British official document. This China company came to grief very rapidly through its leading commander, Sir Edward Michelborne, turning pirate in the Chinese seas. In 1612 the East India Company founded by Elizabeth had established a post and fort at Surat, near the coast of Western India.

The Portuguese objected violently to this infringement of their monopoly—they had already fought with a British fleet in 1611 and been worsted—and attacked the British trading fleet off Swally, at the mouth of the Tapti River in 1615. The result of a terrific naval battle was an absolute victory for the British, whose right to navigate the Eastern seas was never afterwards seriously contested by the Portuguese. This victory, coupled with the diplomatic mission despatched by James I. under Sir Thomas Roe, 1615-1618, to the court of the Mogul emperor, Jehangir, obtained for the British company a special and an officially recognised position in the dominions of the principal ruler of the Indian peninsula.

In 1609 the right to trade at Aden had been obtained from the Arab sultan of that place, and thenceforth British ships entered the Red Sea, and in 1618 established a



ADRIFT IN THE HUDSON STRAITS: THE FATE OF A FAMOUS NAVIGATOR
Henry Hudson, a famous English navigator, who had in vain sought for a direct sea-passage to China round Siberia or across North America, was despatched, in 1610, by a joint-stock company to search for the China passage; his crew rising against him in mutiny, he was cast adrift with his son in a small boat in the Hudson Straits, named after him, and never heard of again.



British factory at Mocha. A post was founded at Jask, on the Baluchistan coast of the Gulf of Oman, in 1619. This once more roused the ire of the Portuguese, who were already on bad terms with Persia by their occupation of the islet of Ormuz and their overbearing demeanour in trying to close the Persian Gulf to all but Portuguese trade. The

Ormuz Lost to the Portuguese

British—no better in commercial ethics in those days—appeared to Persian ideas as less grasping in their ambitions, and, at any rate, as a rod with which to chastise the overbearing Lusitanian. British and Persian forces combined, and Ormuz was taken from the Portuguese. The British received as a reward the right to levy customs and to trade at the port of Gombrun, near Bandar Abbas, in 1622.

In 1611, the East India Company founded a post at Masulipatam, near the mouth of the Kistna on the east coast of India, and shortly afterwards a similar post at Vizagapatam. Agencies, commercial and political, were founded at Agra and Patna in 1620. Relations with Siam—there was an English post at the Siamese-Malay state of Patani as early as 1611—Celebes, the Moluccas, and Java ripened rapidly till after the Amboina massacre. By 1623 the Dutch had expelled the British from the Malay Archipelago and the Far East, which they did not re-enter till the late eighteenth century.

In 1618, James permitted or encouraged the formation of a chartered company to trade with the Gambia River on the West African coast, the charter being based on an old patent, 1588, of Queen Elizabeth. Although neither this company nor its immediate successors were successful—indeed, by 1664 they had lost £800,000—yet these enterprises commenced under James I. laid the foundations of the British West African dominion. James I., therefore, unworthy of regard as he may

James I. the Founder of the British Empire

be in some aspects, was the real founder of the British Empire. Under his unhappy successor, despite home troubles—partly because of them—empire building still went on. The State of Massachusetts, in North America, was founded in 1620, and Maryland in 1632. The charter of the London company had been surrendered to the Crown in 1624, that of the Plymouth company in 1635. These surrenders made it easier for the

Crown to deal with the organisation of the new American territories. In the West Indies, Antigua, Nevis, Anguilla, and Montserrat were colonised—mainly from St. Christopher, and farther back still in time from Bermuda—and a charter was issued to the Earl of Carlisle for certain islands in the Caribbean Sea, among them Dominica. In the East Indies a foothold was obtained at Surat, which was displaced later by Bombay, in 1614. Madras was founded in 1639; Hugli, the forerunner of Calcutta, in 1642; and an attempt, afterwards abandoned, was made in 1647 to establish a rival East India Company's depot on the coast of Madagascar.

Jamaica had been eyed for half a century by British adventurers as a prize which might be one day snatched from Spain. They had become familiar with some of its conditions by carrying thither negro slaves for sale; they realised that the Spaniards had practically exterminated the native inhabitants, that not having found minerals they had lost interest in the island, and further that many of their negro slaves had rebelled and taken to the

Charles II. as Empire Builder

mountains. Accordingly, two "unauthorised" raids were made on the island in 1596 and 1624. Both were repulsed by Spanish valour. Cromwell, however, took advantage of a breach of relations with Spain to send to the Gulf of Mexico a naval expedition under Admiral Penn and General Venables to seize the large island of Hispaniola. Failing in this object the expedition occupied Jamaica instead.

Under Charles II. the empire attained a notable expansion. In North America the Dutch Colony of New Netherlands, with its two towns of Manhatoes and New Amsterdam, was acquired and turned into the English territory of New York. By the close of Charles II.'s reign, the nucleus of the original thirteen states of New England had been constituted: Carolina (North and South), Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Vermont, and New Hampshire. In 1670, however, Charles II. laid the foundations of a much vaster expanse of empire by granting a charter to Prince Rupert and seventeen others, incorporating them as the "governor and company of adventurers of England trading into Hudson's Bay." This was the outcome of the voyages of Davis,



THE ORIGIN OF MADRAS: THE FOUNDING OF FORT ST. GEORGE

To Francis Day, an officer of the East India Company, belongs the honour of founding Madras. In 1638 he was sent to India by that company to select a better site for their headquarters, and from the Rajah of Chandragiri he purchased a tract of land five miles long near the settlement of St. Thome, and thereon he built a factory and a fort, which he called Fort St. George, by which name Madras, which sprang from this small beginning, is still officially named.

From the drawing by R. Caton Woodville

Hudson, and Baffin, already alluded to; and the grant of this charter by Charles II. resulted in the creation of four-fifths of British North America. The company thus founded still exists; its charter—in one form or another—did not finally expire till 1859, and the bulk of its immense private territorial possessions was not

Dutch and British at War

finally incorporated in the lands of the Canadian people till 1870. In India, the island of Bombay and the mainland settlement of Salsette had been acquired in the dowry of Charles II.'s queen. In West Africa a new charter started afresh the British settlement at the mouth of the Gambia.

In 1672, the broken company of British merchants trading on the Gold Coast received a charter which created a new association, known by its short title as the Royal African Company. The outbreak of the Dutch War enabled the British forces to oust the Dutch from a number of strong places where they, in their turn, had supplanted the Portuguese. Thus were obtained the fortified posts of Dixcove, Sekundi, and Accra, the beginnings of the modern colony of the Gold Coast which is now nearly as large as the joint area of England and Scotland.

All this time British trade with the Mediterranean was steadily growing. Cromwell had made Great Britain a naval power in that inland sea, so that her ships were actually able to threaten the coast possessions of the grand duke of Tuscany and the Pope, who had countenanced attacks on British shipping by Prince Rupert, and to chastise most effectually the Turkish pirates of the Barbary States. With Morocco there were occasionally war-like episodes, but, curiously enough, British intercourse with that last independent fragment of the Arabian caliph's dominions had been of a more friendly and commercial character. Nevertheless, the Moorish rovers not infrequently harried British

Spain's Opposition to Britain

ships engaged in the West African trade. Spain, through her vassal Portugal, which then held Tangiers and Ceuta, constantly attempted to close the Straits of Gibraltar to British ships, and thereby interfere with British trade in the Levant. Therefore, as early as the middle of the seventeenth century, there were vague longings on the part of the British to obtain some foothold in or near the Straits of Gibraltar

which might avail to secure a free passage into and out of the Mediterranean. When Charles II. was raised to the throne, Louis XIV. of France, for mysterious reasons of his own, decided to employ the sea power of Britain to support the Portuguese monarchy against Spain. He arranged the match between Charles and Catharine of Braganza. Taking advantage of this overture, the British Ministers of the day were shrewd enough to satisfy the national longing for control over the Straits of Gibraltar by exacting as part of the princess's dowry the city and territory of Tangier.

Having gained possession of this foothold on the coast of Morocco, the government of Charles II. showed itself too frivolous, too wanting in statecraft and Imperial foresight to retain it. Had they acted more wisely as regards the Moors, it is possible that the history of North Africa might have taken a very different and a most surprising course. But, disheartened by the difficulties, and weakened by the frightful bureaucratic corruption which then prevailed in the departments of

Britain's Seizure of Gibraltar

public supplies, the Ministers of Charles II. abandoned Tangier in 1684. Then it was that other British statesmen or sea-captains fixed their eyes on Gibraltar as a more tenable position. The idea remained dormant until 1704, when advantage was taken of the War of the Spanish Succession to seize and garrison Gibraltar. This step was one of the most remarkable ever taken in the history of the world, and may rank in lack of moral justification with the Napoleonic descent on Egypt and the British seizure of Aden in 1839. Beaconsfield's romantic acquisition of Cyprus might have been classed with these episodes as among the great strokes of empire-building, had it not, by the subsequent trend of British public opinion, been rendered a policy of *non sequitur*.

In the course of the eighteenth century the increasing hostility of the Turks towards even British travellers passing through their Levantine dominions, made overland communications with India so precarious and profitless that increasing attention was turned to the all-sea route round the Cape of Good Hope. Just as the Levantine and the West African trade led them to seize Gibraltar, so the development of commerce with India, China, the Malay Archipelago, and the great and small

THE STORY OF BRITISH EXPANSION

islands of the Pacific just coming within their ken, made a foothold at the southern extremity of Africa a matter of the greatest importance to the now unified kingdoms of England and Scotland.

An attempt in 1781—as unjustifiable in actual morality as the seizure and retention of Gibraltar—was made to snatch the Cape of Good Hope from the Dutch. The islands of Ascension and St. Helena—Ascension was not definitely occupied till 1815; St. Helena has been permanently in British possession since 1673—discovered by the Portuguese, and held intermittently by the Dutch, had been intermittently occupied by the British Navy or the East India Company. To the latter, in fact, St. Helena was of the highest importance as the resting place of its fleets during the eighteenth century, and longing eyes were cast on the French islands of Mauritius and Réunion, which to some extent lay midway between the Cape of Good Hope and India.

During the last half of the seventeenth century, the greed of territorial acquisition in West Africa, Eastern Asia, the South Atlantic and the West Indies, had brought

The Rich Possessions of Holland

Great Britain into violent conflict with the equally rapacious and, so far as enterprise-compared to - means goes, more wonderful country of Holland. The British secured a hard-won victory over the Dutch in the long run, not because they were braver or more skilled as fighting seamen, but because they had a larger and richer motherland from which to draw their supplies. Holland, however, had previously plundered the Portuguese to a magnificent degree, and, even with what she had to give up to the British in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was still mistress of possessions in the West Indies, South America, the southern extremity of Africa, Ceylon, Bengal, Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, Java, and Borneo, with a kind of lien over the scarcely known continent of Australia.

During the latter part of the eighteenth century circumstances forced Holland into a position of quasi-alliance with France, some of the circumstances being the territorial ambitions of Great Britain. Putting forward the plea that the Dutch settlement of the Cape of Good Hope served as a refuge and a rallying-point for hostile French ships, the British Government attempted by two surprise attacks in 1781 to seize Cape Town. But they were beaten

off. The idea, however, like that of Gibraltar, never left them, and when the French troops invaded Holland, in 1794, the British Government, in 1795, with the somewhat chary permission of the Prince of Orange, established itself in Dutch South Africa; and although for a few years the forces were withdrawn, just as the cat allows the crippled mouse a moment of illusory freedom, in 1806 they made another descent on these regions, and came there to stay. The eighteenth century, however, not only saw at its close the establishment of the British at the south end of Africa—an establishment which inspired the great Portuguese traveller-administrator of Mozambique, Dr. Lacerda, in 1796, with the remarkable prophecy of the ultimate Cape-to-Cairo ambitions of the British people—but in its early years witnessed the effectual foundation of Anglo-Saxon North America, by the extension of the British colonies from the North Atlantic seaboard to the Mississippi, by maritime explorations of Vancouver Island and Oregon, which sufficed to stop Russian descent from Alaska, and Spanish ascent from California, and finally by the conclusion of the great struggle between France and Britain for predominance in North America.

Newfoundland, the first aim of British aspirations across the Atlantic, became definitely a British colony in 1728, though by previous settlement it was more justly French. The French colonies of Canada—Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick, which then bore the prettier name of New France—were ceded in 1763; Nova Scotia had been acquired in its entirety in 1758, together with Prince Edward's Island; Vancouver Island was not settled till 1843.

Vancouver Island having been rediscovered by Captain Cook, and ear-marked as a future British foothold on the American Pacific, the close of the eighteenth

Outlines of the Canadian Dominion

century saw the main outlines of the Canadian Dominion laid down. The Hudson's Bay Chartered Trading Company, with its four forts on the shores of Hudson's Bay and its far-reaching explorations, had established a prescriptive claim to all Arctic and sub-Arctic America except the coast of Alaska. Sir Alexander Mackenzie, the Stanley of North America and a servant of the Hudson's Bay Company, travelled overland



BRITISH SEIZURE OF JAMAICA IN 1655 AND THE SINKING OF THE SPANISH VESSELS
With sealed orders from Cromwell, in 1654, a fleet of sixty ships, commanded by Admiral Penn, and carrying about 4,000 men under General Venables, left Portsmouth on an expedition, and, sailing for the West Indies, captured Jamaica. But having failed to carry out their orders, Penn and Venables were committed to the Tower on their return.

From the drawing by R. Caton Woodville



THE BRITISH ACQUISITION OF GIBRALTAR: SPANISH TROOPS MARCHING OUT

Though regarded as impregnable, during the War of the Spanish Succession, Gibraltar was taken, on July 24th, 1704, by a combined English and Dutch fleet, commanded by Sir George Rooke, who raised the British flag and claimed the town in the name of Queen Anne. The above picture shows the Marquis de Salines marching out with the Spanish troops.

From the drawing by R. Caton Woodville

to the Pacific coast in 1789-1793, first sighting the Pacific Ocean at Cape Menzies, opposite Queen Charlotte's Islands.

Vancouver Island is supposed to have been sighted by Sir Francis Drake just two hundred years before Cook, in 1578. It or the opposite coast of Oregon was christened by Drake "New Albion." The island was more definitely placed on the map by Juan de Fuca, a Greek sea-captain in Spanish employ, in 1592. Cook's exploration of its coasts led to no immediate settlement. It was Captain George Vancouver, R.N., in 1792-1794, who really laid the foundation of British political rights to this important island. The Hudson's Bay Company did the rest, 1821-1843.

The revolt of the United States in 1777 did not perhaps make such a great impression at the time on the British mind, because it seemed the mere alienation of a portion of the Atlantic coast lands; it had the immediate effect of making the British still more rapacious and energetic as regards Canada. Had this revolt not occurred and been successful, it is quite possible that British energy might have languished and France have been allowed, from her tiny footholds of St. Pierre and Miquelon, and from her great possessions of Louisiana and New Orleans, to build up once again a French empire in North America. What Britain lost in the New England States she more than regained by founding the Dominion of Canada, which, in her intentions and aspirations, even before the expiry of the eighteenth century, extended from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and dwarfed the contemporaneous ambitions of the United States, balked as they were by a Spanish Florida, Texas and California, and a French Mississippi.

With their thoughts bent on the discovery of a north-west passage which would establish an all-British route across

**America's
Struggling
Republic**

America to China, and the intention to seize the analogous southern maritime route from Atlantic to Pacific—marked by the British exploration of the Straits of Magellan, the occupation of the Malouines, or Falkland Islands, in 1765, already half-occupied and settled by France in 1763, when the celebrated Bougainville, the great French navigator of the Pacific whose name is for ever commemorated by a lovely flower, settled on West Falkland

some of the unfortunate dispossessed Acadians of Nova Scotia—and, finally, the attempt to seize Buenos Ayres during the French alliance with Spain, the existence of the struggling American Republic of the sixteen united states must have seemed to the Britain of the eighteenth century a factor of merely local importance, not more serious in a project of universal American Empire than the intermittent independence of the Transvaal was in the scheme of South African dominion.

During the eighteenth century England, in her colonial enterprise, had been powerfully reinforced by the sister kingdom of Scotland. Since the union of the two crowns, Scotland of the Lowlands had thrown herself energetically into oversea adventure. It is true that the English Government spitefully enough had balked the attempt of the Scots—in 1698-1699—to establish themselves on the Isthmus of Darien, there perhaps to found a Central American State; but the bitterness resulting from this was soon forgotten, and Scots and English, without much national distinction, flung themselves energetically into the building up of a great British dominion in the West Indies and Northern South America. At the close of the seventeenth century Britain had only possessed in the West Indies Jamaica, the Bahamas, Barbados, and three small islands of the Leeward group.

But by the end of the eighteenth century Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, Tobago, and Trinidad were added by conquest from France or Spain, while intermittently Cuba was held, attempts were made to take the great island of Hispaniola, the foundations of a British interest in Honduras and on the Nicaraguan coast were laid, and a swoop was at last made on Guiana, with perhaps a notion of extending that dominion later on over the adjoining Spanish province of Venezuela. So, far from the eighteenth century marking the defeat and retrogression of the British in the New World, it might more fitly be styled the American century, the second of the four great eras of the British Empire, three finished and the fourth commencing. The nineteenth century has been par excellence the age of Asian Dominion. It is quite possible that the Asiatic Empire has reached its apogee in extent, if not in population or power. The twentieth

THE STORY OF BRITISH EXPANSION

century may possibly witness the African culmination. But in the years between the death of Queen Anne and the Peace of Amiens the grandest struggles, the greatest gains, and the keenest ambitions were centred in the New World between the Straits of Magellan and the Arctic Ocean.

The desire to know more about the Pacific coast of North America, on which Russians were beginning to encroach from Eastern Siberia, while the power of Spain was obviously waning, led the British Government to send out Captain Cook to the Pacific Ocean via the Cape of Good Hope and the Malay Archipelago, and thus led to the definite discovery of Australia, New Zealand, and most of the Pacific archipelagoes, and, finally, at the end of the eighteenth century, in 1788, to the establishment of a British settlement on the coast of New South Wales—a settlement which was to be the germ of a vast Australian Commonwealth, destined to grow some day into mighty nationalities of Anglo-Saxon stock. Spanish, French, and Dutch navigators of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had surmised the

Discovery of the Australian Continent

existence to the south of New Guinea and the Malay Archipelago of an island-continent, variously named in imagination Greater Java or even "Terra Australis." The actual name "Australia" was applied in the first instance to the largest island of the New Hebrides group by Quiros in 1606, in the belief that it was the promontory of a great southern continent.

Luiz Vaez de Torres, second in command of the Spanish exploring expedition led by De Quiros, the discoverer of the New Hebrides, as they were afterwards named, had passed through the "Torres Straits," discovered, and aptly named, New Guinea, and had "felt" the proximity of the real "Terra Australis." His indications were followed up ten, seventeen, and twenty-two years later by the Dutch navigators Hertoge and Carstenz, who actually located points and named features of the North and West Australian coasts.

In 1642, the Dutch navigator, Abel Janszen Tasman, skirting the western coast of Australia, penetrated so far south that he actually discovered Tasmania, which he called Van Diemen's Land, after the then governor of Java; and New Zealand—"Staaten Land." Tasman, on his return to the eastward of Australia,

derived enough information, no doubt from Malay seamen on the coasts of New Guinea, to forecast dimly the locality and area of this southern continent, "Groote Zuidland," which was soon afterwards definitely named "New Holland," Staaten Land being at the same time styled "New Zealand." In 1689 and 1699 the pirate-

What Captain Cook did for the Empire

explorer William Dampier paid two visits to the Northwest coast of New Holland, and brought back some account of its peculiar peoples and products. But nothing like systematic exploration or definite discovery was accomplished in these directions until the three voyages of Captain James Cook, 1769-1777, revealed the actual coast of South-eastern Australia, and the definite outline of New Zealand. Cook also placed on the map such archipelagoes of the Pacific as had not been already made known to the civilised world by the Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch navigators of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

British exploring enterprise in these regions between the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean had been baffled during the early eighteenth century by the rivalry of the Dutch and French. They had been obliged to fight France for pre-dominance in India, and a fierce though unofficial warfare had been waged with Holland to keep the Dutch out of Bengal. By the middle of the eighteenth century the French had completely lost any chance of building up a great Indian empire, but the Dutch, defeated in Hindustan, still clung to Ceylon, and successfully competed with the British in Java, Sumatra, Borneo, and the Moluccas.

The eighteenth century decided the fate of India, possibly for several centuries to come; but, compared to the present Asiatic dominions, British rule in Hindustan was by no means universal, and it had but a slight foothold on the Malay Peninsula (Island of

Britain's Rule in India


Pinang, acquired 1786), and in the Malay Archipelago, Natal, Fort Marlborough, or Bencoolen, in Sumatra, and a doubtful tenancy of one or two islets off the coast of Borneo. But at the end of the eighteenth century, which, for a logical sequence, one must place at the Peace of Amiens, in 1802, the British Empire, scattered and patchy as it was, had almost the outline—the skeleton—of the empire of to-day, and was



BRITISH TROOPS MARCHING THROUGH THE SWAMPS OF BRITISH GUIANA

This colony, on the north coast of South America, once a Dutch trading outpost, was held by the British from 1781 till 1783; they again held it from 1796 till 1802, and from 1803 till 1814, when the present colony was formed.

From the drawing by R. Caton Woodville



SIR GEORGE SIMPSON ESTABLISHING HIS FIRST COUNCIL OF SETTLERS IN 1835
Justly considered one of the architects of the present Canadian Dominion, Sir George Simpson had the entire management of the Hudson's Bay Company in Canada, and the rise of British Columbia was contemporary with his administration.
From the drawing by R. Caton Woodville

vastly different from the empire over which William III. was ruling in 1702. At that date this monarch, if he had called for a map of the British Empire beyond the seas, which he probably never thought of doing, would have noted a few English "plantations," or settlements, on the Atlantic seaboard of North America between Boston,

Britain's Overseas Dominions 200 Years Ago

New York, and the Savannah River. Other names in clumsy writing across the Caribbean seas would have reminded him that James I. had given a charter for the Bermudas, that Charles I. had permitted the settlement of Barbados, that Cromwell had annexed Jamaica, and that under Charles II. most of the British Leeward Islands had been acquired.

In Southern Asia he would have noted the Island of Bombay—an undoubted British possession. There should also have been marked on the map factories and forts—more or less identical with political footholds—at some point on the coast of Sind, at Surat, Broach, and Ahmedabad, in Western India; at Calcutta, Tegna-patam, Vizagapatam, Madras, and Masulipatam, on the eastern side of the Indian Peninsula; while in the interior there were agencies at Agra and Patna. Along the shores of the Persian Gulf there were factories at Basra, Bandar Abbas, and Jask; and, despite Dutch hostility, the East India Company still held on to trading posts at Bantam, in Java; Macassar, in Celebes; and Achin, in Sumatra. On the West African coast the Royal African Company possessed forts at the mouth of the Gambia, and along the Gold Coast, from Dixcove to Accra, and at Whyda, on the coast of Dahomeh. The East India Company, moreover, had seized the island of St. Helena.

That was the extent of the British Empire in 1702, at which time Ireland still lay a depopulated, desolate, half-conquered country which was being settled on the east and on the north by Protestant English, Welsh, and Scotch settlers. Scotland herself was a separate kingdom, acknowledging only partially the direct rule of William III. The Isle of Man was a feudal kingdom under a British noble; the Channel Islands were semi-independent piratical settlements. At the Peace of Amiens, in 1802, Great Britain, it is true, had nominally surrendered Cape Colony to the Dutch, but

The Nominal Surrender of Cape Colony

had made every preparation for reoccupation, and had made that reoccupation a matter of certainty and legality by the establishment of her sea power and an understanding with the Prince of Orange.

In America she possessed the whole of the vague and vast territories of Canada, which were at any rate conceived of, under the charter of the Hudson's Bay Company, as stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific; besides the West India Islands already owned, she had seized and has since retained Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, Tobago, and Trinidad, and had established a lien on the coasts of Honduras and Nicaragua.

British Honduras began in the seventeenth century as the fortified establishments of piratical British traders and timber—mahogany—cutters. Though frequently attacked by Spain, and frequently ceded to Spain by England, the British settlers held on steadfastly till, in 1786, a definitely British administration was established. She had occupied British, French, and Dutch Guiana. Far away towards the southern extremity of that

The French Ousted from Egypt

continent the British Government had already earmarked the Falkland Islands, but had been repulsed in its attempt to seize Buenos Ayres. In the Mediterranean we held, legally or illegally, Gibraltar, Malta, Sicily, and the Ionian Islands, while British naval and military action had just turned the French out of Egypt.

Here an almost unconscious intimation had been given of an intention some day to occupy that halfway station towards the growing Indian Empire. In East Africa, Britain had opened up relations with Abyssinia and Zanzibar, as also with the tribes of South Arabia and the Persian Gulf. In West Africa her forces had occupied the French colony of Senegal, and strengthened the hold over the mouth of the Gambia. As the first result of British anti-slavery enthusiasm, the colony of Sierra Leone had been founded. The forts along the Gold Coast, already mentioned, continued to be garrisoned by the Royal African (Chartered) Company. Even at the close of the eighteenth century Great Britain was beginning to think about the Niger, the upper course of which river had, in 1796, been discovered by the Scottish explorer, Mungo Park, in the direct service of the British Crown. British trade with West

THE STORY OF BRITISH EXPANSION

Africa at that time had extended to the rivers which form the delta of the Niger, and even to the mouth of the Congo.

In 1796, as already mentioned, the great Portuguese traveller, Dr. José Lacerda, had predicted that the British would attempt to found an empire stretching from the Cape of Good Hope to Egypt. If Mungo Park discovered the main course of the River Niger, another equally distinguished Scot, an explorer of really advanced scientific attainments, James Bruce, had, in 1768-1773, rediscovered and definitely mapped the course of the Blue Nile from Abyssinia to Egypt. He was despatched on this aim by a British Secretary of State, Lord Halifax, and there is little doubt that this journey provoked a special British interest in the affairs of Egypt.

In Asia the British possessions in 1802 included a general sway over Hindustan between the Himalayas on the north and Cape Comorin on the south, between the Bay of Bengal on the east and the Indus River on the west. The actual possessions in India of the Honourable East India Company at this date over which

**Expansion
of one
Century**

it ruled directly were Bengal and the Bombay and Madras provinces; a portion of the Central and North-west Provinces; parts of Rajputana. Indirectly the company controlled the affairs of Oudh, Haidarabad, and Mysore. They had even during the eighteenth century taken the first political step towards establishing British influence over Tibet; their political explorers had penetrated through Afghanistan to Bokhara, and had acquired some influence at the court of Persia. In the Malay Archipelago they replaced the Dutch in Java and Sumatra, as also at various points on the Malay Peninsula. In North Africa, though there was no actual foothold, nevertheless, by Nelson's victories and the British occupation of Malta, they were so predominant in Tunis and Tripoli as to exercise a kind of suzerainty over those Turkish feudalities.

At present the British dominions have attained an enormous area, even compared to what they were in 1802. In North America the small colonised areas of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Upper and Lower Canada, Ontario, and the few forts of the Hudson's Bay Company, have grown into a belt of continuous colonisation and cultivation extending from the coast of Labrador to

the Pacific and right up to the Arctic Circle and the eastern limits of Alaska; while the political dominion of Canada (British North America) reaches to the Polar regions, and comprises nearly half the North American Continent. In the warmer regions of the New World, vague British rights on the coast of Central


**Territories
Under the
British Flag** America at Belize have grown into the definite colony of British Honduras, while the Colony of Demerara, taken over from the Dutch, has become the large State of British Guiana, 90,260 square miles in extent. In the far south, the Falkland Islands have been definitely organised as a crown colony, and the British ægis has been thrown over the large island of South Georgia, annexed by Captain Cook in 1775. These possessions were definitely occupied and administered in 1833, because of their importance to the whaling industry in the South Atlantic.

Within the limits of Europe, though they have given up the islet of Heligoland off the German coast, they have acquired, for all practical purposes, the large island of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Ionian Islands, which France snatched from the dying Republic of Venice, enjoyed a British Protectorate in every sense of the word for sixty odd years, and were then made over to the Kingdom of Greece. Malta, already occupied in 1802, and had been definitely ceded to the British Crown in 1815.

On the continent of Asia, the large red patches of British dominion (through a chartered company), which gave to Great Britain the practical control of the peninsula of Hindustan, have grown in a hundred years to the existing Indian and colonial empire in Southern Asia. This begins almost in Africa, on the far west, with the port of Aden, the islet of Perim at the mouth of the Red Sea, and the island of Socotra off the North-east

**British
Rule in the
Orient**

African coast. It extends eastwards through the British protectorate over the Aden hinterland and protectorate, or sphere of influence—established by treaty—over the whole south coast of Arabia to the vicinity of the Persian Gulf. The south-west coasts of that inlet and the Bahrein Islands are a British protectorate, and in common with the Arabian regions already referred to are attached to the vast Indian dominions, which begin on



THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN 1702, ITS POSSESSIONS BEING SHOWN IN BLACK AND UNDERLINED) Two centuries ago Great Britain had already begun her over-seas expansion, and had laid the foundations of the vast empire of the present day. In the above map, Britain's possessions in 1702 are shown in black and underlined, the figures giving the dates when the various territories were occupied and came under the British flag.



THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN 1900, ILLUSTRATING THE WONDERFUL EXPANSION DURING TWO CENTURIES

How marvellously the British Empire has extended all over the world during the past two centuries is seen by comparing the above map with that on the preceding page, both of which have been specially drawn for this history. The Empire's dominions are indicated in black and underlined, and the dates of occupation are given in every case.

the west at Baluchistan, near the entrance to the Persian Gulf. By the recent agreement with Russia, the South-east Persian coast commanding the entrance into the Persian Gulf is a British sphere of influence. From Baluchistan the Indian Empire extends continuously eastwards to the frontier of French Indo-China, and northwards to Tibet—a portion of which is actually British—and to Afghanistan, a Central Asian state in very close relations with the British Empire. Ceylon has been acquired from the Dutch, 1796-1815, and British influence now reigns supreme, directly or indirectly, over the whole Malay Peninsula from Burma to Singapore. The northern third of the island of Borneo is also under British protection.

In Australasia, and in the archipelagoes of the Pacific, the gains have also been enormous—a third part of the vast island of New Guinea with the adjacent archipelagoes of the Louisiade and the Solomon Islands, the whole inland continent of Australia, the large islands of New Zealand, the clusters of Fiji and of Tonga, the Gilbert, Santa Cruz, Ellice, Phoenix, Union, Fanning, Malden, and Hervey group, and a lien over the New Hebrides.

The last quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed enormous accretions to the British dominions in Africa. Up to 1875 the British had possessed and built up, since 1806, the colony of the Cape of Good Hope about as far north as Kimberley, and the then small colony of Natal, founded 1824-1842. There remained unclaimed areas between Natal and Cape Colony, and there was no hold over Zululand, the Orange Free State, or the Transvaal. On the West Coast of Africa there was a patch at the mouth of the Gambia, and a few patches on the coast of Sierra Leone, a strip of coast country between the Volta River and Assinie on the Gold Coast, and the little island

Growth of British Africa

of Lagos, once a great headquarters of the slave trade. In the Atlantic Ocean we possessed the islets of Ascension and St. Helena; in the Indian Ocean, Mauritius and the Seychelles. That, in 1875, was the utmost extent of British Africa.

By 1909 these patches and strips have grown into colonies, protectorates and spheres of influence which now in their united bulk exceed the possessions of any

other European Power on the African continent, and include the occupation of Egypt, the administration of the vast Egyptian Sudan, the protectorates or colonies of Uganda, East Africa, Somaliland, and Zanzibar, the protectorate or sphere of influence of British Central Africa between the Great Lakes and the Zambesi, and all British South Africa from the Zambesi to the Cape of Good Hope, and from the outskirts of Damara-land to the Portuguese province of Mozambique. In West Africa there are the territories of Nigeria, which extend from the delta of that river to Lake Chad and the borders of the Sahara Desert—a much enlarged colony and protectorate of the Gold Coast—some 82,000 square miles in area—a protectorate over the hinterland of Sierra Leone, and both banks of the lower course of the Gambia River.

The British Empire may not even in our time touch its apogee of extent, and indeed if it be wisely governed and directed so as to enlist with it, and not against it, the sentiments of the backward races, it may develop into a league of

The Coming South African Confederation

peace and mutual co-operation of still more surprising vastness. It may come to include an educational protectorate over Southern Arabia and the shores of the Persian Gulf, an alliance, almost feudal, with Abyssinia, Afghanistan, Tibet, and Siam; it may assist Australia to arrange with France and Holland on equitable terms for extended sway over a small portion of Dutch New Guinea and of the New Hebrides archipelago. In Africa, the coming South African confederation of Boer and Briton may eventually include the cognate German state of South-west Africa; and it may also, by arrangement with Germany, link up the Uganda protectorate with the north end of Tanganyika, and thus establish the last link in the Cape-to-Cairo route.


Or, if it increases in such directions as these, it may shrink in others, yielding here and there a little to France in Western Africa, to Germany an islet or two in the West Indies, or an establishment on the Persian Gulf. But for the most part it is more likely that these extensions or roundings off of the British Empire will be balanced by their standing out of the way of other ambitions in Eastern Europe and Nearer Asia, or in the Congo basin.

THE CONQUEROR'S GIFT TO LONDON



WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR GRANTING A CHARTER TO THE CITY OF LONDON

From the Painting in the Royal Exchange by Seymour Lucas, R. A.



BRITISH TRADE AND THE FLAG THE PIONEERS OF COMMERCE AS MAKERS OF THE EMPIRE

THE causes and motives which have provoked the creation of this vast empire have been numerous and sometimes conflicting. The first incentive and the last have been the desire to find profitable markets for trade wherein British products or manufactures could be exchanged for foreign wares sufficiently valuable to meet the risks and expenses of sea-transport. Coupled with this has been the desire to grab at whatever good things might be going in the way of animal, vegetable, or mineral wealth not already in the possession of a nationality strong enough to defend it. Then the restless, dissatisfied or persecuted, and even the criminals have hoped to find a happier and less trammelled existence in regions beyond the British Isles yet under the British flag. Honest commerce, eager greed for gain, naïf love of adventure, and the search for marvels—these were the provocative impulses which drove daring seamen, merchants, and soldiers of fortune beyond the seas of Britain to new worlds, new hemispheres, and strange climates during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

In the seventeenth century there was superadded the desire to flee from religious or political oppression; in the seventeenth century real colonisation took place. But in that which followed—the eighteenth—the dominant impulse once again was commerce and the rapid making of wealth in exploitable lands. This was the century of the slave trade's greatest development.

Emigration for Religious Freedom The first familiar instance of emigration for religious freedom is that of the 102 dissenters from the Church of England who emigrated in the *Mayflower*, in 1620, and founded Plymouth, U.S.A. The first Quakers arriving in North America, 1652-1666, were hanged, flogged, or expelled; but from 1671 to 1681 hundreds came to America and colonised New

Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. In the nineteenth century the causes of empire extension were more complex. Commerce, exploitation, the possibilities of mineral discoveries were no doubt the most powerful inducements to extend the area of British occupation; and increasing social pressure in England and Scotland, and misery in Ireland, brought about such a rush of colonists for the vacant healthy lands in America, South Africa, and Oceania—some 16,000,000 persons in the last hundred years (of this number about 5,000,000 left between 1815 and 1850)—as its history had not yet known, the movement being enormously aided by the development of steam navigation. But there was a third factor at work in empire-building from the very beginning of the nineteenth century to its very end: sentiment—a sentimentality almost sardonic in some of its manifestations.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries forts were built and colonies founded on the West Coast of Africa for the purpose of carrying on the slave trade in an efficient manner; in the nineteenth century Britain seized important vantage points, annexed or protected enormous areas in order to suppress the trade in slaves.

The eagerness of commerce to go in front of the hampering restrictions of a regular government led to the creation of chartered companies—and chartered companies have always ended in the foundation of colonies, dominions or empires—in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. Greed of gain was coincident with the glamour of India. India has been the mainspring of the empire, the magnet which has drawn men by such strangely devious routes that the pioneers have halted by the way, have started off at a tangent on other quests, or have become involved in the solution of other problems

widely separated from those of Hindustan. The search for a quick sea route to India through North America—analogueous to the Magellan Straits on the south—led Sir Humphrey Gilbert across the Atlantic, to found that Virginia which was occupied twenty-five years afterwards and which was the germ of the United States

**The Days of
Maritime
Enterprise**

of America. The same stimulus led to the journeys of Frobisher, Davis, Baffin; and the last-named was actually killed in an attempt on the part of the East India Company's ships to find in the Persian Gulf that British sphere of influence on the approach to the Indian markets which has only become an accomplished fact in the twentieth century. Drake's attempt to find the Pacific outlet of these northern Magellan Straits, this water route across North America—which, after all, does exist, only it is too much in the frozen zone to be of any use—led to the discovery of Oregon; and, three centuries later, the same motive of research on the part of Captains Cook and Vancouver brought about the rediscovery and annexation of Vancouver Island.

Failing to find an easy way across the North Atlantic to the marvels of Cathay and the Middle East, the diplomacy of Queen Elizabeth was directed to an overland route through the Turkish dominions. As this proved insecure and uncertain, attention was turned towards the sea route round Africa. This led in time to the acquisition of Tangiers as a calling-place, to the settlement of St. Helena, the seizure of Gibraltar as an alternative to Tangiers, the occupation of the Cape of Good Hope, and of Mauritius.

Bonaparte, thinking to strike at Britain in India, where she was wealthiest and weakest, landed in Egypt, and may be said to have opened the overland route. From the days when the French capitulated and quitted Egypt, England could not take

**Great
Britain in
Egypt**

her eyes or thoughts off that country. The splendid private enterprise of Lieutenant Waghorn having started the overland route in 1837-47, in connection with the newly introduced steamer traffic, Great Britain found herself compelled to occupy Aden, in 1839, at the southern exit of the Red Sea, and ultimately also Perim Island. Bonaparte's action in Egypt, indeed, had far-reaching results he could never have foreseen: it brought Great Britain as a

fighting power into the Red Sea. Even Abyssinia and the vaguer Ethiopian and Zanzibar regions were "looked up" at the beginning of the nineteenth century because of the bearing their alliance might have on a life-and-death war between France and Britain for the lordship of Southern Asia.

If the overland route led to an increased interest in Egypt and the turning of the Red Sea into a British lake, what was not the effect of the Suez Canal? It made a British occupation of Egypt a matter of national necessity, a foregone conclusion to all but short-sighted British statesmen.

This last came about in an odd manner, and at an unexpected juncture, and by degrees dragged her into the Sudan as far as the Congo water parting, and compelled in time the annexation of Uganda. Indian affairs were by this time much mixed up in commerce with those of Zanzibar. Consequently, with the flanks of Egypt to be guarded, no other Power but British must occupy Mombasa—already, for Indian reasons, declared a British stronghold in 1823—or the main route to the Nyanzas and the Upper Nile. Hence arose

**British
Flag in
Africa**

the vast British possessions in Eastern Equatorial Africa. By 1898 and 1906 the fortified harbour of Aden had grown into a protectorate or sphere of influence over the whole of the south Arabian coastlands, including the Kuriya-Muriyan Islands, from the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb on the west and the frontiers of Oman on the east. From similar motives also has arisen the British protectorate over the Bahrein Islands in the Persian Gulf. In South Africa she could not occupy Cape Town and remain indifferent to questions of European colonisation and to the welfare of the natives within three hundred miles of the Cape Peninsula. So, in time the British flag crept along the south-east coast till it conflicted with Portuguese claims at Delagoa Bay.

The Mediterranean route to Egypt, moreover, required other calling stations than Gibraltar. Minorca had once been British, but it lay rather off the direct route to Egypt; moreover, it belonged to Spain, and Spain had become her ally. Sicily would have been too large to retain and control. Napoleon had indicated just what was required then in seizing Malta. It was easy to succeed him, for the Maltese, who had little or no affection for the corrupt rule of the Knights of St. John, voluntarily offered the sovereignty of their



BRITISH OFFICIALS INSPECTING THE CISTERNS AT ADEN, BUILT IN 1700 B.C.

The story of how Aden came into possession of the British is one of some interest. In 1837, a British ship was wrecked near Aden, the crew and passengers being severely maltreated by the Arabs. On the Bombay Government demanding an explanation, the sultan agreed to make compensation and to sell the town and port to Britain, but the Turkish ruler's son, who administered the government, declined to implement the bargain, and in consequence the place was reduced by a naval and military force on January 16th, 1839. Aden, which then became an outlying portion of the Bombay Presidency, was fortified and garrisoned, and its ancient water tanks were partially restored.

From the drawing by R. Caton Woodville

little archipelago to the King of Great Britain. Beaconsfield believed he was completing the chain of naval stations and military halting places on the Mediterranean route to India by adding Cyprus, with the intention that a British dominion over Syria and a railway thence to the Euphrates valley and India should follow.

Britain's Expanding Empire Whether his successors were wiser in preferring the sea route, *via* the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, time alone can show. The affairs of India involved us, commercially first, and then politically, in those of China. This necessitated military and naval stations in Chinese waters.

Hence the acquisition of Hong Kong and eventually of Wei-hai-wei. From the desire to prevent a Russian descent into Tibet and Mongolia, and thence a march towards the Himalayas—in fact, a Russian dominion over the Chinese government—arose the Japanese alliance, with all that it may yet entail. Singapore was required to safeguard the sea route between China and India; the occupation of the Straits Settlements has led to a sphere of exclusive influence over all the Malay Peninsula and a protectorate over the northern coastlands of Borneo. Burma has been annexed to obviate any other intrigues or ambitions in that quarter; while, at the risk of war with France some years ago, Siam has been maintained as a buffer state.

India has been the chief pivot of British foreign policy from the closing years of Elizabeth's reign to the rapprochement with Russia in 1907–1908: that Russia which was discovered commercially in the reign of Edward VI. by British maritime adventurers who were seeking for a north-east passage to India. The principal attraction which India and the Indian trade had for British minds in the Tudor period lay in its production of spices and pepper. It is true that many of these spices were actually derived from distant parts of the Malay

Commerce the Motive of Expansion Archipelago or from Ceylon, but these regions were considered part of India in a generalised statement, and as

some of the Southern Indian ports were depots in the spice trade between Arabia, Persia, and the Farthest East, the confusion was very natural. It would be an interesting study in human history to discuss the diet of Western and Southern Europe in the later Middle Ages and down to the sixteenth century, and discover the reason of the

desire which arose for spiced food, and especially the strenuous demand for pepper. It was the desire to obtain unrestricted quantities of pepper which not only founded the East India Company—and thereby the British Indian Empire—but which first drew Britishers to West Africa: first pepper, then slaves, then gold.

Cinnamon, cloves, ginger, sandal-wood, silks, muslins, indigo, ivory, pearls, gums, carpets, and precious stones, were among the other principal Indian products which attracted the attention of European merchants from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century. The rock formations of India were believed to be excessively rich in precious stones down to quite recent times. But this natural wealth was exaggerated by Arab writers and credulous Europeans. Golconda, little more than a suburb of the modern Haidarabad, whose Mohammedan ruler was one of the first Indian princes to give the British company a trading concession, was not so much a place that produced diamonds as a centre for diamond-cutting, such as Amsterdam has since become. The sandstone region of

India's Vast Store of Wealth the Northern Deccan certainly produced diamonds; indeed, in the sixteenth century, the Emperor Akbar received an annual royalty computed at £80,000 from the diamond mines of Panna, in Bundelkhand, on the northern edge of the ancient island of Southern India.

These mines are still worked, but are now of inconsiderable importance. Emeralds to a limited degree, rubies, sapphires, cats' eyes, and other precious stones, were to be obtained from India or the adjacent countries, besides which the accumulation of the labour and wealth of forty centuries had amassed in this wonderful peninsula—the matrix of the human race—a vast store of wealth in gold, silver, and precious stones; and this possible plunder was one of the most potent attractions to Portuguese, Dutchman, Englishman, and Frenchman to found an empire over these patient, placable, thrifty, toiling millions of Aryanised Dravidians.

The pearl fishery was certainly one of the inducements to occupy Ceylon, one of the most notable additions to the British Empire in the early nineteenth century. Eighty years later, the ruby mines of Burma accentuated the impatience felt at the ineptitude of the native Burmese government and its intrigues with France



THE BRITISH IN CYPRUS: THE BASHI-BAZOUKS EVACUATING THE ISLAND

In terms of the Anglo-Turkish Convention, devised at the Berlin Conference, Cyprus was occupied by the forces of Great Britain on July 10th, 1878. The island is now administered as a Crown colony by a high commissioner.

From the drawing by R. Caton Woodville

and Italy. Rubies and teak forests prevailed to decide the immediate political fate of Burma. The location of gold in Australia and New Zealand came too late to be a provocative cause in the annexation of those islands, a deed already accomplished from other motives; though it is quite possible that the early discovery

Gold the Creator of Colonies

of copper in Australia may have rendered the Imperial Government more determined to secure for Great Britain the exclusive political hegemony over Australasia. Gold, however, was the creator of British Columbia, which otherwise might have slid from the feeble hold of the Hudson's Bay Company into the possession of the United States. Conversely, gold in the Yukon valley and sealskins from Alaska have been the principal reasons why the American Government has taken the attitude it has in the settlement of the North-western frontier of the Canadian Dominion, so resolved not to allow Canada to achieve her natural destiny and extend to Bering Strait—an event which I predict will some day come to pass by friendly arrangement.

Diamonds in South Africa, discovered amid the sterility of the Orange Free State borderlands, suddenly changed the attitude of tolerant indifference towards the fate of the South African hinterland into one of eager unscrupulousness. Advantage was taken of the uncertain nature of the Orange State boundary [and of native claims, which were assigned to Great Britain, to extend the British ægis over all the known diamondiferous territory. This opened up the route to Bechuanaland and thenceforth to the Zambesi.

Britain let the Transvaal go back to independence in 1881, and even waived her suzerainty in 1884. In 1886 the Johannesburg and Barberton districts were found to be rich in gold. The attitude of the British Government towards the Transvaal

South Africa's Attractive Gold-Fields

immediately changed, or, more strictly speaking, was changed for it by the rise to wealth and power of Cecil Rhodes, and his British, German, French and Afrikander business associates, who, between 1889 and 1905, controlled and dominated the British Government. Lord Salisbury, in the sad autumn of 1899, may have spoken for himself in disavowing the attraction of the gold-fields as being the reason why England found herself

at war with the Boers, but his colleagues must have found it difficult to preserve solemn faces as he uttered those memorable and rather pathetic words of a weary statesman of lofty ideals, aloof from the vulgar rush for wealth and a little ashamed of his yoke-fellows' greedy jingoism.

Yet to Continental critics never must British hypocrisy have seemed so needlessly patent. Of course she wanted the gold-fields, and the territory too; but for the gold, would Jew and Gentile, Briton and German, American and Frenchman, Indian, Greek and Portuguese have flocked into the prematurely named South African Republic, or have decided rapidly—and truly—that the unadulterated government of uneducated and greedy Boers and a few peevish reactionary Hollanders was not good enough for very modern, clever, hard-working settlers, who wanted the best type and the least obstructive of existing governments—that of Great Britain?

But for gold and diamonds—and missionaries, of whom more anon—the hinterland of South Africa might still be the undisputed appanage of Boer and Zulu; there would be no railway to the Zambesi; no British Central Africa; but there might also be, by this time, the outline of a great German colonial empire. Possibly Afrikander children now born and getting ready for school may, in their old age, say it was lucky for the fate of the great South African nation that the passing wealth in precious metals and precious stones—perhaps by that time no longer precious—induced Great Britain as a government, but more through a few British individuals, to lay her hands on South Africa from the Vaal and the Orange rivers to the Zambesi and Tanganyika. Her intervention, though it may have been influenced by temporary greed of gain, has moulded a great nationality, the future united states of South Africa, an analogue to the fusion of Frenchman, Scot, and Englishman which will some day form the great Canadian nation.

The desire to obtain an ample supply of mahogany, logwood, and rosewood without paying toll to Spain created the British colony of Honduras. Gold and diamonds, again, enlarged the boundaries of British Guiana. Palm oil drew the British Government into a protectorate over the Niger Delta and Old Calabar.

Cloves were not without their influence on the fate of Zanzibar. Tin made it possible to develop the resources of the Malay Peninsula and impossible to brook the ingress there of any other Power. The cultivation of the sugar-cane attracted us to the West India Islands.

Codfish and lobsters have imparted an interest in the fate and prosperity of Newfoundland which might otherwise have been lacking; cotton possibilities in Nigeria are making a chancellor of the exchequer less grim on the subject of subsidies for railway construction, especially with the happy results of the Uganda railway before his eyes; the chance of cotton-growing in the Zambesi territories was the motive in the minds of the Ministry which despatched Livingstone and Kirk to what is now British Central Africa. The charter of the Hudson's Bay Company was the eventual outcome of Frobisher's voyages of nearly a hundred years before, when Frobisher and Queen Elizabeth, his patroness, believed he had discovered ore containing gold on the verge of the Arctic circle.

**Founding of
Hudson's Bay
Company**

For more than three centuries commentators referred to this idea as a strange delusion, but the discovery of gold in the Yukon valley shows that Frobisher and Elizabeth's Italian metallurgists may not have been so very much in error. Frobisher may have picked up gold-bearing rocks on the shores of "Meta Incognita," or Baffin's Land, and the inhospitable regions of Eastern Arctic Canada may yet become as valuable as are those of the North-west.

The Hudson's Bay Company, however, was formed under Charles II. more with the object of discovering and dominating a water route to the regions of China and India across North America. But the company soon found its *raison d'être* and its claims for military and diplomatic support in the vast numbers of fur-bearing mammals which swarmed over Arctic and temperate North America. Canadians of to-day owe to the bear, fox, wolverene, lynx, marten, musquash, and mink, the political unity of their vast dominion. Nor have whales—toothed and toothless—been without their influence on the development of the empire. The Basque people of Northern Spain and South-west France seem to have been the

first race in Europe or anywhere else to pursue whales on the open sea and attack them with harpoons. No doubt, at first the exploit most desired was to drive the whale on shore. The Basques seem to have had the monopoly of this pursuit from the ninth to the middle of the sixteenth century, when the whalebone

whale of the North Atlantic had become almost extinct. Latterly, indeed, the Basque fishermen had been wont to pursue their search for whales as far as Newfoundland, and with the growing demand for oil and whalebone the British seamen had taken up the same quest, hiring frequently the Basque pilots and harpooners to assist them. When Henry Hudson returned in 1607 from his first search for a North-west passage, he spread the news of the enormous quantities of whalebone whales and walrus which were to be found in these Arctic seas. The result was that the Arctic Ocean between Greenland, Labrador, Spitzbergen and Nova Zembla was thronged for twenty or thirty years with British whaling ships, a pursuit which not only added to her stock of hardy, resolute seamen, but increased British interest in the regions of Arctic America.

In the middle of the seventeenth century, however, whaling was almost abandoned on the part of the British, owing to the zeal with which it had been taken up by the Dutch, who became as quarrelsome and as jealous of any competition as they were in the equatorial Spice Islands.

Repeated attempts were made in the early eighteenth century to revive the whaling industry of Britain in the northern seas, and in 1725 the South Sea Company endeavoured to promote the search for whales—whalebone, introduced into English industries a hundred years before, having become an increasingly important article—by offering a subsidy. The matter

was eventually taken up by the Government, whose bounties granted to whaling ships had created by 1749 the first Scottish whaling fleet, sailing from Peterhead. In the second half of the eighteenth century the spread of learning and the love of reading caused an increased demand for lamp-oil and candles. Wax was too expensive, tallow too evil-smelling; palm oil and other vegetable fats for candle-making had not yet entered the

scope of commerce. The voyages of Anson and Cook had drawn attention to the abundance of sperm whales in the south seas. In 1775 the first British whaling ships entered the Pacific round Cape Horn or through the Magellan Straits.

Discovery of Falkland Islands

The pursuit of the sperm whale in the Southern seas, and the growth also of world-commerce on the east and west coasts of South America, drew the attention of navigators of several nationalities to the Falkland Islands, situated off the coast of Patagonia, so near to the extremity of South America.

These islands had been discovered by John Davis, the Arctic explorer who was killed on the coast of Malacca in 1592, and again by Sir Richard Hawkins two years later. In 1598 the indefatigable Dutchmen—led by Sebald de Wert—paid them a visit and named them the Sebald Islands. In 1690, or a little after, they received the name of Falkland Islands from Strong, a British captain.

In 1763 the French attempted to found a colony on Berkeley Sound. But by this time the Spaniards of South America considered that these islands came within their jurisdiction, and they expelled the French by force. In 1761 they had been annexed by Commodore Byron on behalf of England on the ground of their having been discovered by Davis, Hawkins and Strong; but the Spanish Government contested the British claim as vehemently as the French attempt, and prepared to go to war on the subject. Nevertheless, in 1771, the British claim to the islands was recognised by Spain in a formal convention. Either they proved to be of less importance to the whaling industry than was expected, or the distractions of the

Napoleonic Wars caused them to be forgotten, for their formal cession by Spain was not followed by any attempt at British settlement other than the chance visits of whaling ships. So much so, that in 1820 the new republic of Buenos Ayres laid claim to the Falkland Islands, and established a colony on the site of the old French settlement at Port Louis.

As no protest was made by Great Britain, the islands might have lapsed into an appanage of a South American republic had it not been that they had become a rendezvous for American whaling ships from the United States, and the masters of these ships fell out with the newly established Argentine authority. American war vessels seem to have intervened in the quarrel, and between them the Argentine settlement was destroyed. Then the British Government awoke to the importance of this forgotten outpost, with the result that the British flag was again hoisted in 1833.

The whaling industry flagged some twenty years afterwards, and was succeeded by the pursuit of the fur-bearing sea-lion. But for many years subsequently the Falkland Islands have been valued, not as a resort for whaling or sealing-ships, but as a wool, tallow, and mutton producing colony, in which a very vigorous white race is springing up which may some day play a part in the politics of South America.

Whaling's Service to the Empire

The whaling industry also caused the annexation by Captain Cook in 1775 of South Georgia, a large island—the size of Cheshire—in the South Atlantic, about 950 miles to the E.S.E. of the Falkland group. Whalers have also caused the annexation, or the retention, of numerous tiny archipelagoes in the Pacific, and of Tristan d'Acunha in the South-east Atlantic.



THE TOTAL POPULATION, NUMBERING EIGHTY-ONE, OF TRISTAN D'ACUNHA

THE
BRITISH
EMPIRE
III



BY SIR
HARRY
JOHNSTON,
G.C.M.G.

THE SLAVE TRADE AS A FACTOR IN COLONIAL EXPANSION

SLAVERY UNDER THE BRITISH FLAG AND THE SUPPRESSION OF THE EVIL

THE earliest and strongest inducement to acquire territorial possessions on the West Coast of Africa was the facility for carrying on a trade in slaves with America. The search for pepper—cardamoms, grains of paradise, the seeds of the Aframomum plant—was a temporary allurements; and there was always the trade in gold-dust between Assinie and the Volta River.

But although "Guinea gold" was exported to England steadily from the time of Charles II. onwards, it was never in such large quantities as to give a serious bias to Imperial policy. The rivers and estuaries between the Senegal, Gambia, and Sierra Leone, together with a small portion of Liberia, Hwida, Dahomeh, and Benin: these were the principal resorts of British slave-traders during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the eighteenth and nineteenth the trade spread to Lagos, the Niger Delta, Calabar, Kamerun, and Congo. The rapid conquests of the Spaniards and Portuguese in Central and South America had, in the course of fifty odd years, revealed one negative quality of the New World.

These lands, rich with obtrusive mineral wealth, endowed with magnificent timber, a hundred useful vegetables, and many delectable birds and beasts, were either very sparsely populated with indigenous races of man, or the Indians had not the requisite toughness of fibre to withstand the hellish slavery to which they were subjected by the conquistadores. So that, by the middle of the sixteenth century, the problem which is now exercising many minds in the development of tropical Africa worried the Spanish rulers of America: where was the labour force to come from that could toil unremittingly in a tropical climate?

The Portuguese had anticipated the question before the New World had been discovered. Indeed, the theory of slave labour had been in vigour in the Mediterranean world from a most remote period, and had received a considerable fillip during the Crusades

**Victims
of Moorish
Pirates**

and the consequent wars between the Moslems of North Africa and the Christians of Portugal, Spain, France and Italy. Moorish pirates captured Christians, fair and dark, from off the coasts of the Mediterranean and Western Europe, from Ireland to Greece, and the captives were then set to work to row the galley, build the mole, raise the fortress, decorate the palace, and make themselves generally useful in employments not always palatable to the free Moslem.

It was the great desire of the Christian to do likewise, a desire which only began to have its fulfilment when Spaniards and Portuguese first conquered the Moors within the limits of their own peninsula and then victoriously carried their crusading conflict into Morocco. Prince Henry the Navigator did not discourage his Genoese, Majorcan and Portuguese adventurers from making slaves of the Moors on whom they could lay hands in their exploring expeditions. But they soon detected the difference in servitude between Moors and Blackamoors, though generically the two were lumped together.

The captives brought back from the north of the Senegal River were found to be of noble stuff, to whom slavery meant heartbreak. The black people, trafficked in by the very Moors themselves to the south of the Senegal River, were ideal servants, accepting readily both the Christian faith and a mild form of domestic service. In fact, historically, it was the captured Moors who obtained their own

freedom by offering to show the Portuguese where they might obtain slaves of the material required by them

As soon as the British seamen of Bristol, Devon, London, and East Anglia began to venture far afield in sailing ventures under the instigation of Venetian navigators, they were very curious as to the regions from which the Portuguese obtained spices and muscular blackservants; and even in the discouraging days of Edward VI. and Mary I., when much of English capital and enterprise were fettered by religious troubles and the throttling hand of Spanish diplomacy, merchant adventurers set forth to discover West Africa for themselves.

At first seamen shipped with the Portuguese and kept their own counsel till they returned; or, later, some Portuguese commander, unfairly treated at home, would come to England to find a market for his knowledge. The excessive jealousy and hostility of the Portuguese towards any other adventurers in the West African field were somewhat tempered where the English were concerned by Portuguese rivalry with Spain, and the feeling that in the struggle that was coming, Portugal, to avoid absorption by the power of Spain, might find assistance in an alliance with the English. Moreover, in spite of religious differences, which did not really arise until the reign of Elizabeth, and of a dog-in-the-manger policy as regards oversea adventure, there had been from the twelfth century onwards the growing up of an unwritten alliance, even of written pacts, between Angevin England and Burgundian Portugal.

It may even be said that prior to the sixteenth century the rulers and the aristocracy of Portugal and England were much more nearly akin in blood, ambitions, and even speech, than they are to-day. The influence of Portugal

on the historical development of the British Empire has been so important as to excuse this disquisition. By the beginning of Elizabeth's reign, though the Portuguese did not like the entry of British seamen into the West African trade, they did not treat this intervention with such hostility as might have nipped it in the bud. Consequently, Sir John Hawkins, as he subsequently became, was in a position in 1562 to tender to the Spanish rulers of

America, Imperial or Viceregal, for the supply of cargoes of West African slaves, or Moors, as they were still called.

The ventures proved profitable to the English, and so satisfactory to the Spaniards in the West Indies that the supply continued to be carried on even during periods when Spain and Britain were officially at war. Hawkins, having enriched himself over a business in which he saw no more iniquity than has been felt by many a nineteenth century purveyor of Kanaka, or negro contract labourers, was knighted by Queen Elizabeth, and assumed as his crest a "demi-Moor in bondage."

The British trade in slaves from the West African coast might have progressed much more rapidly and prosperously between 1560 and 1660 had it not been for the rivalry and ambition of the Dutch. The inhabitants of Holland and Friesland are so near akin to English in blood and language, have so many of their virtues and faults that we need not affect surprise that a country, small indeed, but nearly as large as the England that counted in the days of Elizabeth, when Wales and much that lay to the north of Lincoln were savage and sparsely populated, should have achieved the marvellous things it did in the seas of Africa, Asia, and America during the time when its people were fighting on their very thresholds against all the power of Spain and Austria. Such surprise at the achievements of big-minded men out of a tiny country savours of a complete ignorance of history. What Holland did is as wonderful, but not more so, than the staggering first successes of Portugal or the civilisation of Greece.

The Dutch, finding that they were twice as good at ship-building, ship-sailing, and ship-fighting as the Portuguese, who had become the subjects of Spain—the Spaniards, except the small Basque population in the north, were indifferent navigators—grasped at transmarine empire everywhere with a greed admirable in its stupendous character. They intended to conquer the whole of Brazil, and wished to supplant Spain in Venezuela and the West Indies. At one time they took nearly all Angola from the Portuguese, and even made an attempt at the subjugation of the Congo kingdom. They usurped the place of the Portuguese in Senegambia—the island of Goree in the

Discoveries of Merchant Adventurers

Marvellous Achievements of Holland

Trade in West African Slaves

SLAVERY AND COLONIAL EXPANSION

harbour of Dakar to this day bears the name of a small island off the Friesland coast, and on the Gold Coast. They occupied the island of St. Helena, discovered and named by the Portuguese, and probably by their maritime attacks checked any intentions on the part of poor paralysed Lusitania to occupy the Cape of Good Hope. They several times took away the island of Mozambique from the Portuguese, occupied and named Mauritius, and exterminated the Dodo. They conquered the coasts of Ceylon, established themselves in Eastern India and ousted the Portuguese flag from almost every part of the Malay Peninsula and archipelago, where it had been so proudly hoisted and so cruelly maintained by the almost superhuman valour of the great conquistadores.

Imitation has constantly been the sincerest, if most unconscious, form of flattery on the part of the British. During the Saxon period they copied the religion, arts, manners, customs, and costume of the Frankish Roman Empire. From before the Norman Conquest they had begun to watch and imitate the Flemings, Picards, and Bretons. Every fashion in dress that came from Italy ran with a rapidity, astonishing without a coach or carriageable road, through England up to Edinburgh.

From the middle of the fifteenth to the end of the sixteenth century British seamen sedulously copied in shipbuilding, in the art of navigation, and in the use of nautical terms the maritime enterprise of Italy, Portugal, and Spain, while during the seventeenth century they devoted the same spirit of assimilation to all they could learn from the Dutch. Indeed, it was not until the second half of the eighteenth century that England began to teach other nations.

Therefore, where Venice, Genoa, Portugal, and Holland led in matters of maritime discovery, and later in the slave trade, Britain followed unquestioningly. In the last-named pursuit she had anticipated the Dutch, but towards the close of the sixteenth century the Dutch took the lead, and kept it for some fifty years. It was a Dutch ship that brought the first supply of negro slaves to British North America, Virginia, in 1619. As soon as she began to get the upper hand of the Dutch in maritime warfare, or,

to put it more fairly, as soon as Dutch enterprise slackened, the British turned the temporary trading stations established at the mouth of the Gambia, in the estuary of Sierra Leone, and on the Gold Coast, into permanent fortified posts. In fact, under Charles II., James II., and William III., the British Empire in West Africa began mainly with the intention of supplying black slaves to the sugar-growing West Indies, where, under Cromwell, Britain had obtained a splendid installation by the conquest of Jamaica. By 1670, she not only desired to obtain contracts for supplying Spanish America with negro labourers, but she required them in thousands for her own American possessions. Sugar was being planted everywhere in the more tropical of the West India islands, and tobacco in Virginia.

There was a growing demand for rum made from sugar. We were approaching the two centuries, the eighteenth and nineteenth, which, amongst a thousand other remarkable characteristics, good and bad, will probably be known in the perspective of history as the centuries of distilled alcohol: the two hundred odd years in which civilised and uncivilised man attempted to poison himself and his progeny, body and mind, with rum, gin, brandy, arrack, kirsch, absinthe, schnapps, and whisky. Rum, the aguardiente of the Spaniard, got a good start in the infamous race, and vastly promoted the cultivation of the sugar-cane, thus causing the British to establish at least fourteen slave-trading depôts on the West Coast of Africa during the eighteenth century, and Liverpool, London, Bristol, and Lancaster to maintain between them a fleet of nearly two hundred slave-ships.

In 1713, the Treaty of Utrecht imposed on Spain the transference from Dutch to British merchants—in the syndicate or combine, as it would now be called, Queen Anne had a fourth share—of the contract for the annual supply of 4,800 negro slaves to the Spanish Indies. This privilege was to last for thirty years; but for some good reasons the Spaniards repudiated it when it had only run for twenty-six. For this and other "wrongs" the British Government declared war on Spain. The long War of the Austrian Succession that followed—and later, the Wars of the Family Compact and of the American revolt—

Traffic in Slaves and Rum

Britain the Pupil of Other Nations

Britain's Share in Slavery

stood in the way of the resumption of the purveying of slaves to Spanish America in British ships. The Spaniards obtained them through the French and Portuguese, and finally made arrangements with Portugal for the cession of the West African island of Fernando Po and an establishment on the African mainland at Corisco

Negroes in the British Colonies

Bay, so that Spaniards could do their own slave-buying and running. But this was little loss to the British slave-traders, because, as the eighteenth century advanced towards its middle, the British-American and West Indian colonies became more and more prosperous and in need of labourers.

In the closing years of the seventeenth century rice from Madagascar had been introduced into South Carolina, and rapidly became an article of profitable culture in the sub-tropical states of British America, provided there was a sufficiency of negro labour. Between 1700 and 1776 about 2,000,000 negroes had been conveyed to the British colonies of Eastern North America by British ships, and in this same period quite 600,000 to the British West Indies—1,000,000 before the century's close.

With the American revolt the slave-market, in what were now the United States, was practically closed to Great Britain. Moreover, coincidentally with this revolt arose the first determined movement against slavery in North America. The Quakers, who played such a great part in the settlement of the original States of New England, had from the first disapproved of slavery. The State of Pennsylvania practically abolished slavery within its limits in 1776, and Vermont in 1777. Slavery, in fact, would have never been recognised by the constitution of the United States but for the insistence of Georgia and South Carolina. It was possibly cotton which gave a ninety years' extension to the institution of slavery in America.

America's Cotton-Growing States

The cultivation of cotton, curiously enough, though the best wild cotton-plants are indigenous to Southern North America, did not begin in Georgia and the Carolinas until 1770. After a few miscarriages of samples at Liverpool, in 1764, it became an astonishing success. Previous to this discovery of the special value of the climate of Georgia as a cotton-producing country, the small

supplies needed by the modest manufacturing of cotton goods at London, Nottingham, and in Lancashire were obtained from Cyprus, Asia Minor, and the West India Islands of Barbados, Anguilla, and St. Christopher. But a simultaneous provocation to the continuous retention of slave labour in the United States arose from England itself.

From 1750 onwards a series of splendid inventions—Kaye's fly-shuttle, Hargreave's carding-engine and "spinning-jenny," Arkwright's spinning-frame, mule, and throstle—revolutionised the cotton industries of England, the whole history and development of Lancashire, whither cotton manufacturers were being removed from London because of the greater cheapness of labour and the peculiar qualities of the Lancashire climate, and even the social fabric of England. Cotton spinners, American and West Indian merchants became enormously wealthy and influential, and their sons entered Parliament. Thus were founded the careers of the great Sir Robert Peel and of Gladstone. These wonderful develop-

Growth of the Cotton Industry

ments of British industry caused an enormous demand for the raw material. It was before the days of steamships, though the machines with steam power invented by James Watt applied to cotton spinning were the origin of the application of steam-power to locomotion; and the sailing voyages from Turkey through a war-devastated Mediterranean, were too uncertain as a means of a large and constant supply. In the West Indies the area under British control suited to cotton cultivation was too small. As soon as the war with the American colonies could be brought to a conclusion, a trade in cotton, cultivated by slave labour, sprang up between the United States and Liverpool so enormous as to preclude for a long while any serious movement on the American side for the abrogation of the slave status.

But the prohibition of the foreign slave trade by the United States in 1794-1808, and the similar prohibition by Britain in 1808—strengthened by the provisions of the Treaty of Ghent in 1814—effected a great improvement in the position and happiness of the slave in America and in the British West Indies. Hitherto the wastage of life had been terrible. There were about 800,000 negro and mulatto slaves



BRITAIN'S PROTEST AGAINST SLAVERY: CLARKSON PRESIDING AT A CONVENTION OF THE ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY
The British Anti-Slavery Society, founded under the presidency of Thomas Clarkson, had as its object the universal extinction of slavery and the protection of the enfranchised population in the British possessions. Chief among those associated with him was William Wilberforce, whose labours on behalf of the cause did much to arouse public sympathy and to bring about its final triumph in 1833, when the Emancipation Act was passed, thus putting an end by gradual steps to slavery, and arranging for the payment of \$100,000,000 to slave-holders.

From the picture by E. R. Haydon, R.A., in the National Portrait Gallery.

in the British West Indies in 1791, but it required annual drafts of about 30,000 to maintain the labour force at its sufficient quota. In 1780 there were about 600,000 negroes in the Southern United States. This figure had risen in 1790, under the stimulus of cotton-planting and increased demand for slave labour—perhaps also

**Great Britain's
Solicitude
for the Negro**

to a more careful census—to 757,000. By 1800 it exceeded a million, of whom, however, more than 100,000 were already free. By 1820 there were 233,000 free negroes in the United States, to whom the ordinary franchise of free citizens was practically denied. The embarrassment thus caused was met by the foundation in 1822 of Liberia, on the West Coast of Africa, to receive back in Africa the descendants of freed slaves whom America rejected as voting citizens.

Great Britain had already felt this difficulty of conceding political rights to the freed slaves of the West India Islands, and further had to find homes for the loyalist negroes who had fought on the British side during the American War of 1777-1783. These had first been moved to Nova Scotia; then they were conveyed to London, and finally to the Sierra Leone peninsula, which had been acquired by a philanthropist chartered company for the repatriation of negroes.

The foundation of the future Colony and Protectorate of Sierra Leone, in 1787-1792, was the first episode in a new order of empire building; sentiment or sentimentality was henceforth to rank with other more practical reasons for annexing countries, large and small, to the British Crown.

The alleged philanthropic origin of some of her possessions is an explanation, which, down to a few years ago, would have called forth the snort or the sneer from home or foreign critics of the empire. But although Great Britain is rightly famed for keeping an eye on the main chance in her Imperial policy,

**Sentiment
in Imperial
Policy**

it is a fact that several of her investments in Africa and Asia in their origin have been undertaken for motives of sincere philanthropy, and not with the immediate prospect of gain. Thus, Sierra Leone was first started as a chartered company, and then grew inevitably into a crown colony. Lagos was conquered and annexed in 1861 because it remained obstinately a

stronghold of the slave trade. British intervention in the affairs of Nyassaland was largely the outcome of Livingstone's denunciation of the Arab slave trade. British missionary propaganda was in the first place the only motive in Bechuana-land and Central Zambesia.

The same may be said for the beginning of British interest in Uganda, in all probability antedating the anxiety concerning the sources of the Nile water-supply and the irrigation of the Northern Sudan and Egypt. Philanthropy—of a rather sickly kind—started the creation of British commercial and political claims over the Lower Niger, and ranged public opinion behind the vacillating British Government of the 'nineties—it would equally have stood behind them in the 'eighties—in the last century, when Lord Kitchener was allowed to undertake the reconquest and resettlement of the Egyptian Sudan. In no region of the British Empire was philanthropy more justified in urging on a conquest than in these regions of the Central Nile valley. The uprising of the bastard

**British
Influence in
the Sudan**

Arab element in this region was in all truth a revolt in favour of the reinstatement of the slave trade in its most extravagantly cruel and infamous aspects. The Mahdi's revolt had blasted and depopulated a region of the earth's surface which, under proper administration, should have been the home of populous tribes of dark-skinned people engaged in rearing large herds of camels, cattle, asses, horses, goats, and sheep, and in cultivating millions of acres of wheat or of date palms.

Its previous government by Egypt had been undertaken first of all on a purely slave-trade basis, and secondly as a speculation very much on the lines of King Leopold's rubber empire on the Congo. The British conquest, occupation, and reorganisation of the Sudan has been a very great gain to civilisation and human happiness.

Whether such a verdict shall be pronounced on all other extensions of British rule is discussed in greater detail in this survey. But it is noteworthy that many a British conquest, in order to excite the philanthropic motive in the British people, has been preceded by a blackening of the character of those about to be conquered.

THE
BRITISH
EMPIRE
IV



BY SIR
HARRY
JOHNSTON,
G.C.M.G.

COLONIES GROWN FROM CONVICT SETTLEMENTS

EFFECT OF THE OLD TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM ON THE EMPIRE'S EXPANSION

ANOTHER inducement to acquire over-sea possessions should not be overlooked, as it has contributed powerfully, if at first unhappily, to the formation of British and French colonies from the early part of the seventeenth to, in the case of Britain, the last half of the nineteenth century: the transportation of criminals or political prisoners.

The fact that several of her proudest, most prosperous colonies began in this way, or were reinforced in population by these means, she need have no scruple in admitting or regret in recording, for in all the period of English history previous to the reform of the criminal laws in 1826, 1832, 1837, persons not hanged, drawn and quartered—allowed to survive their trial—could not have been so very wicked, since the death penalty in those days was frequently imposed where now three months' imprisonment would be considered ample to meet the requirements of justice, to say nothing of the enormous frequency of false witness, of miscarriages of justice, wherein a humane judge or Minister would give the prisoner the benefit of the doubt by sentencing him or her to transportation for the enforced colonisation of new lands.

Given the shocking social condition of England and France in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, this plan was really a blessing in disguise. The wretched criminal, often more sinned against than sinning, was removed from a rut of hopeless social disqualification, and from incessant temptation to run counter to local laws, to a region where muscle, pluck, endurance, resourcefulness—the brigand's instincts, moderately curbed—were the essentials required in empire building. At home he or she would have eventually ended a miserable career on the gallows or in the workhouse prison. In the

American States, the northern West Indies, Australia or Tasmania, the transported developed in many cases into healthy, happy, virtuous, prosperous fathers, or mothers of sturdy colonists, themselves to be the ancestors, perchance, of such as shall found the mighty independent states of the future. Some of the finest of Australian citizens, I have been told, can trace their descent

**Two Sides
of the Australian
Picture**

from stalwart English poachers, whom the iniquitous game laws of a pre-Victorian Britain condemned to transportation. Similar poachers nowadays, unprosecuted or mildly punished, might develop into successful and very respectable professional cricketers, football players, or golfers; or enter the army, rise to be sergeants-major or inspectors of police, and endow their not-sufficiently-grateful country with families of ten to twelve healthy children.

There was, of course, another side to the picture in Australia, and, above all, in Tasmania. A proportion of the convicts were really wicked men and women, and the partial liberty they attained on reaching the southern hemisphere enabled them to spread their wickedness like a subtle moral contamination. The special and isolated penal settlements in New South Wales, Tasmania, Norfolk Island, Moreton Bay, West Australia, became—according to writers of that and a later day, in pamphlets and in novels—"terrible cesspools of iniquity." But the ex-convicts and ticket-of-leave men became prosperous and outspoken citizens: it has been stated in reports on the transportation question that by 1835 some of the New South Wales ex-convict citizens possessed incomes of between £20,000 and £40,000, derived from houses, lands, ships, cattle, and land transport. They advocated on the platform and in the local Press views that were

described as "unprincipled," but in many respects seem nowadays merely Socialism of a respectable and accepted type. The vicious members of the penal settlements mostly died out from their evil courses and left no offspring to perpetuate their moral obliquity. For the rest, the open air, the sunshine, great spaces, necessity for

**Britain's
Policy of
Transportation**

physical exertion, effected a bodily and mental purification. The Australia and Tasmania of the twentieth century bear no more traces in their 4,200,000 wholesome people of the sorrows, tortures, crimes, and privations of a certain section of the original colonisers than do the modern New Englanders, who are in part descended from a similar recruitment.

Penal colonies or settlements of outlaws or mutinied soldiers were not unknown in the polity of ancient Egypt, the Greek or the Roman worlds, and here or there in legend and in history are quoted as the seed of subsequently prosperous communities. In the evolution of the British Empire the policy of transporting law-breakers to lands beyond the sea was foreshadowed by the Vagrancy Act of Elizabeth's reign, on the strength of which her successor, James I., directed that "a hundred dissolute persons" should be sent to Virginia. In 1660 and 1670, Acts of Charles II. prescribed the transportation of offenders against the laws, which then included many who were merely "lewd, disorderly, or lawless persons," or who were dissidents in religion; and from this time onwards men and women were regularly drafted to the plantations in New England.

In 1718, an Act of George I. ordained that criminals guilty of grave offences, who escaped the death penalty, were to be farmed out to labour-contractors for transport to the American colonies. The contractors were thus enabled to sell the labour of these white slaves—men at about \$50 a head and women at \$40 or \$45—for whatever term the judge had

**Fate of
the White
Slaves**

attached to their transportation, say, from seven to fourteen years. At the end of that period the labourer became free, theoretically, and although in many instances, no doubt, a wicked master kept his "convict" at work beyond the term of his sentence, in many others he became a free colonist long before or settled the question himself by running away to the backwoods, or joining the Indians and becoming the father of

vigorous half-breeds. Convicts were also sent to Jamaica, Nova Scotia, the Bermudas, Barbados, and other islands of the British West Indies. But with the revolt of the American States, the transportation of British law-breakers across the Atlantic came to an end. The simultaneous revelation by Captain Cook of the vast Australian territories suggested a far better outlet for the energies of those unhappy convicts in whom the great philanthropist Howard was forcing his fellow citizens and government to take an interest.

The first fleet of convict settlers left England for New South Wales in 1787, and, after a voyage of seven months, landed its consignment on the site of the modern Sydney in January, 1788. In the same year another convict station was established at Norfolk Island, about 400 miles to the north-north-west of New Zealand. In 1804 the first settlement was effected in Tasmania, when 400 convicts, many of them Irish political prisoners, were established on the site of the modern Hobart. The next year the Norfolk Island convicts were removed to Tasmania, and established on the banks of the Upper Derwent.

**British
Criminals in
Australia**

As early as 1832, however, protests began to reach England from the reputable section of Australian society against the principle of transporting thither the criminals of Great Britain. There had always been alongside the deported prisoner of the State a steady influx of free colonists. Some of these came to Australia with a view to farm, by means of cheap convict labour; and no doubt by this association of white and black sheep, not a few among the latter regained their former spotlessness of fleece. It is at any rate certain, though enough emphasis has never been placed on this happy fact, that a proportion of nearly, if not quite, half the convicts sent out to Australia found their way back into the life of decent, self-respecting men and women.

It must also be remembered that between 1800 and 1820 a large number of the prisoners were political: Irish rebels or English rioters, fighters for freedom merely, and often high-minded, pure-minded men. On the other hand, after the first reform of the terrible English criminal code in 1826 and 1832, the persons deemed to have merited transportation were more certainly thorough-going law-breakers than under the former and harsher

COLONIES GROWN FROM CONVICT SETTLEMENTS

laws. So it came about that all the respectable elements of Australian society—from whatever source recruited matters not, for their lives and exploits were sufficient testimony to their character—struck at the dumping of any more convicted criminals on Australian soil. Their protests were endorsed by their judiciary, and after 1840 no more state prisoners were sent to the eastern half of Australia.

A good many of the irreclaimable convicts of New South Wales and Queensland (Moreton Bay) were removed to Norfolk Island, which continued to be a convict station till 1854. Tasmania received all the output of British convicts until 1846, when, in consequence of protests from its Government, the supply was stopped until 1848. Then it began again, especially with regard to Irish and English Chartist political prisoners. This was in 1850, when an attempt to land 250 convicts in the previous year at the Cape of Good Hope provoked almost an insurrection. After 1850 no more convicts were sent to the beautiful island of Tasmania, which, in 1825, had been thrown open to free emigrants. In Tasmania the worst

Troublesome Convicts in Tasmania

features of convict colonisation were certainly manifest. The indentured or assigned criminals, who were subjected to but little supervision, frequently escaped into the bush, and between 1804 and 1830 the island was terrorised by bushrangers. This precipitated trouble with the black indigenes, whose treatment, active and passive, at the hands of British officialdom will always be one of the blots on the empire's record, from the point of view of science as well as philanthropy. The worst type of convicts were herded at the penal settlement of Port Arthur, on Tasman Peninsula, under conditions graphically described by the late Marcus Clarke in his powerful novel, "His Natural Life."

Western Australia had been founded as a colony in 1829, but for many years it languished in growth owing to the superior attractions in rapid fortune-making offered elsewhere in the island-continent. It needed cheap labour above all for the development of its resources, so that when the other states of Australia were indignantly repudiating the principle of convict immigration, the legislature of the Crown Colony of West Australia actually proposed to the Home Government, in 1846,

the sending out annually of a limited number of British convicts. The proposal was eagerly accepted by the British Government in 1849, at a time when they were placed in a very awkward dilemma by the outbreak in Cape Town against the landing of convicts. Accordingly, transportation of criminals was resumed

The System of Transportation Abolished

Australia-wards, and the prisoners, released on ticket-of-leave for the most part, were sent annually to Fremantle and Albany until 1865. Many of these so-called convicts were little more than boys from the reformatory prison at Parkhurst, Isle of Wight. But later the Imperial Government began to develop a plan of regular penal establishments in Western Australia for the using up of British criminals in the mass, and this contemplated procedure offended the growing national pride of Australia.

Moreover, it was complained of by the colony of South Australia, which had never been associated in its foundation with convict immigrants, but which now witnessed a permeation of its settlements by escaped criminals from West Australia. In 1865, therefore, the system of transporting convicts to Western Australia, or to any region beyond the limits of Great Britain and Ireland, came to an end for ever.

There is nothing to gird at in this record. Transportation was a plan which in the circumstances of the time, of home institutions, and colonial needs, served a purpose that in the main was beneficent. At any rate, whether or not displeasing to British pride, it must be ranked among the principal causes which led to the colonisation of North and South Carolina, Virginia, and Massachusetts; of Jamaica, the Bahamas, and the Leeward Islands; of Australia and Tasmania.

But for the need to find a dumping-ground for offenders against the criminal laws or for political prisoners, Australia and

Colonies that were Lost to France

Tasmania would have become French possessions; no doubt New Zealand as well. France, with the gold and copper of Australia and the magnificent climate of New Zealand as baits for French emigrants, might have played a very different part in the world's history. It is curious to reflect on the partly forgotten causes and personalities of this movement towards Australia. After the middle of the eighteenth century there

were British Ministers who took an interest in science for the mere love of knowledge. Lord Halifax, in 1768, had despatched James Bruce, British consul in Algeria and Tunis, to Egypt, to discover the source of the Nile. In the same year, partly through the influence of the same Secretary of State—who died in 1771—Captain James

The Beauty and Wonders of Australia

Cook was sent with a small naval expedition to the South Seas to observe from the longitude of Tahiti the transit of Venus. On his homeward journey he discovered, or re-discovered, New Zealand and Australia. His landing at Botany Bay, near Sydney, at the beginning of the Australian autumn, when there was a renewed outburst of leaf and blossom under the influence of the rains, caused him to give, on his return to England in the summer of 1771—besides the reports of his scientific staff, among whom was Sir Joseph Banks—such a glowing account of the beauty and wonders of Australia as fascinated the attention of arm-chair geographers in England. Amongst this type of useful and enthusiastic students was a Mr. Matra, afterwards British Agent at Tangiers, who had access to the ear of Lord Sydney, the Minister then in charge of Colonial affairs.

The philanthropist John Howard, in 1777-1779, had been agitating for prison reform. The American colonies were now closed as places to which criminals could be transported. The prosperous West Indian Islands rejected this labour material, not half so useful as negro slaves; where, then, was a harassed administration, just awaking to the impulses of modern philanthropy—largely created by the Quakers—to send the wretched beings it was too humane to slaughter and too ignorant to reform? Some suggested a penal settlement at

Gibraltar; others, with more sardonic intent, the Gambia River, where the climate was reported to kill one in six among the Europeans landed there. But Mr. Matra espoused the suggestions of Sir Joseph Banks that the beautiful country of New South Wales should receive a British settlement; and afterwards shaped his plans so as to incorporate Lord Sydney's suggestion that the Botany Bay colony should comprise a scheme for the transportation of large numbers of convicts. Mr. Matra seems to have been a Corsican, the relation or descendant of a Corsican patriot who sometimes fought with, sometimes against, Paoli, in the Corsican struggle for independence which preceded the French Revolution by twenty to thirty years. Matra had become domiciled in England, and, as far as can be ascertained, never was in Australia, but merely became interested theoretically in that country's possibilities and in colonisation generally. Lord Sydney, as Sir Thomas Townshend and later as a peer, was at the Foreign Office between 1782 and 1791.

Then, owing to the disgust occasioned by the issue of the American War, the Ministry of the colonies had been abolished and the oversea possessions of Great Britain were dealt with by the Foreign Department. Matra, with his knowledge of French and Italian, was useful to Lord Sydney, no doubt in Mediterranean questions. His own chief pre-occupation at this time, 1783, seems to have been to find a new home for the American loyalists. Lord Sydney's aim was to select a suitable portion of the globe for the reception of transported criminals. From this curious conjunction of plans and enthusiasms sprang British Australasia.



AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINES RECEIVING BLANKETS FROM THE GOVERNMENT

THE
BRITISH
EMPIRE
V



BY SIR
HARRY
JOHNSTON,
G.C.M.G.

THE WARS OF THE EMPIRE, JUST AND UNJUST

HOW BRITAIN'S OVERSEAS DOMINIONS HAVE BEEN EXTENDED BY FORCE OF ARMS AND THE LOSS OF THE AMERICAN COLONIES

THE participation of England in the Crusades, and, indeed, all the wars carried on by Norman, Angevin, and Plantagenet kings outside the English realm, with the exception of the conquest of Ireland, Wales, and Scotland, can hardly be called wars for the foundation of the British Empire. The campaigns of Henry II., Richard I., the first three Edwards, Henry V. and VI., were undertaken as the attempts of French princes to reign in France, while their work in the Crusades was really a lingering vestige of the Western Roman Empire, a continuance of that work of Rome which was really resumed after the Saxon interregnum.

For a brief period after the Anglo-Saxons had done much to destroy Roman civilisation in Britain, Ireland may have been more civilised and prosperous than England or barbaric Caledonia. Were it not, however, for the vestiges of an undoubted and very beautiful art, the early mediæval civilisation of Ireland might be questioned, seeing how much invention and exaggeration have accumulated in the monkish legends. [Students of this part of British history would do well to read "The Elder Faiths of Ireland," by W. H. Wood-Martin; and "The Making of Ireland and Its Undoing," by Mrs. Alice Stopford Green.] With the influence of the Romanised Franks on the Saxon courts, Roman civilisation soon raised its head again in the realm of the Anglo-Saxon from Edinburgh to Southampton, and the new English civilisation began to infiltrate Iberian Wales and Cornwall. The necessary preliminary to a British Empire abroad was the political consolidation of Great Britain,

Roman
Civilisation in
Britain

Ireland, and Man into a single great power with a central government. Until that could be brought about in deed, if not in word, there could be no motive, no security for an empire beyond the seas of the British Archipelago. The first wars of the empire, therefore, were those which the

England at
the Time of
the Normans

Norman and Angevin kings, incited by the Pope, with his desire to unify the Western Christian Church, undertook for the subjugation of Ireland and Wales. For Imperial purposes, the conquest of Ireland was sufficiently achieved in the reign of Henry II. The Danes had largely prepared the way for the English. They had slain the last Keltic king of all Ireland, Brian Boru. Ireland was then, as now, composed, in a different proportion, of much the same racial elements as England, Scotland, Wales and Cornwall.

It is probable, however, that at the time of the Norman invasion Danish was a good deal spoken on the coasts of Ireland, and from that to the English of Henry II.'s period was no very difficult step. But it was really the Roman Church that kept Ireland under English control until such time as the English infiltration had grown too strong for a national resistance.

Wales had been brought into the English hegemony at the conclusion of the reign of Edward I. Anglo-Saxon, Norman, and Danish influence combined, had, between 700 A.D. and the reign of Robert Bruce, settled the question whether Scotland was to be an independent Keltic kingdom with a predominant Keltic language, or a country ruled by the English speech, by Roman and Norman ideas of law and custom, although for two centuries more she remained a power more often hostile

than friendly. The Isle of Man had come within the English sphere of influence in 1344 and 1406, when it had ceased to be ruled by a Norwegian dynasty, and had been finally wrested from intermittent Scottish occupation. The Hebrides and outer islands of West Scotland were secured from Norway, and, later, from independent rule — by the **Scotland's Union with England** "Lord of the Isles"—in 1264 and 1427. The Orkneys and Shetlands were also pledged by Norway (Denmark) in 1469 as the security for the dowry of Margaret of Denmark, who married James III. The pledge was never redeemed. Thus the kings of Scotland, mainly by war prowess, between 844 and 1470 brought the entire mainland and adjacent islands of North Britain under one rule, and in 1603 united it with the Crown of England, Wales, Ireland, and the Channel Islands, and the suzerainty over Man.

Though the nominal independence of Scotland continued until the fusion of the two crowns in the person of James VI. (I.), Scotland had no Imperial policy of her own after the Battle of Flodden Field, except the unfortunate Darien expedition of 1698-1700 to the Gulf of Uraba at the southern beginning of the Isthmus of Panama, and did not actively participate in the Imperial schemes of Britain till after the Act of Union in the reign of Queen Anne. It was likewise not until the middle of the eighteenth century that Irishmen born in Ireland are found taking any prominent part in colonial expansion.

The war-worn Henry IV. had dallied with Imperial projects of trade in the Mediterranean, and had even received embassies from the Moors of North Africa ; but his death at the early age of forty-seven cut short his plans of expanding English influence. The eighty years of turmoil that followed distracted men's thoughts from any questions but those of

The Seeds of Imperial Desires England, Scotland, France, and Burgundy. Thus the great stirrings of the Southern English—for at first all Imperial enterprise came from south of the latitude of Lincoln—towards oversea adventure and acquisitions did not make themselves felt till the reign of Henry VII. The growing relations of trading Britain with the Low Countries, with Venice, Portugal, and the Hanseatic towns, which became very marked in the reign of Edward IV., sowed

the seeds of Imperial desires. England was prompted to found an empire by giant minds of Venice and Genoa, who, eager to take their inspirations to any monarch with the power of executing them, and often thwarted or maltreated by Spain or Portugal, came to England, and attracted the inchoate desires of this people—emergent from civil wars, safe at home, and fermenting with the new learning—towards the discovery and conquest of lands across the Atlantic Ocean.

The first war undertaken for an empire beyond the shores of Britain did not occur till the early part of Elizabeth's reign, and then for a long time it was an unofficial war, waged by gallant men whose status was little superior to that of pirates. Drake and his comrades, incensed by the attempts of the Spanish monarchy to retain all America within the limits of a Spanish monopoly, boldly attacked the colossus in detail, and by surrendering to the greedy Elizabeth much of the wealth thus acquired, escaped being hanged as pirates. But after their exploits had provoked the despatch of the Spanish Armada,

The Bold Line of Queen Elizabeth Elizabeth took a bolder line. She afforded a somewhat churlish and treacherous assistance to the struggling people of the Netherlands, and waged a war here against Spain—not by any means crowned with honour—which was probably intended, if she saw her way clear, to add the Netherlands to the dominions of the British Crown—still claiming the kingdom of France. The Dutch, after the disgraceful behaviour of Leicester, were by no means minded to pursue their original invitation to Elizabeth to become queen over the Low Countries. Outraged at the treachery displayed by Elizabeth's generals, they resolved to lean on the House of Orange and its German connections, and to pursue an independent and even a rival course to that of England.

This divergence of paths between the people speaking two Low German dialects in the deltas of the Rhine and the Ems, and the people speaking another language of the same stock in Great Britain, Scotland and Eastern Ireland, was to culminate seventy years later in some of the toughest of the colonial fights, and reverberated to its last echo, it may be hoped, in the South African War of 1899-1902. James I. probably permitted rather than encouraged the foundation of a British

Empire beyond the sea, firstly because it was difficult to check the impulses in that direction which had grown up under Elizabeth, partly because these enterprises were encouraged by his gallant eldest son, Prince Henry, who died untimely in 1612; and lastly, because the promoters of these colonial schemes had only to bribe James's favourites to get what charter they desired. James's own colonial or Mediterranean wars were unfortunate, and resulted in no advantage. He beheaded Raleigh to please Spain, and because Raleigh had discovered no gold or silver mines in Guiana.

Cromwell's first colonial war was with Holland. The effect of the massacre at Amboina in 1623 of a number of Englishmen and their followers—nine Englishmen, one Portuguese, nine Japanese, and about ninety Malays—in order that the Dutch might retain the monopoly of the spice trade, had taken some time to reach England, but had never been forgiven or forgotten. Internal troubles had prevented the exaction of any indemnity until the establishment of Cromwell's power in 1652.

**Cromwell's
Revenge
on the Dutch** The Dutch had taken full advantage of the paralysis of England at home between 1630 and 1652, Prince Rupert aiding on behalf of Charles II. to chase British ships from the carrying trade in the Mediterranean, Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

They had, of course, added to their offences in Cromwell's eyes by receiving an envoy from Charles II. after the death of his father. Therefore, in 1651, the Commonwealth Parliament devised the extraordinary Navigation Act; which obliged all colonial or Indian produce to be carried to Great Britain in British ships only, or foreign goods to be brought in ships of the country producing those goods. Thus they dealt a severe blow at the Dutch mercantile marine, which had become the common carriers of the world.

They wished also to check the free use of British fisheries by the Dutch fishermen, and demanded as a royalty the tenth herring of every catch. They also required—which was less defensible—that the Dutch should salute the British Fleet first whenever the two squadrons met in the Channel. The results of the naval war which broke out in 1652 were very favourable to Britain, and the position of the British in the East Indies and on the east coast of North America

was materially strengthened. As regards Spain, which was covertly harassing the British settlers in the Bahamas and Leeward Islands, who for their frequent raids on Hispaniola and Jamaica no doubt deserved such reprisals, Cromwell sent an expedition, 1654-1655, under Admiral Penn—the father of the founder

**Jamaica
Seized by the
English** of Pennsylvania—and General Venables to Barbados. At this island they opened their sealed orders, and found they were to attack and occupy the large island of Hispaniola. Besides the 4,000 soldiers they had on board, they were to recruit a further force from among what we should nowadays call the convict settlers of Barbados, and were further to take up more fighting men at St. Christopher.

With 10,200 men they proceeded to attack the port of San Domingo in a most blundering fashion, and at length were beaten off by the Spaniards and the results of great sickness among their men. Ashamed—or, rather, afraid—to face Cromwell with no better results than this repulse, they proceeded to Jamaica, never very strongly garrisoned by Spain. Their seizure of the island, in May, 1655, met with but a feeble resistance on the part of the Spaniards. The folk who seemed most annoyed at the arrival of the British were the negro slaves of the Spaniards who had replaced the exterminated Arawak Indians, slaves probably brought to Jamaica originally in British vessels. These fled to the mountains, and long remained recalcitrant to British rule.

A small proportion of these descendants of the Spanish slaves claim still a certain independence and peculiar privileges of their own in the bush country of Eastern and Western Jamaica. The Spaniards nicknamed runaway negroes who took refuge in the interior mountain ranges "Cimarrones," from "Cima," a mountain peak. This term was shortened

**England's
Unscrupulous
Action** and corrupted in West Indian English into "Maroons." This attack on a Spanish possession in a time of peace, and when a

Spanish ambassador had been accredited to Cromwell and to the Parliament for the purpose of arriving at a settlement of all outstanding disagreements, and even of the conclusion of an alliance between the two nations, can only be described as a dishonourable and unscrupulous action which, if it had been committed against England

by Spain, British historians would never have ceased denouncing. As it is, I cannot find a word of disapproval in the work of any British historian; only expressions of regret that the drunken squabbles of the leaders of the expedition caused it to fail humiliatingly in the original purpose entertained by Cromwell—the conquest

**England
at War
With Spain**

of Hispaniola. After this outrage Spain declared war. Cromwell had already (1655-6) despatched a British fleet to the Mediterranean under Blake simultaneously with the expedition under Penn and Venables to the West Indies. Blake was to punish the Barbary rovers for their attacks on British shipping, and to strike terror into the courts of Tuscany and Rome for their having given harbourage to the recusant English war vessels, the remains of Charles I.'s navy, under Prince Rupert.

Blake threatened to bombard Leghorn, but finally agreed to accept from Rome and Tuscany an indemnity of £60,000. He then proceeded to Algiers, but the Turkish dey of that country promised reparation. The dey of Tunis refused satisfaction, so the castles of Goletta and Porto Farina were battered by Blake's artillery and the shipping they protected was destroyed. Tripoli was afterwards threatened, but submitted. Blake followed up the Spanish declaration of war in 1656 by blockading Cadiz and burning a Spanish treasure fleet at Santa Cruz (Teneriffe, Canary Islands). The alliance with France which followed the outbreak of war with Spain led to the capture and retention of Dunkirk by the English. Dunkirk was then a town of the Spanish Netherlands. In 1658 Charles II. sold the place to Louis XIV. for £200,000, which he spent on his mistresses.

In 1664-1667 the war with Holland was renewed, owing in part to Charles II. reviving the Navigation Act of the Commonwealth. But hostilities were further

**Unofficial
Warfare in the
Far East**


provoked by the unfriendly attitude of the Dutch towards the newly founded Royal African Chartered Company, which was attempting to establish itself on the Gold Coast in order to take a share in the slave traffic and in the export of gold. Out in the Far East, indeed, there was constant bickering between Dutch and English, and many a spell of "unofficial" warfare between their land or naval forces occurred sometimes when the two

nations were at peace with Europe. This went on until the latter part of the eighteenth century, and had for its general purpose the expulsion of the Dutch from Bengal and the driving away of the English from Ceylon and the Malay Archipelago. An example of one of these local wars was the arrival in 1759 of a Dutch flotilla in the Hugli to assist Mir Jafar to turn out the victorious English. Clive and Colonel Forde turned fiercely on the Dutch and captured or destroyed the whole flotilla. During the eighteenth century it was France rather than Holland that had to be fought for the extension of the British Empire in America, the Mediterranean, and India.

Use was made of the War of the Spanish Succession at the beginning of the eighteenth century to seize Gibraltar and Minorca. The holding of Gibraltar had been once or twice suggested as the alternative to the surrender of Tangier in 1684, and the question of a secure harbour of refuge at the outlet of the Mediterranean had become more urgent to British naval policy after the defeat of Sir George

**Gibraltar
Captured by
the British** Rooke by the French off Cape St. Vincent in 1693, and the capture of the British merchant fleet from Turkey, and, later, during the subsequent operations of Admiral Russell off Cadiz. But the actual capture of Gibraltar was effected rather as a side issue, and not entirely by British valour.

In the third year, 1704, of the war, Sir George Rooke was despatched with a force of German and English soldiers under the Prince of Hesse Darmstadt to seize Barcelona. Here, however, they were repulsed by the Spaniards, who held the place for the Bourbon King Philip. They, therefore, sailed back towards England, but on their return surprised Gibraltar, which was not expecting any attack. The importance of Gibraltar was, at all events, not yet fully realised, though at the Peace of Utrecht, signed on April 11th, 1713, it was, together with Minorca, ceded to Great Britain by King Philip of Spain. Five years afterwards, the Prime Minister, Lord Stanhope, thought Gibraltar of no consequence, and proposed to retrocede it to Spain in order to pacify Cardinal Alberoni. Minorca, the second largest of the Balearic Islands, had been captured by an English force under General and Admiral



BRITAIN'S FIRST FOOTING IN CANADA: THE FRENCH SURRENDER OF QUEBEC

Making his first voyage to Canada in 1603, Samuel de Champlain founded Quebec in 1608, and subsequently became French governor of Canada. In 1629, he was compelled to surrender Quebec to British adventurers under Admiral Kirke, but the captured territory was restored to France, peace having been arrived at between the two countries.

From the drawing by R. Caton Woodville

Stanhope in 1708. It remained as a British possession till 1756, when it fell to a French attack after the defeat of Admiral Byng. At the peace of 1763 it was restored to Great Britain, again lost to the Spaniards in 1782, seized once more by British arms in 1798, and finally restored to Spanish rule in 1803, the British deciding to retain Malta

as an alternative "padlock" on the Mediterranean. The results of the War of the Spanish Succession—1702-1713—also strengthened the British position in the Hudson's Bay territories, Newfoundland, and in the West Indies; and by the Treaty of Utrecht the "Asiento" for the supply of slave labour to Spanish America seemed to the eager British to carry with it the right or the excuse to evade the jealous Spanish monopoly of trade with South America. On such a pretext as this the South Sea Company was founded to trade with the Pacific coasts of Spanish America.

But the powerful Prime Minister of Spain, Cardinal Alberoni, had no intentions of allowing this misreading of the rights obtained under the Asiento. His hostility was accentuated by the interference of George I., in 1718-1721, with the disputes between Spain and Austria as to the division and allotment of Italian territories. The ill-feeling smouldered for years, breaking out in 1727 into a four months' Spanish siege of Gibraltar, a siege which led to assistance being afforded to the British by Morocco, and to the beginning of friendly relations with that empire never since interrupted.

In 1739 war was definitely declared on Spain, the war of "Jenkins's ear," over the interpretation of the Asiento, and was not brought to a close until 1748. During this war—largely concerned as it was with the defence of the Netherlands and Rhineland against the ambitions of France, and the counter attempts of

France to restore the Stuart dynasty—no additions were made to the British Empire; but the raiding voyage of Commodore (afterwards Lord) Anson round the world again drew British attention to the possibilities of the Pacific containing unexplored lands of value.

The peace signed at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 was of brief duration. The territorial ambitions of France and Britain in North America were already becoming

acutely hostile. The quarrel really centred on a very important principle. Were the British settlers to be allowed by France to penetrate across the Ohio River, and thus break through the ring of French forts and claims of sovereignty stretching from the St. Lawrence to the Mississippi? If the British accepted this confinement, then Anglo-Saxon America would at most have been limited to a small portion of Eastern North America, and perhaps to Newfoundland, which had been ceded to Britain at the Peace of Utrecht in 1713; though it is doubtful whether the victory of the French (in a struggle which reached its climax in the British attack on Quebec in 1759) would not have ended in the eventual supremacy of France over the whole of North America.

This American war began unofficially in 1754 by skirmishes and serious fights, in which George Washington, at the age of twenty-one, was engaged, between British and French colonists and regular soldiers along the Ohio River; and by naval combats and raids between British and French naval forces off the coasts of

Newfoundland and in the British Channel. In those pre-telegraph days an unacknowledged state of war could continue, in a condition strongly resembling piracy, for more than a year before it was thought necessary to issue a formal declaration of belligerency.

This war, declared in 1756, lasted until it involved Spain, besides Prussia, Russia, and Austria, and became the "Seven Years War" of the "Family Compact." Its results, ratified by the Peace of Fontainebleau, or Paris, on February 10th, 1763, led to most momentous issues: to the establishment of a vast Anglo-Saxon North America—France only retained the two little islands off the Newfoundland coast and a small portion of Western Louisiana, and Spain gave up all territory east of the Mississippi—to the empire of British India through the victories of Clive and Eyre Coote; to the enlargement and consolidation of that Prussia which was to grow into the great modern empire of Germany; to the British acquisition of Senegal, which first turned her thoughts towards the Niger; and, lastly, to the beginnings of British Honduras and the acquisition of Dominica, St. Vincent, and Tobago in the West Indies. The Seven Years War, that began in

THE WARS OF THE EMPIRE, JUST AND UNJUST

1756, moreover, was remarkable for a fighting element on the British side which has never since been absent from her land forces in times of need—the Highland regiments, the “Berg-Schottische” that delighted and surprised the King of Prussia when they served with Hanoverian, Hessian, and Brunswick soldiers to defend the electoral dominions in Western Germany.

It was the idea of the great Pitt, derived from a suggestion made eighteen years earlier by a Scottish statesman, Duncan Forbes, to enlist in the British Army for foreign service warlike Highlanders, who only eleven years before had been invading England under Charles Edward. From this time forward dates the complete fusion of Scottish and English interests in the conquest and administration of the British Empire.

Attention should also be drawn to the very important part played in all the Imperial wars of the eighteenth century, from 1704 to the struggle with Napoleon, by the German soldiers taken into British pay. It must be remembered that in the early eighteenth century there was practically no standing army in Great Britain,

Britain's Wars on Sea and Land

merely a militia. A good deal of British fighting was done at sea. Warfare was carried on in America much more by armed colonists than by means of imported British soldiers. Some thousands of British soldiers were enlisted for the wars carried on by Marlborough, the Duke of Cumberland, and George II. in Flanders and the Rhenish Provinces; but a large proportion, also, of the troops under British generals were Dutch, Hessians, Hanoverians, Westphalians, Brunswickers. Even under Queen Anne, Hessians, commanded by their own prince, were subsidised to do the work of the British Army; and we have already noticed that it was with a force of this kind, largely composed of Germans and commanded by the Prince of Hesse, that Gibraltar was captured. When George I. and II. were on the throne, German troops were not only employed with British subsidies to defend Hanover, but were imported into England, used in Ireland, and sent over to America, just as in the latter part of George III.'s reign they were employed to garrison South Africa. Men thus employed seldom returned to Germany. They usually married English or colonial wives, and, when disbanded, remained in or migrated to

British colonies, forming in time one of the best elements in the British Empire, physically and mentally.

In 1763, France ceded to Great Britain all the French possessions in North America except Louisiana. Canada was thus united to Newfoundland, the thirteen colonies of New England, and to the

The Mother Country at War With America

Floridas. Three years afterwards, the Stamp Act was passed by the British Parliament. This assertion of the principle that Britain might tax her American colonies without their giving consent to such contributions either by elected representatives at Westminster, or at any provincial assembly of their own, produced serious disturbances in Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, and other of the New England “provinces”; and, although the Stamp Act was repealed in 1766, and in 1770 all the American Imperial import duties were removed, with the exception of the duty on tea, this last was insisted on in a way which brought the conflict between Mother Country and colonies to a head. A state of war with the colonials began in 1775 with the Battle of Lexington, near Boston.

France joined in this unhappy war in 1778, after the capitulation of Burgoyne's troops at Saratoga. French money, men, and the diversions caused by the French Navy, which took away from Great Britain several of the recently acquired Windward and Leeward Islands, ultimately decided the American struggle in favour of the colonial forces under George Washington, Gates, Sullivan, and Greene. But for the French, it is highly probable that Sir Henry Clinton, who succeeded Sir William Howe as chief in command of the British forces in North America, would eventually have got the better of the colonists, who lacked money, stores, and munitions of war. But the ultimate result would have been much

France and Spain Against England

the same. During the Napoleonic wars the United States, as they became from 1776, would probably have effected a completion of their independence, and might by then have won over the French Canadians, and not have left to Great Britain any foothold on the North American continent.

Spain, smarting from the losses she had sustained at the Peace of Paris in 1763, hastened to join France in attacking

England over the American question. She devoted her efforts chiefly to the great siege of Gibraltar (1780-1782) and to recapturing Minorca, in neither of which enterprises she succeeded. Nevertheless, at the end of the war in 1782, England retroceded to Spain the Island of Minorca and the two Florida provinces in North America, thus renouncing, in Florida, one of the most important gains of 1763. Russia showed marked unfriendliness in 1780, combining with Denmark and Sweden in the League of Armed Neutrality. Holland went farther and declared war. At this period the Dutch were much under French influence, and were bitterly jealous of the British successes in India.

**Dutch
Jealousy of
Britain**

The reply to the Dutch declaration of hostilities, besides the destruction of Dutch shipping in home waters, was the despatch in 1781 of a powerful squadron under Commodore Johnstone to seize the Cape of Good Hope. Owing to the treacherous communication of the British plans by a spy the French Government was enabled to forestall Johnstone. He was attacked at the Cape de Verde Islands by the great French Admiral Suffren, and his squadron was seriously crippled. Suffren then went on to South Africa, and landed men at Cape Town to assist in driving off the British, whose second attempt, in 1782, likewise failed.

After Lord Cornwallis had capitulated to the French and Americans at Yorktown in October, 1781, this war of seven years' duration drew to a close, and was concluded by the Peace of Versailles in January, 1783. It is true that during 1782 the siege of Gibraltar had been brilliantly terminated by the heroic bravery and enterprise of the besieged force under General Elliot (Lord Heathfield), and that Rodney had smashed the French fleet under De Grasse in the West Indies; but this war of the American revolt nevertheless imposed

**A Set-back
to the British
Empire**

severe losses and humiliations on the British Empire, and it is difficult to understand why the settlement at the Peace of Versailles is alluded to by British historians with complacency. As a matter of fact, it has been so far the most serious set-back that the empire has sustained. Besides the recognition of the independence of the thirteen states of New England, she retroceded the Floridas to Spain. She gave up Minorca; restored Senegal to

the French; abandoned all stipulations concerning the non-fortification of Dunkirk, and ceded to France the West India Islands of St. Lucia and Tobago, besides several posts in Eastern India.

In 1790-1794 there was nearly an outbreak of war with Spain over the question of Nootka Sound, Vancouver Island, in reality the question whether the British territories of Hudson's Bay and the Canadas should have a Pacific coast. Spain had already occupied California (called by Drake New Albion); Russia, under Catherine II., was establishing fur-trading stations in Alaska. Alaska was discovered in 1721 by the Danish navigator Behring, in the employ of the Russian Government.

The Emperor Paul, in 1799, issued a charter to a Russian fur-trading company to occupy Alaska. Spain was desirous of extending northwards along the Pacific coast until she met the Russian flag. She dreaded the proximity of the English. The expeditions of Cook in 1778, and of Vancouver in 1791-1792 excited her apprehensions, and perhaps for this reason as much as others she was willing, as soon as

**Additions
to Britain's
Dominions**

the first horror of the French Revolution was over, to join France in 1796 in the renewed war against Great Britain. In 1793 was the beginning of those long Napoleonic wars which lasted, with the very brief interval of the Peace of Amiens, till 1815, and which enabled Great Britain to add to her dominions Heligoland, the Ionian Islands, Malta, Cape Colony, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Ceylon, Guiana, Trinidad, the remainder of the Windward Islands, and British Honduras; besides Minorca, Java and Sumatra, Senegal, the French West Indies and Cayenne, and the Island of Reunion; all of which were restored at the Peace of Amiens or at the Congress of Vienna.

Attempts to capture the Canary Islands, Uruguay and Buenos Ayres had failed, the last-named, undertaken in 1806-1808, causing much disappointment in England. The value of temperate South America as a horse and cattle-breeding country had already been appreciated. The monopolist policy of Spain had for generations disgusted and alienated the Spanish and Portuguese colonists, and it was believed that the road lay open for the creation, through Uruguay and Buenos Ayres, of a possible British empire over the non-Portuguese part of South America.



THE SURRENDER OF MAURITIUS TO THE BRITISH IN 1810

Formerly called the Isle of France, Mauritius was discovered by the Portuguese in 1507, it being at that time without inhabitants and unknown to Europeans. Its name was changed on coming into the possession of the Dutch in 1598; they abandoned it about a hundred years later to the French. The British captured it from the French in 1810, and when hostilities ceased, in 1814, the holding of the island by Britain was one of the provisions of the Treaty of Paris.

From the drawing by R. Caton Woodville

But though the South American Spaniards had been alienated from their selfish metropolis and its new Napoleonic dynasty, they were still sufficiently Roman Catholic to loathe the supremacy of a Protestant Power, of a nation which still oppressed its own Catholic subjects in England and Ireland. Therefore they showed such a

**Landmark
in British
History**

dogged resolve to resist to the death that in 1809 the British forces under General Whitelock finally abandoned the attempt to conquer the city of Buenos Ayres, and withdrew from South America, a result which covered Whitelock with altogether undeserved obloquy.

With these exceptions, by the end of the Napoleonic wars the outlines and starting points of the British Empire of to-day in America, Asia, Africa, and Oceania were pretty clearly indicated. From the fact that we have had no "colonial" war with any European or American Power since 1815, that date becomes an important landmark in the history of the British Empire; but to some extent in Imperial warfare the division between ancient and modern should rather be placed at 1763. Up to that period the share in the conquest and defence of the empire fell almost entirely on England and Wales, and more on the navy than on the army. After that date, first Scottish and then Irish soldiers took a notable part in the land warfare of Great Britain, while the Army as a whole began to play a great part in Imperial conquest and maintenance. Indeed, since 1815, the rôle of the Navy has been almost entirely a subordinate one, an unknown quantity.

It has been there to serve as a means of safe transport for the army and as a warning to other Powers not to interfere and not to transgress on British claims, and as an effective security against their attempting to do so. The Napoleonic wars, so far as Great Britain was concerned, began with the murder

**Britain
Envious of
the Dutch**

of Louis XVI., and with the ebullition of the French Republic and its propaganda outside the limits of France. But they were waged very soon for directly Imperial purposes. Statesmen of that time saw the enormous advantages Great Britain might derive from the general upset of affairs contingent on the French Revolution. The position of the Dutch had long excited British envy. Their attitude

towards us in Bengal, Java, and the Spice Islands had never been forgotten or forgiven. Their dogged tenacity and colonising genius in South Africa, which may some day be paralleled by the work of the Scottish planters in Nyassaland — the Scottish and Dutch are singularly alike — showed Great Britain of what vital importance Cape Colony might become to the Mistress of India as a half-way house for the provisioning and repair of squadrons and as a home for British emigrants.

The strength and the situation of Trincomali, in Ceylon, and the menace to India which it would prove in French hands decided the British to seize Ceylon in 1795-96. They also took possession then or later of the Dutch settlement in Java and Malaya. The morality in these actions was no worse than that of the Dutch who, 200 years before, had taken advantage of poor little Portugal being in the grip of Spain to rob her of nearly all her oversea possessions, some of which the British sea-eagle has made the Dutch osprey disgorge, though they were once in the pouch of the Portuguese gannet. No colonial war has been

**Britain's long
Immunity from
Colonial Wars**

waged with a European Power since 1815. But war for the extension or maintenance of the empire has often been so close that ultimatums have been tendered, though subsequently replaced in diplomatic tail-pockets. Wars between France and Britain over colonial questions or ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean or Pacific Ocean were very near in the 'forties of the nineteenth century. At that period, also, began an embittered feeling between the nascent power of the United States and successive British administrations relative to the growth of Canada and of British ambitions in North America. Several times the questions of the Oregon frontier and the amount of seaboard due to British Columbia brought about discussions with the government at Washington.

There were also questions as to the northern frontier of Maine, which projects inconveniently into eastern Canada. The great Russian possession of Alaska was bought by the United States in 1867 more to annoy Great Britain than for any other reason, and long before the existence of Klondyke gold was suspected, or seal-skin jackets had become the reward of virtue or the solace of vice. But for the threats of the United States,

THE WARS OF THE EMPIRE, JUST AND UNJUST

Great Britain would now be in occupation of Haiti and a good deal of the disorderly republic of Venezuela. The Crimean War, as to the wisdom or unwisdom of which we cannot as yet pronounce a definite decision, was only slightly colonial, in the idea which prompted Great Britain to defend the rotten empire of the Turks.

The Turk was still the suzerain of Egypt, and Egypt, through the British-established overland route, was becoming the main road to India. What, in those days of absolute non-scruple regarding "native" rights, withheld Great Britain from accepting the proposal of the Emperor Nicholas that she should annex Crete and Egypt, and in return offer no objection to a Russian occupation of Constantinople, it is difficult to understand; unless statesmen of those days were so far-sighted, an assumption which it is not easy to deduce from their memoirs, as to feel that the abandonment of Constantinople to Russia would mean a future overwhelming impact of the Russians against the British Empire in India. It may have been an impression that France would resist à *outrance* a

Crimean War's Effect on Europe British Egypt. Yet, not long afterwards, the Emperor Napoleon himself proposed that France should occupy Morocco, Sardinia (Italy) should take Tunis, and England Egypt. Neither can this reluctance be ascribed to a period of Imperial lassitude, for whilst Russia was suggesting the division of the Turkish Empire Britain was absorbing vast territories further east.

In the opinion of the writer, the general policy of the Crimean War was right, so far as any war can be right, since it imposed a pause on European ambitions. Both Turkey and Egypt obtained a respite, during which, under wiser sovereigns, these important Mohammedan states might have developed firm and progressive governments. Probably we shall one day see Constantinople the capital of a free and civilised Balkan confederation, in which the Turk, regenerated in his civil estate, will play a leading part, in close alliance with the Bulgarian, Roumanian, and Greek states—a new quadruple alliance whose compact strength will contribute to the maintenance of the world's peace and the restoration of civilisation to the lands of the Macedonian and Byzantine Empires. There

was some menace of trouble with Spain towards the close of the 'fifties over the question of Morocco, which had just been invaded by a Spanish army (1859). Great Britain for a long time regarded Morocco as a possible protectorate, and as a means of controlling access to and egress from the Mediterranean. During the 'sixties of the last century, when the Suez Canal was, in spite of the predictions of the late Lord Palmerston, approaching achievement, the British Government wobbled between a policy that should keep Spain and France out of Morocco and one which should give Great Britain a definite share in the control of Egypt.

Britain's Preparations for War The next menace of war on Imperial causes was again with Russia, when the internal disorders of the Turkish Empire furnished a pretext for the Russo-Turkish War. A seriously directed Russian attempt to occupy Constantinople would certainly have precipitated a fight in 1878. As it was, the Russians, the collapse of whose military power against Japan was foreshadowed by their defects of army organisation in 1877-1878, drew back from a struggle in which they would have had no ally, and Great Britain received as compensation for the £6,000,000 sterling she had spent in war preparations the lease of Cyprus, and a vague protectorate over Asia Minor, which she subsequently abandoned.

Again, in 1884-1885, the danger of war with Russia arose, this time over the safety of the Indian Empire. This was the slow-match of Russia's revenge for her enforced departure from Constantinople. The great success, administrative more than military, which had attended the extension of the Russian power over the Mohammedan sultanates in Central Asia inspired ambitious Russian soldiers with the belief that they might similarly lay hands on Afghanistan, and from this point of vantage win over the people of India to a preference for the supposed easy-going Russian as a ruler in place of the vexatiously interfering, moralising, educating Britisher. But Russia's belief and interest in the matter were half-hearted. Already, in 1885, her ambitions were returning towards Asia Minor and extending over Tibet and the Chinese Empire. Famines and plagues had begun to take the gilt off the Indian gingerbread.

Russia was so splendidly unattackable over the matter of the Central Asian khanates that she worried Indian officials about Afghanistan more *pour le plaisir du taquinage* than for any greater purposes. Moreover, she was already feeling her way towards a French alliance, and knew that this annoying intervention in Afghanistan

Great Britain's Differences with France

would effectually stop the immediate reconquest of the Egyptian Sudan. From the close of the 'eighties of

the last century British relations with France in regard to Egypt, the extension of French domination over Nigeria, and French aggression on Siam, brought her almost to the deliverance of an ultimatum in 1893.

She was probably then nearer to war with France over Imperial questions than even some five years later over the question of Fashoda. France, however, knew better than to go to war with Great Britain over affairs on which she was always ready to compromise. She knew that she had no chance against the British Fleet. On the other hand, she was equally aware that since 1884 a new factor had come into the colonial field—that Great Britain nourished a deep-seated dislike to Germany for having ousted her from the Kameruns, taken Damaraland under her very nose, and snatched at other portions of South Africa; wrested from Great Britain a vast East African dominion, previously controlled by the potent personality of Sir John Kirk, founded a German state on the flank of the Gold Coast; threatened the Lower Niger; and occupied or bombarded Pacific archipelagoes which were only not British because it had not been thought worth while to hoist the flag. France knew that Great Britain did not wish to push her too far, lest a Franco-German alliance should menace the British position in Egypt.

So, between 1893 and 1899, France gave in on this point, and on that principle, and Britain surrendered some undefined claim, swallowed some disappointment, or abandoned a vague project. All danger of a conflict between the two Powers on questions of colonial policy disappeared with the withdrawal of Marchand from Fashoda, and the dropping of any intention on the part of Great Britain to maintain the independence of Morocco.

All things considered, Great Britain had got the better of Germany over the rush for empire in East and Central Africa.

Bismarck had indicated the 11th parallel of south latitude as the *ne plus ultra* of British extension from the Cape northwards, and he or his successors had hoped to secure Uganda and much of the Congo State for German expansion. This and that rapprochement, this and that consideration, not forgetting the serious Arab revolution in German East Africa, checked the German lust of empire over savages.

But as the German mind ruminated over the distribution of the spoil which followed the great European rush for Africa, a bitter feeling was engendered against the British. Partly to humour this, partly with an idea that it might lead to something, German Imperial policy dallied with a Boer alliance. It was felt instinctively that under their skins, Boer and North-west German are singularly alike. If the Boers could not stand alone against England, they might throw in their lot with the future of Germany, and become the nucleus of a great German-speaking dominion in the south of Africa. Hence the intrigues with the Transvaal which provoked the foolish Jameson Raid on the

Germany's Imperial Policy

part of the passionate Rhodes, and in turn the rash telegram of the German Emperor. But it is doubtful, if all the secrets of

the chancelleries were known, whether there has been any serious menace of war with Germany over colonial questions since 1890, so far as the direct interests of Great Britain are concerned. There has been much more danger of an Anglo-German conflict over the position of France. Britain, in order to settle herself definitely in Egypt, "gave" Morocco to France, in 'the calm way in which we nations of higher culture, and consequently greater power, direct the fortunes of the backward or savage peoples. Germany at that time (1904) was giving her Imperial policy an altogether different bent.

Disappointed of dominion over Africa, choked off the conquest of China by the uprising of Japan, temporarily diverted from American enterprise by the ominous hints of the United States, she decided that the line of least resistance lay in the direction of the Balkan Peninsula, Constantinople, Asia Minor, and the Persian Gulf. For the moment, owing to the outcome of the war with Japan, Russia was helpless. France and Britain—France, for some reason, most of all—barred the way to Constantinople. Italy viewed with

Peace Between the Powers

THE WARS OF THE EMPIRE, JUST AND UNJUST

marked disfavour the unavowed German scheme, the *Drang nach Osten*. France was the pivot of this new alliance for the temporary preservation of the Turkish Empire. France was the easiest hit at. Thence arose the emperor's visit to Tangier, the open threat to France, and the nearest approach until then to an armed conflict by land and sea between the forces of Great Britain and those of the German Empire, allied certainly with Austria-Hungary. This happily averted struggle would have been a colonial war, for it would have originated in the Egyptian question.

As regards Russia, it is doubtful whether Britain has ever been on the verge of war with her over Imperial interests since the Afghan settlement of 1885. She was annoyed, exasperated, bothered by the Russian designs on Northern and Western China. But had those designs been pushed to annexation of Chinese territory, and had Japan been powerless to resist, England

might have preferred to indemnify herself by the occupation of Tibet and a protectorate over Central China rather than by going to war with Russia. It was Germany, to a very great extent, that nipped in the bud her plans in regard to Tibet, and perhaps most of all as regards Central China.

It was by no means certain whether, in spite of her benevolent neutrality during the Spanish War, the United States would have given England any backing in regard to Chinese protectorates or spheres of influence. Consequently, finding this policy led to danger, the British Government revived the idea already suggested by Lord Rosebery of an alliance with Japan as a means of holding Russia in check and preserving the balance of power in China.

The outcome of the Japanese alliance may have momentous results, not, perhaps, in all directions palatable to Great Britain. These, however, are best discussed under another heading.



PIONEERS OF EMPIRE: THE HOME OF A BRITISH SETTLER IN THE SOUTH SEAS



LORD ROBERTS CROSSING THE ZAMBUK KOTAL IN HIS FAMOUS MARCH FROM KABUL TO KANDAHAR IN 1880
From the painting by Louis Desanges



BRITISH CONQUESTS IN THE EAST

EXPANSION OF THE INDIAN EMPIRE AND THE OPIUM WAR WITH CHINA

WE have so far dealt with the wars undertaken against or narrowly averted with nations of white men in connection with British imperial interests. Wars of conquest waged with races that were black or yellow have been numerous since the middle of the eighteenth century. The wars with other Europeans were unnormal rather than just or unjust. Both parties quarrelled about the property of a third party, or lands that belonged to nobody worth consideration.

But the imperial wars waged in Africa and Asia have often been unjust, though there were instances of doing evil in order that presumed good might follow. On the American continent and in Australia the population has been too little in opposition to the incoming British settlers to have provoked any conflict worthy of record as a "war"; but the case has been otherwise in New Zealand and some parts of India, Burma, China, and South Africa.

Putting aside the conflicts of colonists with American Indians in Eastern-north America, the first imperial war with non-Europeans and non-Christians was the conflict against the Moors round Tangier conducted by British regiments in the reign of Charles II. This fighting, however, was not altogether unjust. The Portuguese, two and a half centuries before, had taken Tangier from the

Tangier Transferred to Britain Moors, and transferred it by arrangement to Great Britain, probably because if Portugal had not done so the Moors would have taken it from her, as they had taken other Portuguese posts on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. Seeing, however, that the position in Morocco could only be maintained as the outcome of a practical conquest of that state, the British withdrew from the struggle and

surrendered Tangier to the Moors; and although they afterwards indemnified themselves by snatching Gibraltar from Spain, still, there is no unjust war to be laid to their charge in Morocco. The next fighting with native peoples of non-European race took place in India seventy years afterwards. Here British merchants found themselves in the most splendid, thickly inhabited part of Asia. China

India the Birthplace of Man in her best provinces might vie with India in density of population, and in her total sum of inhabitants; but the glory of China was pale before the art, the science, the history of India, and its magnificent physical endowments of fauna and flora. India should be placed first in the list of the world's countries, for she is almost certainly the birthplace of man.

But the India of the middle eighteenth century was an empire to be had for the taking. The Mohammedan power, which had begun with the irruption of Arabs, Afghans, and Tartars in the eighth and eleventh centuries, had crumbled to feebleness. The power of non-Mohammedan peoples and principalities had revived. There was no universal national spirit in India. Each big or petty prince was as ready to ally himself with the power of the European for his own advantage as, in the days before 1870, each kingdom, duchy or principality of Germany was ready to take part with France against the power of Prussia or Austria. The wars waged in India by the East India Company during the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries were in a measure wars waged with Indians against Indians.

As Sir William Hunter remarks in his great work on the Indian Empire, "the British won India, not from the Mohammedans—the Mogul dynasty—but from

the Hindus." In the early part of the eighteenth century the Mogul Empire, founded by the House of Timur, the Tartar, in 1526, was falling to pieces under the attacks of the reviving Hindu power. Though Arabs, and soon afterwards Afghans, had invaded North-west India between 711 and 828, Mohammedan rule over Northern India did not begin until the year 1000. For five hundred years afterwards there were constant compromises with the many millions of Hindus, whose religion co-existed valiantly alongside militant Mohammedanism. Down to the establishment of universal British domination, there remained Hindu kingdoms and dynasties which had never been conquered or ousted by the Afghans or the Moguls.

Revival of Hindu Power

But in the middle of the seventeenth century a very definite revival of the Hindu power began in South-west India, in the hilly country to the south and west of Bombay. This was the confederation of sturdy Hindu peasant farmers, cavalry armed with spears, to be known subsequently as the "Mahrattas," apparently a corruption and shortening of Maharashtra. The Mahrattas' power was built up by a succession of warrior kings beginning with the great Rajput adventurer Sivaji. The power of this dynasty over the whole Mahratta confederation passed, early in the eighteenth century, into the hands of a Brahman prime minister—the Peshwa—and became hereditary in this form.

The French, under Dumas and Dupleix, governors of the French settlement of Pondichery on the coast of South-east India, had started the idea of interfering in the internal wars of nizams and nawabs, rajahs and wazirs. This had been carried on with such success by Dupleix himself, and by the Marquess de Bussy, that a considerable tract of Eastern India between Bengal and Madras had been made over to the French by the Nizam of Haidarabad, and the French had become the dominant power in Deccan and Southern India. But by 1761, in consequence of the brilliant military operations of Robert Clive, Colonel Forde, and Sir Eyre Coote, and the extraordinary lack of support afforded to their agents by the French Government, there was scarcely a French flag flying over any portion of India. Although at the Peace of Fontainebleau (1763) the sites of Pondichery, Chanderna-

India Free from the French

gore, and two or three other trading stations were restored to France, after 1761 she had ceased to count seriously as an Indian power. The British were now face to face with the crumbling Mogul Empire—itsself in the throes of a death-struggle with the new Mahratta power and its independent or semi-independent Mohammedan feudatory states, no other European nation intervening. Prominent among these independent Moslem princes, the descendants of former governors, or wazirs, under the Moguls, was the Nawab of Bengal, Suraj-ud-Daulah.

He succeeded his grandfather in 1756, and immediately afterwards quarrelled with the English of the Calcutta settlement. His capture of Calcutta, in 1756, and the episode of the "Black Hole" need not be further described here. Calcutta was recovered by Clive soon afterwards. Clive had first distinguished himself—in 1751—in surprising and afterwards defending Arcot, a native stronghold in the Madras Presidency. The series of surprising bold actions in Southern India on the part of the British had for result the complete

British Empire in India

breakdown of the French career of conquests. War having been already declared against France, Clive proceeded up country and seized the French post of Chandarnagar. This action led to Suraj-ud-Daulah and the French making common cause. At the Battle of Plassey, in 1757, Clive, with 1,000 British troops, 2,000 sepoy, and eight guns, defeated the army of the nawab, which consisted of 35,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry, and 50 cannon. Moreover, Suraj-ud-Daulah had with him some fifty French artillerymen.

This victory founded the British empire over India. After several other fights with the French and Dutch, and a series of battles with the nawab's forces, terminating with the decisive victory of Sir Hector Munro at Baxar in 1794, Clive was able to bring a good deal less than a quarter of India under British control, direct or indirect. In 1765 he became governor of Bengal, and took the Mogul emperor under the chartered company's protection.

Warren Hastings, who succeeded Clive as governor-general, lent British troops to a British ally, the wazir of Oudh, in order to check the invasions of the Rohilla Afghans, who were attempting to intrigue with the Mahrattas against the Mogul emperor and his feudatories.

BRITISH CONQUESTS IN THE EAST

British interference from Bombay in Mahratta affairs—the promotion of a British candidate for the throne of the Peshwa—precipitated the first struggle with the Mahrattas. This began in 1778 with Goddard's brilliant march across India from Bengal to Gujerat, which province, the last home of the lion, he conquered almost without fighting. One of his subordinate officers, Captain Popham, captured brilliantly the rock fortress of Gwalior, which was restored finally to the native prince, Sindhia, in 1886. In the following year, 1779, the British forces were defeated at Wargaon, and the first Mahratta War ended with the mutual restoration of all conquests, except Salsette and Elephanta Island, both near Bombay, which were retained by the British.

The two powerful Mohammedan states of the Deccan and Southern India. Haidarabad and Mysore, next assumed a hostile attitude towards the aggressive British. Warren Hastings managed to detach the Nizam of Haidarabad and minor Hindu princes from this league, and the British strength was mainly directed

against Haidar Ali of Mysore, whose son, Tippu Sahib, was to prove one of her most formidable enemies in India. The Mysore army had conquered nearly all the British establishments in South-eastern India, except the actual town of Madras; but by persistent fighting all these possessions were won back by 1784. The second Mysore War began in 1790, conducted by Lord Cornwallis. By this time diplomacy had arrayed on the side of the British the important forces of the Nizam and of the Mahratta confederation. Tippu Sahib, therefore, was partially conquered, and his kingdom was reduced by one-half.

He was also made to pay a war indemnity of £3,000,000. Enraged at this, he commenced a correspondence with the French Government, and his letters inspired Napoleon with the idea of seizing Egypt and attacking the British in India. The naval exploits of Nelson ruined that scheme, and in 1799 the British, under the Governor-General, Lord Mornington (Marquess Wellesley) and General (Lord) Harris, fell on the isolated Tippu and captured his last fortress, Seringapatam, in the defence of which Tippu was killed. The second Mahratta War, of 1802-1804, resulted, through the victories of Sir Arthur Wellesley (afterwards the Duke of

Wellington) at Assaye and Argaum, in the Deccan, and those of Lord Lake at Aligarh and Laswari, in the removal of the Mogul emperor from the control of the Mahratta confederation to that of the East India Company, in the British control over Delhi and the North-west Provinces, and in enormous territorial gains in Eastern

India. Unfortunately, it was followed by a disastrous retreat of the British forces and a repulse of Lord Lake at Bhartpur, during the war with Holkar, a member of the Mahratta confederacy, in 1804-1805. The Ghurka or Nepalese Wars of 1814-1815 ended by a peace being signed, after the victories of General Ochterlony, near the capital, Khatmandu, the terms of which confined the Ghurkas to their present territory, recognised the British control over Sikkim, and secured for the Indian administration the hill stations of Simla and other Himalayan tracts, and the faithful alliance of the Nepalese people.

In Central India robber bands, rising here and there to the dignity of predatory states and known as the Pindaris, were ruining settled commerce and agriculture by their raids. They were partly formed by the débris of the Mogul Empire, and were to some extent supported by the Mahratta confederacy in their guerrilla warfare. They were finally crushed, and their leaders killed, imprisoned, or won over to allegiance by an army of 120,000 men wisely collected by the Governor-General, Lord Moira, Marquess of Hastings.

The reason for this overpowering force was the threatening aspect of the Mahratta confederacy. This attitude resolved itself into a rising—the third and last Mahratta War—in 1817. The Battle of Mehidpur (1817) and the magnificent defence of the sepoy garrison of Sitabaldi enabled the British administration to break up, once and for all, the Mahratta confederacy, and to make territorial arrangements

in the Bombay Presidency and in Central India, which have lasted to this day. The Mahratta Confederacy Broken up . . . peshwa, or president, of this great Hindu league surrendered and went to live near Cawnpore on a pension of £80,000 a year. His adopted son was the notorious Nana Sahib, who, in the Indian Mutiny of 1857, avenged on the bodies of English women and children the rage and disappointment he felt at not being allowed to succeed to all the

emoluments and privileges of his patron and adoptive father. Coincidentally with the rise of the British power in India proper, the Indian or Burmese states of Assam, Chittagong, Ava, Bhamma, Arakan, Pegu, and Tenasserim had come under the supreme control of the new Burmese dynasty of the Alaung-paya (Alompra). Elated with his victories over quasi-Hindu states like Assam and Tipperah, the Burmese monarch of Mandalay permitted or encouraged his soldiers or subsidiary chiefs to raid into territories more distinctly British. The eventual results were the first Burmese War of 1824-1826, followed by the annexation of Assam, Chittagong, Arakan, Tavoy, Mergui, and Tenasserim; and the second Burmese War, of 1852, which further added to the Indian Empire the delta of the Irawadi, leaving only to native rule two provinces of the short-lived Burmese Empire—Upper and Lower Burma.

The Two Burmese Wars In 1839 took place the first invasion of Afghanistan. On the face of it this action on the part of Lord Auckland might seem foolhardy and a reckless courting of needless difficulties, except that Britain, ever since she became responsible for the maintenance of peace in India, has been forced at intervals to oppose the Afghans, from Warren Hastings' loan of British troops to attack the Rohillas in 1773 to the Mohammed border warfare of 1908. Lord Auckland endeavoured to place a prince—Shah Shuja—friendly to the British on the throne of Afghanistan, because the usurping ruler of that country, Dost Mohammed, was endeavouring to regain Peshawar, then in the power of the Sikhs, and was entertaining suspicious relations with Russia and Persia.

The installation of Shah Shuja in 1839, after several battles, in which the British were successful, meant the garrisoning of Jellalabad, Kabul, and Kandahar by British troops. Two years later two of the principal British political officers were assassinated, the Kabul garrison attempted to retreat, and 4,000 British and Indian soldiers with 12,000 camp-followers perished.

Disaster to British Forces Only one survived to reach the garrison of Jellalabad. The British women and children and a few sick officers had been detained as hostages by the Afghans, and, on the whole, well treated.

This disaster was avenged by the remarkable marches across Afghanistan of Generals Pollock, Nott, and England. Coming respectively from Jellalabad and Kandahar, they met at Kabul, and there blew up the bazaar and recovered the prisoners. They afterwards left Afghanistan to its own devices and the rule of Dost Mohammed. In the following year, 1843, Sind was conquered by Sir Charles Napier, the crucial battle being that of Miani, in which a British force of 2,600 men defeated 22,000 Baluchis. The battle of Miani was a glory to the British arms and the discipline of the Indian army.

The little force under Sir Charles Napier consisted of 400 British soldiers—mainly Irish—of the 22nd Regiment under Colonel Pennefather. The 2,200 Indian troops included some Bengal cavalry. The bayonet in the strong arms of the Irish, the magnificent ride of the Indian cavalry against the cannon of the Sindi army, the accuracy of the British artillery, and Sir Charles Napier won the day against an enemy of almost dauntless bravery. In 1845, the Sikhs, governed by a committee of generals since the death of Ranjit Singh, annoyed at the British annexation of Sind, crossed the Sutlej and invaded British India. They were defeated in the bloody battles of Mudki, Ferozshah, Aliwal, and finally Sobraon. A British protectorate over the Punjab followed. But, two years later, the Sikhs rose again, and the second Sikh War began with the terrible Battle of Chillianwalla, in which the British lost 2,400 officers and men, the colours of three regiments, and four guns. But less than a month later the conclusive victory of Gujerat destroyed the Sikh army and made it possible to annex the Punjab.

The Great Mutiny of the Indian Army In 1857 broke out the great mutiny of the Indian army. In 1806 a mutiny of the native troops had occurred at Vellore in the Madras Presidency, which had commenced with a terrible slaughter of British soldiers, had been suppressed with the sternest reprisals, while discontent was afterwards appeased by concessions. The effects of this rising had been to some extent neutralised by disbanding the more tainted portions of the Madras army. In 1824 another mutiny nearly broke out in Bengal over the first Burmese War. The Hindu soldiers declared it would break their caste

BRITISH CONQUESTS IN THE EAST

to cross the open sea, and eventually the difficulty had to be compounded by marching them all the way round by the northern shores of the Bay of Bengal. It is not necessary here to review all the causes of the great mutiny of 1857-1858, which for a time partially extinguished British garrisons and power in the kingdom of Oudh and in a portion of North-central India.

It was in the main an insurrection of angry soldiers, who had some real and some imaginary grievances. But it was conjoined with the fury of the dispossessed princes or princesses and nobles of Oudh and Jhansi and the treacherous enmity of the adopted son of the last peshwa of the Mahrattas, Nana Sahib. Also there was much Mohammedan fanaticism and regret for vanished glories at the court of the aged Mogul Emperor at Delhi.

The credit for the military operations which suppressed the mutiny, and the dangerous national rising which it was beginning to create, lies with Sir Henry Lawrence, who defended the Residency at Lucknow, and so detained the rebel forces of Oudh; Sir Henry Havelock and Sir

Heroes of the Indian Mutiny

James Outram, who saved the slender garrison after Lawrence's death; Sir Colin Campbell (Lord Clyde), who rescued the Lucknow forces under Havelock and Outram and finished the reconquest of Oudh and Rohilkund; Nicholson, the never-to-be-forgotten hero of the siege of Delhi; and Sir Hugh Rose (Lord Strathnairn), who defeated the principal native general of the mutiny, Tantia Topi, who recaptured Jhansi and who finished the insurrection in April, 1859, in the wildest jungles of Central India. Probably the greatest of all these dauntless soldiers, and certainly the most picturesque, was John Nicholson, of Delhi.

Nothing has so much justified the abnormality of India being governed by a hundred thousand warriors and officials from islands five thousand miles away in the North Sea as the conduct of the British soldiers of all ranks, the British officials, from governor-general to Eurasian telegraph clerk, during the stress of the Indian Mutiny. One may at this distance of time see and regret the stupid blunders that provoked the mutiny, and put one's finger to a nicety on the precise measures which might have nipped the mutiny in the bud; but once the catastrophe has occurred, one can only marvel

at the qualities of officers and men in that heroic handful of British troops which twice relieved a Lucknow besieged by thousands of well-armed fanatics; in those 8,000 men that fought their way inch by inch through the high, red walls and narrow lanes of a murderous Delhi defended by 30,000 desperate, drug-maddened sepoys, better trained in the actual arts of war, perhaps, than the ill-educated English, Welsh, Scottish, and Irish soldiery who, by sheer force of character and strength of arm, became their conquerors. But in reviewing the history of this time of stress one must admit it was not only men born in the British Isles that crushed a revolt of savage sepoys and frantic people.

India might have been temporarily lost to her but for the co-operation of the splendid Sikh soldiers, men whose valour to the British cause was in no way inferior to the heroic behaviour of the British soldiers on their mettle. She received the loyal assistance of the great Mohammedan kingdom of Haidarabad, which had the effect of keeping Southern India out of the area of disturbance. At the same time the independent state of Nepal sent a force of Gurkas, under Sir Jung Bahadur, to assist in restoring order in Northern India. A small war with the Himalayan state of Bhutan took place in 1864. With that exception, there was peace in India until 1878. Then once more the affairs of Afghanistan compelled attention.

Russia had despatched a mission to that country, which had been received with ostentatious honour. To have acquiesced in this situation would have been to give tacit permission to Russia to win over the country of Afghanistan to her influence, to make of it, perhaps, a vantage-point from which the invasion of India might be attempted with the Afghans as allies. Britain had nothing to offer Afghanistan

Evils of Afghan Raids

but the somewhat barren privilege of isolated independence in a sterile land, with a climate of ferocious extremes.

The British arm had been interposed ever since 1773 to shield India from those devastating Afghan raids which have inflicted deep and shocking wounds on her civilisation since the days of Mahmud of Ghazni. Gradually, by British diplomacy or feats of arms, Afghan rule was pushed back across the Hindu Kush and the Suleiman Hills.

And there it would have been left unmolested but for Russian ambitions turning India-wards in the thirties of the last century. In 1878 a British army entered Afghanistan and rapidly occupied Kandahar and the roads leading to Kabul. Sher Ali, the amir, fled to Turkestan and died. His son was then recognised in his

Afghanistan Under British Protection

stead, after a treaty, which practically placed Afghanistan under British protection. But the history of 1839-41 repeated itself almost exactly, except for the disastrous retreat. The British Envoy and Resident at Kabul, Sir Louis Cavagnari, and his insufficient escort were attacked and massacred, Sir Frederick (Lord) Roberts occupied Kabul with a British army, and the new amir, Yakub Khan, abdicated.

Abd-ur-Rahman was then recognised as amir over two-thirds of Afghanistan, and the remainder, with Kandahar as a capital, was erected into a separate state. But in 1880 a severe defeat was inflicted on a British force at Maiwand, between Kandahar and the Halmand river, by Ayub Khan, a younger son of Sher Ali, and an Afghan prince who in this contest played the part of national hero better than the Russian pensioner, Abd-ur-Rahman.

The position of the British in Afghanistan in 1880 was retrieved by the splendid march of Lord Roberts from Kabul to Kandahar, which led to the total rout of Ayub Khan's army outside the precincts of Kandahar. This place was subsequently abandoned by the British and reoccupied by Ayub Khan. Then followed a conflict between Abd-ur-Rahman and Ayub, which left the former master of Afghanistan until his death, in 1901, and led to Ayub's honourable captivity in India.

In 1885 the last Burmese War took place. It was really the advance of a very strong expedition under General Prendergast up the Irawadi River to

Rising of the Dacoits

Mandalay, which met with no opposition worth noting. The real Burmese War broke out afterwards in a prolonged and gallant resistance to British occupation on the part of the so-called "dacoits"—bands of irregulars commanded or inspired by Burmese nobles or princes. The distinct tribes of the Kachins and Shans took part in the four years of desultory fighting, which scarcely came to an end until 1889. The feeling of unrest produced in this

region led to an outbreak in 1891 in the adjoining state of Manipur, which was put down without much difficulty. In 1888 an expedition had to be sent against the Hazara Pathans to the north of Peshawar; and in the same year British authority was asserted over the important little state of Sikkim, which separates Nepal from Bhutan, which has been under British influence and protection since 1815, and which the Tibetans—inspired, perhaps, both by Russia and China—were endeavouring to conquer.

The definition of the frontiers between British India and Afghanistan in 1893 and the enforcement of its results amongst the turbulent border tribes led to the protracted Tirah campaign (1895-1898) against the Waziri, Swati, Mohmand, and Afridi tribes, and the clans of the Zhob valley between Quetta and the Indus. There was also some fighting in the north-west of Kashmir (Ghilghit and Chitral). Kashmir is an important country in whose government the British had taken a more direct interest since the approximate settlement of the various frontier questions of Afghanistan, Russia, Chinese Turkestan, and Tibet. In this campaign, the work of which is only half-finished, the British lost 1,050 men killed and missing, not to mention over 1,500 wounded; while the cost amounted to over £3,000,000. The prosecution of this frontier war was accompanied or preceded by some ominous signs of disaffection amongst the peoples of North-west India.

Russia's Intrigues in Tibet

Russia had again been intriguing with religious notabilities in Tibet at the beginning of the twentieth century, partly, no doubt, to embarrass Britain, whose alliance with Japan—projected or accomplished—was barring her way in China. It was decided, rightly or wrongly, to put an end to these anxieties which form a pendant to those of Afghanistan, and to force on Tibet the assumption of intimate diplomatic relations with British India not far removed from a protectorate—China, the recognised suzerain, being unable or unwilling to restrain the Tibetans from entering into relations with Russia.

The expedition of 1904 started in March, and was obliged to fight its way, more or less, to Lhasa, which was entered on August 3rd, 1904. Here a treaty was made, fixing a war indemnity, arranging for future commercial intercourse, and

BRITISH CONQUESTS IN THE EAST

giving some recognition to British rights over the Chumbi valley, which projects into British India as a wedge between Bhutan and Sikkim. The British Government decided to submit this treaty to the sanction of the Chinese Government, and the latter, incited by the German Minister at the court of Peking, refused to agree to the conditions imposed on the Tibetans. Practically no results remain of the costly expedition to Lhasa, except a thoroughly accurate geographical survey of Southern Tibet. A treaty has been recognised by China, but it is a colourless document. To some extent, however, the Tibetan question has been settled for a long time to come by the 1907 convention with Russia. If this convention is faithfully adhered to, it will obviate any danger to India from the direction of Tibet.

In the year 1908 frontier warfare was resumed on the Afghan borders with the Zakka Khels on the south-west, and the Mohammedans on the north-east, both sections of hostile mountaineers being aided unofficially by an Afghanistan no longer efficiently controlled by the firm hand of an

Afghan Treachery and Rapacity

Abd-ur-Rahman Khan, but influenced by the fanatical dislike to the European conceived by the younger brother of the present amir, Nasir-Ullah Khan. To some extent Afghan hostility has been neutralised by the recent Anglo-Russian Convention, and a war with Afghanistan, followed by a permanent conquest of that land, which has been the source of so much woe to India, would present no serious difficulty to the Indian Government if the policy was one that commended itself to the views of the intelligent majority of Indian Mohammedans, who, if they read accurate history and profit by its lessons, must by this time be weary of Afghan treachery and rapacity.

Passing outside the political limits of the Indian Empire, the other wars in Asia undertaken by the British Government against native powers may be noted as follows. In 1838 an armed demonstration against Persia—by the despatch of a British expedition to the Persian Gulf—was rendered necessary because of an attempt on the part of the Persians to take Herat. For the same reason, in 1856, Great Britain declared war on Persia, and seized several ports on the Persian Gulf until the restitution of Herat to Afghanistan was effected. The reason of these stern measures was

that Herat was believed to be the key of India, and Persia was regarded as being merely the stalking horse of Russia. All these anxieties have been set at rest by the Anglo-Russian Convention; the British sphere in Persia suffices to maintain an orderly control over the Persian Gulf. Between 1795 and 1801 the island of Ceylon, so far as its coastal regions were concerned, was occupied by Great Britain as a war prize taken from Holland, a country then in the possession of France.

The British had been partly assisted in these operations by the forces of the king of Kandy, the representative of the extremely ancient Singalese dynasty. This monarch, however, died in 1800 without leaving direct issue.

Interior Ceylon was, like so many Oriental countries, really governed by a powerful Minister, the adigar. The British governor of the coast districts interfered in the matter of the succession with a view to securing substantial advantages for his own Government. An expedition to Kandy was undertaken, and a small garrison left at that capital—200 British troops and 500 Malays, under the command of Major Davie. But in those days the climate of the forest regions of Ceylon was extremely unhealthy to Europeans, and the bulk of Major Davie's English soldiers were incapacitated by sickness. Then they were attacked by overwhelming numbers of Singalese, and at last obliged to capitulate and retreat. The terms of the capitulation were not observed by the cruel king of Kandy, who gave orders to massacre the entire party on the banks of the Mahaveliganga, three miles from Kandy.

Scarcely a single member of the force survived except Major Davie, who was taken back to Kandy, where he dragged out a miserable existence for another seven years. This massacre of the Mahaveliganga was not avenged by the governor, whose policy in connection with Major Davie's abandonment had been most reprehensible. Consequently, the king of Kandy, encouraged by this absence of reprisals, sent armies to attack the coast possessions of the British. His forces were repulsed, and a truce was arranged which lasted for several years. But the king of Kandy gradually became ferociously cruel towards his own Ministers, nobility and people, besides causing native merchants

Atrocities of the King of Kandy

—British subjects—to be mutilated or killed outright. His own people rose against him in 1815, and invited and facilitated a British occupation of Kandy, which took place unopposed. The king was captured and sent as a political prisoner to Vellore, in the Madras Presidency, where he lived until 1832. The occupation of the interior of Ceylon seems to have been characterised by some tactless procedure which offended the people's religious prejudices. In addition, the chiefs and priests were rendered inimical at the diminution of their power and emoluments. Consequently, in 1817, a serious insurrection broke out in the eastern provinces of Ceylon, which it took two years of hard bush-fighting to suppress. Two other insurrections occurred in 1843 and 1845, caused by the imposition of taxes.

In 1810, a British expedition, under Sir Stamford Raffles, landed in Java and attempted to wrest that island from the Dutch. At the same time other British expeditions seized the Dutch islands of Amboina and Banda. The Dutch, however, fought fiercely near Batavia, though they were ultimately defeated, and surrendered the island, which was restored to Holland eight years afterwards.

In 1826, British commerce with the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra having suffered much at the hands of pirates coming from the Malay state of Perak, and especially from the Perak River, it was arranged that the Pangkor and Sembilan Islands should be ceded to Great Britain as a base for naval action against the pirates. These settlements, somewhat enlarged, are now known as the Dindings. In 1873-1874, the large Malay state of Perak was brought into closer political relations with Singapore Government, and agreed to accept a British resident. The official appointed to this post, Mr. J. W. Birch, was, however, murdered, with the connivance of the Malay sultan, in 1875. A punitive expedition, composed of British and Indian soldiers under General Sir Francis Colborne, divided into two columns and crossed Perak in several directions, defeating the native forces in four or five stiff engagements, warfare in this land of dense forest being peculiarly difficult. Perak was in the end thoroughly subdued, and, in 1877, the sultan, who was accessory

Malay Sultan Banished

to Birch's murder, was banished to the Seychelles Islands, another sultan being recognised in his stead. This effective piece of fighting sufficed for the assertion of the Pax Britannica on the Malay Peninsula.

The East India Company began to trade with the north of Borneo in 1609. At the end of that century they had transferred their attention to the south side of the island, whence they were driven away by the Dutch. In 1762-1775, the East India Company obtained a concession of the island of Battambang from the sultan of Sulu, together with Labuan and the territory which is now known as British North Borneo. A treaty was also entered into with the sultan of Brunei. But the people as a whole did not welcome the British, as the presence of Europeans interfered with their wide-spread piratical operations. The British were attacked and their posts demolished. The Dutch also were driven away.

The establishment of Singapore, however, in 1819, once more drew attention to the northern regions of Borneo. Trade was opened up with the sultanate of Brunei, which then included nearly all the

northern regions of Borneo, except the extreme north-east. Unfortunately, all this region was, on its coast line, the seat of a vast piratical organisation, in which not only Malays, natives of Borneo (Sea Dyaks), and Chinese were engaged, but also Arabs. These pirates preyed on the extensive commerce which passed through the China Sea. They were becoming a public nuisance, and even a danger to European trade with China. This was noted by a retired official of the East India Company, James Brooke, who, wounded in the war with Burma, was travelling to China for his health. Brooke visited parts of Borneo and the Malay Archipelago, and regretted that such rich regions should be infested by these pirates, many of whom took to piracy because they had nothing else to do.

Having inherited his father's property, Brooke resolved to fit out an expedition of his own and visit Borneo. He reached the present state of Sarawak in 1839, and found the uncle of the sultan of Brunei at war with a rebellious officer turned pirate. Brooke's intervention gave victory to the Brunei Government, and for this service the title of Rajah of Sarawak was conferred on him (1841-42). For six years Brooke, on land and sea, co-operated with

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the British naval forces under Captain (afterwards Sir Harry) Keppel in attacking the Borneo pirates, who, it was found, really derived much of their strength and supplies from the town and sultan of Brunei.

Eventually the town of Brunei was bombarded by a British naval force, while the sultan's army was routed by Brooke. The sultan himself was restored to his throne after agreeing to give no more harbourage to pirates. At the same time he sold to the British Government the little island of Labuan as a base for naval operations in those waters. Sir James Brooke not only by degrees extinguished piracy along the north-west coast of Borneo, but he also, with extraordinary bravery and resolution, put down a Chinese mutiny and rebellion instigated by Chinese pirates in 1857.

He subdued two other risings, but since his death, in 1868, the peace and stability of North-western Borneo have not been seriously menaced. The British North Borneo Company, founded in 1882 as a government over North-eastern Borneo, has had to subdue several insurrectionary movements, under a leader named Mat

Britain's Trade Relations with China Saleh, between 1901 and 1906. British trade relations with China began early in the seventeenth century by James I. chartering a company for the exclusive commerce with the regions beyond the Malay Peninsula. But this charter lapsed, and later on the trade monopoly with China was acquired by the East India Company, whose commercial relations with China, though very limited, were not much troubled by unfriendliness till the advent to power of the warlike Emperor Kin-lung. This monarch strengthened the Chinese hold over Tibet, and marched an army of 70,000 men into Nepal in 1792, the Chinese penetrating to within sixty miles of the British outposts.

At the same time the emperor allowed the agents of the East India Company to be badly treated by the viceroy and other officials at Canton. Consequently, it was deemed wise to send a special envoy to open up diplomatic relations with China, and Lord Macartney was despatched with a special mission to Peking, arriving there in 1793. But neither he nor his successor, Lord Amherst, in 1816, could obtain any alleviation of the severe disabilities imposed on European traders. In 1834, the East India Company's monopoly of the Chinese trade came to an

end, and there was a considerable development of British commerce with China—on the part of British Indian subjects, among others—which necessitated the establishment of a superintendent or commissioner at Canton to watch over the affairs of the British merchants, a superintendent who became the precursor of the present highly organised and efficient Consular Service. The hostility of the Chinese to British commerce was largely due to the importation of opium in large quantities from India. The Chinese officials, especially in the south of China, were becoming awakened to the serious effects of the abuse of this drug on Chinese manhood. They wished to prohibit its introduction altogether. In other directions they brought pressure to bear on British traders.

The latter, through their superintendent, agreed to surrender to the Chinese commissioner of Customs at Canton 20,283 chests of opium, which were forthwith destroyed. They also bound themselves to deal no more in this drug. Apparently, however, the semi-independent government of Canton gave no compensation for this voluntary surrender of opium, and took advantage of the superintendent's conciliatory behaviour to inflict further disabilities on British trade and even offer gratuitous violence to British shipping. The Home Government considered that the British merchants had a right to import opium; at any rate, that the other actions of the Cantonese officials were insupportable. Accordingly they sent a British fleet to China and a small military force.

War was declared in 1840, and in that year the Chusan Archipelago, to the south-east of the mouth of the Yang-tsekiang was occupied. In 1841 the forts guarding the entrance to the Canton River were stormed and captured, and the island of Hong Kong was seized. The Canton viceroy then agreed to

The Opium War with China cede Hong Kong and to pay an indemnity of £1,200,000. These terms were, however, repudiated by the Imperial Government at Peking. The war therefore continued. Sir Hugh Gough occupied Canton, Amoy, Ningpo, Chapu, Shanghai, and two other coast towns. He was about to take Nanking when the Chinese emperor sent commissioners to make peace. The treaty concluded by Sir Henry Pottinger in 1842 provided not

only for the cession of Hong Kong, but also for the throwing open to foreign trade of the ports of Amoy, Fuh-chau-fu, Ningpo, and Shanghai, and the payment of an indemnity of about £3,500,000. The original cause of the war—the claim to be able to trade in opium—was an indefensible one, of which Britain has since

The Policy that Saved China

felt ashamed; but the results of this forcible opening of China to European commerce have, on the whole, been the salvation of that vast empire from falling into complete senile decrepitude. But the Imperial Government at Peking—for two centuries the curse of China—did not appreciate the cruel kindness of Britain. It had yielded to urgent force; now it wished to have as little as possible to do with the red-haired barbarians and their Indian subjects. Russia was a different matter; the frontiers of Russia began westwards and northwards where those of China left off. Russia, therefore, was entitled to have a diplomatic representative at Peking. As to France and England, they were small nations of seapirates unworthy of a place at the court of the emperor. Russia, no doubt, in revenge for the Crimean War, encouraged this attitude of disdain.

On the other hand, a great revolt had taken place in central China, which was eventually headed by Hung-Siu-tsewen, who proclaimed himself as Tin Wang, first emperor of the Tai-ping dynasty. This was an uprising which, one would have thought, might have appealed to all the generous instincts of Britain as the champion of liberty and reform. The recent Chinese emperors had been so shockingly licentious that their moral depravity had affected the tone of public morality. The Tai-ping revolt was greatly a protest at the iniquities of the imperial court. Then, too, Hung-Siu-tsewen was a Christian, to all intents and purposes.

Revolt in Central China

The behaviour of himself and his followers was admirable. His liberal-minded measures vastly encouraged foreign commerce at Nanking and Su-chau. Above all, the movement was a Chinese one, and might have led to the re-establishment of a national Chinese dynasty in the place of the Manchu Tartars, whose rule has, latterly, at any rate, done so much to arrest the growth of Chinese intellectual development and friendly, mutually-pro-

fitable intercourse with foreign nations. Yet Britain, after coquetting with the Tai-ping revolt, proceeded to lend officers—Charles George Gordon from the Royal Engineers, first and foremost—and support for its suppression, and the renewed fixing on the necks of the Chinese people of that Manchu yoke from which the more intelligent were trying to free themselves.

In 1856, the Chinese viceroy or commissioner at Canton seized, on an accusation of piracy, a sloop or "lorcha" from Macao whose captain was a British subject. It is very probable that the Arrow, as this vessel was called, was up to no good, but the Chinese commissioner, Yeh, seems to have been technically in the wrong. Sir John Bowring was then administering the government of Hong Kong and in charge of British interests in China. He decided to deal energetically with the incident of the Arrow, and requested the British admiral on the station to bombard Canton. This took place in 1857. Lord Elgin was despatched to China with a strong force to act as British plenipotentiary. He was diverted from his immediate object by the outbreak of the mutiny in India. The troops he brought with him proved a most welcome reinforcement to the British in Bengal. Lord Elgin, however, reached Canton towards the close of 1857, and succeeded in capturing the commissioner or viceroy, Yeh, whom he sent as a prisoner to Calcutta, where he eventually died. In 1858, France joined Great Britain in demanding redress from China for injuries suffered by French subjects and in requiring that a French representative should be accepted at Peking. At the close of 1858 the Treaty of Tientsin was negotiated. This treaty was to have been ratified by the emperor early in 1859; but when, in June of that year, the British and French representatives attempted to proceed to Peking under a strong escort, their expedition was stopped before it could land, and the British lost three gunboats and 400 men in the action which followed at the mouth of the Peiho.

Britain and France as Allies in China

Lord Elgin and Baron Gros returned in 1860, and at the head of a very strong force occupied Peking. Here the celebrated summer palace was destroyed by Lord Elgin's orders, an action which has been deplored as an offence against the canons of art. Lord Elgin, however,

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could think of no other means of abasing Chinese imperturbability, which was prolonging the negotiations, and, which was more serious, the sufferings of the English prisoners who had been treacherously seized by the Chinese in very bad faith.

The Treaty of Tientsin, however, was ratified in 1860, and from 1861 onwards Great Britain, France and other European Powers, besides Russia, have been represented at Peking by diplomatic Ministers. The third occasion on which Britain has found itself at war with China was in the last year of the nineteenth century. The war between China and Japan, concluded in the spring of 1895, had exposed the seeming helplessness of China.

After intervening to modify the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in favour of China, Russia, France and Germany began to ask for concessions, leases, or admissions of spheres of influence; and Great Britain, not liking to be left in the cold, required her share. Out of this Chinese scramble she came successfully, with considerable additions to the prosperous little colony of Hong Kong, and the leasehold of Wei-hai-wei.

China's Spirit Aroused In fact, the course of events between 1895 and 1900 was thoroughly Chinese in its contrariety. Britain and the other land-hungry European Powers had its annexations first and its war afterwards. The national spirit of China was aroused, at any rate in the foreigner-hating Manchus of the north, and early in 1900 it broke out in the renewed murder of missionaries and native Christians, and finally in orders to the foreign representatives at Peking to leave the country.

Not wishing to trust themselves to the tender mercies of the Boxers, as the unofficial allies of the reactionary party were called, the foreign legations prepared to stand a siege in their "town-within-a-town" in Peking. The British, Japanese, Russian, American, and French authorities from their various Asiatic possessions despatched an urgency relief expedition, the British section of which was commanded by Sir Alfred Gaselee.

Peking was entered first by the British. It was found that of the 500 civilian, naval and military defenders of the different legations, 65 had been killed, and 131 were more or less severely wounded. When this trouble was over, the 20,000 German troops arrived under the com-

mand of Field-Marshal von Waldersee, but the British Government discountenanced any unnecessary coercion of China.

The acquisition of California, by the United States in 1848, led that branch of the Anglo-Saxon power to desire commercial expansion across the Pacific. In 1853-1855 a naval expedition under Com-

The Open Door in Japan

mander Perry was sent to Japan to force that country to enter into commercial and political relations with the United States.

After some display of force Commander Perry succeeded in his famous mission—one of the turning points in world-history. In the year 1858 advantage was taken of Lord Elgin's presence in the Far East for the conclusion of a treaty between the British and the shogunate of Japan—ratified by the mikado in 1864—which obtained for Great Britain the same (limited) privileges as those granted to the United States.

But these concessions were detested by the military caste of the Samurai, by many of the Japanese nobility, and by the mikado himself when he came to hear of them. Indiscreet behaviour on the part of British traders provoked one or two outrages with loss of life. Finally, in 1863, a British naval force, under Admiral Kuper, appeared before Kagoshima and demanded redress for grievances from the shogun. Failing to receive this, Admiral Kuper reduced Kagoshima to ashes and destroyed three war steamers of the Japanese. This action brought to reason the Satsuma chieftains; but there was another potentate acting independently—what time the titular Emperor of Japan lived sequestered in his huge harem at Kioto—and firing indiscriminately on foreign shipping passing through the straits of Shimonoseki. This was the Daimiyo, or Lord of Cho-shu or Nagato. After a preliminary chastisement at the hands of the United States, France and

Foreign Intercourse with Japan

Holland, he, as he still declined to allow foreign shipping to enter the Inland Sea of Japan, was attacked by an international squadron under the command of Admiral Sir Augustus Kuper in September-October, 1864, and utterly defeated on land as well as on the sea. The shogun's government agreed to pay an indemnity of about \$3,500,000, and from that time onwards no serious hindrance was put in the way of foreign intercourse with Japan.



JAMESON'S LAST STAND: THE SURRENDER OF THE "RAIDERS" TO THE BOERS AT VLAKFONTEIN ON JANUARY 2ND, 1896
Prior to the South African War, the Uitlander—foreign—population, who were mostly British subjects, were refused their share of political rights, though they owned most of the property and bore the greater part of the taxation. Agitations for reform were widespread, and to enforce their claims an armed body under Dr. Jameson, at that time administrator of Rhodesia for the British South Africa Company, entered Transvaal territory on December 30th, 1895, suffering defeat by the Boers at Krugersdorp on January 1st, 1896, and again at Vlakfontein on the following day, when they surrendered conditionally. The leaders in the raid underwent trial in England, and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment.
From the painting by R. Caton Woodville by permission of Messrs. Henry Graves & Co.

THE
BRITISH
EMPIRE
VII



BY SIR
HARRY
JOHNSTON,
G.C.M.G.

BRITAIN'S CONTESTS IN AFRICA AND THE PACIFIC

THE LONG SERIES OF VICTORIES IN THE PROCESS OF EMPIRE-BUILDING

WARS of the empire undertaken against the natives of Africa, apart from conflicts in which it was really fighting European nations, may be said to have begun with Admiral Blake's chastisement of the Tunisian sea rovers of Goletta and Porto Farina in 1656. In those days, Tunisia was a kind of dependency of Turkey, having been recovered from the possession of Spain by Turkish and renegade Moslem adventurers in the employ of Turkey during the last half of the sixteenth century. Blake had also threatened Algiers and Tripoli and the Salli rovers of Morocco. The occupation of Tangier in succession to the Portuguese entailed such constant fighting with the Moors that the new possession was deemed unprofitable, and was surrendered to Mulai Ismail, sharifian sultan of Morocco, in 1684. The effective punishment of the piratical Algerine state by Lord Exmouth and the Dutch, in 1816, has already been described.

In 1808, the British Government, having thoroughly awakened to the importance of Egypt as a half-way house to India, and having regretted the easy terms which had allowed the French to withdraw, and a more or less Turkish Government to take their place, attempted, on a rather feeble pretext, to land in Egypt, with the obvious intention of never withdrawing. But

Britain in Conflict with the Negro their landing was opposed by the self-made governor, Mohammed Ali, with such spirit that the attempt was baulked and not renewed till seventy-four years later. England came into serious conflict with the negro over South African questions. Petty skirmishes no doubt had occurred between the soldiers in the employ of the Royal African Chartered Company and the natives of the Gold Coast. Some show of force also had to

accompany the definite establishment of the Sierra Leone settlements, while prior to the annexation of Sierra Leone the British Chartered Company, which was to found a West African Utopia for freed slaves, had engaged in a good deal of fighting with the turbulent natives of Bolama (Portuguese Guinea), who did not

The First of the Kaffir Wars

at all relish having an anti-slave-trade colony founded on their sea front. But the first Imperial war with the black man was undertaken in 1809 and 1811-1812 when, in order to defend the rights, or, at any rate, the claims, of the Dutch colonists, 20,000 Kaffirs were driven by British soldiers away from the "Zuurveld," and across the Great Fish River to its eastern banks. This was the first in the long series of Kaffir wars which was to culminate in the capture of Ulundi in 1880, and of Buluwayo in 1893.

In 1818-9, the second Kaffir War broke out. It originated in an internecine feud between two rival Kosa Kaffir chiefs, Gaika and Ndlambe. [Kosa is written by some South African authorities Xosa, the "X" expressing a side click. Another Kaffir name is often written Gcaleka, the "c" expressing another click. Likewise, the "C" in Cetewayo (Ketshwayo) is a click. The present writer prefers to render all these words with the gutturals, K, G, or Q]. For some reason the Cape Government sent soldiers to enforce the claims of the defeated rival, Gaika. The British force crossed the Great Fish River, and then, in revenge, the Kosa warriors under Ndlambe entered the colony and besieged Grahams-town. The Kaffirs were, of course, defeated, and their frontier was pushed farther to the east, to the Keiskamma River. The land in between the two rivers was to be regarded as neutral ground, though

actually belonging to the British Crown. The Keiskamma, as a matter of fact, had been the original boundary between Kaffir and Hottentot.

In course of time certain Kaffir chiefs were permitted to settle on this neutral territory; then they were ordered to move off again. For this reason, or more probably because the Kaffirs

Kaffirs on the War-path thought they could drive the white man away altogether by attacking in force, 12,000 of

them crossed the eastern frontier of the colony in December, 1834, and for a fortnight carried all before them, killing the white colonists, burning and destroying their homesteads and farms, and turning the district between Somerset East and Algoa Bay into a desert. The raid had from the white settlers' point of view been absolutely unprovoked, and there were loud cries for vengeance from Boer, German, and British colonists alike, nor did the missionaries attempt to defend the action of the invading Kaffirs. Colonel Smith, afterwards to be known as Sir Harry Smith, drove the Kaffirs back beyond the Keiskamma, and then beyond the Kei River. This was the third Kaffir War.

The Kosa Kaffirs then sued for peace. Their new frontier was drawn at the Kei River, and the land between the Kei and the Keiskamma was created a new province of the colony, and named after Queen Adelaide. But within this new province all the Kaffirs who had taken no part in the raid were allowed to remain, and, in addition, grants of land were given to the Fingo tribe, who had been enslaved and ill-treated by the Kosa.

But this settlement, approved alike by the European settlers and the missionaries, was set aside by the Colonial Secretary in England, Lord Glenelg, and Queen Adelaide province was restored to the Kosa Kaffirs, while Sir Benjamin D'Urban, the governor, was recalled. This unwise

Trouble with the Kaffirs

action laid the seeds of much future mischief. It was one of the causes which sent the best of the Dutch farmers out into

the wilderness to carve out homes with their right hands and their guns—rifles had not come into general use—independent of the vicissitudes of a dual government wherein the man on the spot might have his policy reversed heedlessly by the man at home. The Kosa Kaffirs were not satisfied, and the Fingoes found themselves


handed over to the tender mercies of the Kosas. In 1846-1847, war—the fourth Kaffir War—broke out again, provoked by the Kaffirs themselves. At its close the former province of Queen Adelaide was reconstituted under the name of British Kaffraria. In 1850 began the fifth Kaffir War, chiefly with the Gaika clan of the Kosa Kaffirs living in the Amatola Mountains. It extended far and wide over the eastern border districts of Cape Colony, and was marked by not a few disasters.

One of these was not directly connected with the Kaffirs, though it added to the general uneasiness and dislike with which the war was regarded at home. The troopship Birkenhead foundered in a gale off Simon's Bay, and sank with 400 soldiers and many seamen on board. By 1853, General Cathcart had captured all the Gaika strongholds in the Amatola Mountains, and had deported the Kosa Kaffirs from that district, which was afterwards settled by Hottentot half-breeds, and became known as Griqualand East. In 1856 a terrible delusion seized on the Kosa Kaffirs through the crazy teaching of

Kosa Kaffirs Deluded by a "Wizard" a "wizard" who had received a smattering of Christian teaching at a mission school.

He predicted the coming of a millennium, in which the Kaffirs would be reinforced by their dead chiefs returning to earth with many followers, and further assisted by the Russian soldiers of the Crimean War. But to secure this millennium, the existing cattle and crops must first be destroyed. This teaching led to a terrible famine, for the deluded Kosa Kaffirs slew their cattle and cut down their crops of growing mealies. The unhappy people were obliged to emigrate to the extent of nearly 100,000, some 25,000 dying of starvation. The restless movements of these desperate men among more settled tribes brought on the sixth Kaffir War, in 1858. After the war, large numbers of Fingo Kaffirs settled in British Kaffraria, and some of the Kosas returned thither or found a home in the adjoining new Transkei province. Others migrated into Pondoland.

In 1851 and 1852 there were fights with the Basuto (Viervoet and Berea), the first of which was a defeat for the British, the second a drawn battle. In the last instance General Cathcart, after conquering the Kosa Kaffirs, had attempted to seize Thaba Bosigo in order to compel the Basuto



THE FOUNDERING OF THE BRITISH TROOPSHIP BIRKENHEAD ON FEBRUARY 26TH, 1852
The disaster illustrated in the above picture occurred during a gale off Simon's Bay, South Africa, and will ever be memorable for the heroism exhibited in the face of death. On board the ill-fated steamship were nearly 500 officers and men, who stood calmly awaiting their fate while the women and children were saved. The then King of Prussia caused the splendid story of iron discipline and perfect duty to be read aloud at the head of every regiment in his kingdom.

From the painting by C. Napier Hemy, by permission of Messrs. Henry Graves & Co.

king, Moshesh, to come to terms, the Basuto having been attacking the Griqua Hottentots and Boer trekkers. The issue was not a defeat to the Basuto, but Moshesh wisely came in and agreed to a peace which has never since been broken, so far as the Imperial Government is concerned, though the Basuto had somewhat

The Seventh and Last Kaffir War

serious conflicts with the Cape Colonial Government in 1879-1880, conflicts which were eventually solved by their coming under direct Imperial control. In 1877-1878 occurred the seventh and last Kaffir War. After the terrible famine and migration of 1856-1857, a portion of the Galeka clan of the Kosa Kaffirs, under the celebrated chief Kreli, or Kareli, the son of Hintsas, who had surrendered to the British after the Kaffir raid of 1834, had been allowed, in 1865, to settle on the coast of British Kaffraria with the Fingoes and other Kaffir tribes behind them. They increased and multiplied, and in 1877 they turned round and fought the Fingoes. The British Government intervened, and the chief Kreli was deposed. Fighting spread into the colony, and was joined in by the Gaika clan under chief Sandile. This war was brought to a close in 1878 by the death of Sandile and the flight of the aged Kreli.

The impartial historian of South Africa must admit that though many good qualities are inherent in the Boer people, a scrupulous consideration for the antecedent rights of the negroes is not to be attributed to them. In their eyes the natives had no rights, though, at the same time, they were not harsh if Hottentot or Basuto, Bechuana or Zulu were willing to serve for board, lodging, and occasional blankets and Cape brandy. But wherever the Boer ruled he carried on a native policy, as regards land and products, so like that of King Leopold on the Congo as to make one think that in this respect the king of the Belgians may really have borrowed

Boers Leave British Territory

his native policy from Dutch traditions. Soon after the discontented Boers left British territory, because the British Government would not evict native tribes legitimately settled on the soil in favour of incoming white men. The pioneers of the Orange River territory and the founders of the Transvaal State fell out with the warlike Basuto, the southernmost tribe of the wide-spread Bechuana stock. The British forces had repeatedly

to intervene, either to save the trekking Boers from extermination by the enraged Basuto, or later to save the Basuto from being wiped out by the land-hungry Boers.

Between 1836 and 1840 the emigrant Boers, whom Lord Glenelg's foolish policy—among other causes—had driven out of the eastern parts of Cape Colony, had brushed aside the Northern Basuto, defeated the Matabele hordes of the southern Transvaal, and broken the Zulu power in Natal. As regards Matabele and Zulu, impartial history will probably say that they got no worse than they deserved. They were treacherous, cruel, devastating, and not much earlier comers in the Bechuana countries than the Boers themselves. As to the Swazi, a northern section of the Zulu-Kaffir group, they were partially protected by the Transvaal Boers from Zulu cruelty.

But in regard to Sekukuni, the government of the Transvaal behaved badly. Sekukuni ruled over a section of the North-eastern Bechuana in the country just south of the Upper Limpopo. The Transvaal Boers from the early part of the sixties were constantly seizing Sekukuni's

A Blot on South African History

land or people, and ignoring his rights. This chief established himself strongly in the Zoutspanberg Mountains, and after 1870 the Boer Government of Pretoria launched against this unhappy people bands of conscienceless adventurers; one of the cruellest of these was an ex-Prussian officer, Von Schlickmann, whose atrocities were a disgrace to the Boer name and will be a permanent blot on the history of South Africa. But Sekukuni held out so stoutly that he wore out the energies of the Transvaal State. As the Boer dealings with the Swazis had drawn down on them the animosity of the Zulus, it was feared by the Imperial Government that the mishandling of native affairs in the Transvaal might set going a vast negro revolt against the white man. So Sir Theophilus Shepstone was despatched with a few military officers and twenty-five mounted police to investigate. He took the bold step of annexing the Transvaal.

The British had taken no great share in the fighting against the Zulu monarchy which had won Natal for the white man's rule. The Transvaal Boers had done that and had also installed Panda as king of the Zulus in place of the bloodthirsty Dingane. In 1873 the British Government had been represented at the installation

CONTESTS IN AFRICA AND THE PACIFIC

of Cetewayo as successor to Panda. The limit of the recognised Zulu kingdom then, on the west, was the Tugela River. Of course, the colony of Natal contained hundreds of thousands of Zulu-speaking natives, but these, for the most part, had been long dissociated from Zulu rule.

In the North-west of Natal, however, there was the Hlubi clan, originally refugees from Zulu and Basuto lands. These people, under their chief, Langalibalele, began to show themselves turbulent in 1873, and had to be brought to order by the despatch of a small military force. The operations against the Gaika and Galeka clans of the Kosa Kaffirs in 1877-78 sent a thrill of racial sympathy and disturbance through Natal and Zululand, and probably decided the ill-informed king of the Zulus to make a determined fight for Kaffir independence and dominion before the white man grew too strong. It must be remembered that there is very little linguistic difference between Kaffirs and Zulus. Kaffir is an entirely artificial name. It is simply an Arab term meaning "unbeliever," which was applied to the

British Forces in Zululand

pagan Bantu along the South-east African coast by the Arabs, and by them transmitted to the Portuguese, Dutch and English.

Sir Bartle Frere saw the coming danger to Natal, and resolved to forestall it by calling on Cetewayo to disarm, after giving him full satisfaction in regard to territories in dispute between the Zulus and the former Republic of the Transvaal.

No answer was received to the ultimatum. On January 22nd, 1879, the British troops under Lord Chelmsford entered Zululand. The opening of the campaign was marked by two striking incidents. The capture of the British camp at Isandhlwana, the "Hill of the Little Hand," with a loss to the British of 800 white and 500 negro soldiers; and the defence of Rorke's Drift, on the Buffalo River, under Lieutenants Chard and Bromhead, and 120 British and Colonials against 4,000 Zulus, flushed with the victory of Isandhlwana. Another episode of this war, which has raised it in the interest of world-history far above other Kaffir wars, was the death of the Prince Imperial on a reconnoitring expedition. This sad event materially altered the course of modern French history. Zululand was conquered finally by August, 1879, in the battles of Gingihlovo,

Kambula, and Ulundi; and the king, Cetewayo, was captured and sent into temporary retirement. Sekukuni, of the Northern Transvaal, was then tackled and finally disposed of, while the Swazis were also brought under control. Between 1879 and 1893 there was peace, except mere police operations, between the

In Contact with the Matabele

British and the natives of South Africa. British attention was concentrated on a struggle for supremacy with the Dutch-speaking section of the white community. A British advance towards the Zambesi began in 1887-1888, a movement which brought her into contact with the Matabele power.

The Matabele were a section of the Zulus whom internecine quarrels had driven from Zululand and Natal into the Southern Transvaal. From this territory, where they had supplanted the Bechuana stock of the Bantu, the Matabele were driven by the Boers beyond the Limpopo. The Matabele in their turn, from 1840 onwards, became a predatory people, and made themselves masters of the lands between the Limpopo and the Zambesi. They enslaved more or less the pre-existing Makaranga, Mashona and kindred tribes of Nyanza stock, and were a sore affliction to the more peaceable Bechuana on their western flank.

Cecil Rhodes and his pioneers, however, had to deal with the Matabele as the effective masters of the country between the Kalahari Desert and the Eastern Portuguese dominions. Various far-reaching concessions were purchased from the greedy Matabele king, Lobengula, who was not very particular as to what he sold, because in his own mind he had determined exactly what the white men should do and what he would withhold from their scope.

But in Dr. Jameson he had a masterful person to deal with. Jameson had accurately gauged the Matabele strength, and, in a short but very brilliant campaign, conducted by himself and Major

Dr. Jameson's Brilliant Campaign

Forbes, and by Colonel Goold Adams—on behalf of the Imperial Government—Bulawayo was captured, and Lobengula driven towards the Zambesi, where he afterwards died. Out of a force sent in pursuit of Lobengula, a party of thirty mounted men under Captain Allan Wilson was cut off from the main body and killed by the Matabele after a heroic resistance. The Chartered Company's administration,

which followed that of Lobengula, was not in all respects quite wise, and discontent arose among the natives, Mashona as well as Matabele. After the unfortunate issue of the Chartered Company's armed entry into the Transvaal, the Matabele rose against their white ruler, and though they never succeeded in taking Buluwayo or

**Unrest
Among the
Natives**

any other fortified post, they inflicted much damage and some loss of life on the British settlers. Rhodesia was not finally restored to order until the year 1897. Since the great South African War of 1899-1902 there has been a certain amount of unrest among the natives south of the Zambesi, more especially among the Hottentots on the German borders, the Basuto, the Kaffirs of Natal, and the Zulus.

This has been caused by a multiplicity of excitants. The movement originated with certain American negroes of the Ethiopian Church, a form of Christianity which was to treat the interests of the black race as quite distinct from those of the Caucasian; the spread of education, which imparted an honest pride and capability to Christianised Hottentot and Kaffir—so that dull, stupid, violent government at the hands of German or British-Colonial officials or army officers became intolerable; the resentment felt by Zulus and Natal Kaffirs at the alleged filching of their land; lastly, the abundance and cheapness of rifles and ammunition during and after the Boer War; all these were reasons, apart from a general awakening of the negro, why movements towards turbulence and independence necessitated much vigorous police work in 1906-1908—almost amounting to warfare—on the part of British and Colonial troops in Western Bechuanaland, Natal, and Zululand.

Amongst "native" powers which the British Empire has had to fight in South Africa must be enumerated the Boers of Cape Colony, Natal, the Orange State, and the Transvaal. This was a vigorous, emphatically "white" race of splendid physique, compounded for the most part of men of Flemish or Dutch descent, mingled with some proportion of French Huguenots and German immigrants. The resident Boers, as distinct from the officials of the Dutch East India Company, never liked the British intrusion from the day of the first landing of British troops at Simonstown on July 14th, 1795, down to

the granting of self-governing constitutions to the different states of the future South African Confederation. In 1815 the Dutch farmers had risen against the government of Lord Charles Somerset because it interfered with their summary treatment of the natives; but they were surrounded, and laid down their arms at the place since called Slachter's Nek. In spite of their surrender five of them were hanged for high treason, an act inexcusably harsh on the part of the tyrannical governor, Lord Charles Somerset, whose name for the value of his work is too much commemorated in Cape geography.

Dissatisfaction with Lord Glenelg's fatuous intermeddling and with the, often well-founded, accusations of British and Moravian missionaries as to maltreatment of natives, impelled the migration northwards and eastwards, beginning in 1836, of large numbers of Boer farmers. This led to their wresting the Orange Free State from the Basuto, the Transvaal from the Matabele hordes of Umsilikazi, and Natal from Dingane and the Zulus.

Apart from the unfortunate rising of Slachter's Nek, Boer and Briton first came into armed conflict over Natal. The port of Durban had, it is true, been originally colonised by British and Americans; but the mighty power of the Zulus had been first broken by Boer valour. After the emigrant farmers had made themselves masters of the country now known as Natal, the intolerable shilly-shally of the home Ministers began. This was the cause in the past of many a war, large and small, and was the result of the old principles of party government and the placing of incompetent or ill-educated men for short and shifting periods at the head of great departments of state. Slowly, imperceptibly, this system has changed in favour of a trained bureaucracy—a rule of the permanent official, who shapes the policy which his temporary parliamentary chief endorses and adopts as his own.

The Natal "War" of 1842 resolved itself into a night attack by the Englishmen of Durban on the Boer position (which failed), and a siege of Durban by the Boers. This siege was raised by the arrival of a British expeditionary force. The Boers retired, and, a commissioner arriving from England in 1843, terms were arranged by which the Boers had a free hand to the north of the Drakensberg, whither

**Boer and
Briton in
Conflict**

**The Boers'
Dislike of
the British**



THE LAST STAND OF CAPTAIN WILSON: AN EPISODE OF THE MATABELE CAMPAIGN

During the British campaign against the Matabele in 1890, a party of thirty mounted men under Captain Allen Wilson out of a force sent in pursuit of Lobengula was cut off from the main body, and found itself surrounded by thousands of natives. All escape being cut off, the little party made its last stand on a small piece of rising ground and died fighting like heroes.

From the painting by Allan Stewart, by permission of the Fine Arts Society, 1887, New Bond Street

the bolder spirits betook themselves. After well-nigh intolerable vacillation, contradictory proclamations, flag hoistings and pullings-down, treaties with native chiefs or hybrid adventurers, restraining and loosing of the justly exasperated Boers, the British Government of the Cape declared the present Orange State

The Boers to be British territory in 1848.
Rise in This action was resented by the
Rebellion emigrant Boers, with Pretorius at their head. They rose in rebellion, but in meeting Sir Harry Smith—one of the great names in South African history—they met one of their own kidney. After a severe fight, the Boers were defeated at the Battle of Boomplatz, and Pretorius and his men fled across the Vaal River.

The recognition of the Transvaal as an independent state in 1852, and of the Orange River Territory in 1854, are episodes in the relations of Boer and Briton which have been described elsewhere. No further armed conflict with the Boers occurred until December 20th, 1880. In 1877, the Transvaal Republic, in great difficulties over its conflict with the natives, had been somewhat summarily annexed by Sir Theophilus Shepstone on behalf of the British Government. This measure was most unpalatable to the mass of the Boer farmers under the leadership of Krüger, Pretorius, and Joubert; and they never ceased petitioning against it.

At length, encouraged by the British lassitude which had followed the Zulu War, they rose in rebellion, and after the British defeats at Bronker's Spruit, Lang's Nek, and Majuba Hill, obtained eventually the recognition of the independence of their republic, with only slight modifications, modifications which were pared away to a transparency by the Convention of London in 1884. Though this convention established more or less clearly the boundaries of the Trans-

Expansion vaal, the Boers did not hesitate
the Aim of —any more than the British
the Boers would have done—to trespass beyond these limits as far as British forbearance would allow, and proposed to themselves, on the one hand, to seize and monopolise the road to Central Africa, and, on the other, to conquer Zululand and thus attain access to the sea. To stop both these movements an important armed demonstration was made by the British Government in 1885,

whereby Sir Charles Warren, with a force of 4,000 men, marched up into Bechuanaland and suppressed the infant republics of Stellaland and Goshen, and substituted for them the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland, which was ultimately extended to the Zambesi. Zululand was annexed, and ultimately, in 1887-1898, Amamongaland also. The southern and western boundaries of the Orange State had, by a piece of rather sharp practice, been clipped and defined in 1869, 1871, and 1876. From 1898 a final duel between the British and the Boers for the overlordship of South Africa became inevitable. The Boers were resolved to expand, the British determined to compress them within treaty limits, and even to strangle them in their own homes.

First came about the unofficial war, the abortive raid of Jameson at the head of the Chartered Company's forces into the Transvaal in December, 1895. Then ensued four years of preparations on both sides. Those of the Boers were directed to steady armament and training, with results which certainly "staggered humanity"; those

The Great of the British to sounding
War in France, Russia, Portugal, Italy,
South Africa America, and perhaps Germany as to their attitude in the event of a South African War. The outbreak of this long contemplated struggle was precipitated by the two allied Boer States delivering an ultimatum on October 9th, 1899. It is not necessary here to recount the incidents and fluctuations of this great and lengthy contest; it is sufficient to record that the war began with a series of British defeats, retreats, and besiegements in fortified cities or camps. Then came Lords Roberts and Kitchener, and their march right into the heart of the Orange Free State, and thence by a series of successes, which went far to damp any thought of European intervention, to Pretoria, Lydenburg, Komatipoort.

By the autumn of 1900 the Orange River Republic and the Transvaal had been annexed to the British dominions, and President Kruger had fled to Europe. Most persons now thought the war at an end, but the Boers managed to keep up a guerrilla warfare for eighteen months longer, thus securing for their countrymen far better and more honourable terms of peace than would have been granted in the autumn of 1900. As military leaders, De Wet, De La Rey, Botha, Kemp, Lucas Meyer,

CONTESTS IN AFRICA AND THE PACIFIC

and other Boer generals covered themselves with glory, and taught the world new lessons in warfare. But in the meantime Central South Africa was being ruined. These same men who fought so well would not carry on a hopeless struggle after the offer of reasonable terms. To the great relief of all concerned, a peace was ratified on May 31st, 1902, which has left no sting behind it to either party in the struggle. The Orange State, under a slightly different name, and the Transvaal continue to exist as self-governing communities ready to take their part as equals in any future confederation of South Africa, with Cape Colony, Natal, and Rhodesia.

The question of war between the white and the black man in trans-Zambesian Africa is, I fear, not finally laid to rest. Contemporary and later historians have frequently described this, that, or the other Kaffir war as an unjust one. There is no doubt that Britain sometimes fought over a wrong issue, but there is equally no doubt in the mind of the present narrator that the British power has been a great deal more anxious to do the right thing and

avoid injustice in its fights with the great Zulu-Kaffir congeries of peoples in the southern prolongation of Africa than it has shown itself elsewhere in the lands of Black and Yellow. In the first place, South Africa during two-thirds of the nineteenth century was not regarded as an extraordinarily valuable acquisition. The Dutch colonists, it is true, were perfectly ruthless in regard to displacing, dispossessing, killing or enslaving the black races that had preceded them.

They were no more scrupulous in this respect than the English who settled on the Atlantic coast of the United States, the Spaniards in South America, the Portuguese in India, or the Dutch in Malaya. They, the Boers, were "God's chosen people"; the yellow or black Hottentot-Bushman, or Kaffir, was a heathen, with no more claims to consideration than the beasts of the field, and both alike were shot down by the deadly accuracy of the Boer marksman. But British missionary enterprise was early afoot in South Africa, and, as I have said before, the country was not thought particularly worth taking away from its black inhabitants. No minerals of importance had been discovered prior to the diamond revelation in 1869. In many districts

horses and cattle could not live, and there European settlers could not thrive. It was a land of droughts and floods, of ice and sunstroke, of barren steppe more hopeless than the Sahara, of thorn jungle, and of man-eating lions. So far as anyone therefore is to blame for the unjustness of the Kaffir wars, it is the Dutch or Afrikaner colonists, who first picked a quarrel with the natives, and then dragged the British Government into the settlement of that quarrel. Whenever the treatment was just towards the native it provoked a rising, a secession, or, at any rate, a severe disaffection amongst the white settlers.

It is true that in 1879 Sir Bartle Frere—a great and far-seeing viceroy—having annexed the Transvaal, largely because of the Boer mishandling of native rights, forced a war on the king of the Zulus. The alternative was to wait until the Zulu power, a little stronger, a little more reckless, launched itself on the colony of Natal, drowning it in blood, as Cetewayo's grandfather had done, pitiless alike to white and black, for no one has ever been so cruel to the negro as the negro.

The Chartered Company's war against the bastard Zulus of Lobengula, the descendants of the hordes led northwards by Umsilikazi or Mosilikatse, has been arraigned as unjust, except when argued on the basis of the Parable of the Talents. Lobengula and his Amandebele indunas desired to keep the white man out of the country as much as they could, except as an ivory hunter or purchaser, or possibly as one who should find minerals at his own risk and expense and hand over a handsome royalty to the king and his courtiers, who would spend it on the purchase of more oxen, more wives, and more guns and gunpowder, with which to carry out more extensive slave-raids to the north. The Chartered Company had not interfered

with the natives' rights over the land, nor had they attempted any assumption of governing rights. They were genuinely anxious—the present writer can testify—to avoid any quarrels with the Matabele, partly, to cite no higher motive, because they had greatly over-estimated the fighting strength and capabilities of the Matabele. The quarrel really arose over the position of the indigenous tribes, Mashona and Makaranga, who were treated by the

Matabele as their slaves. The Matabele theory was that if the white men wished the Mashona or other of their subject tribes to work for them as porters, labourers, or guides, their services must first be purchased from the Matabele chiefs. The Mashona and their congeners had been waiting for the white man's advent to shake off the Zulu yoke which had lain so heavily on them since about 1845.

Wars with the Matabele

Often, when pursued or plagued by the Matabele, they would fly for refuge to one or other of the white men's forts, and they were frequently followed by the Matabele and brought back. One or two episodes of this kind, though ending in bloodshed, were smoothed over by the company's officials; the Matabele warriors became more and more daring, and at last a stand had to be made. In July, 1893, a Matabele army entered the township of Victoria, and attacked the Mashonas residing there, slaughtering many before the company's police could intervene. A fight between the Matabele warriors and the mounted police ensued, resulting in considerable loss of life to the Matabele, and in an open war with Lobengula's forces, which ended in the Chartered Company becoming the government of the land in the place of these raiding Zulus who had preceded them by forty or fifty years.

In the second Matabele War, which followed in 1896, it is true that the Mashona joined hands with their former oppressors, but the discontent which provoked this war was largely caused by the company having employed an oppressive Matabele police, which, in a different uniform and with a new authority, continue to plunder the unfortunate tillers of the soil.

The foundation of the colony of Sierra Leone, in 1787-1807, for the purpose of repatriating liberated slaves led to very little trouble with the natives till Sierra Leone had been about eighty years in existence as a British colony, mainly because little attempt was made to exercise British authority beyond the Sierra Leone Peninsula and certain islands on the coast duly purchased from the native owners. The same may be said in regard to the Gambia. But as early as 1824 trouble arose on the Gold Coast with the powerful native kingdom of Ashanti. As related elsewhere, the British Crown had shirked as much as possible any direct

responsibility for the West African settlements, though these were amongst the earliest attempts at empire beyond the British Channel. The forts and settlements were held somewhat intermittently by chartered companies. But in 1824 the governor of Sierra Leone—the Gold Coast ports were brought under the Sierra Leone government from 1821 to 1850—Sir Charles Macarthy, was forced into a conflict with the Ashanti people in order to defend the coast tribes who were under British protection. He was killed in warfare (Ensimankao, January 14th, 1824), and the British Government was obliged to avenge his death and re-establish British authority; this was the first Ashanti War between 1827 and 1831.

A short war with Lagos in 1851 was the result of an attempt to put down the slave trade. On this pretext, and also to avenge wrongs done to British merchants, the Dahomeh coast was frequently blockaded or bombarded during the third quarter of the nineteenth century, and punitive expeditions were undertaken in the Niger delta, 1886-1906, and the Congo

British Victories in Ashanti

estuary, 1875. The transfer of the Dutch possessions on the Gold Coast to Great Britain entailed another war with Ashanti in 1873-1874. This was the first occasion on which West African warfare was taken seriously. Sir Garnet Wolseley, who had distinguished himself as the commander of the Red River expedition in Central Canada, commanded a British force of about 10,000 men, 2,400 British, and the remainder negro soldiers, which, together with native auxiliaries under Sir John Glover, entered Kumasi and imposed a war indemnity which was never completely paid. Ashanti was only finally conquered after two more expeditions (1896-1900). It is now directly administered by the British Government, and has consequently increased very considerably in prosperity.

The action of France about the sources of the Niger, beginning in the early 'eighties of the last century, obliged the British Government to concern itself about the hinterland of Sierra Leone; and the various attempts to impose British influence over the warlike Temne and Mende peoples entailed a number of armed expeditions or small wars, such as the Yonni war in 1886, in what is now the rather considerable territory of the Sierra Leone Protectorate. These culminated in a regular rising of the

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Temne and Mende peoples, owing to the imposition of a hut tax, in 1898. The complete subjugation of the colony which followed, coupled with the building of a railway across a portion of the hinterland, brought about the most extraordinary changes in the prosperity of the natives. Sierra Leone is now one of the best governed, most prosperous, and generally successful of the British possessions in tropical Africa. Similar attempts to open up the hinterland of the Gambia, and to protect commerce along the British banks of that river, likewise occasioned a few armed expeditions against the Mandingo or Fulbe sultans of the interior. The last of these was the expedition against Fodi Kabba in 1900.

In the hinterland of Lagos, in the Ibo territories of the Niger Delta, there were punitive expeditions, enforced conquests of natives who would not let the Britisher or his native subjects alone. These occurred mainly between 1885 and 1905, including the expedition in 1897, which rapidly conquered the blood-stained kingdom of Benin, a feat thought to be almost

Conquest of Nigeria

impossible owing to the physical difficulties of reaching Benin through leagues of forest-swamp. But amongst notable exploits of warlike enterprise on the battle-roll of Britain, nothing in this direction equalled in importance of achievements the conquest of Nigeria. As usual, the British Government had turned over to a chartered company of merchants the first responsibility of laying the foundations of the Nigerian Empire. The original attempts of 1841 and 1858 to establish something like a British protectorate or control over the banks of the Niger had failed through the frightful mortality which attacked the naval expeditions. The Lower Niger was justly regarded then as a region so impossibly unhealthy that it could not profit the British Government as a means of reaching the Nigerian Sudan.

As related elsewhere, the foundations of modern British Nigeria were laid by Captain Goldie Taubman, afterwards Sir George T. Goldie. The Royal Niger Company, which he founded, soon experienced, however, enormous difficulties in carrying their charter into effect. It was relatively easy to keep order amongst the savage cannibal negroes along the banks of the Niger and navigable Benue; but immediately beyond these regions were

the Nigerian Sudanese—the Mohammedan Nupe, Fulbe, Hausa peoples under a general Fulbe suzerainty—hordes of cavalry permeated with Mohammedan bravery. These peoples in those days were possibly egged on to try conclusions with the British company by its French and German rivals, who, in the first place, resented the British appropriation of Eastern Nigeria, and in the second, disliked most of all that the government of the country should be entrusted to a commercial company. The company had to face the situation, conquer the amir of Nupe, and impose peace by a show of force on the Fulbe sultan of Sokoto. The expedition of 1897, practically led by Sir George Goldie, was to all intents and purposes organised by the British Government, and was commanded by Imperial officers. It achieved its object after one or two pitched battles, but ran the narrowest risks of failure and disaster owing to the difficulties of transport once it quitted the navigable waterway.

When the company was succeeded by the direct rule of the British Government, Sir Frederick Lugard found it quite impossible to cry halt until, with the forces under his command, led by Colonel Morland, he had conquered the Fulbe power and established British rule over the great Hausa cities of the Central Sudan. These campaigns of 1902 and 1903 were remarkable for the extent of ground covered, the relatively small fighting force at the disposal of the British, and the effect of the victories. It would be too soon to say that the Moslem peoples of Eastern Nigeria will never again raise the standard of revolt; but the surest way of turning their thoughts to better things, the cheapest way of maintaining the hold over this important region of Africa, is by the building of railways. As regards wars in North-east Africa within the memory of living men, the first

The Quixotic Abyssinian Expedition

to record is the somewhat quixotic Abyssinian expedition of 1864-1868. Of all the episodes in the history of the British Empire, this will seem the most difficult to explain. Its analogue in its wars of the first class with European Powers is the Crimean War. Some well-meaning but over-zealous missionaries had offended the usurping monarch of Abyssinia, Theodore. This curious personality, who, like his immediate predecessors for

about seventy years back, had begun to get into touch with the civilisation of the outer world by commerce carried on through Indian traders, had invited to his court mechanics or industrial missionaries, and then, if he were capriciously displeased with them, would hold them as his captives. A British consul of Levantine

Theodore, the Mad King of Abyssinia

or Armenian extraction, selected for his knowledge of Arabic and Amharic, was sent to get these captives out of Theodore's toils by negotiations. But Theodore, who was more than half a crank, and who had proposed marriage to Queen Victoria upon hearing that she was a widow, but had received no reply to his proposal, kept back the consul, too.

In a less sentimental age it might have been questioned whether, as Great Britain had at that time no desire to interfere in the affairs of North-east Africa, she was warranted in spending several millions of money, and perhaps in all about a thousand lives, in trying to rescue a few misguided Europeans who had accepted all risks in going to the court of a barbarous monarch. But there was the question of the British envoy, Mr. Rassam, and British prestige in the Eastern world.

So 16,000 (mainly Indian) soldiers, and some 15,000 non-combatants, marched through the mountains of Abyssinia till they had released the captives and captured Magdala, the last stronghold of Theodore, who committed suicide. Then, after furnishing their principal native ally, Prince Kassai, of Tigre, an Abyssinian prince of less doubtful lineage, with the means of aspiring to the throne of Ethiopia, the British forces marched back again to the Red Sea. In this achievement they were in far better circumstances than the Italians thirty years later, for the British protestations that they desired no territorial acquisitions were believed, and the mass of the Abyssinian people

British Army in Egypt

was on the side of the British against the misconduct of the mad, though talented, usurper. British soldiers were not to set foot in North-eastern Africa again for fifteen years. Then, in 1882, a British force was landed at Port Said under Sir Garnet Wolseley of Ashanti, who was to become Lord Wolseley of Cairo. Here the immediate objective was the subjugation of Arabi's revolt and the reassertion of the power of the legitimate ruler of Egypt, the

khedive. The motive was absolutely not any desire to acquire more territory, but in reality to save the Suez Canal from falling under the exclusive control of France, of Turkey, or of a new Mohammedan nationality, fanatical and successful, which might be arising under the somewhat stupid colonel of artillery, Ahmad Arabi. Britain had seen between 1835 and 1840 a great military power arise in Egypt, which had conquered nearly the whole of Arabia, had wrested Syria from the Porte, and, unchecked, might have re-created from an Egyptian base a vast Mohammedan empire. It was quite possible such a thing might occur once more, with Arabi in the place of Ibrahim, the son of Mehemet Ali.

The British occupation of Lower Egypt was followed by the downfall of Egyptian rule over the Sudan, the futile despatch of Gordon, and the too-late expedition in 1884 sent to extract Gordon from a besieged Khartoum. Here, again, there was no other motive than the desire to retrieve Britain's honour, much as there had been in the case of Abyssinia. Nothing was

Gordon's Death at Khartoum

desired less at that moment than the addition to the British Empire of the Egyptian Sudan. The too-late expedition, only just too late, was recalled from its natural impetus to avenge Gordon by complications with Russia in Central Asia. Little collateral wars had been carried on with the fierce Hamitic tribes of the Nubian Desert between the Red Sea coast and the Atbara, but the British and Egyptian forces were withdrawn to Wadi Halfa and the walls of Suakin, and for some years confined their efforts to repelling the attacks of the Dervishes.

The deliberate attempts at conquest of the bastard Zanzibar Arabs, descendants of the fierce Omani seamen and merchants, whose assaults on the Zanzibar coast had extinguished the power of the Portuguese in the eighteenth century, had steadily pushed inland, and had developed the slave trade to such an extent that they had scandalised the British public through the revelations of Livingstone, Speke, Grant, Stanley, Thomson and others. Ideas of empire had come to them, and they had determined to found vigorous Mohammedan slave states in Central Africa. But they knocked their heads against harder ones—the dogged Scottish pioneers of Nyassaland. It was with the

CONTESTS IN AFRICA AND THE PACIFIC

African Lakes Company at the north end of Lake Nyassa that the war broke out first between European and Arab for the possession of Central Africa. Trade had a little to do with it. The Arabs had begun to interfere between the native seller and the European purchaser; but it is only fair to state that sheer horror at the atrocious cruelties of the Arab slave raids precipitated the fight on the part of such agents of the African Lakes Company as the late Monteith Fotheringham and the still living Moir brothers. The African Lakes Company hastily called for volunteers, and enlisted amongst others a Captain Lugard, bent on East African adventure, and a hunter of big game, Alfred Sharpe. The one became the subjugator of Nigeria and the province of Uganda, and the other is still governor of the British Central African dominions.

But the Arabs were too strong to be subdued by a rabble of undisciplined blacks officered by five or six brave English or Scotch. A drawn battle was practically the result. The slave-traders had to be attacked nearer to their base before the Arab power could be dealt with effectually at the north end of Lake Nyassa. It fell to the lot of the writer of these chapters to head this next movement, which culminated in 1895-1896 by the defeat and death of all the Arab leaders, and the definite establishment of British dominion up to the south end of Tanganyika and the shores of Lake Mweru. A little campaign against the power of the Angoni Zulus, who had invaded Nyassaland in the early part of the nineteenth century, completed such conquests as were necessary to establish a British protectorate over the whole of British Central Africa from the upper waters of the Zambesi to the Portuguese possessions east of Lake Nyassa.

The British establishment at Aden, which was rendered necessary by the opening of the overland route to India through Egypt and the Red Sea, brought the British power into contact with the Somali coast. There had been British envoys to Ethiopia and Shoa as far back as the closing years of the eighteenth century. The coastlands and a good deal of the interior of the Somali country produced sheep, goats, camels, and even oxen, besides other commodities which were required to feed the British garrison at Aden, and also the ever-increasing

number of steamers which called at Aden on their way to and from India. Therefore, as far back as the early 'fifties of the last century Great Britain, by means of official and unofficial explorations, was taking a marked interest in the fate of the Somali coast. During the period of Imperial lassitude coincident with the 'sixties and early 'seventies, Great Britain looked on with a shrug of the shoulders whilst Egypt, which at any rate, in our eyes, was better than France for such a purpose, attempted to make herself mistress of Somaliland.

When the Egyptian power fell, however, with the annihilation of General Hicks's army and the death of Gordon, it was necessary to do something, or else the coast opposite Aden might be jointly occupied by France and Italy. So the very oddly-shaped protectorate of British Somaliland came into existence, and, needless to say, the attempts of the British to become responsible for law and order on the Somali coast dragged them much against their will into an equal responsibility for the disorder of inner Somaliland.

A mad mullah, a robber-fanatic, beginning as so many of these Moslem leaders have done, in a very prosaic way as a disappointed store-keeper or a market gardener whose crops had been ravaged by locusts, and who in a vague way has attributed his grievances to the incoming of the British government, drew to a head the dissatisfaction of the turbulent Somalis at seeing their misgoverned country somewhat rigidly administered by the yellow soldiers and white officers of a Christian empire, or an empire synonymous in their eyes with an interfering Christianity. Had the African policy been wisely directed at the time, the mad mullah, beyond repelling his attacks on settlements near the coast, would have been fought by a railway instead of by armies of negro and Indian soldiers gallantly led by British officers into the thorny deserts over an area as large as England, in attempts, that were to a great extent vain, to grasp the mobile enemy by the throat. Troubles began in Somaliland in 1898. The operations against Sayyid Mohammed, the "Mad" mullah, now no longer regarded as mad, commenced in 1901 and did not terminate until 1904. In 1905 Sayyid

**Fall of
the Egyptian
Power**

**Establishing
a British
Protectorate**

**Operations
Against the
Mad Mullah**

Mohammed was recognised politically by Italy and Britain as a native ruler over a defined sphere with access to the coast. So much bravery and endurance were not entirely thrown away; the Somalis received a drastic lesson. But in the light of later wisdom we now realise that the millions which this little war cost Great

**Civilising
Influence
of Railways**

Britain might have been far more profitably and conclusively employed in the construction of a railway. Perhaps this lesson has been brought home to the empire. In Nigeria, in Sierra Leone, in the hinterland of Lagos, the policy of railway building has now been thoroughly understood. It is realised that a railway is the best investment of British Imperial money in these and other undeveloped countries.

It is true that the construction of a railway cannot be undertaken without a force to guard the railway workers; but it is far easier to advance from the secure base as the railway progresses, and the process requires a far smaller armed force than risky expeditions on a large scale into the unknown. The trouble in all African warfare is not the fighting when it comes to close quarters, but the question of transport in a roadless country. If you rely on native porters, they are relatively defenceless, and may bolt at the first appearance of the enemy; if on beasts of burden, mules or camels, they may be stampeded, maimed or killed by an enemy used to making such procedure the first thought in warfare. On the other hand, the railway inspires interest, curiosity, amazement, and suggests the very sweet thought of profitable commercial relations. It offers well-paid work for vigorous men, and a certain market for all native supplies.

Not long after the Arab question was settled in South-central Africa in 1896, trouble was brewing in the equatorial regions of Eastern Africa. Echoes of the revolt against the Germans in Swahili

**Rising
in Eastern
Africa**

Africa amongst the so-called Arabs or Arabised negroes had spread to the British territories at the back of Mombasa. Here was wont to resort an Arab prince who was by many Moslems of East Africa regarded as the rightful occupant of the Zanzibar throne, the descendant of an Arab dynasty that had been replaced by the Sayyids of Oman. Sidi Mubarak stirred up trouble for the British. Moreover, it had been necessary to conquer by

a naval expedition a small Swahili sultanate on the Ozo River. The question of slavery and the slave trade lay at the bottom of this disaffection against British rule. When these troubles were appeased came rumours of more serious disturbances further to the west, in the Uganda Protectorate.

Sir Frederick, then Captain, Lugard had imported into the Uganda Protectorate, in the days when it was no more than a sphere of influence, a number of Emin Pasha's Sudanese soldiers. These men were brave, but they were emphatically Mohammedans, and with a few of them the old Arab dislike to the rule of the Christian still lingered. Their first easy victories in keeping order in Uganda inspired them with a contempt for the pagan or Christian negroes of that region. They also had legitimate grievances in regard to the manner in which they had been handled by one or two officers in command.

Added to this source of trouble was the extreme dislike on the part of the king of Unyoro and his counsellors and the king of Uganda to the imposition of British control. The mass of people in Uganda, and their local chiefs or headmen, on the contrary, strongly desired a British protectorate, and were opposed to their disreputable monarch on many grounds. But the first attempts to crush the mutiny of the Sudanese soldiers provoked a formidable rising of the Banyoro and disaffected Baganda. The British force, mainly consisting of Indian soldiers and thousands of Baganda "friendlies," got the better of the mutineers in several very bloody engagements, and finally the two kings of Unyoro and Uganda were captured and deported from East Africa.

The Uganda mutiny ended, so far as serious fighting was concerned, in 1899, but a few further engagements with the remnant of the Sudanese followed, and in 1900 there was trouble with the Nandi mountaineers. In all these contests it was obvious—the writer naturally speaks as an eye-witness—that the bulk of the natives of all races and tribes of the large British Protectorate of Uganda were with the British in their attempts to introduce decent government and profitable commerce. Had it not been so, it would have required a force of 10,000 soldiers and an expenditure of ten millions of money to reduce these lands to obedience. As a

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matter of fact, they were pacified by a force of some 400 Indians and 3,000 native soldiers, commanded by British officers and non-commissioned officers. Moreover, an important remnant of the Sudanese remained faithful throughout to the British Government.

After the British Government advised the khedive of Egypt to withdraw his troops and officials to Wadi Halfa or the walls of Suakin, about the year 1886, no further steps of a warlike nature were taken for the reconquest of the Sudan. The task was tacitly postponed till a more convenient opportunity. Meanwhile, the present sirdar and governor-general of the Sudan, Sir Reginald Wingate, was steadily collecting information through one of the best organised intelligence departments in the world.

Emboldened by this silence, after the mahdi's death, when the Khalifa Abdallah succeeded to supreme power, a fierce attack was made on Egypt; but the Anglo-Egyptian army—that is to say, Egyptian soldiers fortified by an admixture of British non-commissioned and commissioned

**The Rebel
Osman Digma
Captured**

officers—assisted by British cavalry and commanded by General (Lord) Grenfell, inflicted on the Dervishes at Saras, about thirty miles to the south of Wadi Halfa, a defeat so overwhelming that it checked once and for all any further aspirations of the khalifa for the reconquest of the world. The battles and skirmishes with Osman Digma, between 1884 and 1897, round Suakin and in the Eastern Sudan, had no such conclusive or effective retort; but the enemy here was worn out by continual defeats, and Osman Digma abandoned the struggle and repaired to the khalifa's army on the Nile in 1897 to oppose Kitchener's main advance. He was subsequently captured in the hills behind Tokar, in January, 1900.

How long this stage of waiting and preparation would have continued it is difficult to say, had not the conclusion of the drama been hastened by the action of France and the misfortunes of Italy. French rancour against the British occupation of Egypt continued to increase during the early 'nineties of the last century. It was envenomed by the opposition offered on the part of the British Government to a French annexation of Eastern Nigeria, and perhaps by the barrier erected against the absorption

of the kingdom of Siam. British inaction was mistaken for indifference or cowardice. The marvellously rapid way in which the French had opened up connections between the Atlantic coast and the Mubangi River, the great northern affluent of the Congo, and between the Mubangi and the regions of the Shari and Lake

**French
Expedition
in Egypt**

Chad, inspired them with the idea, enhanced by the similar successes of the Belgians advancing from the Congo, that the power of the Dervishes was either greatly exaggerated or was on the wane. They found that they could enter the south-western regions of the Bahr-el-Ghazal by friendly understanding with the Niam-Niam sultans, and so they conceived the idea of opening up direct trans-continental relations between the Gulf of Guinea, Abyssinia, and Somaliland, thus carrying a band of French influence right across Africa from sea to sea. It was known to the British Government, and was noted in a historic speech by Sir Edward Grey, that a French expedition was advancing to the Upper Nile.

Italy, in the meantime, was aspiring to conquer and acquire the whole of Abyssinia. Her hopes were shattered at the Battle of Adawa, in 1896. The imagined consequences of this disaster at the time were probably exaggerated in the mind of the German Emperor, who strongly urged the British Government to retake the eastern portion of the Egyptian Sudan, and thus distract the Dervishes from joining forces with Abyssinia, and sweeping the Italians into the Red Sea.

Fortified by this hint on the part of a potent personage, whose moral support in Egypt counteracted the threats of French hostility, the British Government sanctioned the advance to Dongola, long prepared by Sir Herbert Kitchener, and carried into effect with a method, accuracy, punctuality, and economy which

**France
Retires from
Egypt**

filled the British Government with admiration, and encouraged high hopes in regard to a similar advance on Khartoum.

This, indeed, followed in the year 1898 as a necessary consequence of Dongola. It was the only way to prevent a French annexation of the Egyptian Sudan. Omdurman and Khartoum were retaken on September 2nd-3rd, 1898, and the episode of Fashoda followed. France bowed to the verdict of the stricken field, and

withdrew. But the khalifa and some of his principal lieutenants still remained at large. They had withdrawn into that ominous thorny desert of Kordofan, where Hicks's army had been lost—and the Sudan with it—in 1883. So long as they remained at large, gathering again reactionary forces for the attack, there

Conquerors of the Eastern Sudan

could be no rest for the British governor at Khartoum. Consequently, the third and last campaign that regained the Sudan for civilisation was entered upon by Sir Reginald Wingate, to the great anxiety of those who were watching afar off. A success, in its way as triumphant as that of Kitchener, settled the question once and for all. In the battle of Om Dubreikat on November 25th, 1899, the khalifa Abdallah and all his emirs were killed.

Colonel Hunter and Colonel Parsons, between them, had conquered the whole Eastern Sudan, from the Blue Nile to Kassala, in September, 1898; but this region required a small punitive expedition as late as 1908. The great cattle-breeding tribe of the Dinkas has elicited more than one display of Anglo-Egyptian force, and the Nam-Niams of the Western Bahr el Ghazal likewise.

The only "native" wars in Polynesia sufficiently important to be chronicled have been those which took place in New Zealand in two periods, from 1845 to 1848, and from 1860 to 1870. The indigenous New Zealand Maori population, of Polynesian origin, was certain, sooner or later, to come into conflict with the British colonists. Documents were drawn up, and received the crosses of unreflecting chiefs who thereby had disposed of large areas of communal land without realising the after effects. The unscrupulous actions of the European settlers were met by

reprisals. The usual muddle took place in dealing with the great war of 1860-70 in its first stages, and before it came to a final end a good number of British soldiers and settlers had lost their lives. But, as might be anticipated, it resulted in the definite conquest of the Maori; also in more conscientious settlement of their land questions.

No colonial war of recent years has taken place in any British American possession; but in 1865 there was a serious danger of a wide-spreading negro revolt in the island of Jamaica. The somewhat panic-stricken and illegal actions taken by Governor Eyre and the officers under his command cost that otherwise excellent colonial official his career.

The revolt in Upper and Lower Canada between 1835 and 1838 entailed a good deal of stiff fighting. It was finally extinguished by the evident determination of the British Government, through the work of such able administrators as the Earl of Durham and Lord Sydenham, to endow the Canadas with a complete and popular form of constitutional government. In 1870 the revolt of the French half-breeds in the Red River district, under Louis Riel, entailed a military expedition commanded by the present Viscount Wolseley, then a young colonel. But Louis Riel reappeared fifteen years later, and defeated a body of Canadian mounted police and volunteers.

Fate of the Rebel Louis Riel

This success rallied round him the still recalcitrant element of French half-breeds and pure blood Indians. But a body of over 5,000 Canadian militia soon overcame Riel's resistance. He was captured, tried for murder—he was practically an outlaw, having fled from justice after the murder of Thomas Scott in 1870—and hanged at Regina in November, 1885.



BRITISH HAUSA TROOPS STATIONED ON THE GOLD COAST

THE
BRITISH
EMPIRE
VIII



BY SIR
HARRY
JOHNSTON,
G.C.M.G.

THE FIGHTING FORCES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

NAVAL ACHIEVEMENTS FROM THE TIME OF KING ALFRED TO THE PRESENT DAY

THE British, or more strictly speaking, the English Navy began in the time of Alfred as a means of counter-attack against the Danes, and continued afterwards as a collection of armed merchantmen. After the Norman conquest and under the Plantagenets it served as a method of attacking Ireland, Scotland, France, Flanders, and Spain. But as a means to the end of founding a great empire beyond the seas it only began in the time of Elizabeth. Even then there were "Queen's ships" and the vessels of private adventurers whose proceedings were either licensed or winked at by the sovereign, and who were only to be distinguished from common pirates in that their hostile actions were usually limited to the property of such nations as were at war or on bad terms with England.

The first of such sea-fights under the national flag was the battle of an English fleet under Sir John Hawkins and Sir Francis Drake against the ships of the Spanish viceroy off San Juan de Ulua, on the coast of Mexico, in 1567. This ended in a decisive victory for the British, and was the beginning of the long series of attacks on Spanish America, which continued down to 1808, and even found their echo in the United States' war against Spain on account of Cuba and Porto Rico. This particular fight at San Juan de Ulua arose over the desire of the English to carry on a trade in African slaves between Guinea and America in defiance of Spanish monopolies of commerce and privileges.

Sir John Hawkins had begun the slave trade under the indirect permit—a sub-concession from Genoese and Portuguese concessionaries—of Spain in 1562, and it had proved so profitable that Queen

Elizabeth had put two of her ships and several thousand pounds into the business. This unofficial war between England and Spain, provoked by the Spanish and Portuguese monopolies of trade and communications between Europe and America, Africa, and India, was continued by Drake's piratical expeditions of 1572-1573 and 1577-1580, in the course of which he attacked and plundered the Spanish settlements of Santo Domingo, Florida, Cuba, and, most wonderful of all, Peru. He sailed round South America, attacked the Spaniards on the undefended Pacific coast, and then, first of all leaders of men, so far as we know, completed the circumnavigation of the globe. Magellan, the Portuguese navigator, died in the Spice Islands after discovering the Magellan Straits. His ships, not he, completed the first voyage round the world. In 1585, when Spain and England were at last at open war, followed Drake's Carthagenan expedition, and in 1587 was the raid on Cadiz, in which he destroyed or captured eighty Spanish ships which were employed in preparing for the great Armada.

The exploits or outrages of Drake were among provocative causes of the dispatch of the great Armada which was effectually to subdue this nation of Protestant pirates in the Northern seas. The resistance offered to this mighty Spanish fleet may be justly regarded as one of the earliest glories of the English Navy, but we should also not forget that it was equally Dutch valour which rendered the purposes of the Armada impossible and saved England from experiencing at the hands of Spain woes such as England herself had inflicted on Ireland. Frobisher, Howard of Effingham,

Drake's Piratical Exploits

England's Early Sea Fights

Drake and Hawkins, tackled this enormous and clumsy fleet of sixty magnificent vessels as soon as it had entered the British Channel, and followed it resolutely to the Straits of Dover. Here, whilst the Spanish naval commander-in-chief was awaiting the arrival of the Duke of Parma's army for England, which was to sally out

Fate of the Spanish Armada

from the Flemish and Dutch seaports in shallow vessels, the brave Dutch mariners blockaded the coasts and deltas of the Netherlands, and prevented the Spanish soldiers from putting out to sea. During this hesitancy an English sea-captain, probably Winter, thought of the splendid idea—really originated some years earlier by an Italian engineer, Giambelli—of sending fireships to drift with wind and tide into the midst of the huddled and anchored Armada. This for the first time scattered the Armada. The decisive engagement and the complete rout of the fleet took place next day, though the chase was continued on the part of the English to as far north as the latitude of 56°.

The next great naval exploit was the capture of Cadiz in 1596, by Essex, Raleigh, Effingham, and Howard, followed by a raid on Spanish shipping in the Azores Archipelago. Then for a time Spain and England were at peace. The next enemy to be encountered on the sea was Holland. An English fleet under Monk, commissioned by the Lord Protector Cromwell, defeated the Dutch off the North Foreland in 1653, and destroyed much Dutch shipping in the Texel.

All this warfare with Holland, like that with Spain, arose over the question of commercial monopolies in the Colonies and the Eastern seas. Admiral Blake proceeded to the Mediterranean in 1656 and bombarded Porto Farina and Goletta on the coast of Tunis, to punish the dey of that Turkish principality for attacks on British shipping. In 1657

England's Glory in the Navy

Blake's fleet won a victory over the Spaniards at Cadiz. The glory of the navy has been a peculiarly English one, and perhaps accounts for the predominance of England over Ireland and Scotland. The Scandinavians, who colonised the coasts of Ireland and Scotland, did not implant there as strong a lust for a seafaring life as they did all round maritime England, from Berwick to Penzance, and from Dungeness to Lancaster. Of course, English navigation

was confined pretty much to home waters—to the shores of Scandinavia, Holland, France, Spain, and Portugal—during the Middle Ages, and the first great swoops of discovery and conquest under the early Tudors were made at the instigation of Venetian, Genoese and Portuguese pilots or captains; just as under the later Plantagenet kings the English marine learnt much from the Flemings and the Dieppoisi. But by the time of Elizabeth's accession the English—equally with the Dutch—were the hardiest navigators and the boldest sea-fighters in the world.

Thenceforth, though they were not too proud to learn new methods of naval construction or of maritime warfare from Holland, Spain, France, Genoa, or from the Algerine pirates, the English needed no one to show them the way into strange seas, nor, in the long run, could any other navy prevail against them. They fought and beat the Portuguese off the coasts of Africa, India, and the Persian Gulf; they withstood the mighty ships of Spain in English and Irish waters, off the coasts of Spain and of the Mediterranean, in the

The Naval Triumphs of England

Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea along the Pacific coasts of South America, amid the Spice Islands, and the archipelago of the Philippines. They won final victories over the Dutch at the close of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—since when, for unexplained causes, Holland has ceased to be a first-class naval power—and closed their chequered but generally successful duel with the French Navy by the battle of Trafalgar.

America fought with equal valour and address, but with infinitely smaller resources, in the war of 1812-1814, and since then, happily, has been at peace with us. Turkey received an occasional drubbing in the Eastern Mediterranean or the Red Sea between the seventeenth and the early nineteenth centuries. The Barbary rovers were finally settled by Lord Exmouth's bombardment of Algiers in 1816. Since 1806 Great Britain has held the world's championship on the open sea. And the glory till that date lay chiefly, though not entirely, with men of English birth.

In 1692, Admiral Russell defeated the French in a great naval battle off La Hogue, and thus baulked a most serious attempt on the part of Louis XIV. to restore the Stuart dynasty under conditions which would have materially crippled the British

Empire beyond the seas. The British Navy co-operated with an Anglo-German force in the capture of Gibraltar in 1704. In 1718, as a consequence of the War of the Spanish Succession and the disputes over Italy, Sir George Byng fought a successful battle which practically destroyed the Spanish fleet off the coast of Sicily.

In 1747 Admiral (Lord) Anson, Commodore Fox, and Admiral (Lord) Hawke, inflicted tremendous naval defeats and losses on the French Navy between Cape Finisterre and Belle Ile, thus cutting off France from intervention in the West Indies and North America. In the war of 1756-63, the British Navy accomplished many noteworthy feats which atoned for the feebleness displayed by Admiral Byng over the relief of Minorca. It prevented all chance of reinforcing Montcalm in Canada, or Lally in India. Lord Hawke in 1759 destroyed the main portion of the French fleet off the mouth of the Vilaine on the coast of Brittany. In 1762, Lord Albemarle and Admiral Pocock led a naval force which attacked and captured Havana, and practically the whole island of Cuba; in the

The Navy in the War with America

same year Admiral Cornish and Sir William Draper, sailing from Madras, achieved the same result with Manila and the Philippines. Both these expeditions enriched the war-chest of the British Government with several million dollars.

The great War of American Independence was, in its earlier stages, marked by singular ill-success on the part of the British Navy, which proved unequal to the task of preventing the transport of large bodies of French troops to America, and failed to beat or evade the French, or to seize the Cape of Good Hope as a return blow to the Dutch for joining the coalition. But, in 1781, Admiral Parker, in the battle of the Dogger Bank, administered such a severe punishment to the Dutch fleet as disabled it for the remainder of the war.

In 1782, Rodney defeated the Comte de Grasse off Dominica, in the West Indies, and thus checked the very serious depredations which the French were making on British possessions and commerce in that quarter. Nevertheless, this period of the eighteenth century (1775-1785) witnessed the greatest ascendancy of French sea power. The British naval supremacy was never so seriously threatened as between 1770 and 1802. Lord Howe's victory off Ushant on the "Glorious First of June,"

1794, upset the plans of the French Republic for the invasion of maltreated, disaffected Ireland. In the battle of Camperdown, in 1797, Admiral Duncan destroyed the efficiency of the Dutch fleet, which was then under French orders, and in the same year Admiral Jervis rendered a similar service in regard to the naval force of Spain off Cape St. Vincent. The year

The British Navy's Checks to Napoleon


1798 saw Nelson's marvellous victory over the French battleships and transports at Aboukir Bay, a defeat which hopelessly crippled the French plans for the permanent conquest of Egypt. A detachment of the British Fleet under Sir Sydney Smith, by its watchfulness along the Syrian coast and its defence of Acre, rendered impossible what otherwise might have still taken place—a conquest by Napoleon of the empire of the Nearer East. Similarly, the naval action of the British off Valetta made it possible for the Maltese to expel the French from their island. The same force prevented Napoleon's soldiers from capturing Sicily and Sardinia.

Calder's victory over Villeneuve off Cape Finisterre in the late summer of 1805, followed by Nelson's never-to-be-forgotten achievement of Trafalgar—when the naval strength of Spain and France was ruined till the close of the Napoleonic wars—fitly closes this amazing record of victories with a crowning grace so splendid, so complete, that for one hundred and four years no sea Power or group of Powers thought it wise to challenge Britain's supremacy. To Nelson, more than to any other hero on the roll of fame, the British owe the extent, the stability, the wealth, and the happiness of their empire.

From 1805 to 1914 the British fleet fought no action of vital importance, and had, consequently, no striking victory to record over the Great Powers of the world. If the navy had no chance to add to its laurels after 1814, except in the bombard-

Britain's Fleet the Mainstay of the Empire


ment of Russian forts in the Baltic, the interference with Turkish and Egyptian squadrons over questions of Greek and Egyptian independence, the chastisement of Arab, Malay, Chinese and negro slave-traders, and the capture of piratical South American warships; its existence and readiness for action have been the chief mainstay of the imperial forces. Without this overwhelming fleet she could never have restrained France from fresh descents



FLAGSHIP OF THE ENGLISH FLEET AT THE TIME OF THE SPANISH ARMADA




WARSHIPS OF THE TIME OF QUEEN ELIZABETH



THE ROYAL PRINCE: A WARSHIP OF THE TIME OF JAMES I.


BRITISH SHIPS OF WAR IN THE TIMES OF ELIZABETH AND JAMES I.



THE ROYAL GEORGE: TIME OF GEORGE II.



18TH CENTURY MAN-OF-WAR



H.M.S. AGAMEMNON, THE FIRST SCREW BATTLESHIP OF THE BRITISH NAVY



FAMOUS FIGHTING SHIPS, WITH THE VICTORY IN RIGHT FOREGROUND, OFF SPITHEAD

BATTLESHIPS OF THE GEORGIAN AND EARLY VICTORIAN PERIODS

on Egypt and Syria in the middle of the nineteenth century, Russia from occupying Constantinople or Peking, Germany from armed intervention in South Africa, Portugal from annexing Nyassaland, or Turkey from resuming her sway in Egypt or absorbing the Imamate of Oman. But, as before stated, it has always been behind

her land forces to ensure their victory sooner or later. Nevertheless, in this record of achievements mention might be made of the various actions of the navy in the building up of the empire since 1815. In 1816, when the anxiety of the Napoleonic struggle was at an end, it was decided to put a stop once and for all to the insolence of the Algerine pirates.

Since Blake's appearance in the Mediterranean, they had been chary of interference with British shipping, but they still interfered with the Maltese and the Ionian Islands, and continued their piracies along the coast of Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia. Thousands of wretched Maltese, Greeks, and Italians were life-long slaves of the Turkish rulers of Tripoli, Tunis, Bona, and Algiers. Lord Exmouth was proceeding to attack Algiers, after freeing the Christian slaves of Tunis and Tripoli without recourse to force, when he was joined by a small but efficient Dutch fleet under Admiral van Capellen. Together the British and Dutch smashed the fortifications of Algiers, and destroyed the dey's warships, besides exacting ample reparation for past injuries.

In 1827 the British, French and Russian Fleets destroyed the Turco-Egyptian war navy under the Egyptian Ibrahim Pasha in the Bay of Navarino or Pylus, southwest coast of Greece, with a view to establishing the independence of Greece. Then ensued a long spell of peace on the seas, scarcely broken, if at all, by the police duties of the British Navy on the West Coast of Africa—where steam vessels

were first employed in 1827—the Malay archipelago, the West Indies and the Pacific. In 1840, the British Fleet in the Mediterranean bombarded and captured that Acre which Napoleon could not take; but this was when Britain was endeavouring to force Mehemet Ali, the viceroy of Egypt and vicarious conqueror of Syria, back into his subjection to the Porte. During the first conflict with China, British naval forces occupied the Chusan

archipelago and Hong Kong, destroyed the Bogue forts which protected the entrance to the Canton River, and eventually enabled British land forces to occupy Canton, Amoy, Shanghai and other coast towns. In the second Chinese War, the navy again occupied Canton after a bombardment. It also co-operated in the attempt to force the river access to Peking in 1859-1860, and in suppressing the Boxer revolt in 1899-1900.

The navy, in 1863 and 1864, conducted to a successful issue the only armed conflict with Japan. The dangerous Malay pirates of Borneo and the China Sea were dealt with between 1840 and 1857. A naval expedition, under Admiral Sir William Hewett, cleared out the pirates of the Congo estuary in 1875. Piracy in the Persian Gulf has also been suppressed by the patrolling of British war-vessels.

From 1826 until 1885 a detachment of her navy watched the east and west coasts of Africa to suppress the slave trade. A heavy toll of deaths from fever and climatic causes has been exacted from the west coast service, while on the east not a few lives have been lost in the attempts to board, inspect, or capture Arab slave-traders. Occasionally, on the west coast, the measures taken to stop the sale and export of slaves have risen to the importance of small wars. Thus, the roadstead of Dahomeh was blockaded for seven years from 1876 to 1883. Lagos, a great slave-trading stronghold, was bombarded in 1851. Out of opposition to the slave raiding and trading, which were ruining interior Africa, arose the desire to combine a practical, honest commerce with philanthropic police work. It was, therefore, attempted in 1841, and later, in 1856-9, to open up the Lower Niger and Benue. In the first of these expeditions the Royal Navy and naval officers played a considerable part, while the second was also under naval supervision.

Gradually the navy, conjoined with a consular service, came to police the whole Niger Delta and the Kamerun. This state of affairs grew in the latter part of the nineteenth century into the British protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Before this protectorate possessed a properly organised police force, British war vessels inflicted salutary punishment on the eagerly commercial but very bloodthirsty negroes of the Niger Delta. There were

**Checking
the Algerine
Pirates**

**Suppression
of the
Slave Trade**

**Britain's
Naval Wars
with China**

THE FIGHTING FORCES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

naval expeditions to deal with the turbulent people of Opobo (1887-1892), the cannibals of Brass (1895), while an expedition mainly naval, conducted with remarkable skill, under circumstances of the acutest difficulty, put an end for ever to the blood-stained rule of Benin (1897). Gunboats and naval detachments have also maintained or restored order on the Gambia and up the Sierra Leone rivers.

In Eastern Africa the navy has played a considerable part in the operations (1891-1895) against the slave-trading Arabs and Yaos of Nyassaland. Zanzibar was bombarded in 1896 when the reactionary party among the Arabs wished to place on the throne a candidate who was not the recognised heir. Earlier than this, in 1895, a naval expedition succeeded after an exceedingly tough fight under difficulties of swamp, forest and scrub, and native ferocity—resembling the expedition to Benin—in conquering the little independent Swahili sultanate of Vitu, which had so long defied attack from Muscat or Zanzibar Arabs, Germans or British. The navy during the whole nineteenth century has policed the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the adjoining coasts of Somaliland and Southern Arabia, administering chastisement, when they could be got at, to Arab sheikhs and Somali tribes. It has more than once intervened to maintain the Imam of Muscat on the shaky throne of Oman.

Its services during the Egyptian War of 1882 were mainly the bombardment of Alexandria and the control of the Suez Canal. It contributed a contingent to the Gordon relief expedition of 1884-1885, and intervened effectually to prevent the Dervishes from capturing Swuakin.

In the New World, since 1814, its services to the empire have been mainly limited to supporting the civil arm at times of ebullition and threatened revolt among the negro population of the West Indies and British Guiana; or to exacting reparation for injuries to British commerce or British subjects on the part of the impulsive governments of Central America. Off the south Peruvian coast, H.M.S. Shah, of the British Navy, in 1877, pursued and sank the rebel gunboat of Peru, the Huascar, which had turned pirate on a large scale.

In Oceania the navy has never yet fought a great battle, but for a hundred years and more it has maintained a police

of ever increasing vigilance among the many Pacific and Papuan islands under independent chiefs or British protection. It has, since 1870, protected the South Sea Islanders against unscrupulous Europeans or has chastised them for unprovoked acts of aggression against each other or against the white man. Lastly, in that nobler war, the fight against ignorance, that struggle for the disinterested gains of pure science, the British Navy has for the last 150 years played a notable part. In 1768, Captain James Cook sailed for the Pacific in H.M.S. Endeavour (only 370 tons), in command of a scientific expedition to observe the transit of Venus across the sun's disc. The astronomical observations were completed at Tahiti, and Cook then directed his course for the scarcely known southern continent, re-discovering New Zealand on the way. The botanists and zoologists on board his ship had the privilege of first collecting and bringing back for the enlightenment of European science specimens of the extraordinary fauna and flora of Australia.

In 1773, the first directly naval expedition sailed from England for the Arctic regions, though seamen in the service of the Crown had figured much earlier in this field of research. Captain Phipps, R.N., proceeded as far north as 80° 48' N. Lat., with the ships Racehorse and Carcass, beyond Spitzbergen. Since then the share of the British Navy in Arctic discovery has been so gigantic as to be impossible of description in a few sentences.

Among many great names on the roll of Arctic exploration may be mentioned Sir John Franklin, Sir John Ross, Sir Edward Parry, Sir George Back, Admiral F. W. Beechey, Sir Leopold McClintock, Sir R. J. McClure, Captain Austin, Sir R. Collinson, Sir Edward Belcher, Sir Albert Markham, Sir Clements Markham, and Sir George Nares—all of the Royal

Navy, in one category or another. Between them, and with the valuable assistance of the Hudson's Bay Company, served by such men as Hearne, Mackenzie, Simpson, Dr. Rae, and Sir John Richardson, they laid down on the world's charts the greater part of the coast-line of North America and its huge annectant islands between Bering's Straits and the coast of Labrador. The Antarctic regions were first explored by Captain James Cook,

The Navy's Services to the State

Science and the Navy

Explorers in the Royal Navy

1682



1700



1706



1704



1742



1799



1815



1832



1854



HISTORIC TYPES OF THE SCOTS GREYS, THE OLDEST CAVALRY REGIMENT



HISTORIC TYPES OF THE COLDSTREAM GUARDS, ONE OF THE OLDEST REGIMENTS

in 1773, in two ships of the Royal Navy, H.M.S. Resolution and Adventure. Captain James Ross commanded the greatest naval expedition directed towards the South Pole, that of 1839-1843. And the last explorations of these regions—English and Scottish, 1903-1904, 1908-1912—have been conducted by officers of the Royal Navy

The Historic Voyage of H.M.S. Beagle (Captain Scott and Lieutenant Shackleton). In 1821-1822, Lieutenant Beechey, R.N., surveyed the coasts and ruins of the Cyrenaica, then, as now, one of the least known parts of Africa. A landmark in the history of human knowledge will always be the voyage of H.M.S. Beagle, in 1831-1836, with Darwin as surgeon and naturalist. Captain W. F. Owen's great surveying voyages (1822-1827) all round the continent of Africa and Madagascar were truly remarkable in their enormous additions to geographical knowledge. For the first time in history, Africa was correctly outlined in detail in almost all the intricacies of its coasts; in the depths or shallowness, the rocks, shoals, sandbanks, deep channels, and creeks of its harbours, estuaries, river-mouths, bays, gulfs, and lagoons.

Owen's voyage was the forerunner of a general survey of the whole world of waters by the British Navy. There is not a mile of coast in the known continents and islands of both hemispheres which has not, at some time or other, been surveyed and sounded by a British ship. The charts of the Hydrographical department of the British Admiralty are in use all over the world as works of standard reference.

The four years' scientific researches carried on by the staff and crew of H.M.S. Challenger (1872-1876) were epoch-making in their results. All the great oceans were examined as to their depths, currents, temperatures, fauna (especially the living creatures of profound depths), and the conformation of their floors; the formation of coral islands was examined;

The Navy in Scientific Research the action of the sun's rays on sea water was studied; nor was the ethnology of the Pacific Islands overlooked, and the ornithology—the petrels, gulls, and pelicans—of the ocean wastes, or of oceanic rocks and atolls.

The Imperial army in its personnel and recruitment has not always been as English or as British as the navy. For example, the Foreign Legion recruited by the British Government for service during

the Crimean War—not including Turkish irregulars, Bashi-Bazouks—amounted to 16,559 soldiers—German, nearly 10,000, Swiss, and Italians. Until the close of the Crimean War the British Government did not hesitate to fight its land battles by means of foreign mercenaries. Plantagenet kings accomplished much of their conquests of England, Wales, Ireland, and of Scotland with French, Gascon, Flemish, Burgundian troops; though Henry VIII. was all English in his armed force. Mary I. employed Flemings and Spaniards abroad. Elizabeth more than once relied entirely on English valour for her incursions into the Netherlands and the American-Spanish dominions, and also for her ruthless and destructive conquest of Ireland. James I. supported his colonial seizures with English soldiers, a large proportion of whom were what we should now call convicts.

But in the times of the Stuarts—the early Stuarts especially—feudal instincts were still alive. Great nobles were still, to some extent, the rulers of shires or of smaller districts. When James I. or Charles I. "sold" or bestowed

Birth of a National Army or chartered any West India island or North American state to an English earl, baron, or marquess, that nobleman in person or by deputy would proceed to arm and equip a number of lusty and adventurous young men from among his tenantry or hangers-on—Irish, as well as English and Welsh—and these became the first fighting force against interlopers, against Caribs, Arawaks, Mohawks, or Choctaws. Courtiers and peers who were financially interested in the East India Company furnished likewise the few fighting men, not actually sailors, who were required for the defence of the company's small forts, to defend which, later, large native armies of sepoy and Eurasians were employed.

It was really not till the struggle between king and parliament during the middle of the seventeenth century that the English national army came into being; and this growth was to some extent checked after the Restoration. But under Charles II, two of the regiments of Lifeguards (Coldstreams—the Coldstreams were the last vestige of Cromwell's and Monk's standing army—and 1st Lifeguards) began, which have been extended and continued as a corps d'élite to the present day; and in this reign the first regiments for foreign

THE FIGHTING FORCES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

service, the 1st and 2nd Tangier Regiments, cavalry and infantry, "Kirke's Lambs," nowadays known as the 1st Dragoon Guards and the Queen's, or Royal West Surrey Regiment, were recruited, at first mainly from amongst the rascaldom of London and Dublin. William III. employed a large number of Dutch and Danish soldiers in his fight for the British Crown, and for some time after his coronation kept his Dutch Guards in London. In fact, he really conquered Ireland—and thereby retained England—with foreign soldiers.

George I. and George II. brought German regular soldiers to England, and, although these were eventually sent back to Hanover, the principle of recruiting German, mainly West German, mercenaries for service as, and with, the British Army abroad continued until 1857, having commenced under Queen Anne. To these German legions, their most faithful, uncomplaining service, their unswerving loyalty and unstinted bravery, the British Empire owes much. As elsewhere related, they became in many individual instances

Military Training under the Tudors

the salt of her early colonial efforts in America, South Africa, and Australia. There was no standing or professional army in England for home or foreign service until the middle of the seventeenth century. There was a militia, and in feudal days and under the Tudors nearly all the vigorous males of the community of all ranks of life were trained to arms of some kind instead of wasting their time on fruitless athletic sports, the survival in some cases of actual crude efforts to attack or defend. The serfs, peasantry, and mechanics learnt to use the bow, wield the pike, sling the stone, discharge the rude musket. They were the infantry. The gentry, successors of the knights, were the cavalry, who wielded sword or battle-axe.

This cavalry came in time to include the enfranchised yeomanry, "the upper middle class" of to-day. When a war, internecine or foreign, was toward, the king called on his barons, and they in their turn on the lesser authorities below them, to furnish from out of their serfs or tenantry the requisite number of "men-at-arms." And thus an army was gathered together. But it was less easy to do this for foreign service. Men would have come forward readily enough to fight within a few days' or even weeks' march of their own homes ;

but when it came to embarking on board ship to leave for foreign parts, desertions were numerous among the militia. Moreover, the period during which feudal service could be claimed was limited, so that the English kings who carried on war in France were obliged by degrees to pay the soldiers whom they engaged to accom-

First Standing Army in England

pany them. Edward III. landed an army near Calais in 1346 which consisted of about 25,000 English, 4,450 Welsh, and 1,100 Irish. Their daily pay ranged from \$1.60 for the officers of highest rank to six cents for the English soldiers. The Welsh, being less skilled in archery, received only four cents a day. This was the force which won the battle of Crécy.

But, except for companies of archers, halberdiers, and showy men-at-arms, who formed part of the sovereign's household and were a guard about the palace, there was no standing army in England until the time of Cromwell's protectorship. Then there was a public force of 80,000 men.

When Charles II. came to the throne this had become in the main the army under Monk which practically suppressed the Rump Parliament and gave the throne to Charles. Nevertheless, the king made haste to disband it, only retaining out of all this force the Coldstream regiment, which became the Coldstream Guards, the oldest regiment in the British Army. He also received back to English service the Scottish soldiers who had migrated abroad after the downfall of Charles I.

After Charles II.'s marriage, however, it became necessary to raise a limited body of troops for the occupation and garrisoning of Bombay and Tangier. Men were recruited, therefore, from the wilder and more reckless remainder of Cromwell's army to form the Bombay Fusiliers—afterwards known as the 103rd Regiment—the first regular troops of the Crown maintained in India, and the two Tangier regi-

The Army of Charles II.

ments—one of cavalry (the 1st Royal Dragoons of to-day) and the other infantry (Queen Catherine's Regiment, afterwards the Queen's or the Royal West Surrey). When Tangier was restored to the Moors these regiments were brought to England, and formed part of the regular standing army, which at the end of Charles II.'s reign amounted to a total of 16,500 men. James II. raised this figure to 20,000. Much of this army went over

HISTORY OF THE WORLD

to William III. after his landing, but for a long time he preferred to surround his person with Danish or Dutch soldiers, whose fidelity he could trust, and Ireland was conquered by him in 1689 by an army composed of Dutch, Danish, and English regiments, besides contingents from the Ulster Irish. Twenty British regiments

How the Army has Grown

accompanied Marlborough to Flanders on the outset of his marvellous campaigns, campaigns which won colonies and the outlines of empires as their ultimate results. In 1689 William succeeded in getting the Mutiny Act passed, which, renewed every year, makes the maintenance of a standing army legal, and subjects it, through its finance, to the constitutional control of the House of Commons.

Under Anne increasing bodies of regular soldiers were sent out to defend the American colonies and West Indies. By 1713 the British Colonial Army in America amounted to 11,000 men. The Home Army at this period was about 70,000 of all arms. After the Peace of Utrecht this force was disbanded, all but about 8,000, to which George I. added some regiments of German Guards.

In 1759 the 39th Regiment was raised and sent out to India to assist Clive and the forces of the East India Company. In 1793 the Home Army on a peace footing was only 17,013 men. In 1803, on a war footing, it had risen to 120,000 regulars,

78,000 militia, and 347,000 volunteers. In 1822 the standing army, home and foreign service, was only 72,000 in strength. By 1866 this total had risen to 203,500. At the present day the regular army of the United Kingdom consists of about 252,400 officers and men, of whom some 20,000 are non-combatants. Of this total about 126,000 are stationed in India (which has 80,000), and in the crown colonies, protectorates, and in South Africa.

Since the Crimean War, where European soldiery has been necessary to the situation the troops have been recruited mainly in England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland, Man and Channel Islands, Malta, Canada, Australia, and South Africa. Slowly, unwillingly, the truth is being realised that before long the United Kingdom and all its white daughter-nations must submit to the yoke of universal, compulsory military service if they are to hold together the empire won mainly with mercenaries.

The Prospect of Conscription

As a nation the English have always disliked extremely the idea of state Socialism. Individualism has in all things been the guiding principle. So they have rebelled at all effective arrangements of militia, volunteers, and citizen armies. But by one expedient after another, cautious statesmen are bringing the country nearer and nearer to the option of conscription or abdication as a ruling power beyond the limits of the United Kingdom.



A DETACHMENT OF CANADIAN NORTH-WEST MOUNTED POLICE

OUTPOSTS of EMPIRE

Being a series of photographs taken in widely distant parts of the British Empire, selected for the purpose of illustrating the diversity of the countries and climes over which the British flag is flying.



ST. JOHN'S, THE CAPITAL OF NEWFOUNDLAND



GENERAL VIEW OF VICTORIA, BRITISH COLUMBIA



GENERAL VIEW OF ST. HELENA, SHOWING LADDER HILL ON THE RIGHT



VIEW OF PORT LOUIS, IN THE ISLAND OF MAURITIUS



IN THE SEYCHELLES: SCENE IN THE ISLAND OF MAHÉ

BRITISH ISLANDS IN THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS



TOWN AND PORT OF ST. GEORGE'S. IN THE BERMUDAS



PUBLIC BUILDINGS AT BRIDGETOWN, IN BARBADOS

SCENES IN BRITISH ISLANDS OF THE WEST ATLANTIC



CHRISTMAS ISLAND, SHOWING THREE OF THE TEN EUROPEAN RESIDENTS



CAPE BATHURST IN THE PARRY ISLANDS OF THE ARCTIC OCEAN



WHANGAWA BAY IN THE CHATHAM ISLANDS

BRITISH TERRITORY IN THE FAR NORTH AND SOUTH



GENERAL VIEW OF HONG KONG AS SEEN FROM BOWEN ROAD



BHOTI ENCAMPMENT IN THE FARTHEST NORTH-WEST OF INDIA

SEA-COAST AND MOUNTAIN OUTPOSTS OF THE FAR EAST



ASCENSION ISLAND, WHICH IS "RATED" AS A BRITISH MAN-OF-WAR



TRISTAN D'ACUNHA: "EDINBURGH," THE ONLY SETTLEMENT ON THE ISLAND



PITCAIRN ISLAND. INHABITED BY DESCENDANTS OF MUTINEERS OF THE BOUNTY

LONELY ISLANDS OF THE OCEAN WHERE THE BRITISH FLAG FLIES



BAFFIN'S BAY, SHOWING NORTHERNMOST INHABITED HOUSE IN AMERICA



ALBERT HARBOUR, ALBERT LAND, IN THE ARCTIC REGIONS

POINTS OF BRITISH TERRITORY IN THE FROZEN NORTH



A TRADING STATION IN THE WESTERN SOLOMON ISLANDS



BUYING COPRA AT MARAN IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS

BRITISH TRADING CENTRES IN THE SOUTH SEAS



COMPOSITION OF THE EMPIRE

THE VARIED PEOPLES UNDER THE BRITISH FLAG THEIR CUSTOMS, LANGUAGES AND RELIGIONS

THE British Empire should be divided into two distinct sections—that which is governed from London, and that which governs itself. The first is the special appanage of Great Britain and Ireland, and the second is rapidly differentiating into a series of independent states—daughter nations—managing their own affairs, political, fiscal, commercial, with little or no concern for the requirements and interests of the metropolitan kingdom.

They are bound to it in some vaguely filial way; bound to it mostly at present by finance, by a remarkable community of race-feeling—except possibly in those rare sections where the nationality of origin and mother tongue were different—by the use of the same language, the same irrational weights and measures, the same literature and art, the same religious beliefs and prejudices, and by the acceptance of

**Britain's
Vast Inner
Empire**

the same sovereign head. The countries of the first section, outside Great Britain, Ireland, Man, the Channel Islands, and the small Mediterranean possessions, are inhabited in the main by yellow, brown, or black men, essentially non-European in race, religion, civilisation, and languages; those of the second section are "white men's lands," where the preponderating mass of the population is in origin of the white European stock, mainly Anglo-Keltic, and where the climate and conditions are of a nature to permit of the white man raising a vigorous progeny, which shall become the real indigenes of the land.

The first section—the Inner Empire—includes, outside Great Britain, Ireland, Man, and the Channel Islands, Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus; the control of Egypt, and the protectorate over the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan; the Crown colony of the Gambia, the Crown colony and protectorate of Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast Colony, Lagos, and Southern Nigeria, the vast

territories of Northern Nigeria; the South Atlantic islands of Ascension, St. Helena, and Tristan d'Acunha; British Central Africa, including Nyassaland; the island of Mauritius and its dependencies, the Seychelles Archipelago; the protectorates

**Territories
Under the
British Flag**

of Zanzibar, British East Africa, Uganda, and Somaliland; the vast Empire of India, stretching from Aden and Perim at the southern entrance of the Red Sea and the large island of Socotra, off the Gulf of Aden, right across Southern Arabia to the Persian Gulf and Eastern Persia to Baluchistan, and thence through India proper to the frontiers of Siam and French Indo-China; the island of Ceylon and the Maldivé Archipelago; the Malay Peninsula from Burma to Singapore (the Nicobar and Andaman Islands belong to India) and the northern third of Borneo; the island and peninsulas of Hong Kong, the leasehold of Wei-hai-wei, in Northern China; the Solomon Islands, the Fiji Archipelago, the Tonga group, and numerous other islands and islets in the Pacific. In the New World, Jamaica, the Bermudas, Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos islands; British Honduras, the Leeward and Windward Islands, Barbados, Tobago, Trinidad, and the large colony of British Guiana; and the Falkland Islands.

The second section, or Outer Empire, comprises, or will comprise before long, Newfoundland and the vast dominion of Canada; the commonwealth of Australia, the dominion of New Zealand; and British South Africa up to the Zambesi. The last, however, must, on the whole, be

**Possessions
in the
Outer Empire**

treated still as belonging to the first section. The Falkland Islands possess most of the conditions requisite to enable them to enter the category of the second section in course of time. There is no native race whose interests require to be safeguarded

by the Mother Country; the colony is now self-supporting. It is only a question of waiting till the population of this windswept but healthy dependency—as large as Wales, if its area includes the uninhabited South Georgia—reaches a sufficiently large number for it to be granted as complete powers of self-government as Newfoundland. Considerable powers of self-government are already in the possession of British Guiana, Barbados, Bermudas, and Jamaica. The future of Guiana may, if the European population increases considerably, lie rather in the same direction as that of the dependencies of the second section—greater independence of its government from the strict control of the metropolis.

On the other hand, although it is certain and inevitable that British South Africa from the Cape up to the Zambesi will some day be a completely self-governing confederation of states, eventually including German South-west Africa and Portuguese South-east Africa—as independent of direct control from Great Britain as is Canada—that consummation cannot be completely effected till the position, claims, and rights of the aboriginal peoples have been settled to the satisfaction of Great Britain, their present protectress and guardian. Consequently, in some aspects, at the present day British South Africa does not altogether come within the second category of enfranchised daughter nations. She is not as yet entirely mistress of her own destinies.

It is very important that we should realise the distinction between these two categories. England is no longer directly responsible for what goes on in Canada and Newfoundland, in Australia and New Zealand, in Cape Colony, Natal, the Orange River State, and the Transvaal. On the other hand, the citizens of Great Britain and Ireland—ridiculously enough, allow no Imperial representation to Man and the Channel Islands—support alone the financial burden and the defence of the Inner Empire in the Mediterranean, Tropical Africa, Arabia, India, Malaya, Hong Kong, the Pacific archipelagoes, and Tropical and South America. They lay down the law, more or less, as to the fiscal and commercial policy in those regions, the relations between the different human races, legislation affecting

marriage and property, the maintenance or otherwise of a State Church. In fact, they are the complete masters of the destinies, down to the smallest detail, of the peoples dwelling within this first category of Imperial possessions. Their inhabitants have no independent diplomatic national representation in London similar to the agents-general of the daughter nations; the Crown colonies and protectorates are represented in the metropolis by the Crown Agents, a branch of the Colonial Office; the 300,000,000 of India and its dependencies are represented by the India Office; Egypt, the Egyptian Sudan, and Zanzibar by the Foreign Office. All treaties with foreign Powers affecting the fiscal or commercial interests of these lands of the first category must be negotiated through London.

The United Kingdom acts practically as paymaster, as ultimate treasurer, to all the Inner Empire, except perhaps to India. Even the Budget of India must in a sense be submitted to the inspection and criticism of the India Office, because the United Kingdom is, in the eyes of the world, responsible for the wisdom or unwisdom of Indian finance. India is governed by the Viceroy-in-Council, but that viceroy can at any moment be removed by the king on the advice of his responsible Ministers of the British Cabinet. The wishes and opinions of the British Government, to the veriest detail, are conveyed to the viceroy through the Secretary of State for India, who is aided by an advisory council. It is on this council that India might well be represented, not only by retired Anglo-Indian officials, the value of whose opinion is deservedly recognised, but by natives of India, representatives, more or less diplomatic, of Bengal, Burma, Haidarabad, Mysore, Rajputana, of the Parsees, the Sikhs, and the Punjab Mohammedans—a consultative body, at any rate, if not of the innermost council at present.

At the time of writing the Treasury of the United Kingdom, that is, the British taxpayer, finds annually about £800,000 in grants-in-aid to such Crown colonies and protectorates as cannot make both ends meet in balancing their revenue and expenditure. Besides this, occasional special grants out of British funds are made to such West Indian or African possessions as are temporarily overwhelmed

The Future of South Africa

India Under British Government

Empire's Financial Burden

COMPOSITION OF THE EMPIRE

by unlooked-for disasters—earthquakes, famines, fires, floods or droughts. Private British benevolence, directly instigated by royal or municipal authority, transmits from time to time to India almost as much money as, spread over the years, is paid by the Indian taxpayer to the British Indian Civil Service. Moreover, all these Imperial possessions within the first category can borrow money for their public purposes far more cheaply in the world's financial markets because of their connection with the United Kingdom, which not only controls such incurring of indebtedness, but stands as the eventual guarantor of the borrower.

Lastly, for both categories of empire the British people of the United Kingdom keep up a magnificent fleet and a standing army for foreign service, and a Diplomatic and Consular Corps. It is true that Australia, New Zealand, Cape Colony and Natal contribute small subsidies to the cost of the navy, but at present these subsidies are so small that they make no appreciable difference to the annual financial burden. No country outside Great

The Upkeep of the British Army

Britain and Ireland, except the Indian Empire, makes any contribution towards the cost of the army or of the Diplomatic and Consular Service. The Indian Empire pays for the 80,000 British soldiers serving in India, for the Indian Council sitting in London, and for a proportion of the cost of diplomatic and consular representation in Turkey, Persia, Siam, etc.

In the states of the first category no commissioned appointment of any importance is made except from London, and by the sovereign acting through the officers of the British Government. In the states of the second category all appointments to the public services are made by the sovereign through his local representative, as advised by the local responsible government. Therefore, although the Colonial Office and Crown Agents, the Foreign Office, India Office, War Office, Admiralty, Board of Trade, Trinity House, Office of Works, and other government departments may possess the power of filling all posts of any authority or emolument held by Europeans in India, Tropical Africa and America, Malaya, China, Ceylon, and the Mediterranean, they possess of right no such patronage over Australia, New Zealand, Canada, or South

Africa. As a matter of actual fact, even in these great self-governing states the Mother Country is often invited to select the persons to be appointed to most of the higher posts in the civil service, armed forces and marine. An unwritten rule directs that in the postal service the higher officials shall be selected by St.

The Making of Colonial Appointments

Martin's-le-Grand; that great medical appointments shall be filled up on the advice of the Royal Society, the Crown Agents, the Royal College of Surgeons or Physicians, or the Army Medical Department; that the curators of museums, or of zoological or botanical gardens shall be recommended by the British Museum or Kew; judges and lawyers be selected from the British Bar; bishops and chaplains from the Anglican Church; customs controllers from the British Customs Service; commandants of police from the British Army, and port officers from the British Navy.

In this way, and in spite of local patriotism and that natural local clannishness which, unchecked, leads to the evolution of separate nationality, the veins of the empire—its principal arteries, at any rate—are kept flowing with British blood. Perhaps, however, it would be a happier simile to say that as yet a British brain directs the trunk and members of the British Empire.

The total land area under the ægis of the British Empire—including the Siamese portion of the Malay Peninsula, the British sphere in Persia and in South Arabia, also Egypt and the Egyptian Sudan—is approximately 13,138,900 square miles; without these last additions the area is 11,437,486 square miles. Of this sum about 3,140,900 square miles belong to the Inner Empire, and 9,998,000 to the outer or mainly self-governing division; 6,058,669 square miles lie within the temperate or Arctic regions, and 7,080,231 within the tropics.

Britain's Uninhabitable Territory

About 1,700,000 square miles of land in British North America are subject to such arctic conditions as at present these regions are either uninhabited, or merely maintain a few thousand Eskimo. About 150,000 square miles of British Arabia, 100,000 square miles of British India, 200,000 square miles of British South Africa, 600,000 square miles of Egypt and the Sudan, and one-third of the area of Australia—say 1,000,000 square miles—are

at present uninhabitable by reason of the lack of rainfall and consequent sterility. These, however, are adverse conditions which the energy and works of man can abate, and even eventually cause to disappear. It is far more difficult, however, to grapple with the remains of the last Glacial Period—still holding North America and

British Areas and Populations

Northern Asia in its clutches—than to draw up the rain water of the Miocene and Pliocene, stored for ages under the surface formations of Australia, and therewith create a verdure which of itself attracts and precipitates the fickle rain. Roundly speaking, when all deductions for present uninhabitability are made, we are left with 9,400,000 square miles of land under the British flag, which at present supports a population of about 405,000,000.

The proportion of population to area varies greatly. That of the United Kingdom (area, 121,390 square miles; population, 44,100,000) is 342.5 to the square mile; that of Malta and Gozo (area, 117 square miles; population, 206,690) is 1,766.8 to the square mile; of India, from Baluchistan to Siam (area, 1,766,517 square miles; population, about 297,000,000) is 179.5 to the square mile; of Australia (area, 3,065,120 square miles; population, 4,479,840) is only 1.3 to the square mile; of the Canadian Dominion and Newfoundland (area, 3,908,300 square miles; population, 6,216,340) is 1.6 to the square mile; of Trans-Zambesian South Africa (area, 1,091,770 square miles; population, 7,015,200) is 6.4 to the square mile; British Central Africa (Nyassaland and North-east Rhodesia: area, 150,000 square miles; population, 1,274,000) is 6.4 to the square mile.

In the West Indies it is 131 to the square mile; in Ceylon, 141; in British Malaya (less the Siamese Malay States and Borneo), 55; in Hong Kong, 1,121; Northern Nigeria, 62; Southern Nigeria, 101;

Mixed Races Under British Rule

Mauritius and Dependencies, 453; Zanzibar, 245; Gold Coast, 12; and New Zealand, nearly 9 (area, 104,750 square miles; population in 1906, 936,309). Of the total 405,000,000, 62,350,000 belong to the white or Caucasian race (say, 56,464,000 Germano-Kelt, and 5,886,000 Mediterranean, Greek, Arab, Jew, Persian, Eurasian and Quadroon peoples); 282,000,000 to the dark Dravidio-Caucasic stock; about 14,500,000 to the Mongol type;

while there are approximately 1,213,000 Malays (including the Siamese Malay States); 4,000 Veddahs; 3,500 Negritos (Malay Peninsula and Andaman Islands); 66,000 Black Australians; 550,000 Papuans and Melanesians; 100,000 Polynesians; 120,000 American Indians; and 15,000 Eskimo. In British America there are 1,901,000 Negroes and Negroids, and in Africa some 37,500,000. Of the African Negroes who are British subjects or under British control or supervision, about 29,000,000 are pure negro (Guinea, Sudanese, Nilotes, and Bantu); 8,500,000 are Negroid (Arab hybrids, Hamites, Somali, Gala, Fulbe, Mandingo, Hima, Creole half-castes); and 30,000 are Hottentot-Bushmen.

Under the British flag—somewhat imperfectly protected thereby in some cases—are the lowliest in development of all existing human races, and consequently the most interesting to students of anthropology—Veddahs in Ceylon, Australo-Papuans, Andaman and Malayan Negritos, South African Bushmen, and Equatorial Pygmies. The same flag covers what some believe to be the handsomest people in the world to-day—English and Irish—who seem to have acquired by some mysterious process of transmission or of independent development the physical beauty of the old Greeks, possibly because they, like the extinct Greek type, are more purely Aryan in descent than the South and Central or extreme Northern Europeans of to-day. This physical beauty is equally shared by the men and women of Canada and New Zealand, if the ideal sought for is to be white of skin.

Types of Beauty in the Dominions

If, on the other hand, a dark skin is not held to diminish beauty of bodily form, then unquestionably in no part of the British dominions are there more handsome men, from the sculptor's point of view, than among certain types of Nilotic negro or Negroid, Bantu, or Fulbe. But amongst almost every group of negro peoples the women are still in an ugly stage of physical development. On the other hand, in North-western India may be seen some of the handsomest human beings in the world, women as well as men, if the monotony of the yellow-brown skin and the sleek black hair can be accepted in lieu of the blue-grey iris, the golden-brown hair, and ivory-white, pink-tinted skin of the better-looking types of England, Ireland and Scotland.

COMPOSITION OF THE EMPIRE

As regards the range of intellectual development, the British Empire can offer the same extremes as in bodily beauty or ugliness. There are Pygmies, Nègritoes, or Bushmen, who barely know how to originate fire and who are still living in the age of stone implements, or the still earlier phase of the bamboo splinter, the natural club or twisted branch, the undressed stone or pebble, the fire-sharpened stake, the palm or fern-rind bow-string. There are negro peoples on the British verge of the Congo forest, or in the southern basin of the Benue, whose ideas of preparing food by cooking are mainly limited to partial putrefaction.

Cannibalism still prevails in parts of British Africa, Australasia, British Guiana; but the eating of human flesh, though repulsive to our modern ideas and extinct in England since, let us say, 500 B.C., and in Ireland since 100 A.D., is not necessarily a sign of low mental development. Nevertheless, Great Britain is the political guardian of at least a million professing cannibals at the present day. She is also the tutrix of another million Africans, per-

Britain the Guardian of Cannibals

haps a few Nègritoes, Australasians, and Guiana Amerindians, who are absolutely naked, knowing no more shame in lack of body-covering than the beasts of the field. Another 20,000,000 or so, in Africa, America, Malaya, Australia and Oceania, take little interest in clothes as a source of æsthetic delight, but adorn and vary the monotony of an exposed skin by the arts of cicatrisation, tattooing, plastering, rouging and dyeing. Some push the predilection for ear-rings to such an extent that the ear-lobes hang down in great loops of leather to the shoulders. Others ring the septum of the nose or insert large discs of wood or shell or ivory into the upper or lower lip. Quite 20,000,000 also think it more comely and convenient to knock out the upper or lower incisor teeth or to file the teeth to a sharp point. Nearly a hundred million stain their teeth orange-brown with betel nut. About ten million women and men in Scotland and England prefer to lose their front teeth or have them permanently blackened with premature decay sooner than appeal to the resources of modern dentistry.

A million women in the Eastern and Equatorial regions of British Africa think it womanly and becoming to live bald-pated, their heads continually shaved,

while their husbands go burdened with chignons or natural perruques. Perhaps 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 men, Africans and Eastern Asiatics, affect the closely shaven skull, in close proximity, it may be, to other millions of males sworn never to clip their abundant locks, or obliged by custom to wear the yard-long hair in inconvenient, unsightly pigtails.

Customs of Different Peoples

With these or other millions the beard is obligatory and sacred; with others it is scrupulously shaved or pulled out with tweezers. Some, like the old and dying generation of France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, grow long finger-nails (Gibraltarese, Maltese, Malays and Chinese), to show, like the unconscious snobs they are, that they have never done manual labour.

Others wear their nails down to the quick. Two hundred millions at least of British Indians, British Africans and British Arabs keep their nails and hands and feet exquisitely manicured and pedicured, nails clipped and clean, toes cornless; others, like a proportion of the middle and lower classes of the metropolitan state, say 20,000,000 of English, Irish, Scottish, live all their lives long with dirty nails, filthy and deformed feet, and hands not fit to be grasped by a squeamish person.

Ninety-two millions of British subjects, or wards of the empire, practise circumcision as a religious or a mystic rite; about 1,000,000 of British Africans and some 50,000 black Australians pass beyond this harmless custom to elaborate mutilations described in works of technical anthropology.

About 10,000,000 out of the 44,000,000 population of men, women, and children in the British Isles are scrupulously clean as to their persons; about 250,000,000 are the same in India; personal cleanliness is the prevailing characteristic of the negro, of some Arabs, and of the Malays and Polynesians. It is fortunately a strong point with the Neo-British in

Foods of British Subjects

Canada above all, in Australia, New Zealand, and some parts of South Africa. As regards food, 223,000,000 of Hindus, Burmese, Shans, Singhalese, and Tamils, are mainly vegetarian and subsist on sorghum, millet, and wheat flour, rice, butter, sugar, pulse of many kinds, pumpkins, melons and European vegetables, the egg plant, cucumbers, onions, coco-nuts, dates, mangoes, and other tropical fruits. A million and a half of British Chinese live



AN AFRICAN ZULU GIRL



AN ENGLISH BEAUTY



A FRENCH-CANADIAN GENTLEMAN



A CENTRAL AFRICAN DANDY

Photos Valentine, Martin, and E. N. A.

RACIAL CONTRASTS UNDER THE BRITISH FLAG



A VEDDAH WOMAN OF CEYLON



AN EGYPTIAN BEAUTY



A NUBIAN NEGRESS



SUDANESE OF UPPER NILE



WOMAN OF EASTERN SUDAN

DUSKY BEAUTY AND UGLINESS UNDER THE BRITISH FLAG

Photo of Veddah by Drs. Fritz and Sarasin

more or less omnivorously, but probably make rice the staple of their diet. The Mohammedan natives of India, the pagan and Malay natives of Eastern Asia, avoid pork if they are strict Mohammedans, but otherwise are fond of all kinds of meat and fish. The Sikhs of North-west India delight in eating pork, mutton, and

Where the Ox is Sacred goat, but share with the Hindu the horror of touching the sacred ox. The British, Neo-British, Malays (substituting buffalo for ox), Masai, and other tribes of Equatorial East Africa, and to a certain extent the South African negroes also, are very fond of beef. Throughout the Mohammedan Mediterranean, African and Arabian regions subject to Britain, the sheep is the most common meat provider; and, of course, mutton is almost the staple of the Falkland Islands, England, Scotland, Wales, New Zealand, Australia, and parts of white South Africa. Goat's flesh is much eaten at Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, and throughout tropical Africa. Camel's flesh is a favourite meat in Somaliland, British Arabia, and Baluchistan.

Pork is not only eaten rapturously by the refined and lordly Sikh, but by many low-caste or pagan tribes in India. It is said even to be indulged in by the Sennaar Arabs, who have in the Eastern Sudan an indigenous type of wild boar. Wild and domesticated pigs are also eaten in the non-Mohammedan parts of North-central and West Africa. The pig, as we know, is almost the national animal of Ireland; it is a good deal favoured by the Maltese. Jambon d'York was at one time a compliment paid by the French cuisine to the pigs of the English Midlands. And, again, in the Malay Archipelago, Papua, and all the Oceanic Pacific islands, pork is the people's favourite meat. Here, also, they eat dried shark, and the hundred and one edible sea-fish of the coral-reefs and blue lagoons. Dogs

Peoples Who Feed on Dogs are eaten in Hong Kong and Wei-hai-wei, in some of the Pacific islands, and in Equatorial Africa. The Eskimo subjects of the British Empire live on walrus and seal meat, and whale blubber; those of Tristan d'Acunha on—amongst other things—the eggs of penguins and petrels.

The Indians of British Guiana will eat jaguar, if they can succeed in killing the American leopard, besides all the other wild animals of the woods. Ter-

mites (white ants), locusts, beetle-grubs, and the caterpillars of certain moths are greedily devoured by millions of negroes in British Africa from the Zambesi to Lake Tanganyika, and the Blue Nile to the Gambia.

Fish, potatoes, pork, geese, tea, milk and whisky are the principal ingredients of Irish diet; fish, mutton, milk, whisky and oat-meal the staples of the Scottish peasantry; milk, pancakes of wheaten flour, pork, potatoes, cheese, cream, whisky and cider nourish the sturdy Welsh countryfolk; bread, cheese, beer, tea, cider, beef, bacon and fish form the average sustenance of the English peasantry, a wholesome diet varied in the towns with an endless variety of tinned stuff. The Maltese live chiefly on fish, pork, goat's flesh, stirabout made of wheat or maize flour, olives and olive oil, fruit, onions, cheese and wine. The diet of the Cypriote consists of much the same as the foods of the Maltese, less pork.

The Egyptian fellahin use bread or porridge made from the flour or groats of sorghum, wheat, maize and millet as the groundwork of their daily food. They also

Varieties of Rice Foods eat mutton, goat's flesh, pigeons, butter from buffalo and cow milk, dates, rice, vegetables of many kinds, and coarse sweet-meats made of honey or molasses, flour and olive oil. The grains and vegetables cultivated are wheat, rice, maize, sorghum and millet; pulse of several kinds, cucumbers, gourds, melons and onions. Their principal drink besides water is coffee, and for the Christians or the lax Mohammedans, arrack, a spirit made from rice, and the less heady "palm wine," the sap of the date palm.

Rice, of 250 varieties, is the staple of all coastwise India, Burma and the Malay States, also of British China. But wheat is largely grown over all North-west India; also barley (upper valley of the Ganges), sorghum or great millet everywhere below the mountains, spiked millet (pennisetum), "ragi" (eleusine), in Southern India, and paspalum and two kinds of genuine or Italian millet—panicum. There are also many oil-seeds used for food—sesamum, rape and linseed, and ten or eleven kinds of peas and beans (cicer, phaseolus, dolichos, cajanus, ervum, lathyrus and pisum). Many of these Indian grains and pulses are of ancient introduction into tropical Africa, where, with maize, they form the staple of the peoples' vegetable

COMPOSITION OF THE EMPIRE

food. No indigenous African grain or bean is cultivated; almost the only vegetables in native dietary indigenous to that continent are the "yam" (dioscorea, also found in India), and the coco yam (colocasia), and a number of plants with edible leaves like spinach. Manioc, so much eaten in negro Africa, is the same as tapioca, and has been introduced from Brazil. Manioc is also much grown in British Malaya, and this region, with Borneo, is the home of the sago palm. The colocasia yam, really the tuber of an arum, under the name of taro, is the principal vegetable food of New Guinea and the British Pacific islands.

The citizens or the wards of the empire profess almost every known form of religious faith. There are, first of all, about 63,252,000 ostensible Christians—namely, 44,000,000 in the United Kingdom; 403,000 in Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus; 732,000 in Egypt and Sinai; 3,000,000 in the Indian Empire; 17,000 in China; 5,000 in Borneo; 40,000 in the Pacific islands; 920,000 in New Zealand; 4,400,000 in Australia; 1,200,000 in

Religious Faiths in the Empire

British South Africa, St. Helena, and Nyassaland; 300,000 in Uganda, East Africa, Zanzibar, Seychelles and Mauritius; 175,000 in Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, and Southern Nigeria; 6,100,000 in British North America, and about 2,000,000 in the British West Indies, Honduras, Guiana, and the Falkland Islands. Of these Christians, to quote approximate round figures only, about 11,147,616 belong to the Roman Catholic Church; 10,880,000 to the Anglican; 13,000,000 to the Free Churches—Presbyterian, 6,200,000; Baptist, 1,500,000; Methodist - Wesleyan, Congregational, Society of Friends, etc., 3,500,000—255,000 to the Orthodox Greek Church; 580,500 to the Nestorian; and 610,000 to the Coptic Church; leaving about 26,000,000 of men, women, and children undefined as to their actual sect in the Christian Church.

The British flag shelters about 290,000 Jews, of whom 196,000 dwell in the United Kingdom, 26,000 in Egypt, and 23,100 in South Africa. There are 88,000,000 Mohammedans in the British Empire and its feudatory states, mostly belonging to the Sunni division, but also including the Khojas of India, who follow the Aga Khan, a hierarchical descendant of the

Old Man of the Mountain, whose adherents were the original "Assassins." The Buddhists, including the enlightened Jains of India, under the British flag number about 14,000,000. They are found chiefly in Ceylon, Bengal, Sikkim, Burma, Bhutan borders, the Northern Malay Peninsula, and Hong Kong. About

210,200,000 natives of India, Ceylon, and Indian colonies in Africa and tropical America follow the religion of Brahma (Siva, Vishnu) in varying forms and sects. The Parsees of India, some 100,000, are still fire worshippers. A large proportion of the Polynesians and Melanesians on British Pacific islands, of Indians in the dominion of Canada, and the Caribs in British Honduras and the Windward Islands, are Christians.

Those that are not still follow vague fetishistic faiths, usually including a belief in a Supreme God of the Sky, in ancestors living again as spirits, in demigods and demons personifying natural forces and diseases, and in magic, magic being understood to be undefinable, empiric energy acting often through material means or resident in a natural object, or in one which has been shaped by man's hands. These so-called pagans really practise vague, unsuccessful religions closely akin in all their manifestations to the great stereotyped faiths of the more cultured races.

The languages of the British Empire are indeed multiform. Scarcely any great acknowledged family of human speech is unrepresented within the limits of its ægis, except the Basque, the Japanese, and the languages peculiar to the Caucasus Mountains.

Of the Aryan languages 56,810,000 in the United Kingdom, Canada, the West Indies, and British Central and South America, Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific islands, India, Mauritius, and British Africa, speak English. The living

Keltic tongues, Irish, Manx, Gaelic, and Welsh, are still used by about 1,811,000 people

and Man, 1,955,000 use the French language in the Channel Islands, the Quebec, Ontario, and Manitoba provinces of Canada, in Trinidad, Mauritius, and the Seychelles, besides the large extent to which French is used in Malta and Egypt. Spanish is spoken at Gibraltar and in Trinidad. Portuguese in a rather dialectal form is much spoken by

Eurasians in parts of India and on the coast of Ceylon, also in British Guiana. Italian is a good deal employed in Malta and in Egypt; Greek in Cyprus, Egypt, and the Egyptian Sudan. As regards the Indo-Aryan languages, Persian, with Arabic, is the language of the British sphere in South-east Persia, besides being the literary language of much of North-west India; about 1,000,000 speak Baluchi, and 1,300,000 the Afghan or Pushtu dialect; Sindhi is the speech of over 3,000,000 in the Sind province. The languages or dialects descended from Sanskrit, which have become the vernaculars of two-thirds of India proper are Hindi (87,240,000 people), Bengali (45,000,000), Marathi (19,000,000), Punjabi or Gurmukhi (17,000,000), Gujarati (10,500,000), Uriya (10,000,000), and Pahari or Nepalese (1,300,000), besides Kachhi (of "Cutch"), Kashmiri, Konkani (Malabar), and Singhalese, this last being spoken by nearly 2,500,000 in Ceylon.

The Uro-Altaic languages, which cover the north-eastern parts of Asia from the Baltic shores and Lapland to Bering Straits and China, and which include the outlying sub-groups of Turkish and Hungarian, are only represented in the British Empire by the much Arabised speech of the modern Turks, which is still to some extent spoken in Cyprus and—a very little—in Egypt.

The Dravidian and allied groups are wholly confined in their present range to British India, where they are spoken by about 65,000,000. The Tibeto-Burmese group of at least twenty languages furnishes the speech of something like 11,000,000 of people in Northern Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Garo (part of Assam), Tipura, Naga, Manipur, and Upper and Lower Burma. Northern and Eastern Burma (the Khamti and Shan states) and the upper part of the Malay Peninsula are covered by the Siamo-Chinese group, which in its great Eastern branch (Chinese) is spoken by some 2,000,000 of British subjects in the southern Malay Peninsula and Singapore, British Borneo, Hong Kong and Wei-hai-wei, to say nothing of the useful Chinese sojourners in British Columbia. The deltaic region round Rangoon and the isolated patch of Palung in Upper Burma are populated by people speaking dialects of the Mon language,

which is closely allied to the Annamese of French Indo-China. In the middle of Assam is the isolated Khasi language of uncertain affinities, spoken by about 100,000 hill people. Another isolated group is the Kolarian of Eastern and Central India, the language, in many dialects, of the Santalis, Mundaris, Savara, Kurku, etc. The Malay language is spoken by about 1,600,000 of British or British-protected peoples; the Malayo-Polynesian languages from New Guinea to New Zealand, by 100,000; the Melanesian languages by another 200,000, and Papuan by 350,000.

In the heart of the Malay Peninsula there may still be lingering isolated Negrito languages; there is certainly a Negrito speech in the Andaman Islands. A possibly Negrito dialect is still preserved by a small section, some 2,000 or 3,000, of the Veddahs of Ceylon (Rhodiyah). It would be interesting for the ethnologist to compare carefully the fragments of Negrito speech in Southernmost India, Ceylon, the Andamans, the Malay Peninsula, with the Papuan and Melanesian families, and further with what little is recorded of the

language of the extinct Tasmanians. The diverse, but perhaps distantly interrelated, languages, in two very distinct groups, of the black Australians are spoken by about 66,000 savages and semi-savages still lingering in Australia. In British Africa we have still represented by living speakers the wonderfully interesting Bushman-Hottentot language group, so extremely unlike any other human speech of the present day by its intercalation of noisy clicks among the normal consonants and vowels. There are still, perhaps, 5,000 (British) Bushmen, and 25,000 Hottentots alive to perpetuate this primitive phonology.

The Bantu languages of Africa are spoken by about 11,000,000 negroes in British, South, Central, and Eastern Equatorial Africa; besides a few "Semi-Bantu" of the eastern parts of British Nigeria. The languages of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Uganda, and East Africa comprise the Nilotic family, about 4,300,000, ranging from the western parts of the Bahr-el-Ghazal to Masailand, near the Indian Ocean; the unclassified Krej and Bongo groups, and heterogeneous Sudanian congeries (Niam-Niam, Mangbattu, Mundu, Madi, Lendu, Momvu, etc.). In the north-western parts of the Egyptian

India's Varied Vernaculars

The Bantu Languages of Africa

Chinese Subjects of Britain

COMPOSITION OF THE EMPIRE

Sudan is the isolated Nubian family of languages, and the Fôr and Maba of Darfur. In Northern Nigeria there are the distinct Kanuri speech of Bornu, the unclassified dialects of the lake-dwelling Buduma, the great Hausa language—spread as a trade medium from Lake Chad to the inner Gold Coast, or spoken as their native

Dominance of the Nupe Speech tongue by about 15,000,000 of northern Sudanian negroes, Musgu to the south-east of Hausa, and the semi-Bantu dialects, such as Ghari, of the Benue basin, north and south, down to its confluence with the Niger. The Nupe speech is the dominant language of Central Nigeria, and to the west are the Borgu dialects that are related to far-off Ashanti. In Southern Nigeria there are the languages of the Igara, Igbara, Ibo, Jekri, Ijo, and Yoruba; and the Efik group and the semi-Bantu languages of the Cross River basin. Dotted over much of British Nigeria is the Fulbe language, the range of which extends, with many gaps, for a distance of nearly 2,000 miles across Africa from the Senegal River to the borders of Wadai and Darfur.

The dialects of the Gold Coast belong in the main to four groups, the Chwi or Ashanti, the Ga (Akkra), the Mosi, and Teme. The languages of Sierra Leone are particularly interesting, and belong to the Mandingo family of Western Nigeria, and to the prefix and concord-using Temne and Bullom families. The languages of the Gambia are very little studied by a Britain which has possessed the Gambia for 200 years. They come under the Felup, Wolof, and Mandingo groups.

Speakers of Hamitic Dialects The Libyo-Hamitic language family of North and North-east Africa is represented by such wandering Libyans of the Sahara as find their way into the dominions of the sultan of Sokoto, and by the Libyan-speaking inhabitants of the Siwah and other oases on the western outskirts of Egypt; by the remains of Ancient Egyptian in the form of Coptic; by the dialects of the Beja and Bishari, the Danakil and

Somali in nearly all the coast lands of the Red Sea, and all the non-Arabic-speaking tribes between Kordofan and Abyssinia; by the closely allied Gala and the other non-Semitic Ethiopian dialects north and east of the Nilotic negro domain. Hamitic dialects are also spoken in Southern Arabia and in the island of Socotra. The Semitic languages are represented in the British domain by the Maltese language; such Hebrew as is preserved in use by Jews in the United Kingdom, Gibraltar, and Aden; and by the Arabic of Egypt, British Arabia, Zanzibar, and the Persian Gulf.

In British America the Eskimo language is spoken by the sparse inhabitants of the frozen shores of the Arctic Ocean between Alaska and Labrador. Of the American Indian language groups, not much more clearly interrelated than the African languages, the following are represented on British territory: The Thlinkit in the north-westernmost part of the coasts

Languages of British America and islands of British Columbia; the Haida of Vancouver Island and British Columbia; the Athabaskan, Tinne, or Dene of all the central and northern parts of the Canadian dominion between the Rocky Mountains and the eastern shores of Hudson's Bay; the Algonkwin, Chipewea, or Kri, "Montagnais," of Central and Eastern Canada (using Canada in its widest sense), also in Labrador, Northern Quebec, and once in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland; the Huron (Iroquois) of Ontario and southernmost Canada; and the Dakota, Puan, or Siu, found still in the southern parts of Saskatchewan and Manitoba. Then there are the Maya-Kiche group on the interior borders of British Honduras; the speech of the Caribs still lingering in a somewhat mixed type on the coast of British Honduras and in the West Indian island of Dominica and existing far more numerously in the maritime regions of British Guiana; and the Guiana group, divided into the sub-groups of Arawak, Wapiana, and Atorai.



SCENE IN BRANI, IN THE RECENTLY ACQUIRED BRITISH TERRITORY OF THE MALAY STATES




THE GUERNSEY STATES IN SESSION



HOUSE OF KEYS ISLE OF MAN: MEETING OF THE TYNWALD COURT

MINOR PARLIAMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN

THE
BRITISH
EMPIRE
X



BY SIR
HARRY
JOHNSTON,
G. C. M. G.

GREAT BRITAIN'S INNER EMPIRE

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE VAST POSSESSIONS OF THE BRITISH CROWN

It is not necessary to delineate here the elaborate system of partially representative government in national affairs, or wholly elective administration of local provincial matters which prevails in Great Britain and Ireland. It is sufficient to point out that the Upper House in the Legislature differs from all the similar institutions in the daughter nations and colonies in that it is composed of hereditary legislators. Elsewhere the members of the Upper House, or Senate, or Legislative Council, if they are not elected by the people, are appointed for a term of years or for life by the king-emperor, or by his representative, the viceroy, or governor.

Nowhere else in the empire does this principle of hereditary legislators obtain; nowhere else would it be tolerated but in the Homeland, so tolerant of institutions which have outlived their usefulness. The Isle of Man has a Council of Public Affairs, nominated by the Crown, and a House of Keys, which is a representative assembly of twenty-four elected members. The term of sitting for this House is seven years, and the suffrage is based on a property qualification.

The island of Jersey has a lieutenant-governor and a bailiff, who is a kind of president of the legislature appointed by the Crown. The legislature consists of twelve jurats and twelve rectors of parishes elected by the people for life, and twenty-eight constables, mayors, or deputies, elected for three years. Guernsey and Sark, and also Alderney, are under one lieutenant-governor, but have two separate legislatures, which consist of jurats, rectors, and sheriffs, elected indirectly, and delegates and deputies elected directly by the ratepayers. Within the far-flung net of the British Empire are a number of states practically independent as regards their home rule,

but subject to the British Government in London, directly or through the viceroy of India or the high commissioners of South Africa or of the Straits Settlements, as regards their foreign policy, and perhaps subordinated in some other directions. These are: The khedivate of Egypt (area, 400,000 square miles); the petty Arab sultanates to the north-east of Aden and along the south coast of Arabia (area, about 100,000 square miles); the sultanate of Muskat and the trucial chiefs in South-east Arabia and along the Persian Gulf (area, 110,000 square miles); the British sphere in South-east Persia (area, 122,500 square miles); Baluchistan (area, 78,530 square miles); Afghanistan (area, 250,000 square miles); the sultanate of Johor (area, 9,000 square miles). Perhaps to these should be added the sultanate of Darfur, in the western part of the Egyptian Sudan, with an area of about 50,000 square miles. Afghanistan, except in regard to its foreign policy, is an absolutely independent country, and none of its statistics are included in this survey of the British Empire.

The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan is divided into thirteen provinces, the governors of which are all British officers of the Egyptian Army; the sub-governors of districts are Egyptians. The six principal judges are British; the kadis, who deal with Mohammedan law in matters of succession, marriage, and charitable endowments, are Mohammedan Egyptians or Sudanese. The governor-general over the whole of this vast area, including supervision over Darfur, is jointly appointed by the British and Egyptian Governments. He legislates by proclamation. The sultan of Darfur is practically independent in the management of the internal affairs of his country, but he is required to pay an annual tribute to the Sudan Government. The

Independent States in the British Empire



DOUGLAS, THE BEAUTIFUL CAPITAL OF THE ISLE OF MAN

Frith

Anglo-Egyptian Sudan is entirely separate from the internationalised "capitulations" area of Egypt or other parts of the Turkish Empire; foreign consuls must be first approved by the British Government before they can receive an exequatur.

Egypt, until 1915, was under Turkish suzerainty. The present Sultan rules over a country of 400,000 square miles in area, of which only about 13,560 square miles are at present inhabited, in close and peculiar relations with Great Britain. Nominally, the Sultan rules through a Ministry composed of seven members, plus a British financial adviser. But since 1883 there have been the beginnings of representative institutions. These are a legislative council—which is a consultative body, partly elected, partly nominated, qualified to pronounce opinions on the Budget and on all new laws—and the General Assembly. This last consists of the seven Ministers, the thirty legislative councillors, and forty-six popularly elected members.

The General Assembly, however, has no power to legislate, but can in a measure control all new taxation of a directly personal character or connected with land. The territories of the Persian Gulf which are within the British sphere of influence or are

actual British possessions or protectorates are: The British sphere in South-east Persia, from Bandar Abbas to Gwattar, and inland to Kerman and Birian, governed by the Shah of Persia, with British consuls at Bandar Abbas, Kerman and Malik Siah (Seistan) to watch over British interests and subjects; and, in addition, the port of Basidu on Kishm Island and the port of Jask on the Mekran coast, under the direct management of the British Indian Government; the Bahrein Islands, on the southern side of the Persian Gulf, ruled by an Arab sheikh under the control of a British political agent.

There is also the quasi-independent imamate of Oman, under a sultan, or sayyid, whose dynasty began as a sort of prince-bishopric at Muskat in the middle of the eighteenth century. Great Britain and France are mutually bound to refrain from an exclusive political control or annexation of the sultanate of Muskat, but force of circumstances has compelled Great Britain, through the Government of India, to take the leading advisory part in the direction of the affairs of Oman. These are managed almost entirely under the advice of a British consul and political agent at Muskat. The Kuria Muria Islands, off the south coast of Oman, actually belong

**Britain's
Kuria Muria
Islands**

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INNER EMPIRE

to Great Britain, and their affairs are supervised from Aden. From Soham to Masirah Island, the government of Eastern Oman is carried on, more or less, by the sultan of Muskat, but the coast regions to the west as far as the Turkish frontier at Al Hasa constitute what is called Trucial Oman, a region in which the numerous petty Arab chiefs have been coerced by the British power in the Persian Gulf into an agreement not to molest each other or the sultan of Muskat. Law and order in a general way are maintained in all these regions of the Persian Gulf, and justice is administered to British subjects, by a British political resident residing at Bushire, on the south coast of Persia.

British Arabia, not connected with the geographical or political systems of the Persian Gulf, is managed by the political resident, the virtual governor and commander-in-chief, at Aden. This official depends at present on the Government of Bombay. He supervises the affairs of the Aden Protectorate and the island of Perim; those of the island of Socotra and its adjoining archipelagoes; the coast sultanates of Makalla, etc.; the Kuria Muria Islands, and the Oman coast as far east as the island of Masirah. Within

these regions of Southern Arabia there are numerous Arab sultans and sheikhs who govern their people with as little interference as possible on the part of the British, whose own direct rule does not extend over more than the island of Perim, the town and port of Aden and its hinterland, about 9,000 square miles, and the Kuria Muria Islands.

The empire of India, whose outlying spheres of influence in Persia and Arabia we have just been considering, is divided into the following types of government: There is, first of all, British India—*i.e.*, the districts actually annexed to the British Crown, with a total area of 1,097,901 square miles, and the following provinces: Bengal, Eastern Bengal and Assam, Burma, Madras, the Andamans and Nicobars, Bombay, Punjab, North-west Frontier Province, British Baluchistan, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Central Provinces, Berar and Coorg.

A number of small principalities within these provinces are ruled to a certain extent by their native rajahs, or by Mohammedan chiefs; but, for the most part, this vast area is administered directly by British officials in all the principal and responsible posts, and by native officials in all the subordinate positions.



THE PROCLAMATION OF LAWS ON THE TYNWALD HILL IN THE ISLE OF MAN

Then follow the feudatory states of the Indian Empire : Haidarabad (area, 82,698 square miles), ruled by the nizam ; Kashmir and Jamu (area, 80,900 square miles), ruled by a maharajah ; Baluchistan (area, 78,530 square miles), ruled by the khan of Khelat and a few small independent princes ; Jodhpur of Rajputana (area, 34,963 square miles), ruled by a maharajah ; Mysore (area, 29,433 square miles), ruler, a maharajah ; Gwalior (area, 25,041 square miles), the largest Mahratta state, under a maharajah (Sindhia) ; Bikanir, a Rajputana state (area, 23,311 square miles), under a maharajah ; Jaisalmir and Jaipur, both Rajput states (respectively, 16,062 and 15,579 square miles), the first ruled by a mahalawal, the second by a maharajah ; Bahawulpur, in the Punjab (area, 15,000 square miles), governed by a nawab.

In addition to the list of big feudatory states with areas of 15,000 square miles and over, there is the old Mahratta state of Baroda, governed by the maharajah gairwar, which has only an area of 8,226 square miles, but which ranks first on the list of feudatory states, and has a royal salute of twenty-one guns. There are eight minor states in Rajputana ; five in Central India (including the interesting little Mohammedan principality of

Bhopal, under a female sovereign, the begum), and Indore, a Mahratta state under the maharajah Holkar ; three in the Bombay Presidency, the largest of which is Cutch, whose ruler is known as the rao ; five in the Madras Presidency, of which might be specially mentioned Travaniore, the southernmost portion of India, whose maharajah rules over 3,000,000 people ; one in the Central Province, Bastar (area, 13,000 square miles) ; Kuch Behar, in Bengal ; Hill Tipura, on the borders of Burma ; Rampur and Garhwal, between Agra and Oudh ; four Sikh and three Rajput states in the Punjab ; and the interesting little Tibetan principality of Sikkim. In addition to this list, there are numerous small areas administered by minor princes, much on the lines of the smaller German duchies. The total area of feudatory India is 690,272 square miles.

For the administration of British India there is the Viceroy, who rules despotically as the Governor-General-in-Council, subject to the orders of the king-emperor, as transmitted through the Secretary of State for India. The expenditure of the Indian revenues in India and elsewhere—that is to say, the annual Budget of the



GENERAL VIEW OF ADEN, A STRONGLY FORTIFIED POSSESSION OF BRITAIN

N. P. Edwards



VOLCANIC SCENERY AT ELPHINSTONE INLET IN THE GULF OF OMAN

The scenery of Elphinstone Inlet, of which the above is a typical example, has been described as the grandest but the most desolate in the world. The heat is so terrible that the native can live in the place only from November till March; a cable station was once established on Telegraph Island, but it was soon abandoned as some of the men died, while others went mad and the remainder fled. The rocks in the foreground are entirely red, while the sea is a brilliant blue.

Viceroy's government—is controlled by the Secretary of State and the Council of the India Office, who thus, in a manner, act as a kind of selected parliament to discuss and determine by a majority of votes how the revenues of India shall be spent. It is on this board of financial control—the India Office Council—that it has been suggested elected or selected native-born Indians should sit to represent the views of native-born Indians at head-

quarters on matters of Indian finance and taxation. The Governor-General is assisted in his government of India by a council of seven members appointed by the Crown through the Secretary of State for India. These councillors hold their appointment ordinarily for five years, and constitute practically a Cabinet of Ministers to carry on the Viceroy's government. The seventh member of Council, for some reason called "extraordinary," is the British commander-in-chief over all the king-emperor's forces in the Indian Empire. He is practically Minister for War in the Viceroy's Council. The

foreign affairs of the Indian Empire, which include dealing with the feudatory and allied states within and without the limits of the Indian Empire, are under the special superintendence of the Viceroy. One of the government members of Council takes charge of the finances of India, another of revenue and agriculture; a third is the military member, charged more especially with army supply; a fourth supervises the Public Works, a fifth the Home Office and the Legislative, and a sixth commerce and industry. Each of the nine departments of state has a special secretary at the head of it. Including the Viceroy, there are only eight "Ministers" in the Executive Council.

There is further a Legislative Council nominated by the Viceroy, consisting of not more than sixteen members, or seventeen with the addition of the lieutenant-governor of Bengal. This Council has power, subject to certain restrictions, to make laws for all persons within British India, for all British subjects within the native states, and for all Indian subjects, or protected subjects, of the king in any

part of the world. The members of this Council are nominated by the Viceroy under the provisions of Viscount Cross's Act of 1892, a clause of which makes it possible for the Viceroy to introduce the elective principle into the nomination of some or all of these legislative councillors. We have here a door already provided, by

Legislative Methods in India

which the new measures of representative government will be prudently introduced into India. The Legislative Council, which includes the members of the Executive Council, holds its sittings in public, and the text of the Bills to be discussed must first be published for general information through the government "Gazette."

Further, no Bill, as a rule, is brought before the Viceroy's Legislative Council which has not first been subjected to the criticism of the several provincial governments. The wide development of the British Indian and vernacular Press ensures the fullest publicity for the text of all new measures, and the national voice of India to some extent thus reacts on its government, for there is no hole-and-corner legislation, and the Viceroy's Council, before placing any new law on the Statute Book, is well informed as to its popular reception.

Among the Viceroy's nominated council, natives of India probably predominate in numbers over the unofficial British members. Of these last there are generally representatives of commerce, of the Bar, and of railways. This supreme Legislative Council might undoubtedly be much larger—the maximum of sixteen, as it is, is not always attained; it might include representatives of the larger feudatory states, of the principal religions, of native law, medicine, commerce, and industry. To a certain extent, also, the elective principle might be prudently and gradually introduced. Since these lines were written, Lord Morley's far-reaching measures for

Lord Morley and Indian Difficulties

representative government in India have met most of these difficulties and have attempted to solve them. As regards the great provincial administrations, there are legislative councils in Bengal and the Central Provinces, in Burma, Eastern Bengal, the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, the Punjab, Madras, and Bombay. The acts of these provincial legislative councils, on which there are invariably native members, can only deal

with the matters of the province, and are subject to the sanction of the Governor-General. None of these legislatures may do more than discuss the financial statements of the supreme and local governments, and ask questions about them. They may not propose resolutions or call for any votes on the subject of finance.

The metropolitan state of Bengal, and all the other provinces of British India, are under governors, lieutenant-governors, or chief commissioners. With the exceptions only of the governors of Bombay and Madras, who are appointed by the king on the recommendation of the British Government, outside the ranks of the ordinary service, all these great executive posts are filled from the Indian Civil or Political Service. The Viceroy nominates and the Crown appoints the lieutenant-governors, and the Governor-General in council appoints the chief commissioners.

Each Indian province is divided into divisions under commissioners. These, again, are split up into districts, which form the unit of administration. At the head of each district is an executive officer, styled "collector," "magistrate," or "deputy-commissioner," who has entire control of the district and is responsible to the governor or chief commissioner of the province. Associated with or subordinate to the collector are deputy-collectors, other magistrates, or assistants.

"The main functions of the collector-magistrate are twofold," says Sir William Hunter. "He is a fiscal officer, charged with the collection of the revenue from the land and other sources; he is also a civil and criminal judge, both of first instance and in appeal; he is the representative of a paternal, and not of a constitutional government. Police, gaols, education, municipalities, roads, sanitation, dispensaries, the local taxation, and the Imperial revenues of his district are to him matters of daily concern. He is expected to make himself acquainted with every phase of the social life of the natives, and with every natural aspect of the country. He should be a lawyer, an accountant, a surveyor, and a ready writer of state papers. He ought to possess no mean knowledge of agriculture, political economy, and engineering." There are at present some 260 districts in British India administered by these

collector-magistrates. In some cases there is a collector and a magistrate, the two functions being occasionally separate. It is scarcely necessary to point out that these invaluable officials are drawn from the far-famed Indian Civil Service, the finest Civil Service in the world, entrance into which is no longer a matter of patronage, but through open competition.

The collector is the mainstay of the British Government in India. British valour won India in the first instance, and regained it after the mutiny; but the wise, incorruptibly just behaviour of the Civil Service, from its reconstruction in 1853-1858 to the present day, has done more than any feat of arms to retain the allegiance of the masses among the 200,000,000 of directly governed natives of India.

The people of the feudatory states are governed by their native princes in most cases, through a machinery of Ministers and councils, similar in degree to that of British India, except, of course, that the employés are all natives of India. In most cases justice between British Indians on the territories of the feudatory states is administered by the resident or agent of the Governor-General, who resides at the court of each feudatory prince, and advises the latter in such of his affairs as call for attention. No feudatory prince has the right to make peace or war, to send ambassadors to other feudatory princes or to external states, or to keep an armed force above a number agreed upon.

Moreover, no Europeans may reside at their courts without the sanction of the supreme government. Chiefs who oppress or misgovern their subjects, or who waste their revenues, or are unnecessarily absent from their states, are sharply taken to task; but in normal circumstances they are very little interfered with, and it is a matter of no dispute that at the present day several native states are as well and more cheaply governed than the parts of India under direct British government.

At the present date there are 760 towns in British India large and important enough to possess municipalities that have, under the Local Self-Government Acts of 1883-1884, been accorded an elective character. The majority of the members of committees are elected by the rate-payers. These municipal bodies have the charge of roads, water supply, drains, markets, and sanitation. They can impose

taxes, enact by-laws, make improvements, and spend money; but the sanction of the provincial government is necessary before new taxes or new by-laws can be enforced. Very naturally, the vast majority of the members of these municipalities are Indians, and this experiment in self-government is being watched with

Experiment in Indian Government great interest by those who hope, little by little, to induct the natives of India into the harmonious, capable, and honest administration of their home government. For rural tracts there are district and local boards which are in charge of roads, schools and hospitals. Gibraltar, a Crown colony, is little else than a garrison town—nearly two square miles in area—governed autocratically by a military governor and a civilian colonial secretary.

Malta, Gozo, and Comino are an archipelago of three islands and two islets in the Central Mediterranean (117 square miles in area; population, 206,690). The governor, always a military officer, is assisted by a lieutenant-governor (civilian), an executive council, and a council of government consisting of eleven official members, including the governor, and eight elected members. The governor has a right in case of necessity to legislate by order-in-council.

Cyprus is still theoretically a Turkish possession. By agreements concluded with the Porte between June and August, 1878, the island of Cyprus was handed over to Great Britain to be administered entirely free from Turkish control, until Russia restored to Turkey the fortress of Kars and other parts of Armenia acquired as the results of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. At the present time the island is governed by a high commissioner on the lines of a Crown colony. There is an executive council consisting of the chief secretary, the king's advocate, and the receiver-general; and a legislature of eighteen members, which, besides the above-mentioned three officials, comprises the chief medical officer, the registrar-general, the principal forest officer, and twelve elected councillors—nine Christian and three Mohammedan. The voters are all male Turkish or British subjects, or foreigners who have resided at least five years on the island and are payers of land taxes. The council may be dissolved at the high commissioner's pleasure, and

cannot sit for a longer term than five years. Ceylon is administered by a governor aided by an executive council of five and a legislative council of seventeen members, comprising nine officials and eight nominated unofficial members, who represent in their personalities the Singhalese, Mohammedan, Eurasian and British elements in the population. For purposes of general administration the island is divided into nine provinces, presided over by government agents who are the equivalent of the Indian collector. These in their turn are assisted by subordinate

of Singapore and Penang, though their nomination must be confirmed by the Crown. The governor of the Straits Settlements is also high commissioner for the Federated Malay States, which fact carries his commission right up to the confines of India and Siam, and for Brunei, in Central North Borneo; and is also consul-general for the protected countries of Sarawak and North Borneo.

The Federated Malay States—except Johor—are administered by state councils composed of the native sultan, a British resident, a secretary to the resident, and



THE COUNCIL HALL IN THE GOVERNOR'S PALACE AT VALETTA, MALTA

R. Ellis

British, Eurasian and native officials. The Maldivé Islands, 500 miles west of Ceylon, are governed by their own hereditary sultan and a cabinet of seven ministers. They are under the general supervision of the Ceylon Government, to whom the sultan is tributary.

The Straits Settlements—Singapore, Malacca, Penang, Labuan Island, Christmas Island, and the Cocos Islands—are governed much on the lines of Ceylon by a governor, with executive and legislative councils; except that of the unofficial members of council two may be nominated by the chambers of commerce

selected native (Malay) chiefs and Chinese notabilities. A British resident-general under the control of the high commissioner supervises the general affairs of the Malay Peninsula. The state of Johor remains outside this scheme of administration. Its sultan governs the territory of Johor through native ministers and headmen, but entrusts all his foreign relations to Great Britain. The same arrangements prevail in Sarawak, a large Borneo state ruled by an English rajah. In Brunei, the country—3,000 square miles—is governed by a British resident with the co-operation of the sultan and



S. B. Barnard, Cape Town

A SITTING OF THE CAPE PARLIAMENT : THE LATE CECIL RHODES IS INDICATED BY A X



J. W. Waters, Fiji

THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF FIJI IN SESSION

PARLIAMENTS OF BRITAIN'S OVERSEAS DOMINIONS

native ministers. British North Borneo is administered by a governor, practically appointed by the Crown, and a court of directors sitting in London. The territory is divided into ten provinces, and is administered—as in Sarawak—much on the lines of a Crown colony. In Sarawak the rajah is assisted in the work of

Governing the Fiji Islands

government by a nominated council of seven members. The colony of Fiji has a governor, executive and legislative councils; but six members out of eighteen are elected by the non-native settlers, and two are native representatives nominated by the governor. The native population (Fijians)—over 90,000 in number—are accorded a large share of self-government. This is arranged for by village and district councils, meetings of chiefs, and a native regulation board, which has the governor as president and four European and thirteen native members. The native legislation of the board must receive the sanction of the legislative council before becoming law.

The Fiji Islands are divided into seventeen provinces under the control of European or native commissioners. The governor of Fiji is also high commissioner for the Western Pacific, and as such controls the native governments of Tonga (which kingdom has a legislative assembly), the New Hebrides (jointly with France), the Gilbert Islands, British Solomon Islands (area, 8,357 square miles), Santa Cruz Islands, Malden Island, etc., etc. He is also assisted by resident commissioners and deputy commissioners.

The Crown Colony of Hong Kong is administered by a governor, an executive council, and a legislative council of the usual type—eight official members and six unofficial. Of these last, four are nominated by the Crown, and one is nominated by the chamber of commerce, one by the justices of the peace. Wei-

China's Lease of Wei-hai-wei

hai-wei, in North China, is administered by a commissioner, who legislates by ordinance. The territory is leased by China on an uncertain term, and includes the walled city of Wei-hai-wei and an area outside of about 283 miles. Over this last the administration is mainly carried on by native headmen under the supervision of the British commissioner. The native government of the sultanate of Zanzibar, off the east coast of Africa,

is limited to the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, though the sultan, or sayyid, is still the theoretical sovereign over the coast strip of British East Africa. The government of Zanzibar is carried on by the sultan through a British Prime Minister and native officials, judges, etc., but under the supervision of a British agent and consul-general, who also have exclusive jurisdiction over all British subjects or foreigners not the subjects of Powers having special treaty relations with the sultan's government. The Somaliland Protectorate is administered simply by a commissioner and commander-in-chief.

British East Africa (area, 177,100 square miles) has a governor and commander-in-chief, and a lieutenant-governor; an executive and a legislative council. This last consists of eight official members and three (nominated) unofficial. The territory is divided into seven provinces under provincial commissioners, who have twenty-six collectors under them. The Uganda Protectorate is administered by a governor and commander-in-chief, but there is at present

Uganda's Native Parliament

no council. The Uganda Province and portions of the Western Province (Toro and Ankole) are under native governments, except as regards jurisdiction over non-natives of the province or British or foreign subjects. These native governments are carried on under British supervision, and the British governor alone has the power of life and death. There are five provinces. In the native kingdom of Uganda there is a native parliament, or lukiko, the deliberations of which assist the king, or "kabaka," of Uganda (at present a minor) and his ministry in their government of the kingdom of Uganda, a state of great antiquity.

The territory once called British Central Africa, north of the Zambesi, is now divided into the protectorate of Nyassaland and North-east and North-west Rhodesia. The first-named is administered by a governor and commander-in-chief, an executive and a legislative council, the latter consisting of nominated and official members whose legislation is subject to the governor's veto. This virtual colony is divided into thirteen districts under the charge of residents, first, second and third class. North-east and North-west Rhodesia are governed by administrators and magistrates in the

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INNER EMPIRE

service of the British South Africa Chartered Company. Lewanika, king of the Barotse, has still a considerable amount of autonomous power over his own subjects. North-west Rhodesia comes within the purview of the South African high commissioner; North-east Rhodesia is subject to some supervision by the governor of Nyassaland, who, by arrangement, supplies the armed force for the country's defence.

The court of appeal from the courts of Nyassaland and North-east Rhodesia lies in Zanzibar; that of North-west Rhodesian justice in Cape Town. As time goes on, North-west and Southern Rhodesia will probably take their places in the great South African Confederation, while North-east Rhodesia and Nyassaland will become once more fused under their original title of British Central Africa, and will constitute a great negro state under direct British management.

The Seychelles Archipelago is administered by a governor, and executive and a legislative council, the last consisting of nominated members, three official and three unofficial, the governor having an original and a casting vote. The island of Mauritius has an area of 705 square miles and a population of 378,000. The government is carried on by a governor, who is assisted by an executive council composed of the commander of H.M. troops, the colonial secretary, the procureur-general, the receiver-general, the auditor-general, and two elected members of the council of government. This last is almost equivalent to a lower house of legislature.

It consists, besides the governor and eight ex-officio members, of nine members nominated by the governor and ten members elected by the people on a moderate franchise. So that the Mauritians—rapidly becoming a people of Hindu, Negro and Chinese race—possess the beginnings of a representative government. The small island dependencies of Mauritius are governed by magistrates appointed by the governor.

The Transvaal is the youngest of the self-governing colonies. It has a governor, who, in this instance, is also the high commissioner for all South Africa. He governs constitutionally through a legislative council (which is to be ultimately an elective senate) and a

legislative assembly of 69 members, all freely elected by the registered voters in the 69 existing electoral divisions. The franchise is limited to "white male British subjects," and the qualification is a minimum of six months' residence in the Transvaal. The registration of voters takes place biennially. The duration of

the assembly is a maximum of five years, if not dissolved earlier by the governor on the advice of his ministers. Members of

the legislature are paid a maximum of £300 annually. The languages of discussion are English and Dutch, but the language of record is English. Provision is made in the Transvaal Constitution for the safeguarding of the landed and other interests of the native negroes, which in a great measure atones for the denial to them of the franchise.

The constitution and government of the Orange River Colony resemble very closely those of the Transvaal. The number of members of the legislative assembly is at present thirty-eight, elected by registered voters. Basutoland, between the Orange State and Natal, is a great negro reservation, of which the high commissioner of South Africa is governor. The territory is governed by a resident commissioner under the direction of the high commissioner, who has exclusive jurisdiction over all persons not native Basutos. To these Europeans, Asiatics, or foreign negroes, numbering in all scarcely more than 1,000, justice is administered by seven assistant commissioners who are also magistrates. The 347,000 Basutos are ruled by their own chiefs subject to appeals to the British magistrate's court.

Natal, with which the native territories of Zululand and Amatongaland and the former Transvaal district of Vrijheid are now amalgamated, is ruled by a governor, a responsible ministry, a legislative council, and an elective legislative assembly.

The members of the legislative council are summoned to act by the governor-in-council. They sit for ten years, and at present are thirteen in number. No one can be summoned to this "senate" unless he is the proprietor of at least £500 worth of immovable property within the colony. The franchise for the election of members of the legislative assembly is limited to the male sex, is apparently granted without

Representative Government in Mauritius

The Ruling Power in Natal

considerations of race or literacy, and is only qualified by the possession of immovable property of the minimum value of £50, or by paying rent for such property of at least £10 per annum, or having resided at least three years in the colony, and possessing not less than £96 income per annum. The same

**Native
Negroes in
Zululand**

qualifications apply to membership of the legislature. The assembly sits for not more than four years. Members of the legislature are not paid, unless they are ministers, but receive a travelling allowance. The province of Zululand is almost entirely occupied by native negroes. Only an infinitesimal part of its area—one-thirtieth—has been taken up by non-natives. One-fifth of the area of "old" Natal is set aside as a native reserve, besides large areas that have been bought by negroes from the government.

In this and other respects the negroes of Natal seem to have been very well treated by the Colonial Government; but the means of administering justice among them, and the extent to which their interests are represented in the Natal Parliament, seem to require improvement. The negro territory of Swaziland, on the eastern side of the Transvaal (area, 6,536 square miles; population, 85,000 negroes, 900 whites), is governed by a resident commissioner under the direction of the high commissioner of South Africa, much on the lines of Basutoland.

Cape Colony is the premier state of South Africa, and by far the oldest self-governing colony in Africa. It has possessed representative institutions since 1853, but the present form of government through responsible ministers only dates from 1872. The system, of course, starts with a governor, who receives no less than £8,000 a year, and who rules with the advice of six ministers. There is a legislative council of twenty-six elected

**The Premier
State of
South Africa**

members, who sit for seven years, the qualification being £2,000 of immovable, or £4,000 of movable property. The house of assembly consists of 107 elected members, and lasts (unless dissolved earlier) for five years. The qualification for the exercise of the franchise for the election to both houses, and for sitting in the house of assembly, is the possession of personal property (not tribal) worth at least £75 (or salary of not less than £50

per annum) and a standard of literacy—ability to write one's name and address. The suffrage is still limited to males, but no race, colour, or religious distinction is made in the distribution of the franchise.

Members of both houses are paid at the rate of £1 rs. a day, with about £60 extra for travelling expenses. Local government (divisional councils, municipalities, and village-management boards) of an elaborate and efficient type is fully developed over Cape Colony and the included district of British Bechuanaland. The Bechuanaland Protectorate stretches between the northern parts of Cape Colony and the Zambesi, with an area of 275,000 square miles, and a population of 129,000 negroes and 1,000 whites. It is governed as regards the natives by six native chiefs, the most important of whom is Khama. As regards Europeans and internal or inter-tribal affairs the administration is directed by a resident commissioner, government secretary, assistant commissioners, magistrates, etc., under the general direction of the high commissioner for South Africa. The

**Rhodesia's
Limited
Franchise**

area of Southern Rhodesia is 148,575 square miles, the European population is 14,018; and the native population, 639,418. The country is governed by the British South Africa Chartered Company, through an administrator, an executive council of six, and a legislative council of sixteen members. Seven members out of these sixteen are elected by registered voters on a franchise which appears to be limited to European residents. The executive and legislative councils sit for three years.

All laws passed must be submitted for sanction to the high commissioner of South Africa, under whose control is placed the military police. The high commissioner is represented locally by a resident commissioner. For administration Southern Rhodesia is divided into two provinces and eight districts. Native affairs are managed (under the administrator) by a department of state and thirty-one or thirty-two native commissioners. All legislation and land questions affecting natives are especially under the supervision and control of the high commissioner.

The little island of St. Helena, in the Atlantic, is 47 square miles in area, and has a population of about 4,000. Its affairs are managed by a governor and an



A NATIVE TRIAL; SCENE IN A CONSULAR COURT

N. W. Holm



INSPECTION OF CONVICTS AT MANDALAY GAOL IN BURMA

ADMINISTERING JUSTICE TO BRITISH SUBJECT PEOPLES

executive council. The island of Ascension is administered by a naval commandant under the Admiralty. Southern Nigeria has a governor, lieutenant-governor, and colonial secretary, an executive of seven official members, and a legislative council of ten official and four nominated unofficial members, two of whom are negroes. The colony is divided into three provinces and about twenty districts, administered by three provincial commissioners and a large number of district commissioners. Northern Nigeria is governed by a high commissioner without any executive or legislative councils. The fourteen provinces are supervised by ninety-nine residents and assistant-residents. A large amount of North Nigerian territory is directly administered, so far as natives are concerned, by negro or negroid kings and rulers.

The colony of the Gold Coast has a governor, an executive council of four, and a legislative council of five official and four unofficial nominated members, of whom one is a negro. There is a department and a secretary for native affairs, and Ashanti and the northern territories are governed—under the Gold Coast governor—by chief commissioners, provincial, and travelling commissioners.

Sierra Leone, for administrative purposes, is divided into a colony of about 4,300 square miles and a protectorate of 28,110 square miles in area. Both are under the administration of the same governor, colonial secretary, and general staff; but as regards the colony along the coast the governor is assisted by an executive council of five members and a legislative council of five official and four unofficial nominated members, of whom two are negroes. The protectorate is divided into five districts, which are administered by district commissioners, a good deal of power over the natives being still left in the hands of the native chiefs.

**Bermudas
an Important
Naval Base**

In the Gambia Colony the actual "colonial" area is only about 69 square miles, and is ruled by a governor, executive council (three members), legislative council (six official, three unofficial nominated members, one of them a negro). The protectorate—3,911 square miles—is administered by the governor through a number of travelling commissioners. The lovely little archipelago of the Bermudas was really intended by Nature

for the Sea Queen's capital and the Syrens' *pied-à-terre*. It was more than that in the realms of fancy, having been chosen by Shakespeare for the scenes of "The Tempest." Instead of this it has been turned in the course of centuries into an important naval base on the North American station, with dockyard, victualing establishment, and coaling station.

There are 360 small islands in the group, and only about twenty square miles of habitable land, with a population of 683 whites and 11,000 blacks or half-castes. The governor over this microcosm is the officer in command of the troops, and he is assisted by an executive council of six members, a legislative assembly of nine—both these are appointed by the Crown—and a house of assembly—thirty-six members—elected by the people. The franchise is dependent on the possession of freehold property of not less than £60 value. Members of the legislature are paid eight shillings a day for attendance. Representative institutions in the Bermudas date from 1620. The constitution of Jamaica, granted in 1662, was, like that of Bermuda, more suited to a large country than a small island, though Jamaica has an area of 4,207 square miles and a population, mainly negro, of 830,261. But the ancient constitution was surrendered in 1866, and, after several changes and enlargements, now stands thus:

**Jamaica's
Enlarged
Constitution**

The governor rules with the assistance of a privy council of not more than eight in number—mostly officials—appointed by the Crown; a legislative council of the governor, six *ex-officio* members, ten nominated and fourteen elected. The legislative council may not sit more than five years without being dissolved. The franchise on which these fourteen representatives, as well as the members of the parochial boards, are elected is regulated by a small property qualification, residence, rate-paying, and British nationality.

Matters of local administration in Jamaica are carried out by fifteen elected parochial boards of fifteen parishes, into which the whole island is divided. The Turks and Caicos Islands are a dependency of Jamaica, with 5,287 inhabitants, the former group being administered by a commissioner and a legislative board appointed by the Crown. The Cayman Islands are likewise administered

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INNER EMPIRE

by a commissioner under the supervision of the governor of Jamaica. The Bahama Islands have a governor, an executive council of nine, a legislative council of nine, and a representative assembly of twenty-nine members elected on a small property franchise. The total area of this group is 5,450 square miles.

The Leeward Islands—area, 701 square miles; population, 128,000—have a governor, a federal executive council nominated by the Crown, and a federal legislature of eight nominated and eight elected members. These last are elected by the unofficial members of the local legislative councils of Antigua, Dominica, and St. Kitts-Nevis. The Leeward Islands are divided for purposes of local administration into five presidencies: the island groups of Antigua, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Virgin, and Dominica. The three first-named and Dominica possess local executive and legislative councils, the members of which, official and unofficial, are nominated. The Virgin Islands have only an executive council. There is an administrator for St.

Advanced Government in Barbados

Christopher, etc., and one for Dominica, and commissioners for Montserrat and the Virgin Islands. The Windward Islands—area, 524 square miles; population, 175,587—have a governor, who usually resides at Grenada, an administrator for St. Lucia, and an administrator for St. Vincent. In each of the three islands there are executive and legislative councils, the members of which are nominated. In all the legislative councils there are unofficial members.

The island of Barbados has an area of only 166 square miles—a little larger than the Isle of Wight—and a population of under 200,000, but it goes far beyond any other West Indian colony in representative government. It has a governor all to itself, an executive of four members besides the governor, an executive committee partly elective, a nominated legislative council of nine members, and a house of assembly of twenty-four members. The last-named are elected annually by the people on a low property franchise. The executive committee has almost the functions of a responsible ministry. The non-elective element consists of the four members of the House of Assembly appointed by the governor to serve on the executive committee.

As Barbados is exceedingly prosperous, this elaborate machinery of government is apparently worth while. Trinidad and Tobago, with an area of 1,868 square miles and a population of about 273,898, have no representative institutions. Tobago Island is simply a district of Trinidad, under a district officer. The

The Prosperous Island of Trinidad

two islands are under the rule of a governor, with an executive council of six members and a legislative council consisting of the governor, ten other officials, and eleven unofficial members nominated by the governor for five years. The large and prosperous island of Trinidad is divided into sixteen counties, and these are administered by nine district officers. It is therefore entirely without representative institutions.

The colony of British Honduras, on the mainland of Central America, is administered by a governor, an executive council of five members, and a nominated legislative council of three official and five unofficial members. It is divided into six districts under district commissioners.

British Guiana, on the mainland of Northern South America, is a relatively large possession, over 90,000 square miles in area, with a population of 307,000, the largest elements in which are negroes and East Indians. The administration consists of a governor, an executive council of eight members, two ex-officio, six nominated, a Court of Policy (legislative council), and a Combined Court, which deals with finance. The Court of Policy is composed of seven official and eight elected members; the Combined Court consists of these fifteen members of the Court of Policy (which is a purely legislative body), and, in addition, of six elected financial representatives. Thus the Combined Court comprises fourteen elected unofficial members and seven officials. The functions of this Combined Court are to

How British Guiana is Governed

consider the estimate of expenditure prepared by the governor in executive council and to determine the ways and means to meet it. This court alone can levy taxes. Thus, in the possession of this Combined Court, with a preponderating unofficial majority of seven elected representatives, the voting inhabitants of British Guiana come nearest of all the British possessions in Tropical America (except Barbados) to a government of popular control. But,

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though there are no specific principles of race exclusion, the qualifications for membership of the legislature and the franchise for electors at present render it difficult for non-Europeans to control the country's destinies.

The qualification for election to the Guianan Court of Policy consists of (1) ownership of 80 acres of land, half of which must be under cultivation; or (2) ownership of immovable property of a value not less than £1,562 10s.; or (3) ownership or possession under a lease for twenty-one years and upwards of a house or house and land of the annual rental value of £250. The qualification for a financial representative is the same as for a member of the Court of Policy, with the important addition that such representative must also possess a "clear annual income of £300 arising from any kind of property not mentioned in any other property qualification, or from any profession, business, or trade carried on in the colony."

The franchise which elects these fourteen members of the legislature is either "county" or "city." Its restrictions are not very severe, being either ownership or tenancy of cultivated land or houses, or a minimum income of not less than £100 (coupled with residence), or payment of twelve months' taxes of not less than £4 3s. 4d., combined with not less than six months' residence prior to date of


registration. The number of registered electors at present out of a population of 307,000 is about 3,100. Only about 130 square miles of British Guiana are under cultivation. There are two municipalities, with mayor and town council—Georgetown and New Amsterdam—and local government is further provided for by fifty-four village and country district councils.

The Falkland Islands have an area (excluding the uninhabited South Georgia, 1,000 square miles) of about 6,500 square miles, and a population of about 2,100. They are administered by a governor, an executive council of four officials, and a legislative council of three officials and two unofficials appointed by the Crown.

Before passing on to consider the statistics of other parts of British America, we might note the following points about the possessions in the West Indies and Bermudas, Honduras, and Guiana. The total white population of British (mainly), Portuguese, French, and Spanish descent is 62,300. Negroes and mulattoes amount to about 1,550,000; natives of British India, 210,000 (chiefly in Guiana, 110,000; Trinidad, 87,000; and Jamaica, 13,000); Chinese, 1,500; aboriginal Amerindians (in British Honduras, Dominica, and Guiana, about 11,000); mixed races, compounded of negro, East Indian, and Amerindian, 10,000.



GENERAL VIEW OF THE NEW DOCKS AT SIMON'S BAY IN SOUTH AFRICA



PARLIAMENTS OF THE OUTER EMPIRE CANADA AND AUSTRALIA AND THEIR ADVANCED SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT

THE vast Dominion of Canada (nominal area, 3,745,574 square miles, though only about 2,000,000 square miles are really habitable) is perhaps the portion of the British Empire that is most independent of Great Britain. Canada makes no contribution, direct or indirect, to the Imperial fleet or army; but she shares with Great Britain the rule of the king-emperor, and admits an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which is almost expunged from the Australian constitution.

The rule of the king is delegated to a Governor-General, appointed usually on the advice of the British Cabinet. But this governor, once appointed, enjoys greater independence than any other delegate of regal authority, and directs the government of Canada more like a constitutional president elected for five years than a nominee of the British Colonial Office. He is assisted by a Privy Council, chosen and nominated by himself. Representing the king, he rules with the advice of responsible ministers, through a parliament of Senate and House of Commons.

The Dominion of Canada is divided at present into nine provinces and a territory (Yukon). The unorganised remainder of the far north and east is administered through the Home Office of the Dominion Ministry. With the exception of the Yukon

territory, each province has a fully-equipped local government—lieutenant-governor, responsible ministry, elected legislature. In the case of Quebec and Nova Scotia the local parliament consists of two houses—a Legislative Council equivalent to a senate, and a Legislative Assembly. All the other provinces have a Legislative Assembly only.

The Dominion Parliament has much greater and more comprehensive powers than the Senate and Congress of the United States. The provincial legislatures deal

only with direct taxation within the province, provincial loans, the management of provincial lands, provincial and municipal offices, licences, public works, education, and general civil law. They also possess concurrent legislative powers with the Dominion Parliament on questions of agriculture, quarantine, and immigration. All their Bills require the assent of the lieutenant-governor, and may

be disallowed within one year by the Governor-General. The Dominion Parliament deals with all questions except those specifically delegated by the constitution to the provincial legislatures, and may even negotiate commercial treaties with foreign Powers or other self-governing portions of the British Empire. But all Bills passed by the Dominion Parliament require the assent of the Governor-General, and may be disallowed by the king-emperor within two years.

The Senate consists of eighty-seven members, nominated for life by the Governor-General. Their qualifications are: (1) Having attained the age of thirty; (2) birth or residence in the province for which they are appointed; (3) the possession of at least \$4,000 worth of property.

The members of the House of Commons need no property qualification. They must be British subjects, born or naturalised, and twenty-one years of age or upwards. A member cannot sit for both a provincial legislature and the Dominion Parliament. Members are elected by ballot on a male suffrage—suffrage has not been granted to women in Canada—which is very wide, practically manhood suffrage in Ontario, Manitoba, British Columbia, and Prince Edward's Island, Saskatchewan and Alberta; a small property limit in Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. Since 1898, the decision as to the suffrage for election to the

Functions of the Dominion Parliament

Government in Canadian Provinces

HISTORY OF THE WORLD

Dominion Parliament has been left to the provinces to decide according to local views. Senators and members are paid: senators, \$2,500 per annum; members, a maximum of \$2,500 per session. A parliament may not last longer than five years. Local government throughout settled Canada is admirably and fully developed by rural, village, town, city, and county councils. The colony of Newfoundland, with the adjoining coast strip of Labrador, is not part of the dominion of Canada, but an independent government under a governor and responsible ministry. There is an Executive Council of nine ministers, over

term for each elected assembly is four years. The majority in each assembly elects the ministry which is to serve as the governor's executive. Local government—except for the Municipal Council of St. John's—is almost entirely directed by the ministry and government departments at headquarters (St. John's).

It is interesting to note that in differences between the Dominion Parliament and the provincial legislatures an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council resulted in a satisfactory settlement. Appeals still lie from the Supreme Court—created in 1876—of the Canadian



THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS IN SESSION

W. J. Topley

which the governor presides; a Legislative Council of eighteen members, nominated for life by the Governor-in-Council; and there is a House of Assembly of thirty-six members, elected by ballot on manhood suffrage. There is a property qualification for members of a minimum value of \$2,500, or a yearly income of \$500. A payment of \$120 is made in each session to each legislative councillor, and of \$200 or \$300—according to distance of residence—to each member of the House of Assembly. The session seldom lasts more than three months in each year, and the maximum

Dominion to the Privy Council of the United Kingdom. If this could become and remain the final court of appeal for the whole empire it would do more than any other measure to bind it together. But the British law-lords and the national indifference to pomp and show, combine to hinder the creation of an ideal Supreme Imperial Court of Appeal out of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. "Such a court," said Sir Edward Clarke some time ago, "should be strong in its constitution, dignified in its ceremonial, and even splendid in its surroundings,



THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF NEW SOUTH WALES

Kerry



THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF VICTORIA

SCENES IN TWO OF AUSTRALIA'S HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT

so as to command the respect and touch the imagination of our brethren beyond the seas." "The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council," said a morning paper recently, "which is the final court of appeal for the citizens of the Greater Britain, is one of the curiosities of our legal system. It occupies a bare, barn-like room in Whitehall; its members drop in casually and sit around a horseshoe table in their ordinary walking clothes, and there is not a solitary symbol of the dignity one would naturally expect to see associated with a tribunal of such imperial importance and world-wide jurisdiction."

Commonwealth of Australia

The Commonwealth of Australia did not attain to completion as a unified organisation until twenty years after the Canadian Dominion, by the inclusion of the great North-west, assumed its present unity and comprehensive national force. The act creating a Commonwealth of Australia came into vigour on January 1st, 1901.

The commonwealth consists of the six states of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, Tasmania, and Western Australia; the little islands of Norfolk and Lord Howe—governed by New South Wales—and the territory of Papua, administered by the commonwealth government. All the six states have governors appointed directly by the Crown—*i.e.*, on the advice of the British Cabinet; but the lieutenant-governor of Papua is appointed by the Governor-General of the commonwealth, on the advice of his Ministers. The governors of the six states may correspond direct with the Colonial Office, but must supply the Governor-General with copies of their despatches.

The constitution of New South Wales comprises a governor and lieutenant-governor, a Legislative Council of not less than twenty-one members (actually fifty-six), appointed for life by the Crown; and a Legislative Assembly of ninety elected members. The Assembly sits for three years, unless dissolved sooner. Each of the ninety constituencies only returns one member, and each member is paid £300 a year; and, like the members of Council—who are not paid any salary in their capacity of legislative councillors—can travel free on all government railways and tramways, and send their letters postage

The Constitution of New South Wales

free. The electoral franchise is conferred on men and women alike since 1902. Every man or woman, being a natural-born or naturalised subject of his Majesty, above twenty-one years of age, having resided one year in the state, and three months in a particular electoral district, is qualified as an elector, and is entitled to one vote only. Local government in New South Wales is fully provided for through the shires and municipal councils.

In the state of Victoria there are governor, lieutenant-governor, a Cabinet or Executive Council, a Legislative Council (thirty-four in number), and a Legislative Assembly. Members of the Upper House, or Legislative Council, are elected for six years. Their qualification is the possession of an estate of the net annual minimum value of £50 for one year prior to the election. Electors of the Council must be in possession of property of the rateable value of £10, if freehold, or £15 if derived from leasehold; unless, that is, they are graduates of a British or colonial university or students of the Melbourne University, ministers of religion, certificated teachers, lawyers, medical practitioners, or officers of army or navy; in such case they need no property qualification for

Victoria's Complete Local Government

the election of senators. The members of this upper house are not paid. The Legislative Assembly, which, like most of the Australian lower houses, sits for three years only, unless dissolved earlier, is composed of sixty-five members. Neither these nor their electors require any property qualification. There are the usual provisions as to being a British or naturalised British subject. Members of the lower house are paid £300 per annum. The franchise for the election of members of the lower house is practically the same as that described for New South Wales, except that it is limited to males.

Local government in Victoria is very complete, and is carried out by means of municipal and shire councils. For election to these councils—by the ratepayers—the suffrage is extended to women. In South Australia, the Legislative Council consists of eighteen members elected on much the same terms as in Victoria, except that the members elected must be at least thirty years of age, and have resided in the state for at least three years, while the property limit of the council suffrage is slightly higher, and there is no

PARLIAMENTS OF THE OUTER EMPIRE

exemption therefrom for the classes of professional men as in Victoria. This suffrage, like the others, is conferred equally upon women. The House of Assembly consists of forty-two members elected for not more than three years. Qualifications and suffrage are similar to those of Victoria, except that the suffrage is also extended to women. Members of both houses are paid a salary of £200 a year whilst they serve. Local government is carried on through thirty-two elective municipal and district councils in the settled regions. In Queensland there is apparently no lieutenant-governor. The members of

A good deal of the state is divided into shires (rural districts) and municipal areas (cities, towns)—670,255 square miles in all—and over these local government, under elected councils, is fully enforced.

Tasmania has a governor, deputy-governor, and the same type of executive and legislature as the other Australian states. There is a maximum of eighteen members in the Legislative Council. This body is elected for six years. No property qualification is necessary in either house, but there is a very small property qualification attached to the Senate franchise, though, as in Victoria, this is not asked for in the case of university or professional



THE TASMANIAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY IN SESSION

the Legislative Council (forty-four) are all nominated by the Crown for life, and are unpaid. The Legislative Assembly comprises seventy-two members elected for a maximum period of three years, and paid at the rate of £300 a year. There is no property qualification for the members of either legislature.

The franchise is granted to all men and women, born or naturalised British subjects, from the age of twenty-one years, after twelve months' residence in the state, provided they are not insane, have not been criminally convicted or, in the case of men, have not been guilty of wife-desertion.

men. Members of the House of Assembly (35 in number) are elected for three years, the qualification being as described for South Australia, on the usual adult (male and female) suffrage. The only persons who may not sit in the legislature of Tasmania are judges of the Supreme Court, paid officials of the Crown (except responsible ministers), or contractors to Government; neither may any member of the local legislature here or elsewhere in Australia be at the same time a parliamentary representative in the Commonwealth Parliament. The local government of Tasmania is entrusted to

elected municipal and rural councils. West Australia has a governor and lieutenant-governor, a Legislative Council of thirty members, and a Legislative Assembly of fifty. The councillors are elected for six years, and the members of the Assembly for three. The qualification for a councillor is (1) to be not less than thirty years old;

Parliamentary Qualifications in West Australia

(2) a resident in the state for at least two years; (3) a British subject or five-years naturalised subject. The

franchise for the upper house is conferred on persons of both sexes over twenty-one, British subjects, resident in the state six months, and possessing a freehold estate of a clear value of £100, or the usual proportionate equivalent in leasehold, rent or ratepaying.

The qualification for members of the lower house is that they should be male British subjects over twenty-one who have resided in the state for twelve months; or, if naturalised for five years, then their residence must be at least two years. The franchise for the lower house is granted to any man or woman above twenty-one—provided they are British or naturalised subjects—when they have resided at least six months in the state, and whilst they are actually resident in the district at the time of their claim. This condition about residence at the time of claiming the vote is waived for those who have a small property qualification. As throughout the rest of Australia, no elector has more than one vote for the lower house.

Members of both houses are paid £200 a year and travel free on government railways. Local government in Western Australia is entrusted to municipal councils elected by the ratepayers, and to a number of public institutions apparently depending on the Executive or the Legislature—boards of water supply and sewerage (not a very happy conjuncture!), road boards, and local boards of health. The ad-

Where Women Enjoy the Suffrage

ministration of Papua consists of a lieutenant-governor and an Executive Council of six members (officials), and a Legislative Council composed of the Executive and three unofficial members appointed by the governor.

So much for the provincial administration of Australia. It will be observed that in every state with responsible government, except Victoria, the suffrage is granted on equal terms to men and women

alike, universally on the principle of one man one vote; that the terms of duration of the elected lower houses are invariably limited to three years, and that there is no excluding property qualification attached to either membership or suffrage for the lower houses of legislature.

The federal government of Australia consists of the king (represented by a governor-general), a Senate, and a House of Representatives. The Governor-General is assisted by an Executive Council of ministers who are, or who must become within three months, members of the Federal Parliament. There are 36 senators who are elected for six years, and receive £600 a year each, unless already holding salaried posts as ministers, or salaried officers of the house.

Members of the House of Representatives are elected for three years (unless the house is dissolved sooner), and are paid at the rate of £600 a year. There are at present 75 representatives, but the numbers fluctuate in each parliament in relation to increase or diminution of the population. The number of the senators

Australia's Federal Government

may be increased or diminished in the future, but always on the lines that no original state shall have less than six senators nor more than any other original state. The qualifications for senators and representatives are identical: twenty-one years of age, to be an elector, or entitled to be; to be resident at least three years in Australia; to be a British subject born, or a naturalised British subject of five years' standing. The federal franchise for election in both houses is universal adult suffrage (male and female), on the usual terms—twenty-one years of age and upwards, British citizenship, and a minimum of twelve months' residence.

The Canadian legislature has been commended because it left practically no loophole for dispute as to the competency of the Federal Parliament. The subjects on which the provincial parliaments could legislate were clearly stipulated, and the Federal Parliament was empowered to deal with all else which did not infringe the prerogatives of the British Crown. In the Australian Legislature, the case is reversed. The scope of the Federal Parliament is defined in thirty nine articles, and the powers of the state governments are not otherwise limited. Disputes on the

PARLIAMENTS OF THE OUTER EMPIRE

interpretation of the federal constitution will have to be referred to the new High Court of Australia, which is to be an appellate, as well as an original court. An appeal to the final decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from the decisions of the High Court, or from those of the Supreme Courts of the federal states, may only be carried out on a certificate to be granted by the High Court at its own discretion. The Federal Parliament undertakes to legislate for, and to control, the naval and military defence of Australia, its trade, taxation, public debts, loans, postal service, census, and statistics, currency, banking, marriage, divorce, old age pensions, immigration, emigration, railways, regulations dealing with insolvency and corporations, departments of state, foundation of a state capital, etc. etc.

The dominion of New Zealand has an area (including all island groups attached to its administration) of about 105,249 square miles, and a population of nearly 950,000. Its government consists of a governor and commander-in-chief, an Executive Council of Ministers, a Legislative Council of 45 members, and a House of Representatives of 80 members, including four Maories. The extreme duration of membership in the upper house is seven years; the House of Representatives sits for three years, unless previously dissolved. Members of the Council are paid £200 a year, representatives £300. Councillors are appointed by the governor, representatives are elected by the people, the qualification for the last-named being that of an elector. The franchise is granted

Maories in New Zealand's Government to all men and women of European race over twenty-one years of age who have resided at least one year in the colony and three months in the electoral district. For the election of the four Maori members every adult Maori can vote who is resident in the district for which the Maori candidate is standing.

As regards local government, this also is elective on the part of the ratepayers. The dominion is divided into municipali-

ties and counties, road districts and town districts, river drainage, water supply boards, etc. The qualifications for electors are ratepaying, residence, or the possession of property. Municipal franchise is equally extended to women. From this purview of the forms of government in every part of the British Empire and sphere

Great Britain's Advanced Daughter Nations

of influence, coupled with a knowledge of the institutions of the British Islands, it will be seen that the countries with the most modern and ideally perfect type of constitution are Australia and New Zealand; next, and only inferior because it still denies the franchise to women, is Canada. The states of South Africa are not far behind, but some of them are fettered by considerations of race questions and restricted franchise. The Mother Country is still behind the more advanced daughter nations in the solution of several social problems and the simplification of administrative machinery.

India lacks an admixture of the native element in her highest councils. Trinidad is thought by some to be too purely official in its government. Gibraltar, Northern Nigeria, Uganda, and the Egyptian Sudan are administered autocratically without executive or legislative councils. Gibraltar, of course, is little else than a garrisoned fort; in Uganda there is a highly developed representative native administration, and a good deal of Northern Nigeria is still governed in parts by native princes.

The sultan of Zanzibar governs despotically through a ministry of English and Arabs, but in constant touch with the feelings and interest of the populace; the despotism of the petty Arab sultans in Aden territory, Socotra, the Hadhramaut, Oman, and Bahrein is tempered by the advice of British residents. The rest of the inner British Empire is not without some measure of elective or popular representation in its councils, and the full measure of popular government in Barbados and the Bermudas seems to have induced quiet and prosperity.



STABROEK MARKET AND THE STELLINGS AT GEORGETOWN IN BRITISH GUIANA



IN THE ROCKIES: ELBOW RIVER VALLEY AND THE THREE SISTERS



KINCHINJUNGA, THE HIGHEST POINT OF THE NEPAL HIMALAYAS IN NORTH INDIA



THE NUWARA ELIYA MOUNTAIN IN THE ISLAND OF CEYLON

MOUNTAIN RANGES IN GREAT BRITAIN'S OVER-SEAS DOMINIONS



THE SINEWS OF EMPIRE THE RESOURCES, EDUCATION, AND DEFENCES OF GREATER BRITAIN

THE British Empire not only includes that extraordinary diversity of human races enumerated in another chapter, but it is equally diverse in its physical geography, fauna, flora, and climates. It contains deserts such as may be found in Southern Egypt, Southern Arabia, West-central India, and Australia, wherein it may not chance to rain more than once in seven years. It includes regions of mountain and forest like Assam, where the annual rainfall is the highest known—about 300 inches per annum.

It extends to the South Pole and the North Pole, and possesses territories within the equatorial belt in Africa, Eastern Asia, and South America. It takes under its aegis the highest mountains in the world, the loftiest peaks of the Himalayas, and other such notable mountains as Ruwenzori, Elgon, Kenya, Mlanje, and the Drakensberg in Africa, Mount

Mountains of the Empire

Troödos in Cyprus, Mount Sinai in Eastern Egypt, the mountains of Penang and Perak in the Malay Peninsula, the Australian Alps, the New Zealand Alps, Roraima of British Guiana, the Blue Mountains of Jamaica, the Cockscomb Mountains of British Honduras, and the Rocky Mountains of Canada, these last unsurpassed in splendour of scenery anywhere in the world. Nor as providers of inspiring landscapes need the mountains of Scotland, Ireland and Wales, the hills of Shropshire, Derbyshire, Gloucester or Monmouth, Somerset, Devon, and Sussex be left out of the record of the empire's scenic beauty or health resorts.

Great Britain controls half of the basins of the Niger and the Zambesi, and the sources of the Congo; the Nile, from its twin fountains to its mouth, is wholly within the British sphere. It shares Niagara with the United States, and owns exclusively its only rival among the world's

great waterfalls—those which David Livingstone discovered on the Zambesi. Fate has entrusted for a time to its charge—and it is to be hoped Britain will be worthy of the stewardship—a large share of the world's wonders, and many choice examples of terrestrial loveliness. At the same time many of the most productive regions of the world are under its sway. Even the seemingly unproductive, such as those as are well nigh locked in the grasp of the last Glacial Period or scorched by the sun of the Sahara Desert, are found to be rich in minerals—in gold, nitre, or precious stones.


Britain's Large Share of the World's Wonders

The gold of Spanish America and California did much to increase the world's wealth in that metal, but not so much as has been obtained in the last sixty years from Australia, New Guinea, New Zealand, South Africa, British Guiana, India, and West Africa. There is silver also in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Copper is obtained from Australia, from the arid South-west Africa and Northern and Southern Rhodesia, from Canada and Newfoundland; and some day, no doubt, will be obtained from the Egyptian Sudan.

Tin, once the principal attraction to ancient explorers of the British Islands, and still much mined in Cornwall, is now found to be singularly abundant in the Malay Peninsula, and is also obtained from Australia and Northern Nigeria. Coal, the great product of the United Kingdom itself,

South Africa Rich in Diamonds

is also now worked profitably in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, Borneo, Natal, the Transvaal, Rhodesia, and Cape Colony. Petroleum is found in Burma, Canada, and (in a more bituminous form) in Southern Nigeria, Barbados (West Indies), and Trinidad. Diamonds of a good second quality abound in South Africa to such an extent that the trade has



A BRITISH PORT IN CHINA: GENERAL VIEW OF WEI-HAI-WEI, SHOWING DOCKYARDS

to control their output. Of a better quality are those still found in India and in British Guiana, and perhaps in Australia. Australia is rich in opals. Opals, rubies, sapphires, and emeralds come from India. But I think it will be found as the civilisation of the world progresses that the so-called precious stones will deteriorate in value.

There will be a market for them where they can be used industrially, as is the case with the diamond, but as mere ornaments the educated world will be growing too sensible to spend money on them. It will prefer the pure and cheap beauty of flowers and the sensible warmth of furs. As regards this last accessory to an artificial life, the British Empire is still exceedingly rich, though it may be questioned whether it is not gobbling up its

capital at a foolish rate and making no provision for a future supply. The territories of the Canadian Dominion to the north of the fifty-second degree of north latitude are, together with Siberia, the great fur-producing regions of the world.

Hence are exported the skins of beavers, foxes, martens, stoats, otters, lynxes, wolves and bears, which provide such a large proportion of the world's fur coats, muffs, trimmings, and carriage rugs. The Canadian Government, however, might well consider whether measures should not be taken to restrict the output and preserve many valuable species of fur-bearing animals from complete extinction. This problem in regard to the skins of the sea-lions, exported from the Pacific coasts of Canada, has already received attention.



THE IRRIGATION WORKS AND PUBLIC RESERVOIR AT HAIDARABAD, IN INDIA

THE SINEWS OF EMPIRE

India contributes thousands of tiger, leopard, bear, deer, and antelope skins annually. Australia sends a certain proportion of the so-called opossum fur (the soft, woolly pelts of the phalanger). South Africa forwards a diminishing number of karosses made of the skins of red lynxes, foxes, jackals, and springboks. West Africa exports leopard and monkey skins; East Africa the hides of lions, leopards, cheetahs, and jackals.

But passing from the pelt that is used for its beauty and heavy fur, we may enumerate the more essential product of mere leather. Ox, antelope, and zebra hides are an export of growing importance from the territories of Uganda and East

the world, together with cattle for hides, meat, and draught purposes. Somaliland, the Egyptian Sudan, and British Arabia will also become great camel-breeding regions. This is already the case with much of West Central India—in which magnificent one-humped camels (dromedaries) are found. In far North-western India and in all the regions of Central Asia adjacent thereto, and, more or less, under British influence, there is the "Bactrian" two-humped camel, still wild in Tibet. This is an exceedingly useful beast for transport, and furnishes valuable hair for weaving fabrics and for felting. In this region also is the yak—a wild and also domesticated species of ox, which has



CLEARING AN INDIA-RUBBER FOREST IN THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS

Africa, and enormous numbers of hides are sent to the leather markets from India, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

The wool and hair products of the British Empire are a most important item. Australia and New Zealand are largely given up to the breeding of sheep—for wool as well as meat. Cape Colony and other parts of South Africa are breeding Merino sheep, and, above all, Angora goats. The great industry of the Falkland Islands is sheep and sheep products—wool, tallow, meat. It will probably be found that Somaliland and a good deal of the Egyptian Sudan will take prominent places in the future as countries furnishing goats' hair, sheep's wool, and meat to the rest of

an extravagant development of hair along the tail and sides of the body. The yak may bear some relation in origin to the bison. The bison, alas! once abounded in Southern Canada, but is now nearly exterminated.

Australia and British Arabia—later on, Somaliland, Nigeria, and parts of the Sudan—Ireland and Great Britain will produce between them sufficient horses for the needs of the empire and for all climates and purposes. If less attention were given to racing as an odious form of gambling, mixed up with so much that is disreputable and fraudulent, and greater encouragement were given by the state to honest horse-breeding for honest purposes, Great Britain ought to be able to

supply herself with all the horses she needs, and not have to import any from Belgium and Hungary. As regards the domesticated birds produced by the different sections of the empire, Canada is going ahead with her fowl-breeding, not prevented, as are the people of England and Ireland, by the ridiculous cult of the fox, which checks the maintenance of so many poultry farms in the home country.


In this direction the United Kingdom lags behind its possibilities as a country for the breeding and rearing of choice poultry. India raises large quantities of peafowl, Chinese geese, and domestic fowls of various breeds. The rearing of turkeys on a considerable scale has lately made progress in Australia and New Zealand, and even on a portion of the Gold Coast in West Africa. In all the southern regions of Cape Colony and Natal poultry is usually very successful, and may before long be made an article of export. The ostrich farms of South Africa are so famous that they need no description. The wild fauna of the empire is, or should be, one of its glories, for Great Britain at present controls the

fate of some of the most interesting, wonderful, and beautiful creatures still living on this planet. Its political limits include the Polar bear of Arctic Canada and the okapi of the Semliki forests; the lion, tiger, and elephants of Africa and Asia.

The white and the black rhinoceroses are still allowed to exist under the British flag in nooks and corners, and one or two game reserves, where the British sportsman (and his American, German, and Russian friends) has not as yet succeeded in exterminating them. The hippopotamus is still a nuisance to navigation in most of the African rivers. It is possible that the

easternmost parts of Sierra Leone contain the pygmy hippopotamus of the adjoining Liberia. Somaliland, the Egyptian Sudan, British Central, and British East Africa, and the hinterland of the Gambia are marvellously rich in antelopes, giraffes, and three types of buffalo. The kangaroo is almost entirely a British subject. He may have a few arboreal cousins living under the Dutch and German flags.

Practically speaking the British ensign covers all the marsupials of the world, except the opossums of America and the cuscus of the Malay Archipelago, or the rat-like *Cœnolestes* of Ecuador. Britain possesses specimens of every species of zebra and wild ass, and has but some day to extend its political influence over Tibet to throw its ægis over the only remaining wild horse. The tapir of British Guiana and the tapir of the Malay Peninsula are both citizens of the British Empire. Many a wonderful parrot or lory, a pheasant, horn-bill, plaintain-eater or sunbird is entirely "British" in its range. The lyre-bird—one of the small wonders of creation—



OIL-WELLS AT YANANGYET, IN BURMA

is a fellow-citizen of Australia with the kangaroo, though not yet accorded that rigid protection it deserves. As to the botanical wealth, it is stupendous.

The British flag waves over the grandest forests of the world, temperate and tropical. The pines and firs of Canada, the oaks and beeches of England, the mahogany of British Honduras and British Guiana, the Kauri pine of New Zealand, the eucalyptus and acacia of Australia, the teak of India; the ebony, the incense trees, the khayas of West Africa; the junipers and giant yews of the East African mountains; and the sandalwood and bamboos of the Malay Peninsula; the orchids of Burma and British Guiana, the roses of England and Canada,



CRUDE NATIVE METHOD OF WASHING THE RUBY-LADEN GRAVEL



THE EUROPEAN MINING METHODS IN THE SAME PLACE

Underwood

NATIVE AND BRITISH METHODS AT THE RUBY MINES OF MOGOK IN BURMA

the vines of South Africa and Australia, the wheat of British North America, the wheat of India and New Zealand, the bananas of the West Indies and of West Africa, the oranges of Jamaica and of New South Wales, the sugar of Barbados and of Queensland, the apples of New Zealand and Canada, the mangoes and mangosteens of India, the apples, plums, peaches of South Africa, which are some day going to be amongst her principal articles of export to a fruit-loving world; the oil-palm of West Africa; the rubber from the same region, from Ceylon, and from the Malay Peninsula; the tea from Assam, Ceylon, and Natal; coffee from Nyassaland, Uganda, and Sierra Leone; cacao from the Gold Coast, Jamaica, and Trinidad; rice from India and West Africa.

These are a few of the items to be recounted in the tale of vegetable wealth. It is a subject for serious consideration that the rule of the British king as directed and advised by his numerous legislatures all over the world should control such an enormous portion of the world's food supplies. In the time to come—which no living reader of this history may see—food may be more valuable than the so-called precious metals and precious stones.

The educational establishments of the British Empire, besides those of the United Kingdom and the Channel Islands, consist of the following. Gibraltar has thirteen government-aided elementary schools. In Malta there is a university, founded under the rule of the Knights of St. John in 1769, with four faculties, and a lyceum, or public school, for boys, besides two government secondary schools for boys and for girls, 167 elementary schools, four technical and art schools, and seventy-one private educational establishments.

In Cyprus there are two Boards of Education to regulate (a) the Christian and (b) the Moslem schools of the island. These consist of four Greek high schools, and a Greek "gymnasium," or university; one Moslem high school, two similar Armenian-Christian establishments (high schools for boys and girls), a third Armenian school conducted by monks, and three schools for the Maronite Christians are also state-aided. Of the 526 elementary schools, 178 are Moslem. In Egypt there were, in 1907, 2,761 Moslem elementary schools, imparting

sufficiently useful education to receive governmental assistance. There are also many government technical schools for teaching carpentry, metal work, etc.

Under the Ministry of Education there are 143 elementary schools for Moslems, thirty-four primary schools, four secondary schools, ten special and technical schools for dealing with agriculture, art, engineering, teaching, etc., and eleven professional colleges (medicine, law, military, veterinary science, engineering, teaching, etc.). In addition there are also 305 first-class schools maintained by foreigners, notably by Americans. There is the great useless Moslem university of Al Azhar, near Cairo, still wasting human time and marring the intellectual progress of modern Egypt by an antique, fanatical, unscientific, unpractical style of teaching.

Education in Egypt owes a debt to Britain mainly on account of its patience and energy in pressing on the Egyptian Government the need for rescuing knowledge from the strangling grasp of Mohammedan fanatics. But it also owes much recognition to the memory of Mehemet Ali and his great-grandson, Ismail Pasha; also equally to the personal intervention of the late khedive and his father Tewfik. And last, but not least, to private Mohammedan generosity and to the missionary efforts of America.

In the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan there are fifteen elementary Arabic schools, and six secondary. These government schools are practically secular, and Christian as well as Moslem children are educated there. There are two industrial schools, besides that which is attached to the Gordon College, and three training colleges for teachers. Gordon College itself at Khartoum includes a department for the education of the Sudanese in law and the other subjects required by them for entry into the civil service; and also a high school for boys to be taught engineering, surveying, English, etc.

Very little seems to be done for the education of the Arabs or Somalis at Aden or in British Somaliland—practically nothing, in fact; nor are missionaries encouraged to work there, owing to Mohammedan fanaticism. The same is the case in the Persian Gulf and in Baluchistan. In India only about 16,500,000 people out of a total population of 297,000,000 are able to read and write in any language.

Britain's Vegetable Wealth

The Sudan's Government Education

State-Aided Schools in Cyprus



NATIVE WORKMEN FILLING RAILWAY TRUCKS WITH PITCH



A STEAMER LOADING AT THE PITCH LAKE



NATIVES DIGGING THE PITCH

J. White

ONE OF THE WORLD'S WONDERS: THE PITCH LAKE AT LA TREA, TRINIDAD

HISTORY OF THE WORLD

Only about 25 per cent. of the boys ever attend school, and only $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the girls. The best educated region is Bengal. On the whole, the Hindus are better educated than the Mohammedans. There are five universities—Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Lahore, and Allahabad. There are 185 colleges, among which is the Mayo College for the education of the sons of princes, 115,869 government or government-aided schools, including 1,664 training and special schools for the instruction of school teachers and the teaching of many technical subjects. There are numerous government schools of art. There are also 42,604 private and charitable schools. Of the colleges, twelve only are for the education of women, for whom also there are 112 training schools, and 11,256 primary, secondary, and private schools.

In Ceylon, which has a total population of 3,578,333, there are 590 government schools, and 1,785 private schools.

There is a royal college and a government training college, besides several English high schools. Less than half the population is illiterate—a great contrast to India. In the Straits Settlements, the sultanate of Johor, and the Federated Malay States there are about 245 schools of all degrees maintained by the British or the native governments (210 in the Straits Settlements). The educational establishments of Sarawak and North Borneo are almost entirely maintained by missionary societies. Hong Kong has seventy primary schools, two girls'

high schools, three high schools for both sexes, and two high schools for young people of European parentage. On the leasehold of Wei-hai-wei there are four government schools teaching English, one private school for European children, and numerous Chinese schools.

In Mauritius there is the royal college, with two preparatory schools, and there are a training college for teachers, sixty-seven government primary schools, eighty-eight state-aided schools, and one assisted Mohammedan school. Education is gratuitous but not compulsory. The Seychelles Archipelago, with a population of 22,000, maintains twenty-seven primary assisted schools, the Victoria secondary school for boys, two Catholic secondary schools, one for girls, and an efficient infants' school. There are two government scholarships of £50 a year. In Cape Colony there is a university (Cape Town), and there are five colleges and 3,750 schools, primary and secondary. In Zanzibar, and in the various Crown colonies, protectorates, and spheres of influence of Tropical Africa, except the Gambia and Sierra Leone, education is mainly in the hands of the different missionary societies, and is entirely confined to the natives of Africa. In Sierra Leone the educational establishments are excellent. There is Fula Bay College, a first-class institution; there are seventy-five primary schools, seventy-four secondary schools, four Mohammedan schools, and a college at Bô—



A PLUMBAGO MINE AT KURUNEGALA, IN CEYLON
Photo, Morgan Crucible Co.

in the interior—



A TIN MINE NEAR KWALA LUMPUR, THE CAPITAL OF SELANGOR

G. R. Lambert & Co.

for the sons of chiefs. In the Gambia there are six elementary schools under missionary management which receive state aid. There is also one secondary school.

On the Gold Coast, in proportion to its size and wealth, education is not much fostered by the government, and were it not for the work of the Swiss Basle Mission—which for thirty years has flooded West Africa with enlightenment and education of a most practical, industrial character—the Gold Coast natives would contrast disadvantageously with the rest of British West Africans. There are seven government schools in the coast regions of this colony and 140 assisted schools. There are no government schools in Ashanti. In Southern Nigeria education has of late been taken in hand by the government with vigour and success. There is a high school at Bonny, another at Old Calabar, and a grammar school at Lagos. In addition, there are thirty-one government primary schools (four for girls) and sixty-nine assisted schools. A Mohammedan school has been opened at Lagos.

In the Bermudas, where there is a population of nearly 18,000, there are five schools for the children of the soldiers and sailors, twenty primary schools, and five

secondary. There are said to be three Bermudan Rhodes scholars at Oxford. In the Bahamas the government schools number forty-six, together with twelve that receive state aid and forty-nine unaided. All this for a population of only 60,000 promises well for the advancement of the Bahamas.

In Jamaica, with a population—mainly black—of about 830,000, there are 687 government schools, three training colleges for teachers, and a high school at Kingston. There are also a large number of endowed high schools, industrial and technical institutions. Seven elementary government schools are maintained on the Turks and Caicos Islands dependent on Jamaica.

In the Leeward Islands, to a population of 134,000, there are 115 primary schools, six secondary, an agricultural college, and an industrial school. In the Windward Islands of Grenada, St. Vincent, and St. Lucia there is a population of 372,000; and there are 118 primary schools, one grammar school in Grenada, and an agricultural school in St. Vincent. Barbados has a population of 197,000, and maintains 166 primary schools, five secondary, three high schools, and Codrington College, affiliated to Durham University. Trinidad and Tobago together have a

population of 328,000. There are 250 government schools, many private schools, a queen's royal college, and a Roman Catholic college. The Central American colony of British Honduras has a population of 41,000 and forty-one primary schools, together with five secondary schools. British Guiana, in

Camp Schools in the Falkland Islands

Northern South America has a population of about 307,000, 220 schools receiving state aid, and a government college in Georgetown. Besides this, the local government affords certain means to natives of the colony to pursue a university education in England.

In the Falkland Islands, near the southern extremity of the South American continent, there is a population of about 2,100, and there are five permanent schools—one Roman Catholic—besides an excellent system of camp schools, with travelling schoolmasters. Education here is compulsory.

In the little lonely South Atlantic island of St. Helena there is a native population of 3,500, for whom nine schools are maintained, partly at government expense. So much for the education of the Inner Empire; that of the self-governing daughter nations is as follows:

The dominion of Canada has an approximate population at the date of writing of 8,000,000. Her nine provinces and Yukon territory maintain 20,570 schools—public, high, and for secondary education. There are, in addition, many private schools. There are, further, thirty colleges, mostly gathered round eighteen universities. Education is compulsory throughout Canada.

The population of Newfoundland and Labrador is about 233,000 at the present time. There are 881 public and secondary schools and three colleges, supported or partly supported by state funds, but entirely managed by the local Anglican, Roman Catholic, and Methodist churches. Edu-

Cape Colony's Schools and Colleges

education does not appear to be compulsory. In Cape Colony there is a population of more than 580,000 whites of European descent, of whom nearly 145,000 are illiterate. The total population is 2,500,000, and education—not compulsory—is state-provided in some 3,750 primary and secondary schools and in five colleges. There is an examining university in Cape Town. In Basutoland there are four government

schools, an industrial school, and 250 schools maintained—partly state aided—by missionaries. The education in Bechuanaland is entirely conducted by the London Missionary Society and the Dutch Reformed Church.

In Natal there is a European population of about 95,000; Asiatics, 112,000; negroes, 945,000. For the European children there are 295 government or state-aided primary schools, two government high schools in Durban and Pietermaritzburg, two government art schools, 167 government or government-aided schools for negroes, and twenty-eight government-aided schools for Indian children. There are altogether forty-five schools entirely managed by the government and 469 that receive state funds. Education, though much encouraged, is not compulsory.

In the Orange River Colony education since 1905 is practically compulsory. The European population is about 145,000. There are about 170 primary schools, three residential high schools (one for girls), a training school for teachers, and the Grey University College, near Bloemfontein. Two

Compulsory Education in the Transvaal

hundred and ninety thousand inhabitants entirely of European origin in the Transvaal have their children's education attended to at 502 primary schools. There are about twelve schools specially provided for children of mixed race, and there are 209 schools for negroes. There is a normal college for the training of teachers and a Transvaal University College. Education for Europeans is compulsory. The whole character of the educational measures passed by the first Transvaal parliament, in 1906, is essentially modern and efficient.

In Southern Rhodesia there are private schools for European children at Bulawayo and at Salisbury, but of necessity the European population of the three Rhodesian provinces (about 16,000) is at present mainly adult. The education of the great Zulu-Kaffir race in South Africa has received in general a great impulse from the Lovedale Institute of the Free Church of Scotland Mission in Eastern Cape Colony.

The commonwealth of Australia, including Tasmania and Norfolk Island, has a total population of European race of about 4,150,000. For the general and primary education of these there are 7,362 government or state-provided schools, and 2,284 recognised private schools. New South Wales has the University of Sydney



DESOLATE SOUTH AFRICA: TYPICAL KAROO SCENERY



A VAST SEA OF SAND IN THE ARABIAN DESERT



A SAND-BLOWN GRAVEYARD IN THE DESERT

DESERT SCENES IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE

and the Technical College, which last gives instruction in agriculture, among other subjects. There are schools of art in most of the principal towns. Education is compulsory. Victoria has a university at Melbourne with three colleges, a school of mines, and seventeen technical colleges. Education is compulsory, and it is said that only

Australasia's Educational Institution 2 per cent. of the population is illiterate. In Queensland education is not yet compulsory. A university is about to be established at Brisbane. In South Australia, which has a population of nearly 385,000, education is compulsory, but it is said that nearly 17 per cent. of the people are illiterate. No doubt, under this head are included the few thousand Chinese and aborigines. This state has a university at Adelaide, and maintains a training college for teachers. In West Australia education is compulsory, and only 3 per cent. are said to be illiterate. Tasmania has a university at Hobart, two schools of mines, and two technical schools. Education is compulsory.

Little Norfolk Island, under the management of New South Wales, has one efficient government school for its population—European and Melanesian—of nearly 1,000. The dominion of New Zealand has a population of about 890,000 whites, 48,000 Maories, 2,570 Chinese, and in its dependent archipelagoes 12,340 Polynesians. Education is compulsory. There are 1,847 public primary schools, 308 private schools, 28 secondary schools, seven school of mines, four normal schools, five principal schools of art, and 11 industrial schools, besides 104 schools for Maories. There are colleges at Dunedin, Christchurch, Canterbury, and Wellington for specialist education, and these are affiliated to the university of New Zealand at Wellington.

The territory of Papua (British New Guinea) is governed by the Australian Commonwealth. It has a population of under 900 Europeans, almost all adults.

Europeans Increasing in Fiji The native population of Papuans is estimated at 400,000. Their education is in the hands of the London Missionary Society, the Roman Catholic Society of the Sacred Heart, the Church of England Mission, and the Methodist Missionary Society of Australasia.

In the Crown colony of Fiji, the European population is steadily increasing. It numbers at present about 3,300. Education for this section of the com-

munity is provided at the cost of the community, and is directed by the school-boards of Suva and Levuka, and carried on by two government schools at these places. There are also three good Roman Catholic schools at Suva and Levuka. A government native high school has been established for some considerable time at Nasinu, near Suva, where an excellent higher education is offered to the native Fijians and the children of the Asiatic settlers (Indian coolies, mostly).

The Wesleyan and Roman Catholic missions provide entirely the primary education of the natives (Melanesians and Polynesians) throughout the Fiji and Rotuma Islands. The Wesleyans also conduct the education of the natives of the protected kingdom of Tonga. Missionaries of the Wesleyan, Presbyterian, Anglican, and Roman Catholic Churches also preside—without any grant or state assistance whatsoever—over the education of the thousands of natives of the British protected Gilbert, Solomon, and Santa Cruz Islands in the Equatorial Pacific.

The total number of armed men ready for war service—the standing armies, 1st Reserve, colonial volunteers in constant training and thoroughly efficient, also the military police—of the British Empire before the great war amounted to about 926,000, including the British Reserves, Channel Islands Militia, Honourable Artillery Company, and permanent staffs of militia, etc., but not the English Militia, Imperial Yeomanry, or Territorial Army. Of these, in the first place, should be mentioned the regular (professional) army of the United Kingdom, amounting to 216,018 combatants of all arms, and 31,348 non-combatants. This army was distributed thus: 115,148 in Great Britain, and about 15,000 in Ireland; 3,809 at Gibraltar; 7,099 in Malta and Crete; 123 in Cyprus; 76,155 in India; 1,000 in Ceylon; 5,719 in Egypt and the Sudan; 1,500 at Singapore; 3,101 at Hong Kong and Wei-hai-wei; 16,213 in South Africa; 18 at St. Helena; 1,309 at the Bermudas; 547 in Jamaica; and about 726 in Mauritius. The total colonial contingent was over 40,000, but a few years ago there were 50,000 British soldiers in the colonies.

Canada before the war had a military force on the footing of active service, including military police, of about 3,000, and an active militia of about 51,000. Australia



A NATIVE OPEN-AIR SCHOOL AT OPOBO IN NIGERIA

J. A. Green



DUTCH CHILDREN AT SCHOOL IN BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA

T. D. Ravenscroft

EDUCATING THE YOUNG SUBJECTS AND CITIZENS OF GREATER BRITAIN

THE SINEWS OF EMPIRE

maintained a tiny permanent army of 1,329 officers and men, and a partly-paid trained militia of 15,445. Including volunteers, rifle-clubmen, cadets, and a reserve of officers, the commonwealth has a potential army of 84,000 men. The six Australian states, moreover, maintain a force of about 10,000 mounted police, first-class irregular soldiers in war time. New Zealand also has a permanent militia of 341 artillery and engineers, and a regularly drilled volunteer force of not less than 18,000, notwithstanding 700 mounted police. Cape Colony—besides the imperial troops stationed in the

Rhodesia can at short notice put in the field a good fighting force of at least 5,000 volunteers, mostly mounted. The Egyptian army in Egypt and the Sudan consists of a force of 19,010 rank and file, including 121 British officers. Egypt pays an approximate £150,000 a year towards the cost of the British army of occupation. Malta maintains a respectable contingent—the Royal Malta Artillery (446), the King's Own Malta Regiment (war strength, 2,258), and the Malta Militia Submarine Miners (63). The Maltese Government also pays £5,000 to the Imperial Government as a



G. R. Lambert

OPENING OF THE FIRST STATE RAILWAY IN THE MALAY PENINSULA

colony—maintains a respectable armed force: 705 Cape Mounted Rifles, 1,734 Mounted Police, and a body of 5,835 volunteers in regular drill. Natal has an armed force—mounted police, mounted rifles, naval gun corps, and trained militia—of about 6,439 men. She also subsidises rifle associations (5,774 officers and men) and cadet corps (3,471). The Transvaal and Orange State together maintain the South African Constabulary, an efficient force of 2,700 officers and men. In addition, the Transvaal maintains a well-trained volunteer force, mostly ex-soldiers of 10,000 men.

military contribution. Ceylon pays about £70,000 for its Imperial garrison, and maintains in addition an efficient volunteer force of 2,333 officers and men.

India has a magnificent army of 160,000, including British officers, a military police of 56,887, a volunteer force of 34,000 Europeans and Eurasians, and contingents furnished by the feudatory states of 20,189, a total force—apart from the Imperial garrison of 76,155, for which India pays Britain about £1,395,000 annually—of 271,076 officers and men. The Straits Settlements, besides their Imperial

and Indian garrison, for which they pay, have a very efficient volunteer force of about 770 Europeans, Eurasians, and Chinese. The Federated Malay States have a smart little army known as the Malay States Guides—British officers, Sikhs, Pathans, and Malays, 2,665 in all. The local military forces of British

Defenders of British Tropical Africa South Africa, from North-west Rhodesia to Cape Colony, have already been described; likewise those of the Egyptian Sudan. Mauritius is garrisoned by a small detachment of British troops, formerly as many as 1,394, towards the cost of which the colony paid annually £27,000, but now reduced to about 726.

The rest of British Tropical Africa is divided into two great sections, East and West. The Eastern section comprises the colonies or protectorates of Somaliland, Uganda, British East Africa, Zanzibar, and British Central Africa—Nyassaland and North-east Rhodesia. This section is defended by a regiment of negro soldiers known as the King's African Rifles. Of this at present there are five battalions, No. 1 to 6 (No. 5 is at present non-existent). The 1st and 3rd battalions are in East Africa and Zanzibar, the 2nd in Central Africa, the 4th in Uganda, and the 6th in Somaliland.

At present the total number of King's African Rifles under arms is 2,700. In East Africa there is, in addition, a military police of 1,800 under 35 British officers; in Uganda a constabulary of 1,060; in Zanzibar, 500; in Nyassaland, 200. There is also a corps of 160 Sikh soldiers from the Indian Army stationed in Nyassaland. In the West African section the indigenous regiment, so to speak, is the West Africa Frontier Force. This is stationed in the Gambia Protectorate (126 men), the Sierra Leone Protectorate (470 men), the Gold Coast hinterland (2,175 men), Southern and Northern Nigeria (5,266 men).

The Forces in British West Africa In addition there are the West African Regiment and the 1st battalion of the West India Regiment, besides artillery, engineers, etc., at Sierra Leone (2,612 officers and men in all). The Gambia maintains a military police of 80 men; Sierra Leone, 240; Gold Coast, 621; Southern Nigeria, 980; and Northern Nigeria, 1,180. Lastly, there should also be counted with the effective forces in British West Africa

the Gold Coast volunteers (1,056 officers and men), partly paid, and maintained more or less on a war footing.

The local soldiery or military police in the West Indies and Tropical America, apart from the British garrison in Jamaica, consists of the 2nd battalion of the West Indian Regiment in Jamaica (500 officers and men), and 800 militia, besides a very efficient constabulary (1,753) modelled on that of Ireland, and, as a matter of fact, officered and sub-officered by officers and men chosen from the Royal Irish Constabulary. In Barbados there is a police force of 315, and measures are being taken to raise and maintain a small colonial force of mounted infantry.

In the Bahamas, Leeward and Windward Islands there are small forces of civil police. In Trinidad there is a constabulary of 652, and a volunteer rifle corps of 352. British Honduras maintains a constabulary of 100, and a volunteer light infantry corps (mounted and unmounted) of 260. British Guiana either fears no foe, within or without, or is very shy of disclosing its

Empire's Fighting Strength public order, for no particulars are extant as to its military and police. There are said to be militia and volunteers to the total number of 240. The Falkland Islands support a volunteer corps of 98. The total of the forces, therefore, for offence or defence throughout the empire ready for immediate action—professional army, military constabulary, volunteers or militia in constant training and available for immediate service—is about 926,300, of whom approximately 560,000 are white, and 366,000 belong to the coloured races—Indian, Egyptian, Negro, Mulatto, Malay, Chinese and Polynesian.

Behind this force there are as yet undefined potentialities which at present take the place of that actuality so necessary to the safety of the British Empire, throughout all parts of which (in the opinion of the present writer) compulsory military service on the part of all males, more or less between the ages of 19 and 40, should be an article of the constitution of every country under the British flag, most of all in the Motherland. Compulsory service in the militia is now a law of the state in New Zealand (it is projected in Australia), in Canada, in Natal, and in Cape Colony.



A FRIENDLY POWER IN EGYPT: BRITISH TROOPS MARCHING THROUGH THE STREETS OF CAIRO
From the painting by W. C. Horsley, by the artist's permission



BRITISH EXPANSION IN EUROPE AND THE STEADY PROGRESS OF EGYPT UNDER BRITISH CONTROL

WHAT effect have the establishment and growth of the British Empire had on the world outside the limits of Great Britain and Ireland?

In Europe, the ethnological results of the extension of British rule beyond the Irish and English Channels was inconsiderable down to about twenty years ago; in short, down to the time that the other great nations of the White world applied themselves in all seriousness to the foundation of empires beyond the seas. They then began to adopt many British ideas, words, games, notions in art and industry, clothes, furniture, and sport. It is true that in horse-racing, railways, steamships, the training of children, farming, and agriculture we had engendered original concepts and inventions expressed in idiomatic Anglo-Saxon, and these had spread the British influence of jockeys, engineers, governesses, stockmen, and gardeners throughout France, Western Germany, Italy, Russia, Tunis, and Egypt; also that the success of the constitutional government had for at least 150 years turned the eyes of all reformers and political theorists towards England.

But down to twenty years ago it was rather France that set the fashions in all departments for all Europe than the Anglo-Saxon. This "British" influence abroad is at least one quarter American. It is so difficult to discriminate nowadays between what notions and ideas are started in the United States and what have their origin in British, Canadian, Australian, South African, or British-Indian brains, that for the purpose of this review the British and American Empires must be held to be one.

England started by borrowing her dominant language, her culture, industries, ideas, science, architecture, religion, rulers, laws, weapons, and cooking from

France, Rome, the Netherlands, Frisia, Western Germany, and Italy. Her nearest political and racial colonies, beyond her strict geographical limits, were the Channel Islands. These were at first not so much colonies or conquests as the last vestiges of the Norman power which had conquered England in 1066. The Channel Islands had been peopled from quite a remote antiquity by types of the different races that overran the North of France, with which, indeed, Guernsey and Jersey were almost connected by sandbanks and fords of shallow water at the beginning of the historical period. They were taken possession of and named from the ninth century onwards by Norse rovers from Norway, and consequently came to form part of the Duchy of Normandy, of which, politically, they are the last remnant.

These Normans mingled with the preceding Iberian and Aryan Romanised Kelts. Down, therefore, to about the reign of Elizabeth, the Channel Islanders were scarcely distinguishable, anthropologically, from the Normans of Northern France. But in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the political troubles in England caused a number of English to settle in Jersey and Guernsey, and the complete detachment of all the Channel Islanders from the Church of Rome in the middle of the sixteenth century added to the separation from Norman France. In

The Channel Islands Secede From Rome Alderney, Jersey, Guernsey, and Sark the people, almost without exception, belong to the Anglican Church, and here alone is the Liturgy of the Church of England rendered in French. It is somewhat surprising that this adherence to the national Church has not been rewarded by the institution of a bishop of the Channel Islands (they are under the See of

Winchester). There are, moreover, learned societies in Jersey and Guernsey which conduct their proceedings in French. From the eighteenth century onwards the islands have been garrisoned by detachments of British troops, and not a few of these soldiers or sailors from the British fleet have subsequently married and settled down in the Channel Islands, whither also during the last hundred years English families have resorted for permanent settlement because of the delightful climate, lovely scenery, low cost of living, and educational advantages. The use of the English language is spreading year by year over a larger area in these islands. As it is, Alderney is almost entirely

the use of the French language; but all these parts of the world have retained the Roman Catholic form of Christianity. So far as language, prejudices, mode of life, and all that goes to the making of a people is concerned, the Channel Islanders of the present day—in spite of the hundred miles of sea that separate them from England—are more closely knit up with her in sympathy than are the people of half Ireland. They could never be made French citizens except by the continuous application of force, just as, in all probability, the inhabitants of Northern Lorraine would ever resist the attempt to coerce them into German citizenship, or the Germans of the Baltic provinces willingly



CASTLE CORNET IN THE ISLAND OF GUERNEY

Frith

English-speaking. In Guernsey only about a quarter of the population is now unable to speak English, while another quarter can speak no French. The local language is very different from literary French, and is the old Norman speech that was introduced into the island after the Conquest. In Jersey the same thing is taking place, if anything more markedly.

In Jersey, however, if not always in Guernsey, the official language is literary French, which, by the way, is as illogical as making Italian the official language of Malta. Probably here alone in the whole world is the service of the Church of England rendered in French. Other portions of the globe have been peopled by the French and acquired by the British, and yet retain

remain subjects of the Russian Empire. Gibraltar, after two hundred years of British occupation, has had singularly little effect on the people of Spain and Portugal, beyond the neutral zone, which restricts the intercourse of the British garrison on this square mile and seven-eighths of rock with the people of the Iberian peninsula.

The British soldiers and officials for two hundred years have freely intermarried with the Genoese and Spanish women, the descendants of the original inhabitants of Gibraltar when the British took possession of it. The resulting "Rock Scorpions" vary considerably in type and social status. Several of the most beautiful and accomplished women of the world during the nineteenth century have been



MONT ORGUEIL IN JERSEY, SHOWING THE ANCIENT CASTLE



GUERNSEY'S PRINCIPAL TOWN: VIEW OF ST. PETER PORT AND HARBOUR



THE HARBOUR OF ST. HELIER, THE CHIEF PORT OF JERSEY

Frith

SCENES IN THE CHANNEL ISLANDS



GENERAL VIEW OF THE TOWN



A POPULAR PROMENADE, SHOWING PART OF MOORISH CASTLE ON THE HILL

GIBRALTAR: A VALUABLE POSSESSION OF GREAT BRITAIN



THE SIGNAL STATION ON ITS ROCKY EMINENCE



WATERPORT STREET, THE PRINCIPAL BUSINESS THOROUGHFARE

OTHER SCENES IN THE FORTRESS TOWN OF GIBRALTAR

of Gibraltar birth and descended from the unions of British officers with Spanish ladies. But these have married officials in the army, navy, or diplomatic service, and have soon passed away to spheres of influence beyond Gibraltar. There is a considerable Jewish element in the shopkeeping class, and it is these who, together with the descendants of English soldiers and Spanish women, form that type of "Rock Scorpion" that may be met with nowadavs so frequently in Morocco, Algeria, Tunis above all, Malta, and the Ionian Islands. At one time there were quite a number of Gibraltarese in the regency of Tunis, attracted thither by the favourable conditions enjoyed by British

The Jewish Element in Gibraltar

the part of the Maltese people, who largely by their own personal efforts and bravery expelled the French garrison, though, of course, they had been assisted in this task by Nelson's overthrow of the French forces at sea. Fearing lest they might not be able to maintain themselves against future attacks on the part of France, and disliking very much the idea of reverting to that Neapolitan sovereignty from which the islands of Malta and Gozo were withdrawn by Charles V., the Maltese people offered their country to the King of Great Britain and Ireland: Europe confirmed this choice at the Congress of 1815. Under England's rule the Maltese have prospered exceedingly. Magnificent public works have been constructed in the island



BRITISH TROOPS IN MALTA: THE MAIN GUARD AT VALETTA

commerce down to 1898. The regency of Tunis was at one time very near becoming a British protectorate, owing to the influence that radiated from Malta and the friendly relations between the beys of Tunis and the British naval officers which followed on the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte. In the curious struggle that went on, under the surface, between France, Britain, and Italy for predominance in Tunis, Gibraltar Jews were generally the men of straw used by these conflicting influences in their attempts to acquire landed property or other stakes in the country.

The British acquisition of Malta was not—it is sometimes necessary to remind red-hot Imperialists—a conquest, but the result of a voluntary and graceful act on

of Malta—Gozo has not been so well attended to—and under the ægis of the British flag the Maltese have founded flourishing colonies—here 30,000, there 20,000, in another place 10,000—in Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli, Barca, and Egypt, and even in Crete and elsewhere in the Levant. The Maltese in Algeria tend more and more to adopt French nationality, deriving therefrom considerable commercial advantages, and finding perhaps in the French nation a more courteous foster-mother than Great Britain has been to them. "His mother was a Maltese, you know," is the sneering phrase that I have often heard from a British officer in the army or navy or in the Colonial Civil Service in

Malta's Great Prosperity Under Britain



THE BARACCA: A BEAUTIFUL VIEW IN VALETTA



A CURIOUS STREET OF STEPS AND THE HARBOUR AT VALETTA, THE CAPITAL



MARSA MUSCET, SHOWING THE STRONGLY BUILT FORTIFICATIONS

reference to some more or less distinguished man in the employ of the British Government. "He says she was an Italian countess, but she really was nothing but a Maltese, I can assure you." Why it should be in any sense derogatory to be born a Maltese the present writer is at a loss to understand. The population of

British Occupation of Malta

these islands is considerably mixed in origin it is true, but it is derived from very noble sources—from the best of the chivalry of Aragon, France, England, Germany, and Northern Italy; or if it be of a brunette type, then from a splendid Mediterranean stock which goes back in origin to the Phœnicians.

At one time it was thought necessary to treat Malta on very military lines; but it has gradually been borne in on the British Government that the military and civil departments should be to some extent separated, and the time may come when Malta may have a civilian as governor, or even—why not?—a Maltese noble or eminent citizen in that position? But though the connection with Malta has been marked by episodes of a bad taste that seems peculiarly British—and yet not an ancient, but quite a modern trait in the race—the main results of the British occupation of Malta have been of enormous benefit to the inhabitants of the two islands. There has been definitely created a Maltese people, destined to play a very notable part in the commercial development of the Mediterranean.

If England, as the garrisoning race, should mend her manners, the Maltese might at the same time cause an impartial history of Malta during the last hundred years to be drawn up and published, and thereby realise how much indeed they owe in gratitude to the acceptance by George III. of kingship over Malta. The British protectorate over the Ionian Islands did much the same for the Greeks

Greeks and the English Language

of Corfu as for the mixed races of Arab, French, and Italian origin in Malta. It certainly spread acquaintance with and use of the English language amongst the Greeks of the Levant. Many a Greek commercial house now of world-wide importance arose from the British occupation of this archipelago, which, until the onslaught of Napoleon Bonaparte, had belonged to Venice since the time it was detached from the Byzantine Empire.

The Ionian Islands, indeed, were at last the only refuge of Greek culture from the sickening barbarism of Turkey. It is possible that but for the British occupation of these Islands, Greece would never have aspired to or have recovered her independence, would never have possessed a base from which she could organise resistance to the Turkish yoke.

Sentimentality fortunately swayed the nations of Europe in favour of Greece in the first half of the nineteenth century; yet it is doubtful whether the spark of Hellenic nationality in Greece itself could ever have been revived and fanned into a powerful flame but for British encouragement emanating from the Ionian Islands. Nor, had this occupation not taken place, could those Greek houses of commerce have arisen to a secure affluence and have developed such a large Anglo-Hellenic trade as now exists in Western Asia Minor nor at Constantinople.

Curiously enough, Greeks are happier governed by Greeks—even if they be less well governed—than by intelligent foreigners! England would feel it in the same way if the Germans occupied the Isle of Wight. They would probably do a vast deal to improve the service on the Isle

The Ionian Islands Under Greece

of Wight Railway, and carry out much needed public works in a masterful manner, besides endowing the island with better schools than those which are given at present. Yet—illogical and ungrateful though they might be—the inhabitants of the Isle of Wight would probably prefer to remain under or to return to the control of the British Government rather than become citizens of the German Empire.

Consequently, Great Britain acted wisely in yielding to the wishes of the Ionians that they might come under the sovereignty of Greece. Nevertheless, anyone who has visited the island of Corfu, if he be of British blood, cannot but admire the magnificent public works which have been carried out on that island, and ask himself whether the material prosperity of that group might not be far higher than it is at present were the supreme administration in the hands of honest Anglo-Saxons. There is little doubt, however, that the continued retention of this protectorate would have involved England in disagreeable European complications, and certainly would have ended by offending the



VENDOR OF GOATS' MILK



A MALTESE LADY



PRIEST IN CLERICAL ATTIRE



MONK IN HIS ROBES



AN EGG-SELLER



A BOY CHORISTER



COMMON STREET PORTER



A SELLER OF SWEETS



A BRAN-SELLER

TYPICAL CHARACTERS OF THE ISLAND OF MALTA

growing power of that kingdom of Italy, with whom England desires to be connected by every tie of affection and interest. Yet, having lost the Ionian Islands, which gave her a certain hold, a useful garrison in the eastern half of the Mediterranean, England yearned for some alternative possession. The feeling burrowed underground through

Cyprus in British Hands the tortuous channels of the official mind, and emerged at last to the surface through the romantic action of Lord

Beaconsfield in 1878 in acquiring the leasehold—the practical possession—of the island of Cyprus. Several times before and since Great Britain has coquetted with the idea of acquiring Crete, more especially on account of the importance of Suda Bay to a great naval Power. But for unpublished—perhaps only spoken, and not written—warnings from other European Powers that the addition of Crete to Cyprus, or, as was once or twice contemplated, the substitution of this much more valuable island for the half-barren, altogether harbourless Cyprus, would mean the overflowing of the cup of bitterness and the declaration of war, Crete might now by some fiction or another be under the British flag. As it is, its destiny will be inevitably to form part of an enlarged kingdom of Greece.

In Cyprus much the same effect has been produced by British rule as occurred in the Ionian Islands: magnificent public works—sometimes carried out without any regard to picturesque or respect for valuable historical remains—an absolutely honest, painstaking administration; the saving, just in time, of the native forests, and with them the climate, which has been rapidly deteriorating under Turkish rule from one sufficiently moist to maintain an exuberant vegetation to conditions of almost waterless sterility; on the other, the ingratitude of the Greek, due, it is alleged, to the exclusion of Greeks from most of the posts under the British Government.

Where the Turks are Preferred Strangely enough, England relied for local support in Cyprus not on the Greek, but on the Turkish element in the population, and preferred much more to employ Turks than to engage Greeks in the public service, assigning as the reason that the latter were not honest and could not be depended on for steady work; while as a servant, a public servant, under an honest and capable employer, the Turk is

well-nigh perfect. In this case, in Cyprus, the Turk is very often simply a Mohammedan Greek. Actually, in Cyprus, in Crete, in Bosnia, and in many parts of the Balkans and Asia Minor, there is no racial difference between the good and the bad employé, the honest and dishonest merchant, but merely a question of religion.

As a master, the Mohammedan has been hitherto narrow-minded, intolerant, unprogressive, and financially corrupt; as a servant, under an employer of the North European type, a more admirable type of faithful, quiet, industrious public officer does not exist. The British occupation of Cyprus, together with the joint occupancy of Crete, produced this effect on the Mediterranean peoples: that it developed the Turk in the right direction, whether or not it is producing a wholesome effect upon the Greek.

But the occupancy of Egypt, though it should properly be treated of later on in connection with African questions, has in a sense knit England up with the Greek world of commerce to such a degree that in weighing the future relations of the Greek

Greeks as Pioneers of Commerce peoples with the British Empire the peevishness of the Cypriotes will be unheard. No nationality has profited so enormously by the British conquest of Egypt and of the Egyptian Sudan, or even of East Africa generally, as have the Greeks. Since England started somewhat blindly on this Imperial movement which has led her inevitably on the path from Cairo to the Cape, Greek adventurers of commerce have marched *pari passu* with the British forces, military and naval.

There are Greek merchants as far south on the East Coast as Delagoa Bay. They penetrate to Mashonaland and to Uganda; while on the coast of Somaliland they are more numerous than any other Europeans not of the official class. Khartoum is described as being a Greek city. Greeks and Maltese form a kind of middle-class in Egypt, between the indigenous Arabs and negroes on the one hand, and the foreign officials—British, French, and Italian—on the other. The servants of the Suez Canal Company, below the highly paid posts, if they are not Maltese are Greek.

British intervention in the affairs of Egypt and of the Egyptian Sudan, in common with that of France, really dates from Napoleon's invasion of 1799. The two countries see-sawed as to their influence

THE BRITISH EXPANSION IN EUROPE AND EGYPT

over the viceroys of Egypt. France instigated the exploration and conquest of the Upper Nile, and French officers accompanied and historiographed the first expeditions despatched up the Nile by Mehemet Ali.

The British soon sent consuls to Khartoum, who drew thither other explorers and big-game hunters, who in time turned into governor-generals or other officials in Egyptian pay. French engineers constructed great canals, their masterly work

Empire. With what results? Her extravagant debt has now been reduced from £103,969,020 to £95,833,280, in addition to which reduction there is a general reserve fund of £11,055,413; her population has risen from 6,814,000 to nearly 12,000,000; her cultivable area from about 4,000,000 acres to 6,500,000; forced labour is abolished; the rights of the peasants are absolutely secured; justice is pure and prompt; education enormously advanced; canals infinitely



A LOST POSSESSION OF THE ENGLISH CROWN: GENERAL VIEW OF CORFU

culminating in the canal of Suez. The British demanded in compensation the permission to build railways and to open the overland route. The Franco-German War weakened French influence, and 1882 found Great Britain with an almost prescriptive right to interfere in the Sudan, a control of the railway system, a virtual monopoly of the steamship traffic on the Nile, and a vested right in the Suez Canal. Egyptian bankruptcy having compelled her intervention, Egypt since 1882 has been under the control of the British

extended; railways carried to Khartoum and the Red Sea; the Sudan reconquered and administered to the infinite blessing of its native inhabitants, the enrichment of Egypt, and the advantage of European and American trade; and, finally, the people of the khedivate brought within sight of sound representative institutions.

The British occupation of Egypt, without the slightest doubt, has been the happiest event, in its results, which has ever befallen that country since the memorable expulsion of the shepherd kings.



BRITISH EXPANSION IN AMERICA FROM A BRITISH POINT OF VIEW

IN this survey we are treating the United States historically as an outgrowth of the empire of which they formed a part until their independence. When the British first landed as colonisers on the Atlantic coast of North America, in the

The First Britons in America

year 1578, the Spaniards had already overrun Florida, and had occupied a good deal of Mexico. Otherwise, the American Continent to the North of the Gulf of Mexico was free from the presence of the Caucasian. It was at that time populated sparsely by Indians, who, as compared to the races conquered by the Spaniards further south, were leading the life of savages, though there were underlying indigenous civilisations in the temperate or sub-tropical portions of North America which had existed and had died away, or had been overthrown by the arrival of nomad savages from the north.

The Amerindian race probably extended in those days as far north as the Mackenzie River and the shores of Hudson's Bay. (The writer of this essay thoroughly approves the fused word of "Amerindian" to indicate the autochthonous races of North and South America. "American" is more aptly applied to the white peoples; "Indian" is too likely to lead to confusion with the Dravidian peoples. Yet physically the Amerindians are nearly connected with the Malays, Dayaks, and Mongoloid races of further India and the Malay Archipelago. "Amerindian" is a happy blend of the

Habitations of the Esquimaux

characteristics of the "American Indians.") Here they impinged on the Esquimaux, whose range in the sixteenth century was not far different from what it is at the present day—along the Greenland coasts, the great islands of the Arctic regions that lie between Greenland and the North American Continent, and along the continental shores of the Arctic Ocean as far

as Bering Straits. Southwards, the Esquimaux seem to have penetrated on the east coast of America as far as 50° N. Lat., in Newfoundland and Labrador, and to have come as a conquering race, driving before them Indian tribes. It was still farther to the south of these regions, where the Esquimaux prevailed over the Indian, that the Norse colonies of the ninth and tenth centuries had been established (in Nova Scotia and Massachusetts) and had in turn been overthrown, mainly through the attacks of the Esquimaux, or at any rate of some race which in default of better knowledge we identify with the Esquimaux.

The Esquimaux—the word is derived from an Indian nick-name meaning "eaters of raw flesh," the people's own term for themselves being Innuvit—differs in the main from the Indian stock (which is identical with the existing indigenous population of America from the far north right down to Tierra del Fuego) in being moderately dolichocephalous—long-headed, instead of round or short-headed. Otherwise the Esquimaux, like the Amerindians—in a less pronounced form—seem to belong to the Mongolian sub-species of the human race. Probably the Esquimaux is one of the most primitive representatives of this third main division of the human species. The straight-haired, slanting-eyed, large-cheekboned, yellow-skinned variety of humanity, which differs from the other two main divisions—the Negro and the Caucasian—in having a very sparse growth of hair on the face and body, originated in North-eastern Asia, and spread thence northwards round the Polar regions.

The type may be a very ancient one, however, that existed as far back as the time when a land connection remained between North America on the one hand, and Northern Europe on the other, by way of Iceland and Spitzbergen. The

Where the Esquimaux Originated

Esquimaux type indeed may even during the Glacial periods have penetrated with the glacial conditions of life into the British Islands, France, and Scandinavia.

The Amerindians (*i.e.*, all the existing indigenous races in America) belong, in the main, to a Mongoloid type, but one that has developed special features of its own, and which may have absorbed pre-existing long-headed, Aino-like tribes of a more generalised type, such as Caucasoid tribes having preceded the Mongolian in the occupation of North America.

When the British colonists founded the settlement of Virginia, the Amerindians were, from our present point of view, savages, leading an existence more or less nomadic, with a preference for tents or (in the West) caves over huts. It is doubtful whether any of them dwelt in stone houses such as had once existed in the southern regions of North America, or in Mexico.

They lived largely as hunters, but probably did not number in all more than 5,000,000, if as much, throughout North America from the northern frontiers of Mexico to the Arctic Ocean. Their relations

Exterminating the Amerindians

with the British settlers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were in the main hostile. Tribe after tribe was gradually exterminated by diseases introduced by the Europeans, by warfare—often civil war between tribe and tribe, instigated by the European, or by alcohol.

France, late in the race for American colonisation, made up for lost time during the seventeenth century by the vigour and ability with which she colonised. By the early part of the eighteenth century she had laid the foundations of a Canadian empire and of a magnificent domain in what are now the southern states of North America. She dominated the Mississippi River from its mouth northwards so far as to bring her colonists of the south almost into touch with her colonists on the Great Lakes. Through her missionaries and her settlers she obtained a far-reaching influence over the Amerindians, with whom the French "habitants" mingled more freely—sexually—than did the Puritans or Hollanders of the Anglo-Saxon settlements.

The results are the French-speaking half-breeds of to-day in Canada—a handsome, stalwart race, often so prepossessing physically that they have been reabsorbed into the Caucasian community with little or no racial

objection. Yet the British settlers in the hinterland of New England also made friends here and there with Amerindian tribes. At last the Indians became involved in the hundred years' struggle between France and England for predominance in North America; and at this game, though the Europeans thrived and increased, the Indians decreased in

England's Long Struggle for North America

numbers, dying out from the extremely savage attacks of tribe against tribe, both waging that quarrel of the white man which was not theirs. By the time the United States were recognised as an independent power, and France had definitely abandoned political sway over any part of the mainland of North America—at the beginning of the nineteenth century, let us say—the Amerindians of North America had diminished in numbers both in Canada and the United States from the hypothetical 5,000,000 which were there when the white man first arrived to possibly not more than 3,000,000, distributed mainly over the countries west of the Mississippi and of the Canadian Rocky Mountains.

The middle of the nineteenth century saw the United States carrying on many an Indian war, which had arisen from the unchecked rapacity and shameless behaviour of the white colonists, who were pushing determinedly westwards towards the Pacific. Locations were set up by which it was hoped to provide a definite territory for one Indian tribe or another. A few of these locations are still maintained (87,237 square miles in 1906), but there is practically now no purely Indian territory on the soil of the United States or in Canada.

But the decrease of the Indians in the whole of North America, which may have brought their total as low as 1,300,000 somewhere about 1875—this estimate would include all Northern Mexico, with about 900,000 Amerindians—has apparently been checked of late years.

Better Times for the Indians

In Canada and in the United States conscientious legislation has arrested the drink curse, and the greed of a European education is spreading amongst the Indians together with settled habits. Men and women of purely Indian blood are slightly more numerous now than they were thirty years ago. Including all Mexico, Yucatan and Alaska, as well as the United States of America and the Canadian Dominion, there are seemingly at

the present time 1,474,000 pure-blood Amerindians in North America. Yet they are less and less discernible to the traveller from abroad, inasmuch as they tend to dress and demean themselves increasingly more like the Americans of Caucasian race. They intermarry, or, at any rate, mix sexually with white men, the half-breed being of a comely type; so that the eventual absorption of the American Indians into the Caucasian community of North America seems to be inevitable. Indeed, more than one anthropologist has considered the non-Esquimau American aborigines to have resulted from an early intermixture in far-back prehistoric days between a primitive type of Caucasian (like the Aino of Japan) and an Esquimau Mongoloid. At any rate, the cross between the Caucasian of North Europe and the Amerindian is a handsomer type of human being than the hybrid between the same race of white men and the negro.

The future of all English-speaking and French-speaking North America is no doubt the future of a white race, but before this result can be definitely achieved a solution will have to be found for the black problem in the United States. Within a relatively small geographical area of the United States east of the Mississippi there are at the present moment something like 9,500,000 negroes. This estimate includes some 2,500,000 persons of mixed negro and European blood. The tendency of public feeling at the present time in the United States is to lump together as negroes—"coloured people"—all men and women of recognisably negroid appearance and ancestry.

In some parts of the United States it is very awkward socially for anyone to be born with black hair and brown eyes even if they have a lively pink complexion. No doubt, many of these handsome brunettes owe their black hair and brown eyes either to Spanish intermixture or to an older strain of Amerindian. These are the explanations they strive to put forward, but woe betide them if their complexion is sallow! During the days when slavery was an institution, the planters in the south mixed freely (sexually) with the negro or half-caste women whom they kept as their mistresses. But since the great Civil War and the emancipation of the negro, sexual intercourse between undoubted white men and

undoubted negro women has decreased, being now forbidden by motives of racial pride—at any rate, on the side of the white man. The two races, therefore, co-exist side by side with far less tendency to intermingle than was the case when they were respectively master and slave.

But the negro has taken increasingly to the American climate and soil. Were it not for the opposition of the white man, he would have overrun the whole of the continent, and adapted himself eagerly to the most rigorous climate. His future is one of the greatest problems of the world. The white races, to begin with, are numerically as three to one with the negro. They are beginning to refuse him permission to extend as a settler beyond certain geographical limits, and even within these limits they are yearning to find some excuse to eject him from his lawful rights and expel him beyond the continental limits of North America.

If the tendencies of the extreme negro-phobes rule American state policy, where will these ten millions of negroes and negroids find a permanent home? An attempt was made to solve this problem by the institution of Liberia eighty years ago. Liberia has achieved some results, and may yet be a very valuable essay in negro self-government; but so far she has proved a failure as a dumping ground for the American negro, for the simple reason that negroes born and bred on American soil find as great a difficulty in establishing themselves in Tropical Africa as does the European. They are almost equally subject with him to the effects of malaria, and they seem unable, as a general rule, to procreate healthy, vigorous children, unless they mingle with the indigenous races and thus allow themselves to be reabsorbed into the savage or semi-civilised negro tribes of the Dark Continent.

But the Americanised negro colonist clings instinctively, passionately, to American civilisation. He will literally die rather than give up European clothing and American notions of life, and slip back into the palæolithic or neolithic conditions of the African savage. It seems to the writer of this essay that if the cruel injustice of the white man in North America is to refuse to the negro a portion of the United States which can become his permanent home, his only resort will be the islands of the West

Future of North America

America's Attractions for the Negro

The Black Problem in America

Indies and the states of Northern South America. Though in Africa he can scarcely withstand malaria better than the European, he can resist the sun. In America, as in Africa, the man of negro blood can perform manual labour under circumstances of heat and sun exposure which are fatal to the white man. A new Africa, therefore, may arise in Tropical America.

Great Britain is concerned with this problem, because at the present day the British West Indies are in the main peopled by negroes and negroids. In the British West Indies themselves there were very few indigenous inhabitants (Amerindian) when Britain took over the different islands, except in St. Vincent, Dominica, and perhaps Trinidad. In St. Vincent there were Caribs of more or less mixed type, sometimes hybridised with negroes. In Trinidad the few indigenous people lingering on the west coast belonged more or less to the Carib stock, but they were very few in number at the time of the British occupation of the island in 1796, and soon became absorbed in the mixed population of negroes and creoles. This island will

Mixed Races in Trinidad

eventually become peopled by a homogeneous race of mixed negro, European, and East Indian origin. In British Guiana the Amerindian population forms a considerable item, perhaps 10,000 to 12,000; though it has probably diminished in numbers rather than increased during the hundred years of British occupation.

These people belong to the Arawak, Wapiana, Atorai, and Carib groups, related to South American stocks in the adjoining regions of the northern basin of the Amazon and to the former inhabitants of the West Indies. They do not seem to take very kindly to civilisation, and are probably destined to be absorbed into a negro or negroid peasantry, which may be further complicated by intermixture with the Indian coolie and the Portuguese colonist, the resulting race emerging as a type very like the Papuan of New Guinea or the Melanesian of the Western Pacific.

In the Falkland Islands there were no indigenes to be exterminated or saved. The islands were uninhabited by man when they became the resort of whaling ships. The present inhabitants are largely composed of British (Scottish, English, and Anglo-Saxon North American) stock, with an admixture of Spanish Americans

from Uruguay. British interest in the Falkland Islands, and consequently her relations with the terminal portion of the South American continent, have, however, done a great deal to mend the lot of the miserable inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego, chiefly through the work of British missionaries. The Fuegians, a people of the

A Tribute to Missionary Enterprise

Amerindian race, were first brought prominently to our notice by the writings of Darwin, who visited South America in the Beagle in 1833. At the time of his visit these people were leading a completely savage existence under miserable conditions of climate. They were almost entirely nude, and led the simple existence of the Stone Age, being unacquainted even with the use of fire, practising hardly any arts, and living the hunter's life.

The attention paid to Tierra del Fuego by the contending nations of Argentina and Chili, more especially by the Anglo-Saxon and Irish pioneers in the nominal service of those governments, led, in the second half of the nineteenth century, to the usual introduction of spirituous liquors and syphilis, and from one cause and another the Fuegians were rapidly becoming exterminated. But the advent of the South American Missionary Society has, during the last quarter of a century, not only saved the remnant from perishing but has infused into them such a degree of reasonable civilisation as may enable them to recover their numbers and better their position.

Elsewhere, in Chili or in Patagonia, the influence of British settlers, captains of industry or officials in the service of the Chilean and Argentine Governments, has stayed any tendency there might have been to provoke or extend wars between the European settlers and the local Amerindian tribes. But the inevitable tendency of these people in temperate South America, as in temperate North

Fusion of the Tribes

America, will lie towards fusion with and absorption by the invading Caucasian, from whom they are not removed so far physically as the latter is from the negro; no doubt because among the strands that go to weave the Amerindian type are Caucasian threads, traces of very ancient intermixture with the basic stock from which arose the European white man, whether that intermixture took place in far North-eastern Asia or came by way

of the Pacific archipelagoes. Both routes may have been followed. The summing up, therefore, of the effect which the British Empire will have produced on humanity in the United States and British North America, in the West Indies and in South America, is this:

In the English-speaking regions of North America, north of the limits of Mexico, there will grow up a people which would be best represented at the present day by a composite photograph of all the races of Europe between Spain and Siberia, Greece and Scandinavia. The black drop in the blood of this potent race of the future will be no greater than that which has infused anciently the populations of Spain, Southern France, Sardinia, and Sicily, or which makes itself noticeable in such cities as Glasgow, Liverpool, Bristol and London, which traded with the West Indies and thereby mixed with negro slaves in the three last centuries. The

Amerindian in North America will be gradually absorbed, and will improve rather than spoil the vigour and beauty of the American race. It will have much the same racial significance as the Mongolian strain which permeates parts of Scandinavia, Russia, Germany, Alsace, Brittany and Ireland.

The Canadian French and the descendants of the French colonists of Louisiana, the Spanish tinge in Texas, California, and Florida, the million or so Italians settled in America during the last fifty years, the other millions of Iberian Irish, the darker types of Hungarians, will leaven the blond masses, the descendants of the settlers from Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Russia, Poland, Scandinavia, Iceland, and Germany. The most stalwart of the peoples promise to arise in Canada; the Canadian may be the aristocrat of the New World in the last half of the twentieth century.




"BRITANNIA'S REALM"



KING EDWARD VII.

From the Statue by George Wade erected at Reading

Photo by E. H. Mills



BRITAIN'S GREAT INDIAN EMPIRE THE MARVELLOUS EFFECTS OF A CENTURY AND A HALF OF BENEFICENT GOVERNMENT

ON Asia, whatever may be the ultimate fate of the British Empire and the length of its duration, traces of its existence will have been left as far-reaching and ineffaceable in their nature as those of Rome on the Mediterranean world or of Macedon on the Nearer East. The peninsula of India is at once the nucleus and the starting-point of the British Empire in Southern Asia.

An inhabitant of Mars, looking at the outlines of the land surface of our planet, would certainly never have guessed that the people of the southern half of an island off the north-west coast of Europe would have made themselves the masters of Hindustan. It was virtually England that conquered India down to the close of the eighteenth century, largely as Ireland and Scotland have subsequently completed and strengthened the achievement. That a military power uprising in the

Britain's Indian Empire

Balkan Peninsula should extend its sway continuously over Asia Minor, Persia and India is easily conceivable, as also that India should have fallen a prey to the Russians, or the Turks of Central Asia. Yet, of course, the Indian Empire is not much more remarkable as a political achievement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than is the Dutch Empire over the Malay Archipelago or what would have been a French overlordship of the Indian Peninsula. The first two conquests are the results of the development of sea power, and France, in the main, failed to take the place now occupied by Great Britain in Southern Asia because when her sea power was put to the test it yielded before that of the Anglo-Saxon.

If France has satisfied her Asiatic aspirations by the acquisition of large dominions in Indo-China—an almost sufficient compensation for what she lost to England in Hindustan—it is because at one time or another in the nineteenth century her

fleet has been sufficiently powerful to deter Great Britain from the risk of an avoidable war. In other words, in her days of imperial rapacity—the 'eighties and 'nineties of the last century—Britain put up with the growth of French dominion

The Era of England's Rapacity

over Annam, Tonkin, and Eastern Siam, because, up to a certain point, she had too much to risk in going to war with France at sea to interpose a determined veto on her plundering of China and Siam. At such movements, of course, Britain expressed an unaffected disapproval with a naiveté the more extraordinary as the French activities, after all, were merely coincident with her own conquest of Burma and the Shan States and her determination to acquire undisputed political rights over the Siamese provinces of the Malay Peninsula.

In the eighteenth century Britain found India to be a prey to internecine war. After many invasions from the north-west, going far back into prehistoric days, the people of North Central India had been conquered by a Turkish prince at the head of an army composed of Moguls, Turks, Afghans, and Persians.

Thus in 1526 was founded the Mogul—properly spelt Mughal—Empire. Prior to this, much of Western and South Central India had been Mohammedanised and Arabised, so that the irruption of Babar slightly intensified the Mohammedan element, and enabled his descendants for the next two centuries to rule with fairly

Revival of Hindu Power

undisputed sway over about 120,000,000 people, considerably more than two-thirds of whom belonged to the Hindu religion, and were thus violently opposed in their social customs and traditional beliefs to the ruling Mohammedans. The Hindu element began to revive in power and courage in the seventeenth, and above all in the middle of the eighteenth, century. Had

the country been firmly united in religion under a dynasty that practised the faith of the majority of its subjects, England's military and naval forces of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries would not have been able to defeat the Portuguese, Dutch, and French, one after the other, and conquer in turn the native vassals or the foes of the Mogul dynasty till at last that dynasty became in the nineteenth century—it did not expire till 1858—the tool and pensioner of the British Chartered Company. India, speaking from the point of view of the human race and of the origin of many

other important mammalian types, is perhaps the most remarkable portion of the earth's surface. It is in the main the great Mother Country—firstly, of humanity as a genus of the ape order; secondly, it may be, of human civilisation, and almost certainly of the principal religious ideas that now pulsate through the human world. In the Tertiary Epoch there seem to have arisen in India, not only the human genus and species from out of a pithecanthropoid form, but possibly also three amongst the types of surviving anthropoid ape, and also the baboon genus. Moreover, this productive region appears to have been the birthplace of the bovine, antelope, capricornine ruminants, several groups of carnivora, of dogs, deer, and swine.



MAKING A PUBLIC ROAD THROUGH THE FOREST

Here, perhaps, arose the true elephant genus from out of the mastodon. Here was the great radiating centre of the gallinaeous birds. India ranks with North America and North-east Africa as one of the great evolutionary breeding grounds from which have arisen and dispersed the principal forms of animal life. Southern India, joined

amongst the Dravidian peoples, who themselves had overlaid pre-existing negroid Australoid races, for the more ancient negro type likewise originated in India; so that here and there in Northern and Central India, and perhaps along the east coast, there are Mongolian elements older than those which penetrated India from Tibet and the Pamirs within the last 2,000 years.

At some unknown date, this side of 7,000 years ago, occurred one of the great landmarks in the unwritten history of India—the invasion of the Aryans. The name Aryan—itsself of Indian origin—has been applied in past times with a


it may be then with Malaysia, was almost certainly the place of origin of the human genus, and of the three species or subspecies into which modern man is divided.

When, however, the Ganges Gulf had disappeared, and the peninsula occupied very much its present form—in short, some ten to twenty thousand years ago—this portion of the world was inhabited mainly by what are styled the Dravidian races, a low type of Caucasian man, higher in development than the generalised black Australian or Veddah of Ceylon, yet not so distinctly a “white man” as the next upward step, the Iberian or brunette

Mediterranean race. This last furnishes the principal racial element in the peoples of Afghanistan, Persia, North Africa, Southern and Western Europe at the present day. On these Dravidians recoiled prehistoric invasions of Mongols, of the yellow, bare-skinned, straight-haired type of humanity which may have arisen from the existing human species either in India or in Further India. These Mongolians penetrated here and there in prehistoric times

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CUTTING A ROAD THROUGH THE JUNGLE IN THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES

degree of looseness which led for a while to its falling into disrepute. Its linguistic purpose was confused with a racial designation, which is probably of a far more abstruse and limited scope. One may perhaps—as a not altogether improbable theory—identify the original inventors of the Aryan tongues with the blond, grey-eyed Europeans of Russia, Central and Northern Europe.

The Ancient Aryan Languages

But for several thousand years Aryan languages have been spoken by all the types of Caucasian man in Europe and Western Asia, except Lapland, Finland, North-east Russia, part of Hungary, a small part of Turkey, Syria, and the borderlands of France and Spain.

These languages seem—from such knowledge as we now possess—to have arisen somewhere in Eastern Russia or Western Asia, north of the Caucasus, and to have been the appanage of a white-skinned people of pastoral habits, physical beauty, and of a stage of culture which had reached the age of metals—copper, bronze, and perhaps iron. Some have maintained that this golden-haired or red-haired, grey-eyed people may have developed in North Africa from the brunette Mediterranean race or from some more generalised type of Caucasian man. The only clues that we possess at present as to the origin of Aryan languages would seem to lie in the direction of a Finnic or Mongolian stock.

But in prehistoric times, from 7,000 to 5,000 years ago, possibly more than that, Aryan conquerors had entered India from the north-west, and had produced much the same impression on the dark-skinned Dravidians as was made on the pristine negroes of Africa by the prehistoric invasions of Hamites from Egypt.

The Aryans introduced to the millions of Northern, Central and Western India a language of the same family as that to which Lithuanian, Slavic, Greek, Latin, and Keltic tongues belong. This language, represented pretty closely by Sanskrit, developed in the course of several thousand years into the modern dialects of India and of Southern Ceylon, leaving only outside its influence the Dravidian speech of Southern and South-eastern India and the tongues of a few aboriginal tribes. The Aryans brought with them religious ideas which modified the religion of Brahma and eventually gave rise to

Origin of the Buddha Religion

that of Buddha. From them and their intrusion and infusion of superior northern blood arose the idea of caste. The original blond hair and grey eyes of the Aryans soon disappeared in their physical absorption into the millions of dark-haired, brown-eyed, swarthy Dravidians or the yellow-skinned, black-haired Mongolians. The traces of this northern physical type still linger in the highlands of Afghanistan and of the Hindu Kush. Curiously enough, these brown-haired, grey-eyed Afghans resemble strikingly the brown-haired, grey-eyed Berbers of the Atlas Mountains of Tunis and Algeria.

The Aryan influence may also have penetrated beyond India to the recesses of Siam and Cochin China; but at the present day the mass of the population eastwards of Bengal belongs in the main to the Mongol type in varying degrees, with an underlying stratum of Negrito. The people of Bengal, the familiar "Babu" type, no doubt also have an infusion of the Mongolian in their blood. These Aryan invaders of prehistoric times were reinforced as regards language and fighting power by subsequent incursions, legendary and historical, from across the Hindu Kush. Across the lower valley of the Indus, however, at the dawn of history, races of Dravidian stock seemingly were pushing westwards through Baluchistan and Southern Persia to Mesopotamia and Eastern Arabia. Indeed, it would appear as though there had been a strong set of the Dravidian peoples towards Arabia at a remote period in the history of that peninsula, and that there may be even a Dravidian element in the blood of the Semitic and Hamitic tribes of Arabia and Ethiopia.


Alexander the Great definitely linked the fortunes of Europe with those of India. From his celebrated invasion onwards Europe never completely lost touch with the peninsula of Hindustan. Even Alfred the Great, King of Wessex, caused inquiries to be made about India. The invasion of the Greeks 300 years before Christ further strengthened the Aryan influence over North-western India, as is testified by the remains of a debased Greek art in the Northern Punjab and even Greek types of face amongst its people. The next great event in the history of this motherland was the invasion of the Mohammedan Arabs, which began in

India at the Dawn of History

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BENGAL SAPPERS AND MINERS ROAD-MAKING IN CHITRAL



CONSTRUCTING THE PERIYAR DAM IN SOUTH INDIA

Nicolas & Co.

SCENES IN MAN'S FIGHT AGAINST NATURE

1001 A.D., and which, carried on by the Arabised Turks and Persians, culminated in that Mogul Empire for which the British Crown was substituted in 1858 and 1876.

England found India in the seventeenth century more or less completely under the sway of the Mogul emperors. The India which they ruled, directly or indirectly, though it included Southern Afghanistan, scarcely extended to Baluchistan, and certainly stopped in the Far East at the mouth of the Ganges. It did not include Ceylon, which remained more or less governed internally by an ancient dynasty of Aryan origin and Buddhistic religion, but the coasts of which were controlled ever since the sixteenth century first by the Portuguese, then by the Dutch, and finally, in the nineteenth century, by the British. The India of the seventeenth century, ruled by the Mogul emperors, probably contained a population of 150,000,000. The Indian Empire of to-day, excluding Ceylon, extends from the Persian Gulf to the frontiers of Tonkin and contains something like 297,000,000 people. To about 150,000,000 has been brought the means at the present day of acquiring an excellent education, scarcely inferior in its scope to that which is provided for Englishmen at home.

To the whole of the 300,000,000 of Baluchistan, Kashmir, Little Tibet, of the Indian peninsula proper from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin, of Burma and the Shan States England has given security of life and property to a degree never known by these Asiatic peoples in all their recorded history. Equal security has been given to the native dynasties of kings and chiefs who have accepted her suzerainty, and who

conduct the affairs of their kingdoms and principalities with decorum and justice. The wealth of India during the last hundred years, since the British became the effective masters over this region, must have increased tenfold, while the population has nearly doubled.

Magnificent public works have been carried out—thousands of miles of railways, canals for communication and irrigation, gigantic dams and reservoirs for the storage of water, bridges across rivers that are wonders of the world, the sounding, charting, and buoing of great capricious rivers up which ocean ships may travel hundreds of miles; the British have developed coal-mines that have added enormously to the wealth of India; gold-mines, diamond-mines. They have introduced the tea plant, and have made its cultivation one of the great industries of North-eastern India; the cinchona tree, with

its fever-healing bark; the coffee-tree from Africa, and many other useful products of the tropics and the temperate zones which thrive on Indian soil. They have taken up and developed indigenous products like jute, indigo, cotton, wheat and rice. They have improved the indigenous breeds of horses; taken measures to preserve the wild elephant from extinction; checked the devastations and the numbers of harmful wild beasts and

poisonous snakes. More important by far than this interference with the tiger and the viper is the tracking down of the plague, cholera, malaria and syphilis bacilli, and the war that has recently been waged on microbe-bearing rats, fleas and mosquitoes. The British have fought famine in those recurring years of scarcity wherein the



RAILWAY SCENE IN BURMA H. C. White Co.
The above interesting picture not only shows how closely the railway system of Great Britain is copied in Burma, but also illustrates the spread of the English language in that country. Compartments reserved for women have the words "Women only" painted on the doors, while the picture of a woman above the lettering indicates the purpose of the compartment to those who have not learnt to read.



Downie & Shepherd

NATIVE EDUCATION IN INDIA: SCENE IN A MOHAMMEDAN SCHOOL

rainfall was deficient, and have striven to retain the rainfall necessary to the country by a careful control of the forests and the replanting of trees. When England took up the rule of India in the guise of a great amorphous trading company, India was rapidly being ruined by incessant warfare between degenerated Turkish and Afghan dynasties and their Hindu and Sikh opponents.

The country was becoming disforested by fires, by the unchecked browsing of goats and cattle, and by clearing for cultivation. And though this destruction of the woodlands could hardly affect the mighty ranges of the Himalayas or the tropical jungles of Southern India, it was, together with the neglect of irrigation, slowly extending the area of the waterless desert region in the north-west and centre. Temples and mosques and other marvels of Indian architecture at their best were crumbling into decay through the decline of art and the incessant wars between Mohammedans and Hindus. It is said, nevertheless, that the people were less taxed than they are under the existing regime, and that the population

being only half what it is now, disease was not so rampant from overcrowding in towns, while famines were less frequent and severe.

It is doubtful whether these counter assertions are correct. Some of the people were no doubt lightly taxed, or paid no taxes at all, through leading the life of savages. Others again were subjected to such considerable and such irregular extortions that private enterprise was often crippled. The effects of the old regime have not quite vanished yet. Rulers and people were accustomed not only to put their savings into bullion of gold and silver, but, in the uncertainty of their lives, to trust no man, no institution, no government, with their hoards of wealth; rather to bury their gold and silver in the ground against such time as they should need it. In this way many a store of bullion has disappeared which might otherwise have been circulating through the country and stimulating commerce.

As to the records of disease, so little attention was paid to these questions in the native annals that there is scarcely any evidence on which to base a

comparison between the death-rate now and the death-rate a hundred years ago. The great increase in the population, and the going to and fro, hither and thither across the Indian Empire, have no doubt spread certain diseases at one time restricted to special localities. But through the measures undertaken by British medical science some

The Fight With Disease in India

diseases like small-pox have been robbed of their terrors, and others, like cholera, malaria, and the plague, are being brought gradually under control. Progress in the elimination of disease would have been quicker but for the suspicion, the prejudices, the religious fanaticism of Hindus and Mohammedans. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that only two or three thousand natives of India out of three hundred millions have as yet grasped sufficiently the principles of natural science to realise the true causes of disease, and to be convinced that sensible people would not allow either superstition or misapplied religious principles, or foolish social customs and prejudices, to stand between an enlightened government and the elimination of such diseases as the plague.

The effect of 150 years of British rule on the peoples of India has been stupendous. England has put an end to Afghan raids which at intervals since 1001 scattered the accumulated capital destroyed the cities and the public works of

India's debt to Britain

the industrious races, and punctuated the annals of India with holocausts of human victims. She has done away with Thuggism, widow-burning, and her influence is rapidly making child-marriage an obsolete custom. Under her rule there is complete religious liberty for all who do not want to adopt murder or torture as an article of faith. England may not last long enough to make a homogeneous undivided people out of the 300,000,000

inhabiting this sub-continent, for that is nearly as difficult as to fuse all the states of Europe into a single polity; but, at any rate, she has set the Parsees on their feet, has raised the sect of the Sikhs to be deservedly one of the dominant forces of India, has enabled the Mohammedans of Bengal, Oudh, and Agra, and also of the Punjab and of Haidarabad, to develop their religious ideas in unfettered liberty of opinion, till, if any group can save the teaching of the Arabian prophet from falling completely out of harmony with our present life, it will be the prosperous, educated, reasonable Moslems of the Indian Empire.

She may in the same way save the Hindus from themselves by sapping the intolerable nonsense of caste, of the Brahman cult the non-hygenic principles that direct this and that restriction on wholesome food or drink, of the worship of black goddesses

Consequences of Britain's Good Rule


with two dozen breasts, of all the ghastly rubbish which still reduces 200,000,000 of Hindus to a negligible quantity in the weights of the intellectual world. England also will have had the privilege of assisting and rendering prosperous and numerous one of the very few good and noble religions which have arisen in the world—the sect of the Jains.

The effect of the British Empire on the Malay Peninsula and in Borneo has been the abolition of piracy, the stoppage of internecine wars between one Malay sultan and another, and of the Arab slave trade; and the great recent increase of population which has resulted from the abatement of the dense forests and their profitable exploitation, the discovery of tin and coal, and the hundredfold increase of human health, happiness, wealth and intellectual progress in these parts. If there is any portion of the British Empire without a blemish in purpose or achievement, it is the Malay Peninsula, the Straits Settlements, and all their appurtenances.



THE GOLDEN TEMPLE OF THE SIKHS AT LAHORE

THE
BRITISH
EMPIRE
XVI



BY SIR
HARRY
JOHNSTON,
G.C.M.G.

BRITISH EXPANSION IN AFRICA AND THE PACIFIC AND ITS EFFECT ON THE NATIVE RACES

THE existence of a great island or continent to the south of the Malay Archipelago had been suspected by the Portuguese early in the sixteenth century. This dim knowledge was crystallised into an allusion to "Greater Java." The Dutch were the first, in 1598, to refer to this continent to the south of New Guinea as "Australis Terra." The subsequent history of the discovery and settlement of Australia has already been given in preceding chapters.

What were the conditions of Australasia when white men in the seventeenth century were feeling their way towards fresh conquests and occupation? Why, when island after island in the Malay Archipelago was rapidly conquered and occupied by the Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutch or English, did these lands of the southern hemisphere so long evade the white man's sphere

**Australasia's
Savage
Inhabitants**

of practical politics? The westernmost promontories and islands of New Guinea were included by the Dutch within their sphere of commercial and political influence as early as the end of the sixteenth century; but the whole of the remainder of New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand, and the adjacent Pacific archipelagoes were left to themselves till the last half of the eighteenth century. The reasons for this late development were principally the savage and ferocious nature of the inhabitants, who lay utterly outside Hindu, Malay, and Mohammedan influence, and the existence of the Great Barrier Reef, which hindered approach to the coast of North-east Australia.

The extent of this reef southwards was probably over-estimated. But where it came to an end the seas were sufficiently far south to be affected by heavy gales. It was not until better and bigger ships and more scientific navigators entered these waters, with Captain Cook as a pioneer,

that any approach was made by English or French towards discovery and settlement. But the nature of the inhabitants of these Australian lands was a more powerful deterrent than the dangers of navigation. The complete absorption of the Malay Archipelago and Peninsula within the European political area in a few years after discovery had been enormously facilitated by the civilisation of the Malay race at some unknown period by Hindu influences, and, much later, by their conversion to Islam.

**Mohammedan
Religion Spread
by the Arabs**

Just as the Islamising of the northern half of Africa shed a flood of light on a country the indigenes of which (south of N. Lat. 10°) were in a stage of early culture singularly akin to that of Australasia, so the carrying of the Mohammedan religion by Arabs through India and along the trade route to China amongst the Malay Islands did more for mediæval geography and the linking up of the worlds of Europe and the Far East than the attempts of Greece, Rome, and Constantinople or the growth of the Chinese Empire.

The conversion of the Malays to Islam definitely attached the coasts of the East Indian Islands and promontories to the civilised world. The plumes of New Guinea birds of paradise, the camphor of Formosa, the spices and even the cockatoos of the Moluccas may have reached the Persian Gulf, the Mameluke rulers of Egypt, the Greek emperors of

**The Low Type
of Australasian
Aborigines**

Byzantium, the merchants of Venice, and the Arab rulers of Grenada before the oversea exploits of the Portuguese made these regions of the Far East tributary to Western and Northern Europe. The culture which prevailed over New Guinea, excepting the small Malay sultanates of the far north-west, over all Australia and Tasmania, was of such a

low order that it might be called Palæolithic. The aborigines of New Guinea, Australia and Tasmania were, in the main, of a more primitive, less differentiated character than any living races at the present day, except their outlying relations such as the Veddahs and Negritos. The lowest Australian types of men bear in cranial formation a striking similarity to the Neanderthal species of the genus *Homo* which inhabited Europe at a very remote period. They are, indeed, the nearest living representatives of early Palæolithic Man in Europe. Elsewhere this generalised type of our species has been developed, specialised, or exterminated. At the present day the Papuan race of New Guinea makes a distinct approximation towards the negro, and this negroid type penetrates eastward and northward, mixed in varying degrees with the Polynesian, till it reaches Hawaii, Formosa, and Japan.

The theory sometimes advanced to account for the physical attributes of the extinct Tasmanians is that this negroid type migrated southwards along the east coast of Australia and crossed thence to Tasmania, being afterwards succeeded on the continent of Australia by races with straighter hair and more prominent noses, akin to the Dravidian.

In New Zealand there was a different state of affairs. The first European explorers that landed on its coasts—French and English, at the close of the eighteenth century—observed two types amongst the aborigines: a short, dark-skinned negroid, and the tall, light-skinned Maori; and the theory was advanced some thirty years ago that the arrival of the last named from Polynesian archipelagoes had been preceded by a Tasmanian immigration. But it is inconceivable that this low race could have constructed canoes to cross a thousand odd miles of sea between Australia and New Zealand; it is difficult enough to believe that such a primitive type could even have crossed on rafts a strait of a few miles in width between Wilson Promontory and Tasmania; and it has been surmised that their colonisation of this island dates from a time when it was connected by an isthmus with the Australian continent. Therefore, it is more probable that if there was a negroid element in New Zealand, it accompanied the Maories

Diversity of Race in Australia

New Zealand's Early Inhabitants

from the Polynesian archipelagoes. It is the main element of the population of Fiji, and is traceable in Tonga. The Papuans of New Guinea are fairly abundant, of medium height, and good proportions, though some of the tribes of the interior tend to a shortness of legs which recalls the forest negroes of Africa. The skin colour is sooty brown like that of the Australian.

The dark races of South-eastern Asia differ from the "black" negroes in that there is less red colour in the skin, and in the case of the Papuans and Australians there is a much greater projection of the brow-ridges; the nose, moreover, being seldom absolutely flat in the bridge, though the tip is wide and flat at the nostrils, and the lips, though thick and projecting, are not so largely everted as with the average negro. The hair of the Papuans is black and frizzly, and grows semi-erect, like a mop. That of the Australians is curly in a large way, but except for its coarse texture grows very much like a European's. Like the lower races of Europe and India the Australian's body, in the male, is very

hairy. This is one of the characteristics which points to a basal affinity between the Australoid and the Caucasian. The Polynesians seem to be a Far Eastern prolongation of Malay influence, though in physical characteristics perhaps nearer akin to the Caucasian. They differ from the Western Caucasian in the relative absence of body-hair, and a tendency to the straight, coarse head-hair of the Mongol, Malay, and Amerindian.

It may be that before the Mongols of China, Japan, North Asia and the Esquimaux had become differentiated and had reached their present habitat an early Caucasian type threw off a smooth-skinned, straight-haired branch which migrated to North-eastern Asia and thence colonised much of America, while it made its way also south and east to the Pacific archipelagoes, to absorb culture from the more Mongolian Malay and mingle his blood with his. In many of their physical characteristics the Polynesians recall the Indians of Western America. In modern times they have mingled with the negroid Melanesians, inheriting from them wider noses, undulations in the head-hair, and darker skin colour. Yet, when all has been said and done, the best Polynesian type recalls the European, and fundamentally the two

Characteristics of the Polynesians

racés may be akin, a fact which will probably have the happiest effect on the future status of the Polynesians, inter-marriage with whom will be no more prejudicial to racial beauty and mental development than the intermixture with the Amerindian or the Northern Mongol.

The effect of the British Empire on the autochthonous races of Australia and Polynesia cannot be described in terms of such glowing praise as I have applied to the altogether splendid record in India, Ceylon and Malaya. From the point of view of the anthropologist and the philanthropist it is here that the record is sorriest and most ignoble. When the British invaded Australia and Tasmania the welfare, rights, and anthropological importance of the indigenes seem to have been completely absent from their minds.

Their Imperial conduct, in fact, in these regions rank much lower in the scale of morality than that of the late King of the Belgians, who, if he afflicted and diminished the native tribes of the Congo, at any rate contemporaneously illustrated their arts, customs, and beliefs

**Great Britain's
Black Record
in Australia**

whilst such things could be recorded. The treatment of the Australian and Tasmanian blacks has been stupid and brutal down to about 1896, long before which time the Tasmanians were extinct, and England deserves to be scourged for it before the world's tribunal quite as much as the Spanish nation for its treatment of the Amerindians, or Leopold of Coburg for his merciless exploitation of the Congolese. But for the missionaries and, in addition, the fighting qualities of the Maories the Polynesian inhabitants of New Zealand would have been as mercilessly dealt with.

When England laid hands on all Australia, from the point of view of keeping other European Powers out, say, in 1800, the native population of the entire island continent cannot have been less than 200,000; to-day it is computed at 65,000. Extermination seems to have been the order of the day—extermination by rum, syphilis, starvation, and later the more merciful and direct assassination by the rifle bullet. In about forty years from 1800, the natives of New South Wales, Victoria, and of South Australia, had been reduced from a possible 100,000 to about 5,000, not, of course, including those of the central and northern regions, which are still so inappropriately linked with

"South" Australia. Queensland has had as merciless a record, but here the territory was vaster, hotter, and a larger proportion of the indigenes have survived to profit by the development of Queensland public opinion on to a higher plane of thought. Their treatment now is vastly improved in this direction. Western Australia in

**The Natives
Under Cruel
Treatment**

the back blocks, and above all in the far north-west, has still much scourging to receive and atonement to make; from the half-suppressed reports of clergymen and missionaries the Westralian treatment of the natives under their control has been quite as bad as anything recorded of the Congo. But in these matters, where the great daughter nations are concerned, the British Press is inclined to complacent silence.

The black Australian, as he was first found, was certainly a savage, and an unamiable, treacherous savage. "*Cet animal est tres méchant! Quand on l'attaque il se defend!*" If England's fairest coast regions were suddenly invaded by an almost irresistible race of Martians, she, in her futile defence of her homeland, might show herself equally treacherous. For a long time he was said to be an "irreclaimable" savage. But this has been shown to be as true as the dictum of King Leopold's Congo Ministers that the Bantu negroes of Congoland were "outside the pale of the family idea." The irreclaimability of the Australian—as announced by the white colonist—is as true as the depravity of the lamb in the eyes of the wolf.

Fortunately, however, there were other and nobler forces at work in Australia, and the result of their efforts, and those of the colonists and governments helping them, is that there are many police, stock-riders, trackers, farm servants, and other workers of use to the general community at the present day, who are of pure Australian blood. It is no longer probable that this wonderfully interesting race will

**A Brighter
Prospect for
the Native**

be exterminated; it is less unlikely that it will be absorbed. The half-caste between white man and Australian aborigine is not such a disappointment as are some other human hybrids, either physically or mentally. And again, from this cross to further intermixture with the whites—or, as seems now more customary, with such Afghans, Indians, Chinese, or Polynesians as the rigid immigration laws may permit, or fail to prevent—may in time create

a small but prosperous class of dark-eyed, pale-skinned, black-haired, not uncromely people, who may find a place and a decent recognition for themselves in the future great Australian nation.

England had no recognised empire in the Pacific until she annexed New Zealand in 1840, but the unofficial influence of the

Missionaries as Builders of Empire British on the Polynesian and Melanesian peoples began with the voyages of Cook and the first settlement of Australia.

The way for the empire was prepared, unconsciously no doubt, by missionaries, whalers, and traders in small sailing ships, together with the frequent cruises of men-of-war. The missionaries, most of all, brought the Pacific islanders to the idea that their only way of political salvation—decimated as they were by their own inter-tribal quarrels, and constantly under menace of attack from European pirates—was to offer the supreme rule or wardship over their countries to the British queen.

No doubt, they were instinctively right. At any rate, if the islands had not hoisted the British flag they would have been placed under that of France, the United States, or Germany. But it is sad to think that since New Zealand became British its indigenous population has decreased from a hypothetical 100,000 to about 48,000 at the present day. The population of Fiji was estimated at about 200,000 in the middle of the nineteenth century, and is now no more than 87,125 souls, and is diminishing rather than increasing. Elsewhere in the Pacific, Tonga, Santa Cruz, Solomon Islands, Gilbert Islands, Ellice Islands, the population of native strain is on the increase.

Many of these islands were depleted of their able-bodied men by the labour traffic of 1870-1890, which at first kidnapped, and later lured them for work on plantations in Eastern Tropical Australia. Many of these labourers have since returned to

The Future of the Polynesians their homes, materially and mentally improved by their exile. There is no cause now but the inherent weakness of racial stamina why the Polynesians and Melanesians should not once more begin to increase in numbers. Yet in Hawaii, under the Americans, and in Fiji under the British—both governments showing the utmost solicitude for their Polynesian wards—the native race is ceasing to have children, is dying of white

men's diseases, is silently melting away before the Indian coolie, the Japanese, Chinese, and Portuguese immigrants. It is said that native women are more fertile with Japanese, Chinese or European husbands; it may chance, therefore, that the fate of this Polynesian race may be reabsorption, to form with these other racial elements another and stronger Polynesian people, an amalgam, like the predecessors, whom Cook first described, of Australoid, Caucasian, and Mongolian strains.

In other ways, the effect of the empire on New Zealand, and on these "Summer Isles of Eden set in dark purple spheres of sea," has been wholly good, so far as the general enrichment of the world is concerned. New Zealand has become in the last century a young nation of magnificent vigour, with a mighty future before her, and a population of nearly a million.

Fiji now does an annual trade in exports, such as sugar, dried coco-nut kernels, and fruit, and imports of the value of \$6,000,000. This archipelago, extraordinarily-endowed as to climate and healthfulness, scenery, and fertility of soil, is of only

Prosperous Pacific Islands small area, and supplies both Australia and Canada with tropical produce. The inhabitants of nearly all the other Pacific

islands under British jurisdiction are converted to Christianity, and have given up cannibalism and civil war. They are, for the most part, busily engaged in the copra—dried coco-nut—trade, but a number of them still seek service in Queensland, in Pacific islands belonging to France or Germany, or even go as far afield as Mexico, confident that their British nationality will afford them ample protection.

Thus, after vicissitudes extending over more than a century—since their first discovery, or rediscovery, by British and French mariners—the Pacific islands seem to have found peace, prosperity, comparative freedom and political stability. Except in New Zealand, the British have nothing to regret in their treatment of these Polynesian and Melanesian races, since a direct government control was established over the islands, large and small; but there remain some seventy or eighty years of previous unofficial British or British colonial dealings with the peoples that are a sorry record of slavery, kidnapping, alcohol-poisoning, debauchery, disease, ridiculous or even vicious wrangles between Christian sects and churches,

BRITISH EXPANSION IN AFRICA AND THE PACIFIC

cannibalistic outbreaks and sanguinary revenges, farcical governments got up by European or American adventurers, and floated with repudiated paper currencies.

These influences combined must have reduced the total native population of Oceania, excluding New Guinea but including New Zealand, from a possible $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions to about a million at the present day. Of course, it must be remembered this $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions had been living lives of useless happiness, apart from the rest of the moving world, aloof from the sorrows and struggles of the toiling thousand millions in temperate or torrid

than the nourishment of unintellectual idleness in cannibalism and sexual orgies of 2,000,000 brown Polynesians. Such fragments of the Earthly Paradise are worthier to be the home of 50,000,000 men and women endowed with the finest qualities of mind and body.

What has been the effect of the British Empire on Africa? In the west, the scene of her earliest attempts at settlement as traders and rulers, she first encouraged to an enormous extent the trade in slaves. This has led to much intertribal warfare, and even the disappearance of certain coast peoples. Between 1560 and 1860 the



G. Hughes

THE PRIMITIVE SYSTEM OF LANDING ON THE WEST AFRICAN COAST

continents. Seemingly, a policy of secluded selfishness does not enter into the scheme of the Higher Power for the development of the human race. Nature insists on a unification of the genus, and to attain this end extremes meet—the Dutchman mingles with the Hottentot, the Englishman with the Polynesian, Scotsman with West Indian negro, Portuguese with Dravidian, Arab with Bantu, Frenchman with Amerindian. The Summer Isles of Eden and the 104,000 square miles of pasture, meadow, woodland, Alp, lake, and orchard, which constitute the noble patrimony of New Zealand, were meant for better things in the destiny of man

West African slave trade certainly tended to the depopulation of parts of Guinea, Dahomeh, the Niger Delta, and the Kameruns.

The British from 1815 and the French from about 1835 set to work to suppress the slave trade they had once encouraged. This, of course, led to their increased interference in West African affairs, and by degrees to a widespread use of the English language as a medium of intercommunication. The trade in palm oil and palm kernels—said to have been invented in Liberia—was, in its early days, a British industry; and so lucrative did it become to natives as well as white men that it probably proved a more efficient corrective

of the slave trade than the vigilance of the British cruisers. But the palm-oil trade gave rise to incidents and tendencies which provoked further—and often unwilling—interference on the part of the British Government with native chiefs. These last would frequently attempt to make a corner in palm oil, by preventing the interior

Fair Trade on the West African Coast

natives from coming into contact with the white traders, who were thus compelled to deal with the oil-markets by making use of the coast negroes as intermediaries and middlemen. Thus the producing peoples of the interior received a poor price for their industry, and the European had to pay too dearly for the oil which was becoming so increasingly necessary to his home industries.

Now all these questions are regulated equitably. The coast men share in the general advantages of the coast government, which is partly supported by the customs duties levied on general imports and exports. The natives of the interior can dispose of their produce without let or hindrance for the prices determined by the law of supply and demand. But it is in the coast regions, above all, that the advantages of an enlightened British administration have been shown. Here a system of *petite culture* has been brought into existence, in the Gold Coast Colony especially, which has had the happiest results, especially in the cultivation of cacao. In this a trade of something like a million sterling has been developed.

A glance at the revenues and expenditures of all the British West African colonies and protectorates will at once show their prosperity. It is, above all, the prosperity of the people of the soil, whose rights have been most rigorously respected and reasonably defined. The British West African possessions are setting an example to the rest of British Tropical Africa, and to a great deal of Africa and Asia which is under

New Policy of British West Africa

other flags, of the new policy, which is going to spread like a new religion—ample recognition of the rights of the indigenous peoples to the land they live on and to the natural produce of its soil. This theory does not prevent the reservation of absolutely vacant lands or lands containing forests or mines, which must be dealt with in the general interests of the community. Such are held in trust for the community by the established government of the

territory, and the proceeds or profits therefrom are publicly accounted for, and form part of the local revenue. In the administration which controls these sources of public wealth the voice of the real natives of the country will have a larger and larger part as education increases in the native community and fits the people of the soil for playing a responsible part.

Whilst foreign capital is required to fructify industries and to turn the resources of the country to profitable account, that capital must be allowed a fair representation in the local councils, and receive sufficient guarantees as to its investments; otherwise the native community will never obtain money on cheap enough terms for creating its industries. But the ambition of all these negro states under the British flag in West Africa and Nigeria should be to obtain their working capital in time through their own resources and in time to show themselves more and more worthy of home rule.

In East Africa, between the Nile Basin and the Zambesi, the chief effect on the native peoples has been produced by the abrogation of Arab authority in the

The Arab Oppression in East Africa

coast lands and the eventual suppression of the Arab slave trade, and, finally, of slavery. The Arab treatment of East and Central Africa has followed much the same lines as European behaviour elsewhere. First of all, the land was ravaged for slaves and ivory. No thought was taken for the welfare of the indigenes at all. They were originally transported in thousands to Arabia, Persia, Madagascar, and the Comoro Islands—a few also going to Western India—and, later, they were used to develop clove, sugar, coco-nut plantations in Zanzibar and along the East African littoral from Lamu to Cape Delgado.

When the Arabs appreciated the possibilities of Congoland, the slaves of the populations they harried were turned on to create vast rice-fields, orange groves, lime orchards, plantations of sugar-cane, bananas, ground nuts, and maize in the valley of the Lualaba-Congo. When conquered at this epoch, the close of the nineteenth century, the domain of the Arabs on the coasts of Nyassa and Tanganyika and in Eastern Congoland presented to the British, Germans, and Belgians a certain appearance of well-being, civilisation and contentment which was in marked contrast to the savage

regions outside the Arab settlements. To some extent this contrast was an unfair one to the pagan African, because the unsettled regions outside the Arab zone had been reduced to a condition of heedless savagery by the raids of the Arabs and their negro allies. The wretched remnant of the natives only secured some immunity from attack by simply offering no temptation to robbery. They accumulated no stores of food, and avoided giving any evidence of culture.

Had no European intervention taken place, matters would have taken—more slowly—the same course under the Arabs as under the white man's predominance. First, the Arabs would have cultivated millions of acres by forced labour; then, as it became more and more difficult to coerce great negro populations raised to the same level of culture as the Arabs themselves, the Arabs would have sought to work by means of hired labour. Lastly, they might have had the intelligence to perceive what we are just appreciating—thanks to the teaching of men like E. D. Morel, Albert Chevalier, Vandervelde,

**Tropical
Africa's Negro
Problem**

Charles Dilke, Fox-Bourne, and Theodore Roosevelt—that the negro is an ineradicable plant in Tropical

Africa; and that, this being the case, it is better to treat him as the owner and dominant factor in the country, inspire him with the pride of ownership—individual and communal—and by means of trade allurements tempt him to exploit, as a free man and a person with a stake in his own commonwealth, the resources and riches of his dwelling-place.

This theory has its imperfections when contrasted with actual contemporary facts, but on the whole it has proved the best working hypothesis with the negro peoples of Eastern as well as Western and Central Africa. But there are other factors in the East African problem that do not exist in West Africa and the Congo Basin. Half the area of British East Africa, a quarter of Uganda, a quarter of Nyassaland are regions of considerable elevation above sea-level; and partly on this account, partly from other causes, are—or were when England entered the country—devoid of native inhabitants. To tell the truth, although the negro may have avoided settling on these elevated plateaus when he was a nearly naked savage, he has shown himself quite able to do so under

more civilised conditions. But most of these cold countries were No-man's-lands when they were discovered, and England has not felt called upon to hand them over to the black man. For many years there have been Scottish and English coffee planters (colonists) in Nyassaland. Recently England has been permitting the

**Unoccupied
Earthly
Paradises**

appropriation of vacant lands by white men on the healthy uplands of East Africa. Here, as in Western Uganda and Northern Nyassaland, there are earthly paradises still awaiting the people. Consequently, the political future of Eastern Africa is likely to be far more complicated as an entity than that of West Africa, purely a black man's land, or South Africa, where the white man is quite resolved to be the predominant partner.

In British East Africa, including Somaliland and Nyassaland, there will be small, compact, powerful colonies or enclaves of Europeans and Asiatics surrounded by a very numerous, prosperous, and, I hope, friendly, population of negroes and negroids. The Arab element will remain and will permeate the leaven of the docile Bantu with a sense of self-respect and personal pride which will compel a decent treatment at the hands of the British and Indian fellow-colonists.

The effects produced by the British Empire on the native races of South Africa have been most potent. The Dutch and Huguenot settlers who preceded us had conquered the feeble Hottentot and Bushman tribes of the south-western angle of Cape Colony sufficiently to be able to dispose of the land between the little Namaqua coast, the sources of the Zak, and the Great Fish River amongst European farm settlers. These last at times were almost at war with the unsympathetic, selfish, stupid government of the Dutch East India Company. The Boer pioneers of the future white South Africa

**The Racial
Struggles in
South Africa**

shirked any contest with the powerful Bantu peoples to the east and north of the land from which they had ousted the Hottentot. Indeed, the drift of the racial struggle was rather the other way when the British first took possession of Cape Town.

Should the Kaffir and Basuto be allowed to drive the Boer farmers' back on to the Cape Peninsula and occupy the lands of the Hottentot in their stead? For centuries the big Bantu negroes had

been pressing south from their original home in Central Africa. They had absorbed or exterminated the Hottentots and most of the Bushmen in South-eastern Africa; on the south-west their advance was hindered by the aridity of the Kalahari Desert and Namaqualand, but they had already turned the obstacle by coming

**Britain's
Great Work in
South Africa**

round the south coast of the continent and advancing thus on the delectable region of the Cape of Good Hope (one of the world's paradises). The Sneeuwbergen and the Great Fish River were the limits on the north and east which temporarily detained them when the Briton arrived on the scene.

But for his armed support—the resources of Britain in men, money and ships—it is doubtful whether the Boers, left to their own resources, could have stemmed this impetuous flood of Basuto and Kaffir warriors. Supposing even that Holland had remained the sovereign of Cape Colony, could the Dutch nation at that juncture have fought and vanquished two or three millions of Bantu negroes of the Zulu and Suto calibre when, even with all the resources of modern warfare and the unquestioned bravery of her troops, she has not been able to subdue the small sultanate of Achin (Sumatra) since 1815.

It seems very probable that the assumption of British control over Cape Colony in 1806, and later over Natal, saved South Africa for the white man, who, in the temperate regions of the south-west, had just as much right there as the Bantu. The subsequent effect of British rule has not been to lessen the black population of Trans-Zambesian Africa. The Bushmen, already half absorbed by the Hottentots and nearly exterminated by the Bantu, are, it is true, only about 4,000 to-day, where there were perhaps 10,000 seventy years ago, and the Hottentots are a decaying people to some slight extent. They seem more likely to exist in a half-caste type, the original hybrids with the Boers—Griqua—mixing again with the pure

bred Hottentots and strengthening the race. But, thanks to the staying of civil war and mad superstitions among the Kaffirs, holocausts of slaughter and incessant murderous raids by all the Zulu clans, conquests and ravages by the different Suto or Bechuana tribes between the Upper Zambesi and the Orange River, the settled Bantu population of Southern Africa—Zambesi to Algoa Bay—has increased probably from 3,500,000, as we may compute it to have been in 1806, to nearly 6,000,000 at the present day.

The increase has been most marked in Eastern Cape Colony, Natal, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Eastern Rhodesia, and Portuguese South-eastern Africa, where the conditions of native life have been vastly improved by the wages of the mining labour market in Kimberley, the Orange State, and the Transvaal. Unfortunately, although the Imperial rule of Britain has been—no honest person or competent judge can deny—a very great blessing to humanity in West, East, and South Africa, it has in the south and south-centre, and a little in the east, spelt ruin to the magnificent wild mammalian fauna.

The Boer hunters counted for something in this work of thoughtless destruction, but only as the disciples of British sportsmen. These were originally officers in the army, for the most part visiting the Cape on their way to or from India. India had initiated them into the joys and thrills of big-game shooting, the rifle had come into general use as a sporting weapon of precision, and thus were provoked the wonderful crusades against elephants, buffalo, antelopes, rhinoceroses, giraffes, lions, hippopotami, zebras, which have ended by leaving nearly all Cape Colony with no more notable wild beasts than a few baboons, leopards, jackals, civets, springboks, and rodents; a campaign which has placed the quagga and the blaubok on the list of extinct animals, and has brought the white rhinoceros, South African oryx, and several other interesting mammalian types very near the vanishing point.

**Hunters'
Destructive
Crusades**



BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN AFRICA: THE NYASSA-TANGANYIKA ROAD

THE
BRITISH
EMPIRE
XVII



BY SIR
HARRY
JOHNSTON,
G.C.M.G.

MAN'S TRIUMPH OVER NATURE THE WONDERFUL RECORD OF BRITISH ACHIEVEMENT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

THE British nation has not merely fought with rival or recalcitrant men for the colonisation, retention, and development of its empire; it has done things more worthy of remembrance perhaps than that. It has steadily fought the reactionary forces of Nature, and has often scored a victory.

Surely something of the genius of old Rome must have left its germs in British soil and been absorbed by British men and women, whether they were Kelto-Roman, Danish, Saxon, Norman, or French in their ancestry. The Roman nature of her public works is not of to-day or the last century only. Even the roystering, dissipated, drunken, peculating soldiers and officials of Charles II. left traces of their brief occupation of Tangier in the massive masonry of the mole. Though it is over 100 years since she lost Minorca, Britain has dowered that island with magnificent

**Builders
of
Empire**

roads, bridges, quays, and bastions. Corfu bears the impress of the practical British mind more thoroughly than any civilised influence that has preceded or followed. The public works of Aden are tremendous, awe-inspiring, even though they may be but the logical continuation of cyclopean tasks begun by prehistoric Arabs.

In Canada, before the united "dominion" days, the British and colonial governments had constructed canals across the Niagara Peninsula, alongside the rapids of the St. Lawrence. These have been subsequently extended and improved by the dominion government, until now the waters of Lake Superior—2,200 miles inland—and the other great fresh-water seas of the St. Lawrence system, including the port of Chicago, are in direct steamer communication, for reasonably small steamers, with Britain and the rest of the world.

Since Canada became a self-governing country, British capital and credit almost entirely—besides British heads and arms—have built the Canadian Pacific Railway,

which has revolutionised the economics of Northern America. Energy, either of direct or indirect British origin, is combating the Glacial Period in North-western Canada, in the region of the Yukon, grappling with the permanently frozen

**Possibilities
of Energy
and Science**

soil, extorting riches and comfort from the icy north, driving back, it may be, later on, by the resources of science that hatefullest affliction of our mother earth, that possible foreshadowing of the end of all things we shall never see—the icy touch which brought about many successive glacial periods, and rendered the Polar regions, north and south, uninhabitable. It is just possible that the energy of Britons or the descendants of Britons may push back artificially the realm of ice to the shores of the Arctic Ocean, bringing in happier conditions of climate, and turning to account millions of acres of rich soil now locked in ice that has not melted for 100,000 years.

In Tropical America and the West Indies England's achievements have not been so colossal. Here they should lie in the extermination of disease. They have, however, erected and endowed colleges, built railroads, roads, and bridges—Jamaica, almost from end to end, Barbados, British Honduras (uncompleted), and Trinidad—and regulated forests. In 1898 was founded the Imperial Department of Agriculture for the West Indies under

**Developing
the
West Indies**

Sir Daniel Morris. This department is at present paid for by the Imperial Government. It has rendered great services to forestry, agriculture and horticulture in the West Indies. A great deal has been done in recent years to open up the asphalt resources—the lakes of pitch—in Trinidad and Barbados, the diamond and gold mines of British Guiana, together with the water power developed by the cascades that tumble from the edges of

the Venezuelan Plateau. Forestry in British Guiana, British Honduras and Trinidad, has received some attention. Horticulture has been much and wisely developed in Jamaica, and the more important of the West India Islands. From Jamaica, indeed, West and Central Africa have received most valuable contributions in the shape of improved varieties of cotton, coffee, bananas, oranges and many useful plants for tropical cultivation. In the Falkland Islands, since the British assumption of authority in 1833, much has been done to develop the possibilities of cattle and sheep breeding. Latterly, sheep have become more important than anything else, not necessarily for export in the form of mutton and wool, but for the rearing of good rams for breeding purposes. These are exported to South America. Here also has been made an important coaling and provisioning station for vessels going round Cape Horn.

The first great public works of Britain in India were probably trunk roads. These were begun as far back as 1790, when the East India Company settled down seriously to taking up the reins of government. The great trunk road from Calcutta and Bengal to Peshawar was first projected by an Afghan emperor, Sher Shah, and was more than half completed by the Mogul rulers. It was continued by the East India Company, and finished about 1830. A great triumph in roadmaking, achieved early in the nineteenth century, was the road up the Ghats from Bombay Island to the interior plateau. The roads of British India now run to 193,000 miles of metalled and unmetalled surface.

Canals in India followed the damming of streams—especially parallel with the sea-coast of Malabar, where they linked one lagoon to another—and then came the construction of great irrigation works. There are now 4,055 miles of navigable canals in India and about 43,500 miles of irrigation canals bringing water to 13,606,000 acres. In 1850 began the era of railways. By the end of the nineteenth century the Indian Government had constructed about 25,000 miles (at present over 30,000 miles) of railways, from the hill stations of the Himalayas, such as Darjeeling and Simla, to Cape Comorin, opposite Ceylon, and from the frontier of Arakan to Quetta

and the Afghan frontier. Since then, the railways have been creeping on towards the Persian Gulf, on the one hand, and Burma on the other. Before long, no doubt, there will be direct railway communication from some port on the Persian Gulf, from which again a connection across Persia with the Russian railway system is inevitable, to Singapore. Some of us who read these lines may yet live—still enjoying health and vigour—to travel from Calais to Singapore without changing the carriage, or, if something less “1850” than the present condition of the South-Eastern Railway can be brought into existence, we may enter our travelling and sleeping compartment at Charing Cross, and enjoy a marvellous panorama of the most varied landscapes, races and products of the earth’s surface before we quit our compartment at the southernmost extremity of the Malay Peninsula. The engineering works of India, such as the great bridge across the Indus at Attock, are worthy examples of the mechanical achievements of the British Empire. So is the bridging of the Zambesi at the Victoria Falls in South Central Africa; so is the damming of the Nile at Assuan, Esna, Assiut and Zifta. These engineering works, conducted under the auspices of Great Britain in Egypt, have conferred enormous benefits on the peasantry and the industries of that country. Water has been brought from the foot-hills of Ethiopia to Port Sudan, and also to the town of Suakin. The Red Sea has been united with Khartoum by a railway, and Khartoum with Upper Egypt. Steamers now ply on the Nile from Khartoum to the Uganda frontier, and right into the heart of Africa up the tributaries of the Bahr-el-Ghazal or to the Abyssinian frontier on the Sobat. On the West African coast the public works have not been altogether worthy of the British Empire until quite recently. Down to a very few years ago everyone of high and low degree who desired to land or embark on the Gold Coast had to do so more or less at the peril of his life, in heavy surf-boats, through breakers that occasionally capsized the boats and drowned the passengers. Even at the present day, Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, is very early nineteenth century, and compares unfavourably with the new French cities of North-west

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The Era of Indian Railways

A Series of Engineering Triumphs

MAN'S TRIUMPH OVER NATURE

Africa, where the ocean-going steamer can draw up alongside a magnificent quay. At Freetown the passenger has still to embark or land in a small boat. But things are moving, even in British West Africa. The public works of the Sierra Leone Protectorate are worthy of portions of India in the way of roads and bridges, and a railway of 230 miles connects Freetown with the north-western frontier of Liberia, and has already doubled the exports of the country that was once called the "white man's grave."

There is also a railway advancing from Lagos to the Niger, and from the Niger across to the commercial centres of the Hausa country, perhaps linking up some day with the railways of Egypt and of French West Africa. No enterprise would be more beneficial to the commerce and peoples of Africa than a railway from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Guinea across the Sahara Desert; for the railway causes the desert to blossom as the rose. If only the dread of Germany could be put aside, and Britain and France could turn their *entente* to the magnificent end of crossing the Sahara by a railway, they would have achieved a triumph over recalcitrant Nature as grand as the attacks on the Glacial Period which are going on in North-western Canada. One of the best schemes conceived by Rhodes—his own especial scheme, started and maintained by his own money—was the trans-African telegraph, a line which was to run from the Cape to Cairo.

Thus far, the communication is interrupted in several places. Through the efforts of the British South Africa Company, Cape Town is linked with Lake Nyassa and the south end of Tanganyika, and even with Ujiji in German East Africa. The next gap to fill will be from Ujiji to the telegraph system of the Uganda Protectorate. This extends no further, at present, than Lake Albert. Probably by the time these lines are in print it will have reached Gondokoro. From this point there is no further break till Alexandria is reached, near the mouth of the Nile. A land line now goes from Lagos to the heart of British Nigeria, and from Sierra Leone to the north-west frontier of Liberia.

This last will soon be linked with the French land lines of Senegambia, and these again, before many years are past, will have traversed the Sahara Desert.

A telegraph line crosses the inhospitable interior of Australia from north to south. It has seemed to the present writer that this was one of the most marvellous achievements in its way to be placed to the credit of the British Empire. The central part of Australia is a more terrible desert, perhaps, than any part of the Sahara. At the time the overland telegraph line was conceived it was practically an unknown country; all that was recorded of it was the death or disappearance of explorers. It was not uninhabited, though almost uninhabitable (in its pristine conditions), but the indigenes were hostile and treacherous. Yet these difficulties were overcome, and in a few years. The spanning of Australia by this wire deserves to rank among the great Imperial achievements.

Although carried out by commercial companies and not directly by the government, mention must be made here of the deep-sea cables which are another source of gratification to her national pride. Great Britain was long the first to construct and lay a deep-sea cable. The whole conception and working out of this feat in all its parts was the work of British minds. All the great oceans, the narrow connecting seas of the world, are now spanned by British cables. Africa is girdled with them, so is South America.

Thus England has striven to conquer distance and efface time. In the course of a few hours a message can be sent from London to the heart of Central Africa, to the watershed of the Arctic Ocean, to the hill stations of the Himalayas, and receive a reply; and the agency principally or wholly employed will have been a British-laid cable or a British-hung land wire. We can travel from Cape Town to the Victoria Falls in five days where Livingstone fifty years ago took five months. We can traverse India from Baluchistan to the vicinity of Burma in another five days; or, in a period of time scarcely longer, rush from the snows of the Himalayas to the Equatorial luxuriance of Ceylon. Already Egypt, under British guidance, is feeling her way in railway construction towards Tripoli and across Arabia.

If Turkey can be brought to see the advantages of co-operation, there may be still within our lifetime a delightful alternative railway route to India, say for the winter

**Linking
Up the
Empire**

**Australia
Spanned by the
Telegraph**

**Results of
British
Enterprise**

season, when the line through France, Switzerland, Italy, Austria, Roumania, Russia, and Persia is too cold. By the alternative route we may travel via Paris, Madrid, Algeciras, Tetuan, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Cairo, and Basra—unless before that time airships or aeroplanes that are really safe, certain and commodious have

Railways as a Civilising Influence

made railways only useful for goods traffic. The present writer would be sorry for this.

Nothing fertilises, nothing pacifies, nothing civilises like a railway. Perhaps, in fairness, something should be said about what Britain has done about steam communication at sea. The British Empire has given birth to a marvellous mercantile marine. Being of necessity the creation and dependent of sea power, this fleet of 9,000 or 10,000 steamships has always had a strong navy as its corollary. But the triumphs of peace have been those of the mercantile marine, a marine that has grown up and prospered with very little direct encouragement from the state.

The first practicable British steamers—paddle-wheelers—plied about the west coast of Scotland from 1812 onwards. In 1833 the first thorough-going steamship—*i.e.*, not a sailing vessel with auxiliary steam power—crossed the Atlantic, the Royal William, of Quebec. This steamer made the journey from Nova Scotia to Gravesend in twenty-two days. She had been entirely built by Canadians on the St. Lawrence, and was engineered by them across the Atlantic. The return voyage was first made by an Irish steamer of the Cork Packet Company. The City of Dublin Steam Packet Company had been founded in 1823, and really became the parent of the great Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company in 1826.

This line originally started by a feeble steamship service to Gibraltar, then was extended in 1839–1840 to Alexandria to meet the demand for the overland route. Others of its steamships had painfully laboured through stormy seas round the Cape, and established themselves on the Red Sea side of the Isthmus of Suez.

The Early Days of the Steamship

The General Steam Navigation Company was founded in 1824; the first steam voyage to India, round the Cape, was made in 1825; the Aberdeen Line—George Thompson—had been founded in 1824; the Harrison Line in 1830; the Royal Mail—West Indian Line—in 1839; the City Line

of Glasgow in 1839; the Cunard in 1840. In this same year the Pacific Steam Navigation Company began running steamers to South America. The Wilson Line of Hull was founded in 1845; the Natal Line—Bullard—and the Inman Line in 1850; the Bibby in 1851; the Anchor Line (Indian) and the African Steamship Company in 1852; the Union Steamship Company (of South Africa) in 1853; the Allan in 1854; the British India Steam Navigation Company in 1855. Several of these lines of steamships began as associations trading with sailing-ships, so that some of the great houses with their wonderful modern fleets of passenger and cargo steamers have a history beginning with the nineteenth century.

British statesmen have left one blot on the record of British prescience, in that they never believed in or encouraged the cutting of the Suez Canal, nor realised till the work was an accomplished fact what a marvellous gain it would be to the shipping industry of the British Empire. Ferdinand de Lesseps was one of the greatest benefactors of the British Empire.

Britain's Debt to a Frenchman

The remembrance of that fact should be an additional incentive to an everlasting friendship with France. For many years the British steamship companies held the field in regard to all long sea journeys. Then there grew up rivalry in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and Indian waters on the part of steamship lines from Marseilles, Trieste, Genoa, and Barcelona to Tropical America; Hamburg to the West Coast of Africa; Rotterdam to the Malay Archipelago; and, after 1880, that marvellous development of German shipping enterprise, which created first-class steamer communication between the north-eastern ports of Germany and almost all parts of the world. In speed the British vessels still hold their own, though it is a neck and neck race with Germany. In comfort, modernity of appliances, and food, it is to be feared that the German, French, and Austrian liners are superior to the British.

The Nobel Prize, however, has yet to be awarded to that steamship line which introduces the surest element of civilisation into its passenger traffic—one passenger, one cabin. It ought to be made penal to compel two, three, or four unrelated strangers to share a single sleeping compartment. In forestry and horticulture the British Empire has taken a leading



THE LANSDOWNE BRIDGE OVER THE INDUS AT SUKKUR F. Brenner, Quetta



BRIDGE SPANNING THE ZAMBESI NEAR THE VICTORIA FALLS



THE REVERSING RAILWAY STATION AT KHANDALLA IN INDIA Frith

OVERCOMING NATURE'S DIFFICULTIES: TRIUMPHS OF BRITISH ENTERPRISE

part, though it has frequently borrowed from Germany its adepts in forestry and economic botany, to the great advantage of British research in those directions. The names of Gustav Mann, West Africa and India; of Brandis and Kurz, the Himalayas; Sir Julius Vogel, New Zealand; Dr. Otto Stapf, Kew Gardens, will at once occur to the mind of any

The King of Biological Research

reader interested in these subjects. But there have been great exponents of what might be termed Imperial botany of wholly British descent—men like Sir Joseph Banks, Sir Joseph Hooker, Professor Daniel Oliver, Sir W. Thiselton Dyer, Sir Daniel Morris, and Lieut.-Col. D. Prain.

The work of these men is of even greater fame in Germany, France, Belgium, and the United States than to the careless minds of Britishers, so indifferent in the main to scientific research. Purely scientific research, and the reading of the world's past history, the very secrets of the origin and development of living forms, have owed nearly as much to the exploring journeys of Hooker in the Himalayas and on the Atlas Mountains of Morocco as they did to the king of British biological research, Darwin—Darwin, who also qualified as an agent or servant of the empire when he accompanied the Beagle on its famous cruise in the interests of science.

Sir John Kirk, in a somewhat similar capacity in connection with Livingstone's government expeditions, opened our eyes to the wealth and the economic importance of the East African flora. British enterprise has introduced the tea-shrub into India and Ceylon, cotton into all parts of Africa and the Pacific, cacao into West Africa, coffee into Ceylon, Nyassaland, Jamaica, and Trinidad.

Sir Clements Markham won his eventual C.B. and his first renown by his splendid attempts to secure the seed of the cinchona-tree, jealously guarded as its transmission was by American Indians and South American governments. He enabled the cinchona to be planted widely over the tropical regions of the world, and brought down the price of quinine, the most potent drug yet known against malaria fever, till it eventually came within the reach of poor sufferers. If in this field of botany and agriculture there have been triumphs, what are we to say about zoology? Well, there are two

Blessings of Botanical Discoveries

sides to the account, though the debit balance of humanity is largely in the ascendant. Britons are credited, and only too truly, with having caused over Tropical Africa a devastation in the mammalian fauna which it might have taken a whole geological epoch to have brought about.

Gordon Cumming, Cotton Oswell, William Webb, William Baldwin, and F. C. Selous led the way in that crusade against the big game of the South African peninsula which has gone far to rob that future confederation of one of its most attractive possessions in the eyes of educated men and women. Oswell, Baldwin, and Selous were, at any rate, naturalists who greatly—Selous very greatly—enriched scientific zoology with specimens and information as to life and habits.

The rampant desire to kill, kill, kill, to have the joy of hearing the bullet go plunk into a mighty carcass, or some form of marvellous beauty and swiftness, still animates the minds of most South African pioneers who are carrying on the work of empire ever nearer to the Equator. Much of the big game of Somaliland near the coast

Leaders in the Realm of Natural History

has been killed out. Everyone who has been divorced or who wishes to divorce, who is threatened with a breach of promise action, or has made an ass of himself—in the phrase of his relations—hies to East Africa to wipe out an unpleasant little piece of past by big-game shooting.

There are, and have been, of course, important exceptions to this category—men who have shot wisely and well, and who have observed and annotated, and have thus enriched not only our museums with important specimens—skins, bones, and pickled corpses—but who have given us the life history of the animals they pursued. Natural history, a better term in this last respect than biology, owes much to the writings of Livingstone, Sir Samuel Baker, W. C. Oswell, Baldwin, Selous, J. G. Millais, R. Crawshay, Alfred Sharpe, Alfred Neumann, E. N. Buxton in Africa, Sir Emerson Tennant in Ceylon, Sir Samuel Baker, Dr. W. T. Blanford, B. H. Hodgson, and R. Lydekker in India and Central Asia. One of the leaders in this modern movement of the camera versus rifle, himself distinguished as a shot and pursuer of shy beasts over difficult ground, is Edward North Buxton, who has illustrated the rare wild beasts of Corsica, Sardinia, Central Africa, and the

MAN'S TRIUMPH OVER NATURE

Sinai Peninsula, besides those of Eastern Africa. J. G. Millais has perhaps done the most striking work of all, in founding a school in the artistic and faithful portrayal of the wild life of beasts and birds in Britain, South Africa, and Newfoundland.

As regards great naturalists—biologists if you will—men to whom the study of all living things was one, indifferent as to whether they exercised their wits on geology, botany, zoology, anthropology—what a crown of glory will rest over the British Empire as long as British records remain! Darwin at the apex, Huxley, Sir Charles Lyell, Sir Joseph Hooker, Alfred Russel Wallace, Sir John Murray of the Challenger—a Canadian, Sir Richard Owen, Sir William Flower, Henry Walter Bates, Sir E. Ray Lankester, Alfred Garrod, W. A. Forbes, P. L. Sclater, E. B. Tylor, Alfred Newton, F. M. Balfour, and Wyville Thomson. Britons first revealed the curious water fauna of Lake Tanganyika—J. E. Moore and Dr. W. Cunnington—and then that of the Victoria Nyanza, not less remarkable because of its coincidence. They—Falconer, Lydekker, Bain, Dr. Anderson, Dr. Lyons, Capt. Gregory, and others—discovered, elucidated, and illustrated the wonderful extinct mammalian fauna of North-west India, the strange beast-reptiles of South Africa, the early elephants, Sirenia, hyraces of Eocene Egypt, the extraordinary giant marsupials and birds of Pleiocene Australia. These achievements not only led to the purest of all joys, the increase of abstract knowledge, but have aided us in our fight against the real reactionary Nature.

For, in the most part the deadliest foes of man are the minutest organisms at the bottom of the tree of life, simple developments of living matter scarcely to be classified as animal or vegetable. In the fight against the bacillus, spirillum, amœba, coccidium, treponema and trypanosome, the British Empire has taken a leading place—a dominant place almost, not forgetting the splendid co-operation of France, Germany, Italy, and America. Sir Patrick Manson, Ronald Ross, and others, discovered the whole process by which amœboid spores are introduced into the human system by such agencies as the mosquito, tick, and flea, thereby producing malarial fever and other dread diseases. Sir David Bruce elucidated the mystery of the

tsetse disease and, in concert with Drs. Nabarro and Castellani, solved the problem of sleeping sickness. An Indian army medical officer, Colonel Lambkin, has discovered a means of inoculating for syphilis—syphilis, like sleeping sickness, is produced by a flagellate protozoon, in this case a treponema—which may eventually stamp out that horrible malady. The eagerness to open up Equatorial Africa brought the sleeping sickness into Uganda, and has cost that protectorate in all nearly 100,000 lives. This is a terrible item at first sight, but one we can balance at once by discounting the (at least) 100,000 lives probably lost in Uganda and Unyoro during the reigns of the kings Mtesa, Kabarega, and Mwanga, by the internecine wars, poison ordeals, slave-raids, famines, and other causes of depopulation which have been abolished by the introduction of law and order under the British ægis.

It is a mistake to suppose also that the indigenous population of Africa was exempt from these awful visitations of disease before white men mixed them all up; before we opened routes this way and that way across the continent, which conveyed disease through insect agencies from one lot of people to another, hitherto separated by mutual distrust or by pathless forests. On the contrary, before the white man arrived on the scene, the population of Africa was, I surmise from native legends and traditions, constantly being wiped out by epidemics, first of one disease, then of another; by famines due to unexpected droughts, locusts or other insect plagues, or by attacks on food crops by herds of elephants, and the destruction of livestock by lions and leopards.

These are all evils which have been or are being abated by British energies. I confidently expect that we shall soon have mastered the mysteries of sleeping sickness, blackwater fever, cholera, and many other diseases, and be able to prevent them or to cure them with certainty.

In India it has been realised for the last ten years that sanitation, a cleanliness which would suppress the flea, other precautions which would exterminate the mosquito, might reduce the mortality from plague, cholera, and other dreadful maladies of the tropics to small dimensions, ever dwindling to cessation; and this has been

Deadly Foes of Man

The Toll of Sleeping Sickness

Sanitation the Enemy of Disease

one of the hardest, most disinterested, most thankless tasks which the British Empire has taken on its shoulders. Unhappily, though the education of India has advanced by leaps and bounds, the masses of ignorant Moslems and fanatical Hindus do not appreciate the value of science and of a scientific conduct in our lives, any more than do the peasants of Ireland, of some parts of England still, of Spain, Italy, or Russia. India has once or twice been brought nearer to general revolt by honest and sincere attempts to get rid of plague and cholera than she has by the imposition of salt taxes or the insufferable snobbishness of "mem-sahibs" or eyeglassed officers.

British efforts to improve the breeds of horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, dogs, and many domestic birds are world-famous. They have domesticated the ostrich, introduced the Angora goat into South Africa, the Merino sheep into Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa; the camel into Australia; the horse into South and South Central Africa, Australia, and New Zealand; deer into New Zealand and Mauritius. The mountain streams of New Zealand, British Central and East Africa have been abundantly stocked with trout. They have systematised the preservation of the Indian elephant, his capture and training for industrial purposes.

When they first took Cyprus in hand, the forests and the native agriculture were disappearing under the combined attacks of domestic goats and swarms of locusts. The goats were soon kept outside the protected area, but the fight against the locusts was a struggle that lasted for many years. This hateful insect pest is now practically extinct in Cyprus, to the very great gain of the island's prosperity. They are now bracing themselves for an attack

Wealth in Natural Products

on the mosquitoes, rats, sparrows, flies, fleas, and other small but significant pests of the empire. The mineral discoveries of the British have already been alluded to in the chapters dealing with their economic aspects. This exploitation of the gold of India, British Columbia, Australia, New Zealand, West Africa, South Africa, Egypt, British Guiana, and the Far North-west of Canada has added appreciably not

only to the wealth of the world in general, but to that of the indigenous peoples of the gold areas. The same may be said about the tin of the Malay Peninsula, the coal of India, Natal, Borneo, Australia, and British Central Africa. They have discovered and worked petroleum and bitumen in Burma, Nigeria, and Barbados.

Copper has enabled Britain by its intrinsic value to gain for the general use of man the ghastly deserts of South-west Africa and Australia. Diamonds have brought water, trees, flowers, livestock, human settlers, and the amenities of a highly civilised life to bare, stony, lifeless plateaus of inner South Africa. Their attraction is enabling us to combat the choking vegetation of British Guiana.

It is impossible in the space at my command to enumerate the names and the individual services of those British subjects whom the special conditions of the empire have impelled to wonderful discoveries in all the unenumerated branches of pure science—philology; comparative study of religious beliefs, mythology, and folk lore; comparative anthropology, and all branches of human

Britain's Predominance in the World

anatomy and medical jurisprudence; in medicine and surgery, in law and the framing of legal codes; in military and naval strategy; industrial appliances; electricity; ship construction; the invention and improvement of locomotives, steam-engines, bicycles, automobiles, and turbines; in chemistry and metallurgy; in sanitary engineering; in architecture, photography, painting, etching, engraving, book illustrating, printing, cabinet-making, tailoring, dressmaking, and upholstery (the carpets of the British Empire deserve a special mention); in the drama and literature, prose and poetry.

Innumerable works of reference would show either the active participation or the predominance of British citizens in all the spheres of great intellectual and practical achievements. It is to this record I appeal in maintaining that—with all its imperfections, shortcomings, blunders, or episodes of wrongdoing, violence, or injustice fully discounted—the British Empire has been a greater blessing to the world at large and to all the countries within its scope than any congeries of states under one head that has preceded it in history.

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XVIII



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CIVILISATION AND CHRISTIANITY EMPIRE'S DEBT TO MISSIONARY ENTERPRISE

IT has been the custom until quite recently to sneer at missionaries, propagandists of the Christian religion, in all circles except those of the professedly devout. The late Lord Salisbury, in veiled terms, once or twice described them as a nuisance. They have often been regarded as such by statesmen who conducted the foreign or colonial affairs. I am not going to deny that there has been misdirected zeal in the past, and that in some cases the wrong kind of missionary did a great deal of harm and put Great Britain to much anxiety and expense.

Elsewhere I have animadverted on the somewhat crack-brained, uneducated missionaries who wandered into Abyssinia to convert the Abyssinians to a different kind of Christianity to that which they already professed, and who involved Great Britain and the British taxpayer in a war which cost quite a thousand lives and several millions sterling. This is the only case I can call to mind where missionary enterprise was excessively ill-directed, and where it gave just ground for the animadversions of the 1860 type of statesman, who would not dream of omitting attendance at church on a Sunday morning, yet was perfectly indifferent to the spiritual or moral welfare of the myriads of black or brown people with whose affairs Great Britain was beginning to interfere politically.

When our descendants are able to look back on things from the large end of the telescope, and the history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is concentrated into a single readable volume, I think a very large part of that volume will be taken up with the results of mission work, possibly a larger space than is accorded to the successful campaigns of great conquerors by sea or land. The point of view from which I write is a peculiar one, which will probably please no one set of thinkers. I know it is no longer fashionable to

denounce Mohammedanism or idol-worship, just as any lively interest in a new metrical arrangement of the Psalms is almost impossible to find, even in the unexplored parts of New England. My own lawless views, if I may obtrude them without impertinence, would be rendered

The Supreme Power of Christianity

thus: That nearly all religions have been a great burden, an incessant clog on the upward progress of humanity, and the only teaching which seems to the present writer to be in consonance with progress is the teaching of Christ and the words of such of His apostles as caught His spirit. Christ's teaching, like two or three other great utterances of humanity, seems the goal of which we are never quite abreast; it is always a little ahead of the ideals of true Socialism; it is a religion which is an expression of the truest Liberalism.

Many versions of Christianity have developed into fetish worship and fatuous formalities, mystic rites bordering on sorcery, Judaism run mad; the letter has killed the spirit; the Incarnate Love has been lost in fanatical hate. Still, this religion, even in its most violent or foolish phases, has never quite left the skirts of commonsense, the middle path of sanity along which man advances, with occasional checks and deviations, towards the goal of the Millennium.

What has Mohammedanism done for the world? What has been accomplished of permanent good by Buddhism, and by the wild, raving, nightmare nonsense of Hinduism? It is true that the Religions of the East Arabs less than a century after the death of Mohammed absorbed Persian and Byzantine culture, and spread this through Syria, Egypt, North Africa, and Spain. It is also true that, to a limited extent, they kept the lamp of civilisation burning, some of the old Greek culture living with them, while Roman civilisation in Northern and Western Europe was overwhelmed by the

Goth, Hun, Frank, and Lombard. To a great extent the civilisation of the Arabs in pre-Turkish days was the distorted civilisation of Rome. Rome and Byzantium, the direct inheritors of Hellas, had implanted their civilisation too strongly along the shores of the Mediterranean for it to be annihilated by that mixed herd of Saracens, which after all only included a proportion of Arabs of the desert in its ranks, and was recruited largely from the Mediterranean world.

But there was something in the Mohammedan religion which prevented intellectual advance. Like the other great religions of Asia, it was a case of arrested development. The results are plain to the minds of all but fantastic perverts. Why is the Christian—real or nominal—top dog to-day? Because he is healthier, stronger, far wiser, much superior in mental capacity to the millions of Asia and Africa. What have the Turks invented? They have conquered mainly by Christian weapons, by the arts invented and perfected under the comparative freedom of Christianity.

The Japanese have emerged from the vassaldom of Asia because they have copied the arts and sciences of Christendom, because they are unhampered by any binding religion which makes it impossible for them to live after the manner of Christians. It was the more primordial and pure type of Christianity that, consciously or unconsciously, the great Protestant and Catholic missions of the British Empire

have sought to implant in the backward and foolish places of the world during the religious revival of the nineteenth century. The Christian propaganda of the Crusades was, of course, no better in any one whit than the holy wars of the Moslems.

If anything, the Christians of the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries conducted themselves worse in Syria and the Holy Land than did the Mohammedans, when it was their turn to be uppermost. The motives of many of the Crusaders were not Christian, but selfish, and they were guilty of deeds of violence and oppression essentially un-Christian. The Crusaders' type of Christianity lasted down to the sixteenth century and the Spanish discovery and conquest of Tropical America.

The Quakers as Pioneers of Missions It was the Quakers that really started on the missionary path the churches outside the pale of Rome. They seem, first of all, to have conceived—apart from the Jesuits, Capuchins, and Franciscans of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—the idea of peoples of a different race and a dark-coloured skin enjoying equal rights of humanity with the conquering Caucasian.

The Society of Friends—"Quakers" is a silly nickname which might surely be allowed to die—in fact, had not long been in existence as a definite sect of thinkers before they had begun a crusade against the slave trade, which was never to die out or even perceptibly to slacken



THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CATHEDRAL AT LAGOS IN WEST AFRICA N. W. Holm



F. Moor

THE HANDSOME MISSION CHURCH AT BLANTYRE IN BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA

until the trade in slaves was exterminated. The Anti-Slavery Society of Great Britain and Ireland, which exists to this day, was founded and has been mainly supported by Quakers. In the eighteenth century—the unsectarian missionary Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge was founded in 1698; the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, in 1701—other Nonconformist bodies in the West Indies and the United States championed the cause of the negro. It was not until the time of Wesley that any section of the Church of England interested itself actively in humanitarian propaganda. The

Missionary Interest in the Negroes interest that the Quakers, Baptists, and Wesleyans took, more especially in the fate of the West Indian and North American negro, drew them inevitably to the coasts of Africa, firstly to repatriate negroes who had attained freedom, and who found themselves outcasts in the body politic of white men's colonies or states; and secondly—with a much greater enthusiasm and success—to evangelise the indigenous savage negroes of West Africa.

India offered an immense field for missionary enterprise. The kings of Denmark, from 1705 to the early part of the nineteenth century, promoted actively Danish, German, and Nonconformist British missions to the east coast of Hindustan. For some fifty years after the British dominion had been founded by

Clive, anything like a Christian propaganda was sternly discouraged by the honourable East India Company from the fear that it would arouse Mohammedan and Hindu fanaticism; also because in England itself interest in religion had very much slackened, and official Christianity was not considered an *article d'exportation*.

The Church of England had no zeal for propaganda amongst the heathen as a body, though there were a few notable exceptions amongst its clergy who went abroad. Bishop Heber (1783-1826) was probably the first to arouse the sympathy of the members of the National Church in regard to the deplorable condition of the natives of India. The Church Missionary Society was founded in 1799. Its first field of operations was India. It was supported by the Low Church rather than the High, and in its early days it drew down a certain amount of ridicule on mission work by, possibly, an excess of sentimentalism.

In its desire to make up to the negro for the wrongs that he had suffered at the hands of the white man for the two centuries, during which the exponents of Anglican teaching were too much inclined to stand behind the slave-owner, the negro was placed on a pedestal by the Church Missionary Society, and credited with qualities of head and heart that he did not, unfortunately, always possess. The Baptist Missionary Society, founded in 1792, began a great educational work

in India at the close of the eighteenth century, and soon afterwards began to work among the West Indian negroes. It laid the foundations of a negro civilisation in Fernando Po during the middle of the nineteenth century, which even under the once unfriendly rule of Spain and many other difficulties grew slowly to its modern developments. The same thing was done for the coast country of the Kameruns, and is being done now for the central basin of the Congo. The educational work of the same society in India and China is also being conducted on a gigantic scale.

Livingstone the Great Missionary

The London Missionary Society came into existence in 1795, and represented the aspirations of the Congregationalists and Wesleyans. One of its first great pioneers was David Livingstone. It is difficult to exaggerate the benefits that the Bechuana tribes in South Central Africa and the peoples of the Nyassa-Tanganyika Plateau and of Madagascar have owed to the agents of the London Missionary Society.

The Universities' Mission was founded in 1860, after the appeal of Livingstone in 1856, and has since taken a large share in the evangelisation of East Africa and Nyassaland. The great missions of the Presbyterian churches have done much for education in India, China, British Central Africa, Nigeria, and South Africa. The evangelisation of the Pacific has been largely the work of the Church of England and of the Wesleyans. Most people nowadays have read of the success of the Church of England in Uganda.

There is an English Catholic Mission, directed from Mill Hill, at work in the eastern section of the Uganda Protectorate. Some mention should be made of the struggling North African Mission, which, I believe, has also sent exponents of Protestant Christianity to Persia and the Turkish dominions. It has been an up-hill task for the brave men and women of this

The Value of Medical Missions

band to fight against Mohammedan prejudice, superstition, and ignorance, especially in matters of hygiene. This mission, so far as it has succeeded, has done so by following the only means of access to the citadel of the Mohammedan heart—a thorough-going knowledge of Arabic, of the history of Islam and the features of its faith, and of medical science. Medical missions indeed, during the last quarter of a century, have developed to a

remarkable degree in India, China, and Africa. Along these lines of approach it is not easy to overestimate the sheer good that has been effected by Christian missions. This leads me to my plainest speaking and the core of my argument.

The whole of the Christian world itself is far from being in agreement on even fundamental dogmas of its religion, and so long as each sect, branch, or church adhered rigidly to the exposition of its own version of Christian dogma and of that alone, so long much of its work with intelligent non-Christian races was fruitless and even baneful, since it revived the dislike and distrust of the Christian as an official or ruler. But when, as has been the case almost universally for the last thirty years, each mission in its turn thought more of the teaching of Christ as a means of beginning, and endeavoured to deal fraternally rather than paternally with the people it had come to teach, Christian propaganda began to achieve success by leaps and bounds. When some historian of the world sums up its results a hundred years or so hence, he will—I say with confidence—

A Testimony to Missionary Achievement

be able to show that the great Christian missions emanating from Europe and America have conferred on the backward countries of the world, to say nothing of the savage regions, a veritable renaissance, an education, an elevation which has been conveyed in a better and more salutary manner than it could have been by soldiers or officials, whose teaching was imposed by force and not persuasion.

I am well aware that that is not the verdict of to-day in all respects. Missionary efforts, in China especially, have not only been extremely obnoxious to the indigenous governing class and to uninformed public opinion in that region of 400,000,000 conservative, industrious people, but the troubles which have ensued have entailed armed intervention on the part of European nations. For these wars the missionaries have been held to blame. Several European and American statesmen have told them that they were not wanted in China, and had much better go away.

Yet, a hundred years hence, even if the missionaries were to depart from China tomorrow, it will be realised that they have done much to lay the foundations of a new China, to harmonise the ideas of China with those of Europe and America.

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They have broken down more completely than any other force the isolation of China from the world's movements; and surely it is not well for the progress of the human race that 433,000,000 out of a total of 1,200,000,000 should be entirely out of touch with the rest?

What has been the result to China of her isolation and her degenerate pursuit of false knowledge? That at the present day, though she numbers 433,000,000 of people under the nominal sway of the Chinese Emperor, she is more or less under the thralldom of Japan (50,000,000), with an alternative of being under the thumb of Russia (150,000,000). Take one instance alone of the false culture that missionary teaching has attempted to remove—the cramped foot of the Chinese woman. There may be some variation in a code of morals or accepted canons of beauty.

The ultimate test of the value of both probably is the prosperity and happiness of the people that adopt them. Put to this test, it must surely be admitted that the taste, morality, and good sense of the white races of Europe and America are superior

What Chinese Women Owe to Missions

to those of the backward peoples. The alternative is to admit oneself ignorant or of unbalanced mind. We must cling to some standard in these things, and all the evidence which can be submitted to reasonable, sane men points to the fact that the European standard has generally been the best. Well, according to the European standard the cramped foot of the Chinese woman is as silly as the precautions against defilement on the part of the Brahmans, the law which forbids the eating of beef to the Hindus, the Levitical prohibitions of the pig, the hare, and the oyster, the Moslem disapproval of pictures and statues, or the fetishistic practices of negro Africa. When Chinese women all over China are able to walk about with the ease and comfort intended by Nature, they should put up some commemorative tablet to the memory of the Christian missionaries whose advice and influence abolished this and other preposterous mistakes in the perverted culture of the Chinese.

I have ventured in other places to call the missionaries the tribunes of the people. Mission influence created Exeter Hall, and all which that now vanished place of meeting portended in the attitude of the British Empire towards indigenous

and inferior races. This policy, one may hope, will still be maintained by the Aborigines Protection Society. Again and again the responsible rulers of the British Empire have been prevented by its influence from committing acts of injustice, or allowing colonists or colonial officials to do so, against the previous occupants of the soil. Many of these had never been conquered, but had accepted the advent of the British Empire peacefully, and even with acclamation, as a force which would maintain law and justice.

Unfortunately, the first instinct of the impetuous colonist or pioneer has been to deprive these prior inhabitants of their just rights. There has been, no doubt, exaggeration on both sides. It would have been manifestly unfair to attribute to inactive, ignorant savages the whole of the vested rights over vast areas which have only been turned to profitable use by the expenditure of British capital and British lives. In some few instances the European missionaries may have been unjust towards the European pioneer or trader, and have denied him the reward to which he was entitled for his supreme efforts in the cause of civilisation. On the other hand, these lay colonists would have reduced the indigenes to miserable, landless serfs, have denied them a common humanity with us—though that this tie existed was soon shown by the hybrids which sprang up—but for the outcries of the missionary and the philanthropist.

The final test of the right to survive can only be physical and mental fitness; but it is advisable that there should be a brake on the reckless advance of the Caucasian, and this drag is provided by both the teaching and the true practice of the principles of Christianity. There should be a real Christian science, based upon a clear understanding of the foundation principles of the Christian religion,

A Plea for More Missionaries

which should apply the principles of Christianity to the wild flora and fauna of the world. Every human race and every type of animal or plant should be given a chance to show if it cannot find some niche in the mosaic of the wide world. There should be missionaries of biology as well as missionaries of Christianity, and both alike should plead the cause of the overwhelmed, the backward, the imperfect that may yet be made perfect.



THE FUTURE OF THE EMPIRE PROBLEMS OF GREATER BRITAIN THAT DEMAND ATTENTION AND SOLUTION

A GROWING difficulty, the principal unsolved problem of the immediate future, is the regulation of the interrelations between the different states, colonies, protectorates, and other divisions of the empire in regard to mutual defence, or a common action of offence, the conduct of Imperial diplomacy, and, above all, inter- and extra-Imperial commerce. When through such workers on the imagination as Lord Beaconsfield and Sir Charles Dilke (in his "Greater Britain") an idea of the majesty, the marvellous scope of the British Empire began to permeate the minds of educated people, the question of Imperial Federation became, and has remained, an important political idea.

The desire was born in England, and has remained until recently an English aspiration, not as yet warmly espoused in Scotland, and only shared by that small portion of Ireland that is English in sympathies. South Africa in the 'seventies of the last century was so strongly Dutch in feeling, and so inherently hostile to England, that the late Lord Carnarvon was unable to bring into existence even a confederation of the South African states, though he had solved that difficulty between French and English in Canada.

A certain Irish element that prospered in South-eastern Australia, and by its talent and influence directed a good deal of the local Press opinion, threw cold water on the Imperial Federation idea so far as it concerned Australia. India at that time possessed no vehicle for the expression of Indian opinion. It merely spoke through the mouths of Anglo-Indian officials. Nevertheless, the idea made progress up to a certain point. It was discussed on two lines: A commercial union and the universal participation of all parts of the empire in the common support

of the armed forces by land and sea. The desire to promote Imperial unity of purpose induced several statesmen, such as Lord Randolph Churchill, Jan Hofmeyr, and Joseph Chamberlain, in 1885, 1892, and 1903, and also important organs of the Press to modify their views on Free Trade, and to advocate the restoration of differential duties, in favour of the colonies and India, at the ports of Great Britain and Ireland—in short, Protection.

So long as there was any chance of the great raw-material-producing portions of the empire like India, Australia, and New Zealand and Canada caring nothing about the fostering of local industries, but agreeing to devote all their energies to the production of raw materials which might be manufactured by the looms, forges, and factories of Great Britain and the North of Ireland, there was much to be said in favour

The Colonies and Self-Protection of a commercial union of the whole empire which would discriminate in all its customs Houses against the goods arriving from countries not belonging to the Imperial pact. Great Britain would then have become a privileged market for the sale of colonial produce (raw material), and the colonies would have absorbed the bulk of the British manufactured goods. There would have been small local sacrifices, but such a bond as this would have knit the empire together, and the wealth and power derived from this close commercial association would have made it irresistible by land and sea—the mistress of the world.

Unhappily, as some think, India, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada did not share these views. They wished not only to produce enormous quantities of raw material, but to be equally endowed with highly organised industries to manufacture that raw material. They wished to protect these nascent industries by a relatively high tariff wall which would make it very

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nearly impossible for the Mother Country to compete against local manufactures. It is true that a somewhat illusory preference was to be granted to British goods in comparison to those coming from other countries, but this preference was not enough to make Australia, New Zealand, or Canada a better market for the manufactures of Britain than any other civilised country of the world. In India, as the government of King George has the supreme controlling power, while there has been fair play to local Indian industries and administrative independence, Free Trade has been maintained throughout all Southern Asia under British influence, and British manufactures are still able to find a profitable market under the British flag. There has also been less attempt on the part of the self-governing colonies in South Africa to shut out British manufactured goods than has been the case with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.

This being the general position, therefore, the policy of Protection has fallen to the ground—inevitably—since England's trade with the non-British world is at present as three to one in comparison with her trade with the rest of the British Empire. If she broke her commercial treaties in order to discriminate in her home ports in favour of her daughter nations, colonies, or protectorates, she would probably be ruined as an industrial nation, for the self-governing portions of the empire offer her practically nothing in exchange.

Unfortunately, to those who still take an interest in Imperial federation, the great daughter nations are setting their faces towards the ideal of fiscal independence and isolation. It may be, from the point of view of all humanity, that this is the best plan to cherish. If persisted in, it will mean that every separate section of the empire which is independent of monetary subsidies or help from the British Parliament will frame its own tariff and initiate its own commercial relations, with the point of view solely of local advantages, and without any regard to the commercial welfare of the empire as a whole.

If Jamaica can make better terms for her sugar, fruit, or other products by joining the Customs Union of the United States, to the disadvantage of British imports, she will do so. Perhaps, from the Jamaican standpoint, she will be right. New Zealand or Australia may also enter into

special arrangements with the United States, to the disadvantage of Britain, but to the gain of local manufactures or products. India may enter into closer arrangements with the empire of China or with Japan—in matters of commerce—than with the two islands in the North Sea. South Africa may conclude a commercial alliance with Canada or with Australia, to the great advantage of all these regions, but very much to the detriment of purely British commerce. The very unfair part of the entirely self-seeking views now in vogue with colonial statesmen is that to the British taxpayer—almost alone—is left the onerous charge of supporting a navy which mainly exists to defend the overseas possessions of Great Britain, and an army which must be ready to strike at foes of the empire in any or all of the continents when called upon to do so.

If the self-governing sections of the empire contributed proportionately to their population and their commerce to the Imperial cost of the Imperial army and navy, then there would be less hardship to the British, their creditors and creators, in their utter disregard of their commercial requirements. But to continue to leave England almost the entire expense and responsibility of defending the empire, and maintaining law and order within its limits, is a policy which must in the long run split up the British Empire. There is a limit to its resources in money, as well as in men.

Colonial statesmen argue that there shall be no taxation without representation; that they have no unbounded faith in the wisdom, economy, or talent of the Board of Admiralty, the War Office, or the Ministries for Foreign Affairs or for the Colonies; they are not disposed to furnish funds from out of their own internal revenues to be spent at the discretion of the government sitting in London. If they are to contribute, they must be proportionately represented at some Imperial council stationed in London, and be able to influence the general policy of the empire in all matters that might lead to interstate trouble or external wars. The opposition to any such Imperial policy and to the intervention of delegates from the daughter nations or dependent kingdoms or empires in bureaucratic affairs comes entirely from Britain itself,

Burdens of the British Taxpayer

Friend of Colonial Commerce

Case for an Imperial Council

chiefly from that great and important body of permanent civil servants, trained by generations to exceeding discretion, reserve, and prudence. Statesmen from the great colonies are often widely different in nature from the men that serve King George in the Home Country. They are negligent of official secrets, daring in public speeches, and reckless of consequences, for the very good and sufficient reason that, situated where they are, they are so absolutely safe. They can say and do the most imprudent things to foreign Powers, and leave Great Britain to bear the brunt of their reckless actions.

Indiscretions of Colonial Statesmen

The statesmen of Canada know that a punitive expedition or a great invasion of Canada by another Power from across the seas is an almost impossible feat, though it may be much easier for Germany or France to bombard London. Australia and New Zealand also know that they are immune from serious attack on the part of the United States, Japan, Russia, Germany or France. On the other hand, the two home islands are exceedingly vulnerable, more so, perhaps, than the mass of their population or some shortsighted Ministers believe.

Whatever course may be taken by events, there is no real danger to the independence of Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Canada. If Great Britain were driven out of India as a governing power she would not be replaced by any other European nation. It is possible that in course of time strong commercial relations may grow up between South Africa and Australia. Both countries may maintain fleets, with New Zealand, perhaps, as a third, which would be sufficient to prevent the hostile action of Asiatic or European Powers in the southern seas. The only danger to Canadian independence is from the United States, which, however, is hardly likely to

Danger to Canadian Independence

waste blood and money in an unprofitable war for the annexation of Canada. If the Imperial Federation idea is not revived and carried through to ultimate success with an Imperial council that will be a real working element, and with some sacrifices on the part of the component daughter nations, the next stage or phase of the British Empire to be reviewed by historians may be its restriction to the control of India and Southern Asia,

Egypt, and all existing British Africa down to the River Zambesi, the Mediterranean Islands, Gibraltar, the Falkland Archipelago, the West Indies, Guiana and British Honduras, together with the commercial outposts in China and the Pacific.

And here, again, the British must not look for finality. In all these regions they are simply playing the part of educators. Their descendants will have to face the idea of a universally educated, self-governing India, wherein the British Empire may be only a subject of grateful remembrance, local nomenclature, and innumerable votive statues. Perhaps the English language, if all European tongues have not been set aside for a universal Esperanto, may remain as the commercial medium in India. England will have left on that vast region of Southern Asia, the original matrix of Man, an impress more lasting and more creditable than the effect of the Roman empire on her own land and kindred European countries.

The only way to counteract such a fate—and, as it may not come about for a hundred years, it need not unduly agitate

The Better Government of India

the readers of this History—would be the suspension of race or religious prejudices, the inculcation of courtesy, sympathy, and unswerving justice in all the civil and military officials sent from Great Britain to serve in India, and the patient education of the peoples of India to see the world a little more through her eyes, to take advantage of her own painfully acquired knowledge.

On her part, she must associate the educated classes of India more and more with the administration of her Indian Empire; she must give them a share in the councils which regulate the finance and taxation of their native land. India at the present day is not ripe for complete self-rule; the withdrawal of the British Civil Service and soldiery would merely lead to devastating warfare between the Mohammedans on the one side and the Sikhs and Hindus on the other, either or both of these sections enslaving and oppressing the unwarlike races of Southern India or Burma.

Much the same may be said about the future of Egypt and of British Tropical Africa; the British are only in Egypt as educators. But this is a land which by climate, even as far as some parts of the Sudan, is as favourable to the settlement

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of the races of Southern Europe as it is to the indigenous people, who are compounded of an ancient mingling of European, Asiatic and negro elements. There may be a steady set of Greek, Maltese and Italian settlers towards the lands irrigated by the Nile and its tributaries. A new European nation may be compacted; it will contain very little that is North European and British in its physical elements, and it will some day ask to stand alone.

In Uganda, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, with the kindred Liberia alongside, working on similar lines, England is building up educated negro nationalities. Little by little they will get a larger and larger share in their own self-government, until at last, like India and Egypt, they may thank her warmly for all she has done for them, and request to be allowed to manage their own internal and external affairs in future.

Such, likewise, may be the fate of a new Cyprus, and of a Malta, which was never conquered, but placed herself unreservedly and trustingly in British hands, and therefore deserves all sympathy within the limits of reason in the protection of

A Possible Alliance of the Future

her well-marked nationality and many claims to self administration. A day may dawn when British men and women may no longer be sent from their shores to govern, control and educate races that are no longer backward in the march towards a universal civilisation. It is to be hoped, however, that if England has played her part fairly, these races and peoples that she raised up from a condition either of savagery or of hopeless confusion may unite with her on some basis of strict and honourable alliance, together with her white daughter nations; an alliance which shall only be framed and directed for the maintenance of the world's peace and the study of the world's happiness.

Until the question of the internal administration of Ireland, Scotland, England and Wales has achieved a proper and fairly complete settlement it can hardly be said that the British are fully prepared for the responsibilities of empire outside these islands. To some extent, almost enough for practical purposes, Scotland has attained Home Rule, and Wales is well on the way towards it. The arrangements for quick legislation in and for England as regards purely English requirements are still very imperfect. But the question of Ireland is an urgent one. In this case we

have an island blest with a temperate and a healthy climate, set in seas remarkable for their wealth of fish, a country of 32,605 square miles, which, if handled scientifically in the way of agriculture, forestry and horticulture, ought to support a prosperous, robust, and intellectual population of 20,000,000. As it is, its

Desperate State of the Irish

people (4,458,000) are less in number than the inhabitants of London. Such as they are, they are a notable race. Though they differ much in physical type, all their types can be paralleled in the adjacent island of Great Britain. Religion is mainly to blame for the desperate case of the Irish, and the intolerance on the part of all the principal religious bodies in Ireland still stands to some extent in the way of a fusion of interests.

Home Rule would have been restored long ago but for the extremists of the Nationalist party—that is to say, the party of Irishmen mostly, but not entirely, Roman Catholics, who have openly clamoured not only for the right to administer their own internal affairs—which, with some reservations, is clearly due to them—but for the power to sever their political connection with Great Britain. This demand is so wholly unreasonable from the racial, the religious, commercial and political points of view that it is little wonder it has been resisted so far by the majority of the electorate in Great Britain.

The Ulster minority in Ireland represents an enormous amount of profitable industry; it stands for the prosperous and well populated portion of the island. Racially speaking, it is less Iberian and autochthonous than the rest of Ireland. Historically, its colonisation from the adjacent coasts of Wales, England and Scotland was much more recent than other settlements from these directions. This minority declines to place itself under the rule of the National party, since it

Ireland's Need of Home Government

fears injustice in fiscal and religious matters. Extended measures of local government would probably clear away this danger. The administration of their own internal affairs must be eventually accorded to the Irish people, coupled with the same participation in the affairs, responsibilities and charges of the United Kingdom as a whole, and of such of the British Empire as is equally administered by Scotland, Wales and England.

Beyond the seas, the idea of Home Rule is no new one. The states of British origin that now compose the United States of America all had their local assemblies and considerable powers of self-administration; but a foolish king and an ignorant Minister fought the battle of taxation without representation in the eighteenth century, and lost it. This im-

**Home Rule
Beyond
the Seas**

planted an idea in the minds of British subjects beyond the seas that has never been allowed to die. The representative institutions of the component parts of the empire outside the British Islands have been described elsewhere. It only remains to glance at their past history and at the problems they may raise in the immediate future.

Assemblies of an elective and fully representative character were early brought into existence in the West Indies at various dates from 250 years ago. It is possible that in these instances the idea of Home Rule was premature and carried to extremes. Area, population, and the future race-elements of the population were not taken into consideration in granting these rights: and at various times during the nineteenth century the representative institutions—except in the Bahamas and Barbados—were abrogated or seriously limited.

A constitution and elective lower houses of parliament were conceded to the two organised provinces of Canada in 1792; and responsible government for Upper and Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island was introduced in 1841, after what might almost be called a series of rebellions between 1837 and 1839. But for this wise concession, the vast provinces of Canada would long ago have been part of the United States, to the detriment of British commerce and British influence on the fate of the North American Continent. A constitution was given to Newfound-

**Constitutions
in the
Colonies**

land in 1832, and full Home Rule in 1855. Home Rule was accorded also in a reasonable degree to the colony of British Guiana in Northern South America in continuation of the Dutch Constitution already in force in 1803. This was modified or extended in 1812, 1826, 1831, and 1891.

The provinces or colonies that now compose Australia received constitutions, and finally Home Rule, as soon as they were able to show indications of the

power to maintain orderly government. These rights were granted to New South Wales in 1824, 1842, and 1855; to Victoria in 1851 and 1855; South Australia (Northern Territories added in 1861-1863) in 1856; and Tasmania in the same year; Queensland in 1859; and West Australia in 1850 and 1890. The enfranchisement of the six colonies culminated in the recognition by Great Britain of the Australian Commonwealth as a whole in the year 1900. New Zealand received Home Rule in 1882, and the status of a dominion in 1907.

South Africa has presented greater difficulties in the framing of responsible government because of the two rival types of European colonists—British and Britannicised Germans speaking English; and Boers, with the descendants of Huguenot Frenchmen, speaking Dutch. Further, there were the millions of indigenous negroes to be taken into consideration. Cape Colony, which was by far the "whitest" of the South African states, was erected into the position of a self-governing colony in 1853 and a

**Self-Governing
States of
South Africa**

responsible government in 1872. Natal did not receive full responsible powers of self-government till 1893. The Orange Free State and the Transvaal were respectively accorded the position of independent nations in 1854, and 1852-1858.

When the Transvaal was annexed in 1877, it was the intention of the British Government to bestow on it a few years afterwards much the same powers of self-government as were already under consideration for Natal. This solution of the difficulty, which would have probably saved the South African War, was prevented by the Boer uprising in 1881. Before the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal could be brought into line with the rest of the colonies in South Africa they had to be conquered and annexed. They were then as speedily as possible (Transvaal in 1906, Orange River Colony in 1907) re-erected into responsible self-governing states, in the same quasi-independent position as Cape Colony and Natal.

There still remain subject to a great extent to the direct administration of Downing Street, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and the vast Rhodesian territories to the north and south of the Zambesi. Bechuanaland and Basutoland will no doubt remain for a very long time to

come, black states, wards of the British Empire, with the guardianship either remaining in London or eventually entrusted to the White Confederation of South Africa—not, however, until such time as England can trust the colonists to give fair play to their black neighbours and fellow-citizens, and until they are entirely able to relieve the Mother Country of the cost and responsibility of intervention. The Rhodesian provinces south of the Zambesi will eventually become self-governing white man's lands of the same status as those other great states that will with them form the Confederation of South Africa. The provinces north of the Zambesi will, no doubt, be grouped under the general government of British Central Africa, and eventually be dealt with on much the same lines as the country of the Basuto and Bechuana.

They, at any rate, emphatically are black man's lands, and should certainly be regarded as a future home and privileged reserve for such negro peoples of South Africa as may choose to migrate thither, seeking a refuge from the incompatible

The Hindu Demand for Home Rule

white man. The statesmen and thinkers of the British Empire are now beginning to face the question of self-government in such territories under the administration of the empire as are not inhabited in the main by white men and Christians. The lands of the Mohammedan have certainly the best of the premature claims to self-government, because the Mohammedan religion is less unreasonable than that of the Hindu or the Buddhist. But at present the cry for Home Rule is louder and more menacing from the educated Hindus of East Central India than it is from lands where the Mohammedan influence predominates.

As regards the Straits Settlements (Malay Peninsula and Borneo) and much of the surface of India, the question is partially solved by the preservation and education of native rulers. Such, probably, will be the course followed in Egypt, in Southern Arabia, in the Persian Gulf, and in Zanzibar. England will not grab at the land of these countries, nor seek to substitute a white man for a yellow or black as settler or colonist.

England will work for free play and full protection for the white man's commerce and commercial agents, and also maintain as far as is reasonable the principle of

Free Trade. But she should strive by her advice, her threats (if necessary), her cash influence to educate the native dynasties in the ever better government and administration of the lands subjected to them. If these native rulers consider it advisable by degrees to enlarge their native councils into elective legislative assemblies, such a course will not be opposed by Great Britain, provided the native legislatures show themselves prudent and observant of treaty obligations. In Uganda the present writer was permitted to restore the indigenous legislature, and more clearly to define and strengthen the prerogatives of the native king. Other supreme chiefs were set up by himself or by his successors as administrators, and the peace and quiet which have followed have shown the wisdom—in this part of Africa, at any rate—of trusting to native dynasties to rule their own people. A similar course has been followed in the protectorate of Sierra Leone, and is, no doubt, being adopted in Nigeria.

Besides the questions of interstate commercial relations and Home Rule there are other problems and dangers to be faced and solved—not perhaps with a rush, but as occasion serves. One of these is the colonisation of vacant lands, and consequently the distribution of the world's racial types. Within the vast limits of the Canadian Dominion there are perhaps a million square miles of fertile land with a healthy climate still uninhabited by men.

Most notable perhaps are the coast-lands and islands of British Columbia, an earthly paradise for scenery, climate, and wealth of natural products. British Columbia, calculated on its endowment by Nature, should be a country with the population of France, and should be one of the envied nations of the world. At present it is inhabited by about 200,000 men and women, mainly of British origin—there are also 13,000 Chinese, and 4,600 Japanese—some of whom have

Mixed Races in British Columbia

come direct from the Mother Country, others by way of the Eastern Canadian provinces, or from the United States. There is, in addition, an Indian population of about 29,000, living very much the life of gypsies. This Indian type will—I venture to predict—become fused into the general community without harm to it. Physically, it does not differ very

much more from the modern type of British colonist than do some of the cotten fishing folk of North-western Scotland and Western Ireland from the more modern race types of the British Islands.

Still, 200,000 British colonists and 29,000 Amerindians are not a sufficient population for the area and extraordinary natural advantages of British Columbia and its dependencies. The Japanese divined this long ago. The limits of Japan are all too small for its overflowing population. Korea may receive some of the overflow; China, on the other hand, may resist Japanese immigration, and is quite vigorous and numerous enough in her peoples to do so. Even if Japan should wrest the Philippine Islands from the United States—as she may yet try to do—this region does not offer great possibilities for the building up of a powerful people. It is small wonder, therefore, that Japan has hoped, little by little, by degrees, unobtrusively, to infiltrate the lands of British Columbia, Alaska, and the North-western part of the United States, and thus in time create a new Japan beyond the seas which might resist aggression by the eventually effete races of Europe.

Canada and British Columbia, and also the United States, are alive to this difficulty, and seemingly resolved to resist it. This movement has done something to weaken the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and it may considerably embarrass the Asiatic policy of the British Government. Yet the problem of Canadian-British Columbian colonisation will not be solved by our keeping out the Japanese and Chinese.

The alternative seems simple: "Encourage white immigration." But the emigration of poor whites, labourers, competitors with the working men already in possession, is not encouraged; rather the reverse. One can understand the

Problem of Canadian Colonisation

objection of Canadian citizens to having their Motherland made the dumping ground for white refuse. This they have every right to reject. But if they are not to admit for menial work, or for the less attractive walks of life, the Oriental races—also an exclusion with which we can sympathise—then something must be done to attract large numbers of white settlers who will come ready to work, though with no more capital than their head and limbs.

The objection to this policy—of throwing open the Canadian Dominion to all white immigrants on the easiest terms subject to the indispensable conditions of healthiness and morality—arises from the labour leaders and trade unions of Canada. "We will not have labour cheapened" is the substance of their outcry. Their argument would probably be that they do not want to repeat in Canada the miseries of the Old World. "All labour shall be highly paid in future," almost equally paid, whether it be hair-cutting, wood-sawing, teaching mathematics, painting pictures, composing operas, writing books, reaping corn, preaching sermons, pleading or defending at the Bar.

Perhaps they are right. But meantime agricultural, mining, domestic work is almost at a standstill in the Far West while these laudable attempts are being made to solve the social problem, to create a white Canada in which there shall be no distinctions between skilled and unskilled labour—for that is what the argument resolves itself into in the long run. Already young native Canadians are

Canada's Social Conditions

migrating to Mexico, and the young married womanhood of the western parts of the dominion is wearing itself into old age and ugliness in the endeavour to be cook, washerwoman, housemaid, governess, nurse and wife in one. These are the complaints voiced by many private letters, by signed and unsigned contributions in the colonial Press. The population of Canada has not increased proportionately by anything like the same ratio as that of the United States, though there is an almost equal area of territory suited to the habitation of the white man.

Japan may also turn her attention to the colonisation of Australia, but the lands left open to her here do not offer one tithe of the advantages and attractions of British Columbia or of North-west America generally. They are arid and extremely hot, and in some parts very unhealthy. Possibly Japan may hope for a tropical future. It is a people of extremely mixed elements, as likely to develop into a tropical race as into a people of the temperate zones. In that case, Japan may accept in return for a promise to leave America severely alone the overlordship of the Philippine Islands, and little by little become the mistress of the Dutch, German, and perhaps a part of the British

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Empire in that region of Malaya between Australia and New Guinea on the south-east and Cochin China on the north-west. Meantime, if any movement should be directed by the Imperial statesmen of Great Britain, it should be the direction of British emigration towards British Columbia—one of the world's paradises.

There is a future before Trans-Zambesian Africa, from a white man's point of view, that is scarcely realised. Before many years have passed, science will have found a means of extirpating such local germ-diseases as affect man and beast. The climate over nearly the whole of this region from the Zambesi to the southern ocean is magnificent. Where the soil is arid it is packed with precious metals, but much of the aridity is caused by the ill-regulated water supply. Afforestation is already producing a change in this respect, and increasing the rainfall. In fact, the rainfall may be equalised by a moderate de-forestation of the too tropical eastern coast-belt coincident with the planting up of the interior deserts. The streams produced by the heavy tropical or temperate rains will be made to supply water for the irrigation of the less favoured regions.

The White Man's Prospects in Africa

The coexistence of a negro population of some five or six million within these limits is, together with the general question of unskilled labour, one of the problems that the empire has to face and solve before long. About 1,500 years ago, in all probability, there were very few big black negroes dwelling in the lands to the south of the Zambesi. This sub-continent then was sparsely peopled by a Hottentot-Bushman race of low or arrested physique, and of poor intellectual development.

These men were leading the almost animal life of the Stone Age. Then came successive rushes of the powerful Bantu negroes from the north and east, and a good deal of the centre and east of South Africa was populated by black men, the ancestors of the modern Bechuana, Zulu, and Nyanja tribes. The Hottentots in the south-west had made a more determined resistance, and when the European first arrived on the scene, in the sixteenth century, much of the south-western part of this sub-continent was still outside the Bantu sphere. The persecution or the control of the Hottentots by Dutch and British indirectly assisted the attempts of the Kaffirs to extend further and further to

the south-west. Speaking, however, racially, some sections of the Zulu-Kaffir-Bechuana peoples are no earlier colonists of South Africa than the Dutch and even the British. Some sections of them have inherently no better right to the soil of a No-man's-land than we have; both alike have entered into the inheritance of a vanished Bushman type, if one can seriously ascribe full territorial rights to a race of wandering human nomads, as much, and no more, entitled to the fee-simple of the soil they roved over than the wild beasts they were attempting to dispossess.

The Early Colonists of South Africa

In deciding such grave questions it has always seemed to the present writer that a very great distinction must be made between nomads and agriculturists. An agricultural race that has distinctly benefited the land it has occupied, by subduing Nature and making the country fit for intelligent human occupation, has acquired a fee-simple in the soil; not so the nomad, who is a mere hunter. Pastoral peoples should be given reservations in return for the care they have bestowed on domestic animals, and for their having subdued more or less the wild beasts that would make the keeping of these flocks and herds impossible; or they may have uprooted poisonous herbs, and have mitigated marsh or thorny scrub.

To reduce a long argument into as few words as possible, the future settlement of race distribution in Trans-Zambesian Africa should follow these lines: The existing agricultural races should be granted definite areas of land, which would become as much theirs as land similarly taken up by white men; but every inducement of teaching, all fair persuasion, should be used towards these negro tribes to leave the high, cold regions or the temperate coast lands and migrate little by little to the tropical eastern belt, and, most of all, to the basin of the Zambesi, especially the magnificent territories of British Central Africa. This is a climate well suited to negro physical development, not so well suited to the white man. As compensation for the gradual creation of a white South Africa, the building up of a black Central Africa should be carried on simultaneously. No injustice should be done to Basuto or Zulu, to Bechuana or Baronga. But actual inducements may be offered to the more vigorous and

A Black Central Africa

enterprising amongst the black men to migrate a little farther to the east and north in return for a good substantial grant of land. In exchange, the vacant soil of the high cold plateaux might be disposed of to European settlers. Gradually in this way the two races might draw apart, the black men living more to the east and north, and

Bonds of Union for Black and White

the white to the south and south-west. As in India, so in South Africa, the alternative to this policy is the

setting aside of racial prejudice and the free interbreeding of black and white; the same education, the same laws, the same social organisation being made to apply to both.

This consummation is less and less in favour. The blacks dislike interbreeding with the whites quite as much as the reverse is the case, and so far the result of such intermixture between the absolute negro and the absolute white man has not been happy either in its physical attributes or its political status.

On the other hand, the retention of five, six, ten millions of negroes as a permanently servile force has likewise ceased to be possible. Sufficient education has been brought amongst them by the white man, he has departed sufficiently from the ideas of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to have made the reinstatement of negro slavery a physical impossibility. The negroes would resist it to the death, and the white man has not the numbers, the strength, or the money to reimpose such a condition on his still slightly inferior brother, whom at one time he would, if he could, have reduced once more to the level of a beast.

Of course, if the white peoples decide for a white South Africa they must face and settle the problem of unskilled labour. Either they must consent to work with the pick and shovel, the mason's trowel, the bricklayer's hod, the gardener's spade, to perform all the menial functions of domesticity, to police, to be signalman, pointsman and guard,

The Ideal of a White South Africa

telegraph clerk and messenger, postman, groom, carter,

shepherd, vine-dresser, ostrich attendant, and dock labourer; or they must decide for a partnership on equal terms with the black and possibly the yellow man so far as South Africa is concerned. The Chinaman need have no say in the development of South Africa. He has quite a large enough sphere in Eastern

and Central Asia, but if the "White South Africa" ideal is to be lowered because the white man dislikes to work as an unskilled labourer, the Indian must be readmitted to take his share in the development of this neglected region.

There are few problems now to be solved in British West Africa since it has most wisely been decided it is the black man's country, to be owned and developed by the negro and negroid. In Uganda the same principle is in force, but in East Africa the future is much more complicated; a parti-coloured policy may be the wisest to adopt. The rights to land, communally and individually, on the part of the indigenous blacks and browns are already recognised and have been secured.

There still remain territories, collectively as large as Ireland—situated at altitudes between 6,000 and 13,000 feet above sea-level, above sunstroke and most tropical diseases, except malaria, which is a matter of infection—which are in every way suited to European settlement. Owing to former wars between tribe and tribe, and to the cold climate, there are no existing native inhabitants. Will the British

East Africa's Asiatic Problem

promote the colonisation of these still vacant lands by homeless Britishers or will they let them drift into the possession of Boers, Italians, Greeks, or Russian Jews? Then in East Africa is also the Asiatic problem.

Are they then to encourage, discourage or remain indifferent to the immigration on a large scale of natives of India, who will come not merely as employés, merchants or soldiers, but as settlers, bringing their women-folk and determined to find in East Africa that America which England is denying them in Natal and the Transvaal? Can she refuse them this satisfaction? Are the British as Imperialists to shape new homes for white men only? Or should they expect the overplus of India to be content with new fields of energy nearer home—Southern Arabia, Southern Persia, Malaya, Borneo, Fiji, Northern Australia, Mauritius; or in Tropical America—Honduras, Jamaica, Trinidad, Guiana, leaving Africa to the Negro, Negroid and Caucasian?

Egypt is one of the knottiest problems that offer themselves for solution. England has raised a Mohammedan people from the dust, has forced on it education, law and order, security and affluence, has even assiduously taught it what it

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had forgotten since it was submerged and denationalised by Islam (that lava flow of human history), that the lands of the Lower Nile and the people generated from Nile mud and sand were once the cradle and the exponents of a mighty civilisation. By her intervention this modern Egyptian race has been saved from dwindling into virtual extinction, bled to death by heartless Turkish pashas and their Circassian and Armenian servants.

Now, under an enlightened prince, who, like his father, has Egyptian blood in his veins, and administered by a new school of Egyptian, Armenian, and Turkish ministers, Egypt desires to be allowed to run alone. The Sudan, it is virtually acknowledged, is a totally different question; it has its own outlet to the sea at Port Sudan and via Uganda and Mombasa. The Sudan administered by Britain will relieve Egypt from one great menace on the south. If, argue some Egyptians, the British troops were removed from Cairo and Alexandria to the other side of the Suez Canal, in short, if the Sinai peninsula were definitely ceded to Great Britain and Egypt

British Officials in Egypt

became an absolutely independent kingdom, the British would obtain means of defending the Red Sea route to India and the Suez Canal and yet might relieve the administration of Egypt of that admixture of British officials, which, by its crushing superiority of attainments and ideals, galls the rising generation of the upper and middle classes of the native-born Egyptians.

There are other Egyptians who say or write that they are in no hurry to lose the British civilian employés of the Sultan's administration; the admirable qualities of these as judges, financiers, engineers, or police officers, are fully recognised. It is the military officers who, for some reason, have made themselves disliked through want of tact, consideration, or sympathy. It is the army of occupation rather than the British officered Egyptian army which is the thorn in the wound. "If the British soldiers were removed to the Sinai Peninsula," say the Young Egyptians, "we should be content to remain for some further period under British tutelage: but let the Sultan be master in his own house."

This much is clear to people in the United Kingdom, that Egypt, by its mere geographical position, is the central connecting link of the empire in Europe, Africa, and

Asia. Under present circumstances, and until the navigation of the air is a commonplace fact—when there may be universal peace and a world-federation—it is vital to the continued existence of the British Empire abroad that it should neutralise the geographical advantages of Egypt by controlling the destinies and the foreign policy of that country. So much so, that, if need be, violence must be done to the finer feelings of the Egyptians by the declaration of an actual protectorate or suzerainty—a clear intimation to the Sultan and his people that they are, and must remain, for an indefinite period within the diversified confederation which is called the British Empire. This high-handed action should be justified by an appeal to the civilised powers that count in the world's councils.

Ask educated India, Australia, East Africa, Uganda, British Central and South Africa, Zanzibar, Mauritius, New Zealand, and even Canada, to consider what would happen to them and to their commerce if the Suez Canal were under the control of an absolutely independent power which could close it at any moment to British ships; or else in the keeping of a state so feeble and so disorganised that it was at the mercy of a *coup-de-main* on the part of any strong Mediterranean nation.

With the proviso, however, of the full recognition of Great Britain's supremacy, there is no reason whatever why Egypt should not receive in time full representative government under the ruler, who has now been raised to the rank of sultan, and even exercise almost completely independent powers in regard to internal administration and the foreign affairs of Egypt proper. Perhaps the best arrangement in the long run would be the cession to England of the Sinai Peninsula and the Sudan, the British troops being withdrawn from the sultanate of Egypt, but the sultan of that country acknowledging the over-

Italy's Place in the Mediterranean

lordship of the British Emperor, just as Bavaria does that of the German Emperor. Provided the vital rights of control over Egypt and Southern and Eastern Arabia are recognised, the British people would welcome most heartily the regeneration of Turkey. It may be necessary to the peculiar position of Italy in the Mediterranean that Turkey shall cede some rights in Tripoli to the Italian kingdom, in return for assurances that Italy will not

interfere in Albania. All of this must be determined at the conclusion of the great European war.

Besides the reforms already touched on—local administration, commercial interrelations, and secular technical education—we must aim at making the English language a universal medium of intercommunication. It must become eventually the one official language of the whole empire. This need not lead to the neglect of other forms of speech; on the contrary, for purposes of literature, science, history, and the right understanding of diverse minds and intellects, language study—not merely Hebrew, Ancient Greek, or Latin—must be enforced on all persons in the Imperial service. But English should be taught everywhere in all government or state-aided schools.

And we must put our own pride in our pocket and make on our part concessions to commonsense. English must have its standard pronunciation fixed for a hundred years, and must then be spelt phonetically in the Roman alphabet, just as we spell African and Indian languages phonetically. Moreover, there must be but one alphabet, one printing type all over the empire. At present we tolerate the Irish alphabet in Ireland; the Greek letters in Cyprus; Coptic in Egypt; Arabic in Arabia, Egypt, India, Central Africa, and Malaya; about fifty different alphabets in India and Ceylon; and the Chinese syllabary in Hong Kong. This leads to a sickening waste of time, and to an obscurantism beloved of schoolmasters, clerics, cranky professors, pedantic prigs, sulky bonzes, rebellious Hindus, intriguing Arabs, and all those who are really opposed to the enlarged study of languages and their rapid acquisition by people in a hurry. No one can accuse me of a narrow nationalism in advocating the universal use of the so-called Roman alphabet, because this elegant, clear, easily recognised type was invented in Italy, and as regards its adaptation to the phonetic rendering of all known languages is a German invention by the great Lepsius.

Besides a uniform alphabet we want a uniform coin of standard value, uniform weights and measures, and postal rates. This last reform is nearly accomplished.

In weights and measures we might very well adopt the metric system, and thus put ourselves in harmony with France and the whole Latin world, Germany, Latin America, Turkey, the Balkan States, Roumania, Austria-Hungary, and Japan. In regard to coinage, see how ridiculously the empire differs one portion from another. In Great Britain, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, British Central Africa, South Africa, West Africa, St. Helena, the West Indies, Falkland Islands and British Guinea, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and the Western Pacific, we have a gold standard and the pound sterling as unit of calculation, and a very sensible unit, too. In Egypt and the Egyptian Sudan there is a monetary system nearly in accord with that of Britain, but the Egyptian pound is worth about threepence more than the English sovereign. It is divided into 100 piastres. In British Arabia, the Central Sudan and Zanzibar the Maria Theresa dollar of an approximate American dollar still lingers. But throughout the Aden territory, British East Africa, Zanzibar, Seychelles, Mauritius, Persian Gulf, Ceylon, and the whole Indian Empire, the silver rupee of a more or less fixed exchange—value of fifteen rupees = five dollars—is the established currency.

In the Straits Settlements and the federated Malay States the official currency is a dollar, worth about 56 cents. At one time there were three kinds of dollar in circulation as legal tender: the Mexican dollar, say an American dollar; the British dollar, value about sixty cents; and the Hong Kong dollar, value about fifty cents. These are still, with varying values, the currency of Hong Kong.

In 1902 a committee sat at the Colonial Office to consider and make recommendations regarding the currency question in the Straits Settlements. They recommended a return to the gold standard, but, for some inscrutable reason, instead of taking this occasion to introduce the Imperial coinage, they started this great Malayan colony off on a fresh currency of its own, equivalent to the British dollar of an approximate value of fifty-six cents—another unit of independent value added to the Canadian dollar, the pound sterling, the rupee, the Hong Kong dollar, the five-franc piece (which is much used in British Gambia and in Jersey). It is actions like these that stand in the way

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of Imperial federation. The currency of Hong Kong and Wei-hai-wei is enough to make the brain whirl, and must cause many a suicide among cashiers and accountants. The Hong Kong dollar is at present worth about fifty cents. Two other dollars of totally different and constantly varying value equally pass current. The copper coinage is shamefully bewildering. British Borneo shares the dollar standard of the Straits Settlements.

Canada has from its entry into the empire adopted the dollar of the United States as its unit. Newfoundland also keeps its accounts in dollars and cents (American), but British sterling is legal tender. British Honduras likewise employs the American dollar as its unit of value.

In some parts of West, East, and Central Africa the kauri shell is not demonetised. In Nigeria, 1,000 kauris are worth threepence. This will give some idea of what a worry they can be as cash or in accounts. In British China there are copper coins representing one-hundredth part of the fifty-cent dollar—less than half a cent, and one-thousandth part of the same coin, or one-twentieth of a cent. On the other hand, in South Africa there is a distressing dearth of

small cash, no coin below a silver threepence being in circulation.

Will no great Imperial statesmen arise, will no council of broad views and dominant authority come into existence which will cause the empire to agree on:

1. A phonetic spelling and writing of the English language.

2. Uniform weights and measures (metric).

3. Uniform coinage and unit values in calculation (decimal).

4. A single alphabet—the Roman—for writing and printing all languages on an identical phonetic system, the same that is applied to English?

I doubt if there are great men to devise great measures, and if this magnificent but unwieldy empire, too loosely compacted, too perversely individualistic in all its parts, be not drifting on to eventual dissolution for the want of men in its supreme councils "with head, heart, hand; like some of the simple great ones gone; for ever and ever by," who will impose unity in essentials and allow liberty of judgment in what is unessential.

HARRY JOHNSTON



THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, SHOWING THE ROUTES FOLLOWED BY EARLY VOYAGERS
 Separating the Old World from the New, and extending from one Polar circle to the other, the Atlantic Ocean has, since the sixteenth century, been the chief commercial highway of the world; but even earlier than that period, hardy voyagers were bold enough to venture on its waters in their quest for lands unknown. In the above map the routes taken by the various discoverers are distinctly shown, while the dates of their famous voyages are also given.



THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

AND ITS PLACE IN HISTORY

By Dr. Karl Weule

THE ATLANTIC BEFORE COLUMBUS

THE Atlantic may be regarded as a long canal which winds, in the form of a letter S, and preserving an almost uniform breadth, between the Old World and the New. It extends from one Polar circle to the other. Such a configuration, when once it became known to mankind, was bound to favour international communications. The narrowness of the Atlantic has had momentous results for the history both of states and of civilisation. But it was long before the shape of the Atlantic was realised, and this for two reasons. First, the Atlantic has few islands, and this is particularly true of the zone which was the first to be attempted by navigators, the zone lying opposite the mouth of the Mediterranean. Secondly, the Mediterranean was a poor school for explorers. The broken coasts and the numerous islands of that sea make navigation too easy. The Mediterranean peoples did not, therefore, obtain that experience which would have fitted them for the crossing of the outer ocean.

Their explorations were never extended more than a moderate distance from the Pillars of Hercules, either in the Greco-Roman period or in more recent times. Almost the same obstacles existed to the navigation of the northern zone of the Atlantic. The North Sea and Baltic are not easily navigated; they presented difficulties so great that for a long time they discouraged the inhabitants of their littorals from taking to the sea. The dolmen builders, indeed, showed some aptitude for maritime enterprise; and much later we find that the men of the

Hanse towns and their rivals in Western Europe made some use of the sea for trade. But maritime enterprise on a great scale was not attempted by these peoples. In the days before Columbus, only the inhabitants of Western Norway made serious attempts to explore the ocean. They were specially favoured by Nature. A chain of islands, the Faroes, Iceland, and Greenland, served them as stepping-stones. But the voyage from Norway to the Faroes is one of more than 400 miles over a dangerous ocean; and this was a much more difficult feat than the voyage of the ancients from Gades to the Isles of the Blest, if indeed that voyage was ever made. The evidence for it is by no means of the best.

The Atlantic is not merely remarkable for its narrowness and dearth of islands, but also for the great indentations which are to be found in its coasts on either side. These have exercised a great and a beneficial influence on the climate of the Atlantic seaboard. Those of the American coast-line balance those of the Old World to a remarkable degree. It is true that the eastern coast of South America bends inward with a sweep less pronounced than that of the west coast of Africa.

But there is a striking parallelism; and the same phenomenon strikes us when we study the shores of the North and Central Atlantic, in spite of the fact that broken and indented coast-lines make it difficult to perceive the broad similarities at the first glance. Thus the Mediterranean corresponds to the immense gulf which separates North and South America.

Features of the Atlantic

Difficulties in the Way of Navigation

The part which the Mediterranean of the Old World has played in history is so important that it has demanded special treatment in a previous chapter. The Mediterranean of America has no such claim upon the attention of the historian. It facilitated the conquest and settlement of the Spanish colonies. It has favoured the

Linking the Atlantic with the Pacific

development of those motley communities which fringe its shores from Cuba and Florida on the north to the Cape of San Roque on the south. But when we have said this we have exhausted the subject of its historical importance. More important it doubtless will be in the future. Up to a short time ago it afforded the sole outlet for the Central and Southern States of the American Union; but now that the Panama Canal is completed, this sea has become the natural high-road between the Atlantic and the Pacific—a great factor in political and economic history. It will be what the Eastern Mediterranean was in the early days of the Old World. But we are concerned with history and not with prophecy.

North of the latitude of Gibraltar the two shores of the Atlantic present a remarkable symmetry. In shape the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Hudson's Bay resemble the North Sea and the Baltic. Labrador, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton Island may be compared with North-western Europe. The chief difference between the two coast-lines is one of scale. Hudson's Bay, for example, is considerably larger than the North Sea and the Baltic put together. This does not detract from the importance of the symmetry which we have pointed out. It is all the more important because it is most striking on those lines of latitude which have been most important in the history of mankind.

The Northern Atlantic Ocean has influenced the development of our general civilisation in two directions—namely,

The Ocean's Influence on Civilisation

by those physical characteristics which originate from its configuration, and by its situation with reference to the other countries on the globe. The extensive fishing grounds which it affords have been a source of wealth to European populations. Even when we take into account the colossal proportions of modern international trade, deep-sea fishing is none the less an industry of note, and makes a very important difference in the profit and loss

accounts of many a northern country. Three hundred, and even two hundred, years ago the fishing fleets of the Northern Sea, which were then numerous though clumsy, gathered, no doubt, a harvest in no degree greater than do the steam fishing-boats of the present day; but at that time the profits made a much more appreciable difference to the national wealth, and the safety of the national food supply was more largely dependent upon their efforts.

Much more important, from a historical point of view, is the influence on character of this trading in the difficult northern seas; for the Teutonic nations of North-west Europe and for the French, it was the best of all possible schools of seamanship, and largely contributed to the fact that these nations were able to play a leading part in the general annexation of the habitable globe which has taken place during the last three centuries.

The fisheries are here in closest communication with that other attempt, which, historically at least, exercised influence no less enduring, to find a passage round North America or round Northern Europe and Asia to the east shore of Asia.

England's Supremacy of the Seas

Nothing did so much to promote the maritime efficiency of the British nation as the repeated attempts that were made to find the North-west and North-east passages, which began with the voyage of the elder Cabot, and continued to the middle of the nineteenth century. To the Atlantic as a whole belongs the high service of having led the civilised peoples of the Old World out to the open sea from the confines of the Mediterranean and other land-locked waters; from the time of Columbus it has been a school of technical skill and self-reliance. However, its most northern part, storm-lashed and ice-bound as it is, is in no way inferior to the whole, in this respect at least, that it gave to one sole nation not otherwise particularly strong, to the English, the supremacy over the seas of the world within a short three centuries.

The Atlantic Ocean may be regarded as a broad gulf dividing the western and eastern shores of the habitable world, conceived as a huge band of territory extending from Cape Horn to Smith Sound; this implies a limitation of our ideas regarding the age of the human race. Its share in universal history does not begin before the moment when the keel of the first Norse boat touched the shore

THE ATLANTIC OCEAN BEFORE COLUMBUS

of Greenland or Helluland. Thus, this sea, so important in the development of the general civilisation of modern times, is, historically speaking, young, and its significance in the history of racial intercourse is not to be compared with that of the Pacific or the Indian Ocean.

When compared with those ages during which these two giants, together with our Mediterranean, our Baltic and North Seas, made their influence felt upon the course of history, traditional or written, the thousand years during which the Atlantic has influenced history become of minor importance. The investigator, indeed, who is inclined to regard as "historical" only those cases in which the literary or architectural remains of former races have left us information upon their deeds and exploits will naturally be inclined to leave the Atlantic Ocean in possession of its historical youth. He, however, who is prepared to follow out the ideas upon which this work has been based, and to give due weight to all demonstrable movements and meetings of peoples, which form the first visible sign of historical activity upon the lower

Beginnings of Mankind

planes of human existence, will consider the importance of the Atlantic Ocean as extending backwards to a very remote antiquity. Our views of historical development, in so far as they regard mankind as the last product of a special branch of evolution within the organic world, have recently undergone a considerable change; the most modern school of anthropologists conceives it possible to demonstrate, with the help of comparative anatomy, that the differentiation of mankind from other organisms was a process which began, not with the anthropoid apes—that is to say, at a period comparatively late both in the history of evolution and geologically—but at a much earlier point within the development of the mammals.

From a geological and palæontological point of view, however, this conclusion carries us far beyond the lowest limits previously stated as the beginnings of mankind. We reach the Tertiary Age, a lengthy period, interesting both for the changes which took place within organic life and for the extensive alterations that appeared upon the surface of the earth. The nature and extent of these changes must, in so far as the new theory is correct, have been of decisive importance for the

earliest distribution of existing humanity. If the theory be true that during the Tertiary Age two broad isthmuses extended from the western shore of the modern Old World to modern America, then from the point of view of historical development there can be no difficulty in conceiving these isthmuses as inhabited by primeval settlers. That point of the globe over which at the present day the deep waters of the Atlantic Ocean heave would then, in fact, have been not only the earliest but also the most important scene of activity for the fate of mankind.

The Atlantic as a Gulf of Division

As regards the later importance of the Atlantic Ocean, the collapse of these two isthmuses marks the beginning of a period which is of itself of such great geological length that those first conditions which influenced the fate of our race appear to its most recent representatives as lost in the mists of remote antiquity. After the Atlantic Ocean appeared in its present form, the inhabitants of the Old World had not the slightest communication with the dwellers upon the other shore. The Atlantic Ocean then became in fact a gulf dividing the habitable world.

In all times and places mystery and obscurity have exercised an attraction upon mankind, and thus, too, the Atlantic Ocean, bounding as it did the civilisation gathered round the Mediterranean, attracted the inhabitants of those countries from an early period. As early as the second millennium before the birth of Christ we find the Phœnicians on its shores, and soon afterwards their western branch, the Carthaginians.

The inducement to venture out upon its waves was the need of tin, the demand for which increased with the growing use of bronze; and the rarity of this metal induced them to brave the dangers of the unknown outer sea. However, these two branches of the great commercial nations of Western

Italy's Dread of the Sea

Asia did not attain to any great knowledge of the Atlantic Ocean. We are reminded of the reluctance of the towns and republics of Italy to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar, though the high seas had long been sailed by the Portuguese and Spaniards, or the cowardice of the Hansatics, who hardly dared to approach the actual gates of the ocean, when we find these two peoples who ruled for so many centuries over the Mediterranean, which

is itself of no small extent, unable to advance any material distance beyond the Pillars of Hercules. Even as regards the tin trade, the chief labour was probably undertaken by the seafaring coast-dwellers of separate parts of Western Europe. How small in reality were the achievements of both nations upon the Atlantic

The Days of Greek Civilisation

is shown by the amount of praise lavished upon the coasting voyage of Hanno, which, however important for geographical science, was no great achievement of seamanship. It is a characteristic feature of all landlocked seas to limit not only the view, but also the enterprise of the maritime peoples upon their shores.

In Greek civilisation the Atlantic Ocean, as such, is only of theoretical importance. A few explorers did, indeed, advance from the Mediterranean northwards and southwards into the Atlantic. Such were Pytheas of Massilia (about 300 B.C.), who journeyed beyond Britain to the fabulous land of Thule; his compatriot and contemporary, Euthymenes, followed by Eudoxus of Cyzicus (about 150 B.C.) and the historian Polybius (about 205-123 B.C.) succeeded in reaching different points upon the west coast of Africa; but none of these undertakings led to any practical result. The reason for this fact is to be found in the length of a voyage from the coast of Greece, which was a far more difficult undertaking for the sailors of those days than it now appears. Especially important, moreover, is the fact that the Greeks, although they were the general heirs of the Phœnician colonial policy, never attempted to overthrow the supremacy of the Carthaginians in the western half of the Mediterranean Sea.

For them, therefore, the great western ocean remained permanently wrapped in the obscurity of distance, a fact which enabled them to people its illimitable breadth with creations of fancy, such as the "Atlantis" of Plato; but distance was too important an obstacle to be successfully overcome by their instinct for colonisation and discovery. The Atlantic Ocean came into the purview of the Romans at the moment when their struggles with Carthage for the Iberian Peninsula ended definitely in their favour (210 B.C.); it was not until then that this rapidly developing Power in the west of the Mediterranean was able to advance

Rome's Struggles With Carthage

from the east coast of Spain to the interior of the country and thence to its western coast. Notwithstanding the activity of Rome in colonisation, her supremacy in Iberia led to no enterprises by sea; nor were any such undertaken by the Romans until they had established themselves in Gaul, and had thus gained possession of a considerable seaboard upon the Atlantic Ocean.

It was in 54 and 55 B.C. that Julius Cæsar made his voyages to Britain; a few decades later came the advance of Drusus and of Germanicus into the North Sea. The nature of these conquests precluded adventure upon the open sea. The Romans were attempting only to secure their natural frontier against the threatened encroachments of the Germanic tribes, and confined their explorations to the southern portion of the North Sea.

During the first thousand years after the birth of Christ the North Sea is the only part of the Atlantic Ocean which can be demonstrated to have had any enduring influence upon the history of Western Europe. The Veneti, and other tribes inhabiting the western coast of Spain,

Atlantic Ocean in Legend

Gaul, and Germany, certainly adventured their vessels upon the open sea southward in continuation of the primeval trade in tin and amber; even the Romans, before indefinitely retiring from Britain, made one further advance during the expedition which Cn. Julius Agricola (84 A.D.) undertook in the seas and bays surrounding Great Britain. Of other nations, however, we hear nothing during this age which would lead us to conclude that they carried on communication by means of the ocean to any important extent.

The age preceding the tenth century A.D. is entirely wanting in maritime exploits, with the exception of the expedition of the Norsemen, but is, on the other hand, rich in legends, the locality of which is the Atlantic Ocean. These are important to the history of civilisation by reason of their number; they are the most striking proof of that general interest which was excited, even during the "darkest" century of the Middle Ages, by the great and mysterious ocean upon the west. Historically, too, they are of importance for the influence which their supposed substratum of geographical fact has exercised upon the course of discovery. This interest appears, comparatively weak at first, in the "Atlantis" legend. The

THE ATLANTIC OCEAN BEFORE COLUMBUS

legend, together with many other elements forming the geographical lore of classical Greece, was adopted by the Middle Ages, but cannot be retraced earlier than the sixth century. For nearly one thousand years it disappears, with Cosmas Indicopleustes, that extraordinary traveller and student in whose works the attempt to bring all human discovery into harmony with the Bible, an attempt characteristic of patristic literature, reaches its highest point. In the "Atlantis" of Plato, Cosmas apparently sees a confirmation of the teachings of Moses, which had there placed the habitation of the first men; it was not until the time of the Deluge that these men were translated to the European continent. The ten kings of Atlantis were the ten generations, from Adam to Noah.

The power of legend as a purely theoretical force continued after the first millennium A.D. only in the north-eastern borders of the Atlantic Ocean. The Baltic, owing to its Mediterranean situation, was at that period the theatre of so much human activity and progress that it has already received special treatment. The North Sea, regarded as a landlocked ocean, was not so greatly benefited by its position as it has been in the later ages of inter-oceanic communication; at the same time, the coincidence of advantages, small in themselves, but considerable in the aggregate, have made it more important than any other part of the Atlantic Ocean as an area of traffic. These advantages included one of immeasurable importance to early navigation—namely, a supply of islands which, as formerly in the Mediterranean, conducted the navigator from point to point; a further advantage was the character of its inhabitants, who were far too energetic to be contented with a country which was by no means one of those most blessed by nature.

Hence we need feel no surprise at the fact that the North Sea was navigated in all directions as early as the eighth century by the Vikings; their excursions to Iceland, Greenland, and to that part of North America which here projects farthest into the ocean, are fully intelligible when we consider the training which the stormy North-eastern Atlantic Ocean offered to a nation naturally adventurous.

The example of the Norsemen was not generally imitated in Europe at that time. Charles the Great launched, it is true, a

fleet upon the North Sea to repulse their attacks, and this was the first step made by the German people in the maritime profession; though we also see the merchants of Cologne from the year 1000 sending their vessels down the Rhine and over the straits to London, the commercial rivalry of Flanders and Northern France following them in the thirteenth century, and about the same time the fleets of the Easterlings visiting the great harbour on the Thames. For the immediate estimation of existing transmarine relations on the Atlantic side of Europe, these expeditions are useful starting-points; they have, however, nothing to do with the Atlantic Ocean as a highway between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres. The navigators who opened up the Atlantic for this purpose started from the point which past history and the commercial policy of civilised peoples indicated as the most suitable; that is, from the Mediterranean.

The sudden expansion of the Mohammedan religion and the Arabian power over a great portion of the Mediterranean gave a monopoly of the whole of the trade passing from east to west to the masters of Egypt and of the Syrian ports; a considerable alteration took place in those conditions under which for more than a century commercial exchange had quietly proceeded between the Far East and the West—an alteration, too, greatly for the worse. Commercial intercourse became so difficult that the chief carrying peoples of the Mediterranean, the commercial city-states, began to consider the possibility of circumventing the obstacles presented by the Moslem Power, which not even the Crusaders had been able to shatter.

From the year 1317 the traders of Venice and Genoa regularly passed the Straits of Gibraltar to secure their share of that extensive trade in England and Flanders which

had everywhere sprung into prosperity north of the Alps, owing to the great economic advance made by North-west Europe. Almost a generation earlier they had advanced from Gibraltar southwards in the direction which should have brought them into direct communication with India, according to the geographical knowledge of that day. This idea is the leading motive in the history of discovery during the fourteenth and fifteenth

Opening up the Atlantic

The Vikings in the North Sea

Traders of the Fourteenth Century

centuries, so far as the history was worked out upon the sea. We see it realised in the voyage of the brothers Vadino and Guido de Vivaldi of Genoa in 1281, and that of Ugolino Vivaldi, who in 1291 sailed down the west coast of Africa in a ship of Teodosio Doria with the object of discovering the sea route to India; it is an idea

Arabs as the Teachers of the West

apparent in the voyages made by the Italians to Madeira, to the Canaries, and to the Azores, enterprises both of nautical daring and of geographical importance. Mention must also be made at this point of the several advances upon the west coast of Africa made by Henry the Navigator; this series of attempts occupied the whole life of that remarkable prince.

It is true that the Portuguese of the fifteenth century, like the Italians before them, proposed to use the Atlantic Ocean as a means of communication only up to that point where an imaginary western mouth of the Nile came forth from the Dark Continent. Not in vain were the Arabs the teachers of the West, both in what they did and in what they did not understand; their additions to the knowledge of river systems are even more superficial than those made by European geographers of the Dark Ages. The mistake of the Arabs most fruitful in consequences was their division of the Upper Nile into three arms—one flowing into the Mediterranean from Egypt, one flowing into the Red Sea on the coast of Abyssinia, and one flowing into the Atlantic Ocean on the coast of North-west Africa. This hydrographical myth, of which a hint had been given long before by Ptolemy, was transmitted to the West immediately by the Arabs.

It is to the influence of this strange theory we must ascribe the attempts made by the Italians and also by Prince Henry; they hoped to find a short cut to the realm of Prester John and the Elysium of Southern

The Atlantic Regarded as Illimitable

Asia. A common feature in all the theories of the time about the Atlantic Ocean is the tendency to consider it as the illimitable western boundary of the habitable world. In the history of discovery, this mental attitude continues until the time of Columbus, whose westward voyage cannot for that very reason be compared with any similar undertaking, because it was based upon the conception of the world


as a closely united band of earth. However, in the scientific treatment of the great sea upon the west, views and conceptions of the world as a united whole had made their influence felt almost two centuries earlier. The fact that elephants are to be found both in Eastern India and Western Africa had led Aristotle to suppose that the two countries were separated by no great expanse of ocean.

After the Patristic Age, the theory was revived by scholasticism upon the basis of Asiatic and Greek geography. As transmitted by the Arabs, this theory respecting the configuration of the ocean assumed that form which was bequeathed by Marinus of Tyre about 100 A.D. and by Ptolemy to the Caliphs. The Western Ocean, upon this theory, was not reduced to the narrow canal which Seneca had conceived; but, compared with the length of the continent which formed its shores, it yet remained so narrow that a man with the enterprise of Columbus might very well have entertained the plan of finding the eastern world by crossing its waters westwards.

The Coming of Columbus

Ptolemy had given the extent of the continent between the west coast of Iberia and the east coast of Asia as 180° of longitude; thus one-half of the circumference of the globe was left for the ocean lying between. He had thus considerably reduced the estimate of his informant Marinus, who had assigned 225° longitude for the whole extent of land, thus leaving only 135° for the ocean.

Columbus was more inclined to rely upon Marinus, as Paolo Toscanelli had estimated the extent of land at very nearly the same number of degrees as the Tyrian. Relying upon the stupendous journeys of Marco Polo and the travelling monks of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, he observed that Marinus had estimated his 225° of longitude only for that part of Eastern Asia which was known to him; whereas the fact was that this continent extended far beyond the eastern boundary assumed by Marinus, and should therefore be much nearer the Cape Verde Islands than was supposed. This view strengthened Columbus in that tenacity and endurance which enabled him to continue working for his voyage during ten years full of disappointments, and it gave him that prudent confidence which is the most distinguishing feature of his character.



THE AGE AFTER COLUMBUS

THE INFLUENCE OF THE ATLANTIC ON THE WORLD'S COMMERCE DURING FOUR CENTURIES

ONE of the most remarkable facts in the history of geographical discovery is the failure of the discoverer of the New World to recognise it in its true character as an independent portion of the earth's surface ; Columbus died in the belief that he had sailed on four occasions to the eastern and southern shores of Asia, and to his last breath remained faithful to that picture of the globe which has already been described.

His contemporaries were under the same delusion. This adherence to old beliefs regarding the hydrography of the globe has produced the characteristic circumstance that, in political history and in the history of exploration, the Pacific and Atlantic are closely linked, until the year 1513, when Nuñez de Balboa descended from the heights of Darien to the shore of the southern sea. The Pacific and Atlantic Oceans were considered as forming one sea, which lay between the western and eastern shores of an enormous continental island, the Indian Ocean being nothing more than an indentation facilitating communication to the western shore. It was not until the return of the Victoria from the voyage of circumnavigation undertaken by Magalhaes that Europe learnt that between the western and eastern shores of their own world there lay, not the narrow sea they had expected to find, but two independent oceans, divided by a double continent, narrower and running more nearly north than south, and possessing all the characteristics of an independent quarter of the globe.

Epoch-Making Voyage of the Victoria

An entirely new picture of the world then arose before the civilisation of the age—new in the influence it was to exert upon the further development of the history of mankind, which had hitherto run an almost purely continental course. In every age, from that of the early Accadians to that of Hanseatic ascendancy in the Baltic, the sea has ever been used

as a means of communication. Before the year 1500 A.D. we see the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean with all their branches, as well as the North Sea and the Baltic, in constant use by mankind, and during that long period we know of a whole

The Power of Maritime Nations

series of powers founded upon purely maritime supremacy. But the political and economic history even of those peoples whose power was apparently founded upon pure maritime supremacy has been everywhere and invariably conditioned by changes and displacements in their respective hinterlands ; even sea powers so entirely maritime as the Phœnician and Punic mediæval Mediterranean powers and the Hanseatics have been invariably obliged to accommodate themselves to the overwhelming influence of the Old World.

To those peoples their seas appeared, no doubt, as mighty centres of conflict ; but to us, who are accustomed to remember the unity underlying individual geographical phenomena, these centres of historical action give an impression of narrow bays, even of ponds. On and around them a vigorous period of organic action may certainly have developed at times, but their importance to the geographical distribution of human life surpasses very little their spatial dimensions.

After the age of the great discoveries history loses its continental character, and the main theatre of historical events is gradually transferred to the sea. At the same time, the co-existence of separate

The Atlantic as an Agency of Education

historical centres of civilisation comes gradually to a close, and history becomes world-wide. The leap, however, which the population of Europe was then forced to make from its own convenient landlocked seas to the unconfined ocean was too great to be taken without some previous training. This training the Atlantic Ocean provided in full ; in fact,

during the sixteenth century its historical importance begins and ends with the task of educating European nations to capacity for world supremacy. No other sea upon the surface of the globe has exercised such an influence, nor was any sea so entirely suited as a training ground by configuration or position. The Pacific Ocean lies

**The Pacific
Greatest of
all Oceans**

entirely apart from this question: From 1513 the task naturally placed before the white races was that of learning to sail this sea, the greatest of all oceans, and apparently the richest in prospects. Its importance is chiefly as a battlefield; it has nothing to do with military training.

In this respect the Indian Ocean can also be omitted particularly for geographical reasons, though at the same time the chief obstacle to its extensive use by European nations is its lack of some natural communication with the Mediterranean. Compared with these hindrances, the political obstacles, varying in strength but never wholly absent, raised by the Moslem powers of Syria and Egypt are of very secondary importance. How important the first obstacle has ever been is shown by the results of the piercing of it in modern times by an artificial waterway, which is kept open by treaty to the ships of every nation.

Speaking from the standpoint of universal history, we may say that the Mediterranean has exercised a retrograde influence upon humanity, even more so than the Baltic. Both seas conferred great benefits upon the inhabitants of their shores, and indeed the Mediterranean gave so much that we may speak of a Mediterranean civilisation which had lasted for thousands of years, and did not end until the growing economic, political, and intellectual strength of Northern and Southern Europe transferred the historical centre of gravity from this inlet to the Atlantic Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean itself.

**Influence of the
Mediterranean
on Humanity**

But neither of these two seas enabled the inhabitants on its shores to take the lead upon the ocean, when the fulness of time appeared with the westward voyage of Columbus, the eastward voyage of Vasco da Gama, and the circumnavigation of the globe by Magalhaës. These seas renounced the claims which they preferred before that great decade, if not to be regarded as the transmitters of civilisation and history, yet to be considered

as a history and as a civilisation. We do not see either Venice or Genoa crossing the Straits of Gibraltar, or the Hanseatics crossing the Skagerrack or the Straits of Dover, with the object of taking their share in the struggle that was beginning for maritime supremacy. Those powers were sufficiently skilled in seamanship to maintain their supremacy within their own narrow circles, but their experience was insufficient to enable them to venture upon the open seas surrounding the globe.

A strict and thorough maritime education has been from the age of discovery the fundamental condition for the attainment of the position of a modern civilised power in the hard struggle between races and peoples. Of the nations whose voices are heard with respect in the councils of peoples, there is none which does not consider itself permanently equipped and armed for the wide and mighty political and economic struggle upon the stage of the world; for of the original combatants on the scene those who have obviously remained victorious were forced to gain their early experience

**The Atlantic
as a
Battlefield**

in the hard school of maritime struggle. These original combatants were Spain and Portugal upon one hand, Holland, England, and France upon the other, and the scene of struggle was the Atlantic Ocean. As regards Spain and Portugal, it is a remarkable fact that this sea concerned them only temporarily and within definite limits, thanks to the Papal edict of May 6th, 1493, which divided the world between the two Romance powers at the outset of their career of colonisation on conditions which placed their boundaries within the Atlantic Ocean itself.

This line of demarcation was to run from north to south at a distance of 100 leagues from the Cape Verde Islands, extended to 370 by the Treaty of Tordesillas of June 7th, 1494. Thus, as soon appeared, the main portion of the New World fell within the Spanish half, and only the east of South America was given to the Portuguese. The importance of their American possessions was naturally overshadowed by the far more important tasks which fell to the share of the little Portuguese nation in the Indian Ocean during the next 150 years. Brazil served primarily as a base for the further voyage to India and the Cape of Good Hope. It was impossible to make it a point of departure for further

THE ATLANTIC AFTER COLUMBUS

Portuguese acquisitions, as the Spaniards opposed every step in this direction on the basis of the treaties of partition.

During the first half of the sixteenth century other European powers besides England and Holland crowded into the north of the Atlantic Ocean in pursuit of the same objects; we find not only French explorers and fishermen, but also Spaniards and Portuguese, in the Polar waters of the American Atlantic. However, none of the other nations pursued their main object with such tenacity as the two first-named peoples, above all, the English; the period between 1576 and 1632 belongs entirely to them, and was occupied without interruption by their constant endeavours to discover the north-west passage.

The reward, however, which the English people gained from their stern school of experience in the northern seas was one of high importance. England then was unimportant from a geographical point of view, and a nonentity in the commercial relations of the world at large; but it was not until the middle of the nineteenth

century that clear evidence was forthcoming that the communication by water between Baffin Bay and the Bering Straits, though existing, was of no use for navigation. But the high nautical skill, the consciousness of strength, and the resolve to confront any task by sea with adequate science and skill—in short, the unseen advantages which the English nation gained from these great Arctic expeditions, and from their slighter efforts in the first half of the sixteenth century, proved of far higher importance than the tangible results achieved. It was these long decades of struggle against the unparalleled hostilities of natural obstacles that made the English mariners masters on every other sea, and taught the English nation what a vast reserve of strength they had within themselves.

In considering the historical career of this extraordinary island-people from the sixteenth century onwards, we are forced to regard modern history as a whole from the standpoint of national Arctic exploration, although this is far too confined for our purposes as compared with the sum total of forces operative throughout the world. During the age when maritime skill was represented by the city republics in the Mediterranean and the Northmen in the

North Sea and the Northern Atlantic Ocean, the Spaniards and Portuguese were already fully occupied with their own domestic affairs, the Moorish domination. Their first advance in the direction of nautical skill was not made until a considerable time after the liberation of Lisbon from the Moorish yoke (1147), when

Decadence of Spain and Portugal

the magnificent harbour at the mouth of the Tagus had become more and more a centre for Flemish and Mediterranean trade; even then it was found necessary to call in all kinds of Italian teachers of the nautical art. It was only slowly and at the cost of great effort that Spain and Portugal became maritime peoples; and their subjects were never seafarers in the sense in which the term is applied to the English and Dutch of the present day, to the Norwegians, or even to the Malays.

Indeed, the period of their greatness gives us rather the impression of an age of ecstasy, a kind of obsession which can seize upon a whole nation and inspire them to brilliant exploits for a century, but which results in an even greater reaction so soon as serious obstacles to their activity make themselves felt. Only thus can we explain the fact that these two peoples, once of world-wide power, disappeared with such extraordinary rapidity and so entirely from the world-wide ocean. The last Spanish fleet worthy of consideration was destroyed off the Downs by the Dutch lieutenant-admiral, Marten Harpertzoon Tromp, in 1639; about the same period the Portuguese were also considered the worst sailors in Europe.

The Dutch and the French held their ground more tenaciously. In both cases Arctic training ran a somewhat different course than in the case of the English. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries they certainly took part in the attempt to discover the north-west and north-east passages; with a tenacity

The Age of Maritime Enterprise

highly praiseworthy they applied themselves to the more practical end of Arctic deep-sea fisheries and sealing. That such occupations could provide a good school of maritime training is proved by the energy with which the Dutch, and afterwards the English and the French, made the great step from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean; further evidence is also to be seen in the unusually strong resistance which the two colonial powers in the seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries were able to offer to their most dangerous rival, the rapidly growing power of Great Britain.

Towards the end of the sixteenth century the historical character of the Atlantic Ocean undergoes a fundamental change. From the beginning of the period of great discoveries its special destiny had been to provide a maritime training for the nations of North-west Europe, and to make these nations sufficiently strong for successful resistance to the two powers of Spain and Portugal, for whom the supremacy of the world seemed reserved by their geographical position, the world-wide activity of their discoverers, and the pronouncements of the Pope. Maritime capacity they had attained by their bold ventures in the Arctic and Antarctic waters of the Atlantic Ocean; the struggle was fought out by these nations independently or in common in the seas to the south either of their own continent or of the West Indies.

We refer to the great epoch of the English and Dutch wars against the "invincible" fleets of Philip II.; it was a period, too, of that licensed piracy, almost equally fruitful in political consequences, which was carried on in the waters of East America by representatives of all the three northern powers. The North Sea, the Baltic, and the Mediterranean have all been scourged by pirates at one time and another; and in all three cases the robbers plied their trade so vigorously and for so long a time that the historian must take account of them.

This older form of piracy was undertaken by ruffians beyond the pale of law, who were every man's enemy and no man's friend, and plundered all alike as opportunity occurred, it being everybody's duty to crush and extirpate them when possible. But towards the end of the sixteenth century a different state of affairs prevailed on the Atlantic Ocean. After the

Powers Seeking a New Route

discovery of America as an independent continent, it became a question of life and death for the North-west European powers, which had grown to strength in the last century, to find an exit from the Atlantic Ocean to the riches of the eastern countries of the Old World. It was possible that this exit was to be found only in the south, in view of the constant ill-success of expeditions towards the Pole: and to secure the pos-

session of it in that quarter was only possible by the destruction of the two powers that held it. This attempt was undertaken and carried through in part by open war, in part by piracy, which was not only secretly tolerated but openly supported by governments and rulers.

No stronger evidence is forthcoming for the value attached to these weapons and the free use of them during the last ten years of Elizabeth's reign than the honourable positions of Sir Thomas Cavendish, Sir Francis Drake, Sir John Hawkins, and Sir Walter Raleigh. On April 4th, 1581, the maiden queen went on board Drake's ship, concerning which the Spanish ambassador had lodged a complaint of piracy on its return from the circumnavigation of the globe, and dubbed him knight.

This irrepressible advance on the part of the North-west powers towards the east of the Old World is closely connected with the fact that the struggle for maritime supremacy was confined to the Atlantic Ocean only for a short period; no sooner had England and Holland become conscious of their strength than we find both

Scenes of the Nations' Conflicts

powers in the East Indies, and on the west coast of America; in short, wherever it was possible to deprive the two older powers of the choicest products of their first and most valuable colonies. So early as 1595 Cornelis de Houtman sailed with four Dutch ships to Java and the neighbouring islands; he was followed shortly afterwards by the English and Danes.

When the North-west European powers began to extend their encroachments beyond the limits of the Atlantic Ocean, this latter naturally ceased to be what it had been for a century past—the main theatre of the naval war; not that it became any more peaceful during the next two centuries. On the contrary, the struggles which broke out amongst the victorious adversaries after the expulsion of the Portuguese and Spaniards from their dominant position were even more violent and enduring than those of earlier days. This conflict, too, was largely fought out in the Indian Ocean, but it was waged with no less ferocity on the Atlantic.

The great length of the two coast lines which confine the Atlantic Ocean, and the general strength and growing capacity of the states of North-west Europe, led to the result that, during the course of the last three centuries, repeated changes

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have taken place both in the locality and vigour of the struggle for the supremacy of this ocean, and also in the personality of the combatants. Among these latter we find Portugal and Spain long represented after their rapid decadence. In the first decades of the seventeenth century the Portuguese colonies on the coast of Upper Guinea fell quickly one after the other into the hands of the Dutch; Elima was conquered in 1537; in 1642 Brazil fell into the hands of Holland, after eighteen years' struggle, though nineteen years later it was restored to Portugal for an indemnity of \$4,000,000; in 1651 the Dutch seized and held for 115 years the important position of the Cape of Good Hope.

In the West Indies the division of the Spanish possessions began from 1621 with the foundation of the Dutch West Indian Company, "that band of pirates on the look-out for shares." In the course of the next ten years the majority of the Lesser Antilles were taken from their old Spanish owners. In 1655 Cromwell took possession of Jamaica. The rest of the Greater Antilles remained Spanish for a

Fight for the Supremacy of the Seas

considerably longer period; Hayti held out its eastern part until 1821, and Cuba and Porto Rico remained Spanish until 1898. The combatants in North-west Europe are divided into groups, according to their respective importance; on the one hand, the three powers of England, Holland, and France, each of which has made enormous efforts to secure the supremacy of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and, on the other hand, Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia, which pursued objects primarily commercial and on a smaller scale. Their efforts on the African coast are marks of the rising importance then generally attached to trans-oceanic enterprise, and form points of departure of more or less importance in the histories of the states concerned; but in the history of the Atlantic Ocean all of these are events of but temporary importance compared with the huge struggle between the other three powers.

The beginnings of this struggle, as far as England and Holland are concerned, go back to the foundation of the English East India Company; the first serious outbreak took place upon the promulgation of the Navigation Act by the commonwealth on October 9th, 1651. Henceforward English history is largely the tale of repeated efforts to destroy the Dutch supremacy, at

first in home waters, afterwards upon the Atlantic, lastly on the Indian Ocean. This policy produced the three great naval wars of 1652-1654, 1664-1667, and 1672-1674, which, without resulting in decisive victory for the English, left them free to proceed with the second portion of their task, the overthrow of French sea power and

England's Wars on Land and Sea

the acquisition of predominance in the commerce of the world. Judged by the prize at stake, this struggle must rank amongst the greatest of modern times. It began in 1688, when Louis XIV. opened his third war of aggression; it continued, with some cessations of hostilities, until the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815).

The struggle was carried on at many points. A land war in India (1740-1760) decided the future of the Indian Ocean. The contest to secure communications with that ocean was fought out in Egypt (1798-1801) and at the Cape (1806); but the main conflicts were waged on the seaboard of the Atlantic or on its waters. Supremacy in the Atlantic meant supremacy in the world until the age of steam began and the Suez Canal opened a new route to the Farther East.

Some events which are otherwise of secondary importance deserve notice because they prove how much the current estimate of the Atlantic's importance changed in the course of the struggle. Tangier came into the hands of England in 1662 as the dowry of Catharine of Braganza, the queen of Charles II.; it was given up in 1684 on the ground that it cost more than it brought in. Twenty years later English opinion as to the value of Tangier had been materially modified; and Gibraltar, on the opposite shore, was seized in 1704. Since then England has never relaxed her hold upon this fortress; it has been repeatedly strengthened and defended under the greatest difficulties. Were Tangier an English possession to-day,

Gibraltar's Value to Britain

English it would certainly remain, even though it were to cost infinitely more than the yearly vote of £40,000 which England has expended on Gibraltar for the last two centuries. Equally significant is the attitude of England towards the solitary isle of St. Helena. The Portuguese, by whom it was discovered in 1502, were content to found a little church on the island; the Dutch noticed St. Helena so far as to destroy the church in 1600. But

the East India Company, upon acquiring it in 1650, recognised its importance by establishing upon it the fort of St. James. The island, however, was not appreciated at its full value until the English supremacy in the Indian Ocean and until Australia had been founded; that is, not before the beginning of the eighteenth century.

St. Helena a British Possession The taking over of St. Helena by the English Government in 1815 was the logical sequel to the occupation of the Cape.

Both of these new possessions were intended to serve as calling stations on the main line of ocean traffic. It was not until the opening of the Suez Canal that this line declined in importance. The main route now runs from Gibraltar, by Malta and Cyprus, to Egypt, Perim, and Aden.

The eastern part of the Atlantic has served, like the Indian Ocean, as an ante-room to the Pacific. The first explorers of the Atlantic, and those powers which first seized strategic points in it, had the Pacific for their ultimate object. The opening of the Suez Canal has taken away this characteristic of the Atlantic, which is now important for its own sake alone.

The political history of the Atlantic begins upon its western seaboard, though not so early as the history of exploration might lead us to expect. In the Spanish and Portuguese colonies of South and Central America a vicious system of government acted as a bar to political and economic development. In the French and English colonies of North America progress was slow, owing to the existence of physical obstacles. Independent development began in the American continent with the Declaration of Independence.

The American War of Independence marks from yet another point of view a turning-point in the history of the Atlantic Ocean.

After the Convention of Tordesillas, in 1494, Spain had ruled supreme in the Atlantic, and had almost put her authority in a position above the possibility of challenge when she attempted to use Holland as a base for attacking England, the second of her rivals as an instrument for the destruction of the first.

France's Shattered Navy The Treaty of Paris (1763) gave England a similar position of predominance in the North Atlantic, since it definitely excluded the French from North America and left their navy in a shattered condition. The treaty created a *mare clausum* on a great

scale, and for the last time; under it England for the first time realised the object towards which her policy had been directed for the last two hundred years. This situation, the most remarkable which the Atlantic had witnessed since the days of Columbus, lasted for over thirteen years. It was not at once destroyed by the Declaration of Independence (1776), but the growth of the United States introduced a change into the existing conditions.

England's position was altered for the worse; and the North Atlantic began to play a new part in the history of the world. Hitherto there had been a movement from east to west; this was now reversed by slow degrees. Europe had acted upon America; America began at the opening of the nineteenth century to react upon Europe; and now, at the beginning of the twentieth century, America has become a factor, sometimes a disturbing and unwelcome factor, in European complications.

The American War of Independence was a chapter in the conflict for colonial and commercial power between England and

Brilliant Era in British History France. The United States were largely indebted to French support for their victory.

The desire to obliterate the humiliation of the Treaty of Paris and to avenge the loss of vast tracts of territory in America and India had proved too much for the French. Their interference was repaid with interest by the British; for a long period the French marine was swept from the seas; for a considerable portion of the nineteenth century Britain monopolised the seas of the whole world. Next to the period of Atlantic supremacy, from 1763 to 1776, that which followed the Peace of 1815 is the most brilliant in the "rough island story" of the British. Geographical conditions were favourable to them. But they also showed a quality which few nations have possessed—the power of not only recognising, but also of securing, their true interests.

With the two conventions of peace concluded at Paris on May 30th, 1814, and November 20th, or with the closing act of the Vienna Congress on June 9th, 1815, the Atlantic Ocean begins a new period of its historical importance. In those conventions Britain had certainly condescended to return to her former masters some portion of the colonial prizes that she had gained during the last twenty

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years. These concessions were, however, of very little importance compared with the extent and the economic and strategic value of that increase to which the island kingdom could point upon the Atlantic Ocean alone. Even at that time these concessions were more than counter-balanced by Britain's retention of the Cape, and the claims which such a position implied to the whole of South Africa.

Tobago and Santa Lucia in the West Indies, and Guiana in South America were to be considered, under these circumstances, as accessions all the more welcome to Britain. These possessions could not compensate for the irrevocable loss of the North American colonies, but they implied an increase in the area of operations from which she could contentedly behold the development of the strong and independent life in the New World. The rocky island of Heligoland, which had been united to Britain in 1814 for seventy-six years, narrow as it was, was only too well placed to dominate commercially and strategically both the Skagerrack and particularly the mouths of the Weser and Elbe; it gave Eng-

Britain Predominant on the Ocean

land the position, so to speak, of guardian over the slow growth of Germany and the no less slow recovery of Denmark. Britain's maritime predominance after the conclusion of the great European wars was so strong, and the transmarine relations into which she had entered in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were also so numerous, that this energetic nation could not fail to draw the fullest possible advantage in every quarter of the world from the position which she occupied at the moment.

The period of England's unlimited predominance in the Atlantic Ocean, which she had gained at some cost to her own strength by the wars against France (1755-1763), had been too short for the completion of those transmarine objects which she had in view; but after 1815 she alone of all the powers not only found herself at the height of her strength, but had also the additional advantage of being able to avail herself of a longer period of time to strengthen her position in other respects precisely as she pleased. Then it was that Britain extended her Indian colonial empire in every direction, founded an equally valuable sphere of rule in Australia, and established herself in South Africa and on the most important points

along the Indian Ocean. In view of these undertakings, which claimed the whole of her attention, Britain had but little energy to spare during this period for the Atlantic Ocean. The occupation of the Falkland Islands to secure the passage of the Straits of Magellan, in 1833, the occupation of Lagos as the obvious exit from the Sudan district of Central Africa in the year 1861, and finally the beginning of the further development of a limited trade on several other points on the West Coast of Africa—these were at that time the only manifestations of British activity on the Atlantic shores.

The increase in the value of the Atlantic Ocean to the nations of the world at large only began with the coincidence of a large number of new events. Of these the earliest is the surprisingly rapid growth of steam power for the purpose of trans-Atlantic navigation. Not only were the two shores of the ocean brought considerably nearer for the purpose of commercial exchange than was ever possible with the old sailing-vessels, but passenger traffic was increased; emigration from Europe to the New World on the scale on which it has been carried out since 1840 was only possible with the help of steam traffic.

The European Powers of the last two-thirds of the nineteenth century have not yet fully realised the importance, either from an economic or political point of view, of the emigration to the United States, a phenomenon remarkable not only for its extent, but for the unanimity of its object; yet the states thereby chiefly affected had already drawn general attention to the fact. This process of emigration and its results only forced themselves upon the general notice upon either side of the ocean after the youthful constitution of the United States of North America had coalesced into a permanent body politic and had developed a new race, by a fusion, unique in the history of humanity, of that growing population which streamed to it from every country of the world; and, finally, when this new nation had applied its energies to the exploitation of the enormous wealth of natural riches in its broad territory.

This highly important point was reached considerably earlier than any human foresight could have supposed, owing to the unexampled rapidity of the development

of the United States ; and its importance holds good not only for the Atlantic Ocean but for the habitable globe. So early as 1812 the United States, when scarcely out of its childhood, had declared war upon the mighty maritime power of Britain, for reasons of commercial politics. In consequence, the United States seceded from Great Britain, and paid for its first attempt at trans-oceanic aggression by confining itself to its own internal affairs for a long period ; in particular, the proclamation of the Monroe doctrine on September 2nd, 1823, is to be considered as a political act materially affecting the Atlantic Ocean.

As a matter of fact, the doctrine still remains in force, notwithstanding the selfish demands of France upon Mexico in 1861, and certain views apparently entertained by Britain and Germany with regard to South America, as the American Press affirmed, during the disturbances concerning Venezuela. To this sense of their own military and naval insufficiency is chiefly to be ascribed the fact that the trans-marine efforts of the United States were applied first of all to the Pacific Ocean, which is turned away from Europe, although the European side still forms their historical coast. Between 1870 and 1880 America secured her influence in Hawaii, while at the same time she succeeded in establishing herself in Samoa. It was not until she advanced to the position of a leading state in respect of population and resources that she ventured any similar steps upon the Atlantic side, and even then her attacks were directed only against the Spaniards, who had grown old and weak.

The war of 1898 was the first great transmarine effort on the part of the United States. By their action at that time they openly broke with their former tradition of self-confinement to their own territory ; for that reason, above all others, the United States have become a factor in the politics of the rest of the world, not on account of the military capacity which they then displayed : any European power could have done as much either by land or sea. Far more important to European civilisation than their military development is the economic development of North America, which has advanced almost in geometrical progression. The immediate consequence

The United States Secede from Britain

America a Factor in World Politics

of that development has been that home production not only suffices for the personal needs of the United States, but has introduced a formidable and increasing competition with European wares in Asia, Africa, and the South Seas, or has even beaten them on their own ground ; moreover, the abundance of economic advantages has transformed the previous character of trans-Atlantic navigation materially to the advantage of the United States.

It is hardly likely that the bewildering number of trans-Atlantic lines of steam and sailing ships will in any way diminish in the face of the North American trust, which was carried out in 1902. But American control over British trans-Atlantic lines and certain Continental lines most certainly implies a weakening of European predominance. Henceforward the Atlantic Ocean loses its old character and becomes a great Mediterranean sea. The teaching of history shows us that its further development is likely to proceed in this direction ; so much is plain from the development of circumstances on either side of the Atlantic. The European Mediterranean and Baltic are

The Atlantic's Future Development

not, perhaps, entirely parallel cases, owing to their comparatively smaller area ; yet the history which has been worked out upon their respective shores is in its main features nearly identical. Whether we consider the Phœnicians and Carthaginians, the Ionic Greeks, or the modern French on the shores of the Mediterranean, or turn our attention to the Hanse towns or the Swedes upon the Baltic, the result is the same. First of all, we find tentative efforts at occupation of the opposite shores. Phœnicia occupies Carthage ; Greece colonises Asia Minor ; France, Algiers and Tunis ; and Sweden, Finland and Esthonia. In this way permanent lines of communication are slowly developed, though the mother country for a long period remains the only base.

Independent commercial and individual life on the part of the colony only appears as a third step. Both the Carthaginians and the Greeks of Asia Minor surpassed their mother countries not only in the extent and organisation of their economic development but also by the boldness with which they carried it out. Applying these conclusions to the Atlantic Ocean, the prospects before the Old

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World seem somewhat doubtful; even to-day, many an individual might find good reason for characterising the once boundless ocean as a future *mare clausum*, access to which is to depend upon American favour. In any case, the times when the European Powers could rightly regard the Atlantic Ocean as their special domain by right of inheritance are past for ever. Probably, now that the Panama Canal is opened, the Pacific Ocean and the countries upon its shores will become more prominent than hitherto; however, the general direction of American life will remain as before, directed towards Europe and the Atlantic Ocean.

The reasons for this are both historical and geographical. Historically speaking, the closest national and political relations conjoin both shores of the Atlantic Ocean. It is true that, when viewed in the light of the rapid growth of modern life, the dates of the foundation of the South and North American colonies appear considerably remote. None the less, Brazil at the present day considers herself a daughter of Portugal, and the united provinces of Canada recognise their origin upon the other side of the Atlantic. These old ties of relationship tend to reappear with renewed force. In the financial year 1890-1891 2·4 per cent. of the United States imports went through New Orleans, 6 per cent. through San Francisco, but no less than 81·5 per cent. through the great harbours of the Atlantic coast. Moreover, notwithstanding the rapid development of the West, the most populous and the most commercially powerful colonies and states of North America are to be found on the Atlantic coast; the great towns, the most important centres of political and intellectual life, are also situated upon the shores that look towards Europe.

The indissoluble character of these historical relations is reflected almost identically in the geographical conditions. To a modern steamship even the great breadth of the Pacific is but a comparative trifle, and this means of rapid communication is proportionately a more powerful influence in the narrower seas. It was not until steam navigation had been developed that the full extent of the Indian and Pacific Oceans was explored. In the case of the Atlantic the date of exploration is much more remote, but this ocean has profited to an infinitely greater

extent than the two former by the new means of communication. The advantage of friendly shores lying beyond its harbours favoured extensive sailing voyages ever since 1492, and this advantage naturally exists in increased extent for steam navigation. The general shortness of the lines of passage is more than a mere geographical phenomenon.

Relations of the Old and New Worlds Politically and economically, it brings the countries and continents into closer relation.

Britain and North America are not only more closely related anthropologically and ethnographically, but at the present day they carry on a larger interchange of commercial products than any other two countries. Improved communication between the harbours of these two countries is certainly not the ultimate cause of the two phenomena above mentioned.

Upon the west of the Atlantic Ocean the achievements of technical skill in steam navigation, together with the political and economic advance of the United States, has increased the importance of this sea to an unforeseen extent; so, too, upon the east the achievement of connecting the Mediterranean and Red Sea, and the political progress implied in the rise of the German Empire, have led to the same result. To the southern part of the ocean as a whole the opening of the Suez Canal implied at first some loss; since 1870 the old lines of steamship traffic from Europe to India and the Pacific, by way of the Cape, have been deserted; sailing lines carrying heavy cargo to the south and eastern shores of Asia and the steamship lines bringing Europe into direct communication with the west coast of Africa have remained.

Notwithstanding the rise of a commercial movement from west to east and a consequent lessening of the importance of the eastern ocean, the Suez Canal may in a certain sense be regarded as the primary cause of the greater value which has been recently attached to the eastern Atlantic Ocean and its shores. The opening of this canal—of no use to sailing-ships—through the old isthmus at the end of the Red Sea was certainly not the first and only cause of the remarkable sudden rise in oceanic communication, which is a feature as distinctive of the years 1870 to 1880 as is the decay in communication by sail that then began; this

advance in trans-oceanic communication is much rather to be ascribed to progress in the art of naval construction. The fact, however, remains that since that period the Indian and Pacific Oceans, which had formerly been unknown to the maritime nations of Europe, with the exception of peoples like the English and Dutch who had sailed on them for nearly three centuries, have now been thrown open to the maritime world at large; these powers required but a very mild stimulus to become aspirants for colonial possessions instead of desiring merely commercial activity.

The Modern Empire of Germany

This impulse is now visible as an influence affecting every district of the world that still awaits division, and it was Germany that performed the historical service of giving it; we refer, not to the old "geographical idea," but to the modern united empire of Germany, which has realised the necessity of making strenuous efforts if it is not to go unprovided for in the general division of the world. All the old and new colonial powers at once gathered to share in the process of division, so far as it affected the islands and surrounding countries of the two eastern oceans—a fact that proves the importance of the new line of communication which had immediately given an increased value to the districts in question.

These attractions were nowhere existent in the case of the west coast of the Dark Continent, which has only recently been opened, and perhaps not yet entirely, to commerce; they would, no doubt, have remained unperceived even yet had it not been for the surprising rapidity with which Germany established herself on different points of the long shore, and thereby attracted the attention of others to that locality. So quickly did the value of the continent rise that in the short space of a year not a foot of the sandy shore remained unclaimed. Since that date, almost the whole of the interior of Africa, which had remained untouched for four centuries, has been divided among the representatives of modern world policy. Owing to the massive configuration and primeval character of the district, the greater portion of its history has so far been worked out within the continent itself behind its sand-hills and mangrove forests; at the same

Partition of Africa's Interior

time, this discovery of modern politics, which in our own day implies an immediate commercial development, has again made the adjoining area of the Atlantic Ocean a prominent factor in the great struggle for the commerce of the world, more prominent, indeed, than could have been imagined two decades previously. The conquest of the ocean was successfully carried out for the first time at a point where geographical configuration favoured the passage, while also demanding that maritime capacity which can only be acquired in a hard school of training. Such a school was provided for nearly a century by the Northern Atlantic Ocean for those nations who were forced to stand aside—even after the discovery of the New World, and the clear delineation of its hydrographical conditions, by two enthusiastic and highly favoured nations of the south had greatly increased the sphere of influence of the white races.

In the event, neither enthusiasm nor good fortune proved for success in this labour; the honour due to the final conquerors of the Atlantic Ocean and the sea in general belongs chiefly to the English nation after its training in the Arctic school. The Atlantic Ocean has lost its Old World character as a boundary sea or oceanus; at the present day it is a Mediterranean dividing the two worlds. In the Old World, the narrow area of the European-African Mediterranean once gathered the material and intellectual wealth of antiquity upon its shores, and became the nurse of widely differentiated civilisations; so at the present day the Atlantic Ocean, especially on its northern shores, has become the intermediary of our civilisation, which embraces the world.

This ocean is now the permanent means of communication between the two great centres of civilisation, and the promoter of every advance in culture. We ask whether this is to be permanent? The value of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, of the Baltic and Mediterranean, to humanity in the past can be traced without difficulty, while their value at the present is clearly apparent, but what their influence will be upon humanity hereafter, how their relations may be adjusted with the Atlantic Ocean, their latest and most successful rival, only time can show.


Destiny of the Atlantic


KARL WEULE

HISTORY
OF THE WORLD
SEVENTH GRAND DIVISION
AMERICA



STEPHEN R. BIRD





AMERICA BEFORE COLUMBUS

PRIMITIVE RACES OF THE CONTINENT

By Professor Konrad Haebler

WHERE DID AMERICAN MAN COME FROM?

THE problem how the first men may have come to America has always given much food for reflection to both learned and unlearned. Many could not imagine that a continent should exist with countless different races for whom no place could be found in the genealogy of Genesis, and for want of a better way out of the difficulty they assumed that the inhabitants of America were the descendants of the ten lost tribes of Israel. This naïve assumption did direct service to science itself by offering occasion to some intelligent observers to go thoroughly into the manners and customs of the American Indians, in the hope of discovering analogies which might serve them as proofs.

A second hypothesis regarding the origin of the Americans has received a far more scientific colouring. The fabulous island-world of the Western ocean, the oldest evidence of which is the mythical Atlantis of Plato's *Timæus*, exercised an indirect influence on the discovery of the New World, in so far as even Columbus was under the spell of belief in it. Whether it was based

**Was there a
Land-bridge over
the Atlantic?**

on any historic or prehistoric fact has not hitherto been proved. But men of science are not wanting who answer this question in the affirmative, and who see in a land-bridge over the Atlantic Ocean the way by which the first men came to the American continent.

Modern research no longer takes up so naïve a position on this question as the old Spaniard who therewith attributed to the Indians a Keltiberian origin. The sinking

of a continent between Europe and America in an age when one part of the earth was inhabited by peoples whose traces are still to be found must in any case have left some signs which could not have escaped the advanced investigation of the earth's surface. The attempt to trace the outlines of this continent from the cliffs and

**The First
Route
to America**

shoals of the Atlantic Ocean is also worthless trifling. On the other hand, geologists of note believe that they can prove that the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean was not always covered by water, and they think it was by this way that man came from the Old World to the New, in times when the climatic conditions existing in Europe were still considerably different from those of history.

Finally, still a third hypothesis exists for the population of America. It would be the simplest of all did not the same science which admits the possibility of a North Atlantic land-bridge having existed dispute the same possibility for this. Nowhere do the continents of the Old and New World approach nearer to one another than in North-west America, where Bering Strait separates them by only a narrow arm of water, and the Aleutian Islands also make it possible for a navigator provided with but the most primitive appliances to cross from one to the other.

At all times vessels of the inhabitants of the Asiatic coasts have occasionally been tossed by wind and weather as far as the shores of Alaska, and that an immigration took place in this direction even in historic

times is almost a certainty. The resemblance of the American aborigines to Mongolian peoples and the similarity of certain ethnological peculiarities in races of the Pacific states of America to those of the civilised nations of Asia have long brought this hypothesis many adherents. Some, indeed, would find direct proof of intercourse between the Chinese and America in the accounts of the land of Fu-schan, and on the strength of this would boldly claim the Aztec civilisation to have been an offshoot of the Chinese. Such inferences, however, have not been able to stand the test of strict examination.

In the ages which we can connect with even the earliest Chinese epochs America was certainly not populated by this means; and if the geologists are right who assert that the far north-west did not rise from the waves of the Pacific Ocean—which once flowed with a boundless expanse to the North Pole—until after the Glacial Period, then the first inhabitants of America certainly did not get there in this way, for by this time the bones of many generations were already bleaching on the soil of the New World.

Since it has been proved that the human race on American soil can be traced back to the same periods of the earth's history as in the Old World, the question whence the first men came there has lost much of its importance. It is true that the cradle of the human race can hardly have been in America; to cite one objection, the anthropoid apes, which are indispensable to the theory of evolution as the connecting link between the animal world and man, have at no time been native here, any more than they are now, as the fossil finds in all American excavations have proved.

But, however, if the first men came over during periods in which the distribution of land and water on the earth's surface was still quite different from that

shown by history, then geology will one day, at least, be able to give an answer to our question. Yet even this negative

result is of unequalled scientific importance, for it puts all those in the wrong who pretend to see in the customs of the savage and civilised races of America the influences of certain ethnographic units familiar to our ideas. If the first man made his home in America at the time when his fellow in the Old World still vied with the

beasts in gnawing the bones of the game he had killed, and if a hollow in the hills was the only shelter he knew, the dispute as to whether the civilisations of America are to be traced to Aryan or Semitic influences may be given up as idle. For this much at least is irrefutably proved by the palæontology and history of the New World—that its development from the times of the mammoth to its discovery by Christopher Columbus was continuous and was not influenced from without.

America is also highly interesting to the student of the early history of the human race as well as to the geologist, in that it preserved the witnesses of a past of which we find in the Old World only scanty and often obliterated traces until a later time. This later time did not, it is true, possess such a developed method of research as the present day, but in its accounts, and in the memorials that it handed down to posterity, it has consigned to us far richer material for research than has the Old World, and has given us information of events and conditions in the early history of man which we should otherwise seek in vain. Even the most highly

The Stone Age in America civilised races of America were only at the beginning of the Copper Age when they were discovered, while most of the inhabitants of the New World still lived entirely in the Age of Stone.

Americans once asserted that they had dug human bones out of strata of the Tertiary Period; but, like those who had made similar assertions regarding finds in the Old World, they failed to give scientific proof. On the other hand, human relics have come to light here, as they have there, that belong to the Interglacial Period; nor are such relics, although naturally not very numerous, limited to a small area, but are found both in the mountainous regions of California and in the vast plains of the Argentine pampas. In America, too, man was the contemporary of the mammoth and other ancient gigantic species of animals, and at a later but still prehistoric period the New World even had a population which in places was fairly considerable.

That this was the case is evident from the considerable number and unusual size of the refuse accumulations of prehistoric man that are known by the name of "kitchen-middens." These refuse mounds exist in North and South America, on the shores of the ocean, on the inland seas,

WHERE DID AMERICAN MAN COME FROM?

and on the banks of the great rivers, and, besides their scientific name, are called "shell-mounds" in the North and "sambaquis" in the South. They consist of accumulations of the inedible parts of fish and other aquatic animals, especially shell-fish, and naturally contain among this refuse fragments of objects that were used by the men who inhabited their sites. That these objects belong chiefly to the earliest human culture, the Palæolithic, was to be anticipated, but it must not be forgotten that refuse mounds are also met with, especially in South America, which belong not only to the Neolithic Period, beyond which the wild Indian of Eastern South America has never advanced, but even with certainty to historic times.

What number of people and what time it may have taken to throw up these mounds, which are often hundreds of feet long, and of considerable height, we have as yet no reliable means of determining. But it can scarcely be assumed that they were formed very slowly, for otherwise the action of the elements, especially on the sea-coasts, would scarcely ever have allowed accumulations to be made which have stood the test of thousands of years. We are, therefore, undoubtedly justified in concluding, from the large extent and wide distribution of these mounds, that large areas of the continent were thickly populated even in prehistoric times.

This fact must especially be kept in view, in order to estimate at their proper value the hypotheses regarding the civilising influences of the peoples of the Old World on those of the New; for if in times when even Asia and Europe still possessed an exclusively uncivilised population America was already inhabited by man in exactly the same manner, then, considering the geographical conditions of the continent, foreign influences can only be called in to account for culture phenomena when the supposition of independent development is insufficiently strong.

If we now view the American continent in its entirety on its appearance in historic times, it affords us surprising confirmation of the extraordinary influence of geographical position on the development of human culture. The comparatively narrow strip of coast which accompanies the mountain-chain of the Cordilleras—the backbone of America, as it has been significantly called—at its

western foot, with the terraces in which these mountains rapidly rise to considerable height, was almost in its whole extent, from Alaska down to Chili, the seat of civilised and half-civilised races; at any rate, their degree of civilisation was far above the level of that of the population of the vast plains and extensive lowland through which, east of the Cordilleras, the mightiest rivers of the earth roll their waters to the sea. Here lay the two great centres of civilisation of Peru and Mexico, the latter of which, it is true, spanned the American continent from ocean to ocean near its narrowest part.

In the regions east of the Cordilleras, which probably form three-fourths of the whole area of the continent, man was still, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, in a primitive stage of civilisation. North America showed him then at best as beginning to rise from his state of "natural man"; whereas in the southern continent no traces of this are to be discovered. The clever paradox that hunger is the father of all progress, because it forces man to fight with his surroundings, has probably nowhere been more strikingly confirmed than in South America. The Peruvian of the mountains, for example, on a soil from which he wrung his living by energetic toil, created one of the most ingeniously organised of bodies politic in the world's history, while his eastern neighbour, reveling in the luxuriant wealth of tropical Nature, roved about in a condition which did not even bring before his mind the principal difference between man and beast.

It is true that Nature held the Indian back, keeping him at the lowest possible stage of civilisation, not only through its bounteous gifts, but also by reason of other and less beneficent influences. On the vast plains which accompany the great rivers far along their upper courses Nature denied to man even a permanent abode, one of the most necessary conditions for the development of progress in culture. The floods which recurred periodically, placing areas of many square miles under water for weeks and months, compelled the Indian—who had to build his hut close to the banks of the rivers on account of the fish that gave him food—regularly to abandon his dwelling and leave it to destruction. It is no wonder that he became an indefatigable swimmer, an

History from the Ancient Shell-mounds

Primitive North Americans

Nature's Influence on Man

excellent boatman, and an expert fisherman; but his mind became as little associated as his body with the soil he lived on, and the water that washed away his light hut effaced also from his mind any remembrance of his past history. Historical research was for a long time helpless as regards these primitive races.

Features of the Aborigines

Attempts were first made to pick out from the endless mass of races and tribes the groups that were more or less closely related to one another; but even these attempts encountered the greatest obstacles. The outward appearance of the aborigines, their complexion, and the form of their skulls and bodies, were first tried as distinctive marks. It proved that races of different complexions exhibited signs of relationship, whereas the same complexion and figure were repeated in races that were not related at all; and the skull measurements often gave every gradation from the dolichocephalic to the brachycephalic among the individuals of a single small tribe.

The only guide that has hitherto proved at all trustworthy is the linguistic one. On the bases that we obtain with its aid is founded, almost exclusively as regards South America, the little we know of the history of these races, or rather the little we know in the way of facts. The uncivilised Indian knows nothing of the history of his tribe. He rarely knows more than the names—and perhaps, in the country not subject to floods, the dwellings—of his father and grandfather. After a few generations the knowledge of long migrations fades away into a dim tradition, and in his legends the overgrowth of mythological fantasies completely stifles clear historical recollection.

This also explains how the Indians so easily changed under the influence of new surroundings. Language alone followed this process of transformation

The Mixed Languages of the Indians

comparatively slowly, and contained elements of persistency which asserted themselves more lastingly amid all change. But far more importance must be attached to the influence exercised by mixture on the languages of the Indians. It will seldom have resulted from peaceable intercourse. The Indian in his natural state, while looking on the beasts of the forest almost as his equals, considered every strange man, on the other hand,

much as game, and every man was strange to him who was not of his clan. This explains the war of "all against all" that existed among most of the Indian tribes.

Whether we have to regard this same conception as accounting for the anthropophagy which seems at times to have existed throughout the whole American continent, from one end to the other, may perhaps be disputed. In any case the Indian pursued his human enemy with the same unmercifulness as he pursued his worst enemies in the animal world, and his war was, as far as the male portion of the hostile tribe was concerned, a war of annihilation. But he behaved otherwise towards the women. In the restless life of the nomadic Indian a great share of the daily toil and care fell to the female sex, and the Indian knew well how to appreciate the faithful services of his women.

Thus, when he succeeded in capturing the women of a hostile tribe in battle, it was only rarely that he wreaked his wrath on them; far oftener he saw in them a welcome addition to the hands that provided for his bodily well-being. It is

How New Tribes were Formed

clear that these strange women who were adopted into the tribe must also have exercised an influence for change upon it under certain circumstances, especially if such adoptions happened repeatedly. It must often have come to pass that a tribe, whose outward circumstances were favourable rapidly increased, so that at last all its members could no longer find room within its circle. It was then naturally the youngest members—those in the first stage of manhood—whom the uneasy pressure first affected, and whom must have first migrated. Only a few women, or none at all, would have followed them on their journey into the unknown, for their diligent hands could far less be spared at home than the surplus warriors.

So that, in order to establish a home, these warriors would have to resort to the abduction of women. The nearest village would then be attacked; the men that could not escape would be slaughtered; but with the women the band of warriors would combine to form a new tribe, which must naturally show in every respect the mixture of different elements. This formation of new tribes is not only logically quite admissible, but it is also verified by historical instances among the many races of South America,

AMERICA
BEFORE
COLUMBUS



PRIMITIVE
RACES
OF AMERICA
II

PREHISTORIC SOUTH AMERICA THE EARLY PEOPLES & THEIR CIVILISATIONS

FROM the few historical facts that we are able to glean with the help of the sciences of language, ethnology, and anthropology, we are still only able to ascertain in rough outline the past of the chief races of South America. Of those that we can still recognise the Tapuyas are considered to be the oldest. "Tapuya" is really not a name at all, but the term in the Tupi language for all "strangers," or "enemies." Karl von den Steinen, an authority to be frequently cited, calls this group that of the Ges tribes; others follow the example of some of their Indian neighbours and call them the Crens, meaning the "old" or "ancient ones."

They have become most popular under the name of Botocudos, from the lip-peg (botoque), which, however, is worn as an ornament of distinction not only by them but also by most of the other primitive races of South America; even

**Prehistoric
Tapuyas
of Brazil**

the warriors of the Chibchas, who must be unconditionally reckoned among the civilised races, stuck as many pegs through their lower lips as they had killed enemies in battle. The name "Tapuya" recommends itself most, because in history it has been specially applied to the Ges tribes, and did not, like all the other names, actually belong only to a small number of the tribes that are called by it. The age of these tribes is shown by the fact that their neighbours, who have driven them farther and farther from their former abodes, call them "the ancients."

The most decisive proof that they have lived in the regions of Brazil from the earliest times, long previous to history, is the circumstance that the palæozoic skulls from Lagoa Santa, which Lund brought to light in the caves there, exhibit all the characteristics peculiar to the Tapuya skull. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the "sambaquis," or refuse-mounds, of Brazil are also attributable to them, because the Tapuyas

seem at all times to have been, as they are to-day, a nomadic race of hunters, and never a race of navigators and fishermen. Only such a race, and a comparatively sedentary race, too, could have consumed such quantities of shell-fish as form the

**Territory
Ruled by
the Tapuyas**

mounds of the sambaquis. The Tapuyas have played an historical part only passively. They were probably once the sole masters of the whole of Brazil, from the watershed of the Amazon down to the Parana; but probably even in prehistoric times they were hemmed in on all sides so that at the time of the Spanish conquest they ruled practically only the hill-country of the interior of Brazil.

Tribes of them were also drawn into the great racial migration which, several centuries before their discovery by the Spaniards, set out from the east to make an onset upon the more highly civilised races of the Andean highlands; but the Semigaes, who on this occasion penetrated into the region of the upper tributaries of the Amazon, became differentiated in character from their race, and so assimilated themselves with the surrounding Tupi and Carib tribes that only their name and their language still show their old connection.

There have probably never been any races of the Tapuya stock on the north side of the Amazon. Here, until a few centuries before Columbus, one of the most extensive races of the New World, the Aruacs, held unlimited sway. They, too, belong indisputably to the oldest

**Where the
Aruacs
Held Sway**

nations of America. Where their real original abodes may have been can be only approximately determined. The Aruacs also represent the type of an inland race. Although in later times many of their tribes were quite at home on the water as navigators and fishermen, their primitive culture points unconditionally to an inland home. And although they

HISTORY OF THE WORLD

were subsequently the undisputed masters of the vast regions north of the Amazon from the Andes to the shores of the ocean, their original abodes cannot have been in the luxuriant, tropical lowlands of the great river territories of South America; on the contrary, the characteristics we find common to all their widespread branches, as the original elements of their culture, lead us to the conclusion that their home was situated above the region of periodical floods, and yet was still in tropical climes. Now, as we find them on the eastern slopes of the Cordilleras, from the peninsula of Goajira in the north down to the borders of Chili, and in specially large numbers in Eastern Bolivia, the original home of all these tribes is probably to be sought in this direction.

The tribes of the Aruac group, among which must also be counted those called the Nu tribes by Karl von den Steinen, ranked far higher in civilisation than the Tapuyas; and although Tupis and Caribs subsequently became fully their equals, the civilisation of the Aruacs was founded

much earlier than theirs. There is abundant proof that the Aruacs were the teachers of their younger conquerors.

When the Aruac group may have begun to spread from the hill country of Eastern Bolivia to the north-east, east and south-east, and whether in its advance it found the basins of the Orinoco and Amazon and their tributaries still unpeopled or inhabited by other races, cannot be ascertained even approximately. It is probable

Migrations of the Aruac Races

that it found these new regions uninhabited, because Aruac races have formed a uniform substratum over large areas of Northern South America, which substratum of race reappears wherever the later conquerors did not completely fill the area. But to judge from its extent, and from the great deviations in the language of its various branches, this group of races took not only hundreds but thousands of years for its migrations. In spite of this the Aruacs were not a rude, savage race when this process began, for even the original race knew an



A GROUP OF INDIAN ARUACS, ONE OF AMERICA'S EARLIEST RACES

Until a few centuries before the coming of Columbus, the Aruacs, one of the most extensive races of the New World, held unlimited sway on the north side of the Amazon. Higher in civilisation than the Tapuyas, this group was by no means a rude, savage people, for even the original race knew an agriculture that cannot be called quite primitive.



THE ELABORATE HEAD DECORATIONS AND UTENSILS OF THE INDIAN ARUACS

agriculture that cannot be called quite primitive. In large parts of South America the agricultural Indians live not only on maize, which is grown all over America, but even to a greater extent on the tuberous root of a species of *euphorbiaceæ*, the manioc (*Manihot plum.*) or cassava.

In the raw state these roots are highly poisonous, owing to their containing prussic acid ; otherwise they are rich in nutritious properties. Now, in early times some unknown Indian tribe made the discovery that the manioc is deprived of its poisonous

**Far-Reaching
Discovery of an
Indian Tribe**

properties by squeezing the sap out of the root and preparing the latter in a suitable manner : a discovery of far-reaching importance, considering that the manioc afterwards formed almost the sole means of subsistence of hundreds of thousands of Indians. As the manioc shrub does not flourish in the tropical and flood-exposed lowlands, neither the Tupis nor the Caribs, both of whom probably were originally pure fish-eaters, can have been the inventors of this process ; still less the Tapuyas, who did not practise agriculture at all. It does not naturally follow that the honour of this discovery is due to the Aruacs, whose probable original abodes

certainly correspond to the special climatic conditions necessary for the manioc ; it is conceivable that they, too, were first instructed in the art of preparing the manioc by a still more highly civilised race. But this certainly took place in the original home of the race, which, with its gradual expansion, spread the cultivation of the manioc, so that finally the Indians of other stocks also learned the art from them.

The Aruac races are further distinguished by their skill in making earthen vessels. This is still so characteristic of them at the present day that, of the races of Central Brazil, Karl von den Steinen classes those of the Aruac stock under the name of "potter tribes." It is certainly not a coincidence that, the farther one goes from the east coast of the continent towards the mountains, the better and finer the pottery becomes. All the races that inhabit the eastern slopes of the Cordilleras were comparatively far advanced in the working of clay, and the products of their industry are distinguished by variety of form and purpose and by elegance of decoration—which ranges from simple lineal ornament to the plastic imitation of living things—from the products of the primitive races of the lowlands. This

distinction is certainly not limited to the Aruac races. South of them, among the races of the Gran Chaco, which are still regarded as belonging to other stocks, the same thing is observed, and the pottery which has been dug up from the ruins of the old Indian settlements in Catamarca vies with that produced by many civilised nations. There can be scarcely any doubt that with the Aruacs it is not a case of independent development but of an influence exercised by the ancient civilised races of the Peruvian highlands or their eastern neighbours. But this influence must also belong to an extraordinarily early period, for even the Aruac



STONE SEATS IN USE BY THE ARUACS

such as is seen in the spread of the Aruac stock, and all that we know of the history of Indian migrations shows that they have proceeded only from comparatively young and rising races.

We shall therefore have to explain the historical process thus. At a period when their original stock on the plateaus of Bolivia began to develop vigorously, the Aruacs were raised from the pure natural state by the cultural influences of the more highly civilised races in the west, and were advanced in a manner that indirectly served to strengthen the aspiring power of the race. In the old home there was no scope for this abundant energy, and so the emigration began. Whether this moved simultaneously in a southern and northern direction cannot be ascertained. We meet with detached tribes of this family south of their original abodes and likewise in the far east. But they throw no light on the date and direction of their migrations. On the other hand, we can trace the northern current for a long time, and fairly clearly. As the Aruacs had already begun to till the ground in their home, their migrations will, on the one side, have progressed much more slowly than those of races that

peopled the high valleys of the Cordilleras long centuries before the founding of the Inca dynasty. But an important circumstance stands in the way of this hypothesis. The Aruacs, as we meet them in history, never developed a really higher civilisation than, as we have shown, probably belonged to the original race; the latter must therefore have reached the limit of its progress—that is, it must have passed the culminating point—before the expansion of the nation over the whole north of the South American continent began. Here we have a contradiction. A nation whose progressive development is over can no longer generate an expansive force

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PREHISTORIC SOUTH AMERICA

did not know any artificial means of procuring food; on the other side, they must certainly have moved first in a direction that did not compel them to accommodate themselves to other habits. This was only possible if they followed the spurs of the Cordilleras northward. We find them in the sixteenth century in the mountains between Santa Marta and Venezuela, and at the present day in the peninsula of Goajira, their most northern continuation. The Carios in the neighbourhood of Coro also practised agriculture on

Aruac Tribes on the Sea

Venezuelan soil, and lived in permanent abodes at the time of the discovery. At the Cabo de la Vela, Nature checked their northern advance; but their migration was continued in an easterly direction, and reached, still centuries before the discovery of America, the mouth of the Orinoco.

Meanwhile, a change had taken place in respect to part of the race—Aruac tribes had become used to the water, and had become navigators and fishermen. Whether this change began among the coast tribes or among those which had penetrated from the old home into the flood districts of the upper tributaries of the Orinoco is doubtful; the latter appears the more probable, as the sea offers too many difficulties for elementary navigation. Moreover, Aruac tribes are repeatedly found scattered in the basin of the Orinoco. At any rate, the race must still have possessed a considerable power of expansion, for even the ocean on the east coast set no limit to its migrations. The Aruac navigators ventured out from the mouth of the Orinoco upon the open sea, and gradually gave the whole island-world of the Caribbean Sea what is supposed to have been its first population. A little farther, and they would have reached the North American continent from the islands and made the connection

between it and the southern continent, which does not seem ever to have been effected. Meanwhile, their brother tribes on the mainland still followed the sea coast in their new change of direction. Through Guiana they turned again to the south, and even the Amazon did not prove an insuperable obstacle to them. Aruacs are found, with the sure signs of an immigration from the north, as far as the watershed between the tributaries of the Amazon and of the Paraguay.

The migrations of the Aruacs came to a standstill only when they were met by other races with the same desire for expansion. This probably took place comparatively early, the tribes that were advancing south-eastward coming upon the Tupi races. At a later period they encountered the Caribs, to whom finally, in a struggle which lasted for centuries, the majority of the northern Aruacs fell victims.

Although the Tupis have had uninterrupted intercourse with the white man from the first discovery of Brazil down to the present day, the methodical investigation of this race is considerably behind that of others. The reason for this lies in the fate that awaited the race upon the occupation of the land by Euro-

peans. At an early date the missionaries formed, from a dialect of the Tupi language, the so-called *lingua geral*, in which a series of grammars, translations, etc., have been written. It is due to this that the study of the wild Tupi languages, if they may be so termed as opposed to the *lingua geral* cultivated under European influence, has been improperly neglected, and thus one of the best



TOMBS OF THE ARUAC PEOPLES

means of ascer-

taining the ancient history of the Tupi stock has been withheld from us. The same circumstance—long familiarity with the race—has also kept ethnologists from giving their closer attention to the Tupis, whose characteristics have, meanwhile,

been gradually succumbing to the influence of civilisation, so that for the ethnographical and historical study of the best-known stock of the South American Indians we are restricted to inadequate material.

The original home of the Tupis has also been said to have been in the highlands of the interior, but this is based on quite unreliable data and is in contradiction to what is shown by the characteristics of the race in historic times. The mother country of the Tupi races is presumably to be sought not very far from where Europeans first met them, although their expansion and migrations had then been going on in different directions for centuries. Their original home was, in any case, in the region of the northern affluents of La Plata, but scarcely on the other side of the watershed from which the rivers run northward to the Amazon. In contrast to the Aruacs, the Tupis are a decided water-race. Although most of their tribes, but not all, also tilled the ground to a limited extent, in the sixteenth century they still lived almost exclusively by fishing and hunting. On the Paraguay and its tributaries, and on the rivers of the regions of which their wandering hordes further took possession, they boldly launched their canoes in peace and war. In early times they peopled the few islands that lie at inconsiderable distances from the coast, and they were evidently at home on the sea itself so far as their small craft permitted. Even the Tupi tribes who went far into the interior in their migrations still remained navigators and fishermen.

A map of the races of South America shows at once the direction in which the Tupi race expanded. It first followed the affluents of La Plata in a southerly direction to the ocean, but only slowly so long as

it had no special need of expansion. On the other hand, the migration of the Tupis along the coast of the Atlantic Ocean in a northerly direction seems to have proceeded, comparatively speaking, much more rapidly. Up to the mouth of the Amazon they never occupied a broad area, but satisfied themselves with driving the old Tapuya races from a narrow strip of the coast-land, on which, always with an eye to the water, they settled.

That their territory at the time of the conquest still formed an exceedingly narrow strip as compared with its length, but one which was nowhere broken by the return of the hostile nations they had displaced, goes to prove that its occupation took place quickly and at no very remote period. The migrations of the Tupis must have

been of a considerably different character from those of the Aruacs. Whereas the latter evidently proceeded slowly and without serious fighting (in the territory of the Aruacs we scarcely ever find clear traces of a strange population not merged in them by assimilation), the migrations of the Tupis bear throughout the stamp of having been warlike in their nature. Even the name Tapuya (strangers or enemies), which they gave to all races with which they came in contact, is historical evidence of this. In their intercourse with Europeans the Tupis by no means proved to be a particularly savage and cruel race; they were the good friends of the first settlers, and subsequently became tractable material in the hands of the Jesuit missionaries. But in their relations with their Indian neighbours they seem to have been pre-eminently the aggressors, and with proud self-



A CARIB IDOL

The idol represented in the above illustration, which throws an instructive sidelight on the worship of the Caribs, was discovered in 1792 in a cave in Carphenter's Mountain, Jamaica.

consciousness the southern Tupis called themselves Guaranis (warriors). Nor must we forget that with few exceptions,



REMNANTS OF AN ANCIENT RACE: PRESENT-DAY CARIBS AT HOME

Underwood

The youngest of South American races, the Caribs were at one time a powerful people, with a degree of civilisation exceedingly low. Eating their enemies was so characteristic of the Caribs that their name of "cannibal" has become identical with the term for man-eaters. The Caribs of the present day bear little resemblance to their remote ancestors.

to be explained by special circumstances, the Tupi tribes were given to cannibalism. It was certainly no longer a scarcity of food that made them cannibals, nor was it a sacred ceremony springing from religious conceptions, such as we find among several civilised races of ancient America. The Guarani ate the prisoners he made in battle to celebrate his victory over his enemies. The custom observed in this connection is almost a characteristic of the Tupi tribes.

The prisoners were not put to death immediately upon their captors' return from the warpath, but were first kept for some time in by no means severe imprisonment, which became lighter and lighter the nearer the time of their end approached, and terminated with most luxurious living, during which the prisoner was not only abundantly provided with the best of food and drink, but was even married to the daughters of the tribe. Meanwhile, without his being aware of it, preparations were made for the feast which was to be crowned by his death. In the middle of the ceremonial dances of his enemies

he received the fatal blow; immediately thereupon followed the definitely prescribed dissection of the corpse, and the distribution of the portions among the members of the tribe. The women and even the sick who were prevented from attending the feast also received their share. In this form of cannibalism it is obvious that the characteristic features of different stages of culture come into contact. It still contains reminiscences of the time when the flesh of an enemy, like that of a wild beast, served to appease hunger. But it is already pre-eminently the expression of proud triumph over the conquered enemy, for we have special testimony that the feast bore the character of the celebration of a victory. But finally, ceremonial influences also begin to show themselves to such an extent that the transition from the cannibalism of the Tupis to the human sacrifices of the Aztecs appears near at hand.

As anthropophagy, in this or in a similar form, is a common trait of almost all Tupi tribes, it must have begun in the original home of the race. This is a

further argument against the Tupis having come from the highlands of Bolivia. The Tupi tribes which live nearest to this region, and should accordingly present the most archaic forms, are the only ones which have entirely done away with cannibalism, and have generally reached the highest degree of civilisation of any members of the race: these are the Omaguas between the Putumayo and Caquetá, and the Cocamas at the confluence of the Marañon and Ucayali. How these tribes of the Tupi stock could be cut off so far from the others is not difficult to explain. The Aruacs coming from the north halted at the great waterway of the Amazon at about the same time as the Tupis from the south reached its other bank.

So that, to the difficulties that Nature set in the way of a farther advance, was here added the hostility of new and powerful tribes. It was probably this, even more than the river with its innumerable sluggish arms—which is no grave obstacle to a race familiar with boats—that was the chief reason why the main body of the Aruacs could not advance any more to the south bank than the main body of the Tupis could advance to the north bank. That attempts could not have been wanting on both sides is shown by the small detached tribes of each nationality that are met with in turn on the hostile bank. But, on the whole, the division is sudden and sharp. To the Aruacs it meant the end of their onward movement. They seem still to have possessed the power to offer the Tupis an invincible resistance, but not to continue their advance in a new direction.

But the Tupis continued to advance. Their traditions show that they followed the Amazon and its tributaries upward; and that the passage up the Amazon did not appear an impossibility to these Indians as proved in the year 1641, when some of them served the Portuguese as guides during the first expedition of the kind undertaken by the latter. Owing to the enormous extent of the Amazon,

Peoples who Sailed the Amazon

it no longer appears possible to follow the Tupi migration upward in its basin, but probably even the tribes of the Xingu and Tapajoz did not come down from the watershed to the Paraguay, but from the Amazon up its tributaries. For, in contrast to the Aruacs and Tapuyas, traces of Tupi tribes only occur where there was

sufficient water to allow them to remain true to the characteristic of their race. Numerous hordes of Tupis may have been scattered and destroyed in the network of the Amazon, and we cannot now ascertain to what circumstance it was due that the ancestors of the Omaguas and Cocamas managed to break through the central mass of the Nu-Aruac tribes and penetrate almost to the foot of the Cordilleras. Probably the report of a rich cultivated land led them up the Amazon and its tributaries, as in later times the legend of the Omaguas and of the ever-vanishing Eldorado led the Spaniards down the same way.

According to the traditions of the Spanish chroniclers the remembrance of an invasion by the hostile population of the lowlands had not quite died out even among the Indians of the civilised states. Between the immigration of the Omaguas to their later abodes and the discovery of America there must in any case have been a considerable space of time, for the Omaguas not only rose far above the average degree of civilisation of the Tupi races under the influence of more highly

Caribs and Their Civilisation

civilised peoples, so that they renounced cannibalism, tilled the ground, and occupied permanent dwelling-places—indeed, even founded large towns—but the knowledge of all these achievements had even had time to spread abroad among their less civilised neighbours, who reported the name of the Omaguas to the Spaniards as being a race of fabulous wealth and extraordinary power.

The youngest of the races of South America is that of the Caribs. It is partly due to this circumstance, and to good fortune in the field of ethnographic research, that we know its history somewhat better than that of the other groups. The original abodes of the Carib race probably lay near the original home of the Tupi race. As the latter peopled the upper affluents of the Paraguay, the Caribs peopled the upper basin of the Tapajoz and of the rivers flowing in the same direction to the lower Amazon. The degree of civilisation attained here by the Caribs must be described as extraordinarily low; their language could not count farther than three, really only to two, and we must imagine that their other conditions of life corresponded to this poverty of ideas. Even here mutual intercourse will have taken place between them and the Tupis,

PREHISTORIC SOUTH AMERICA

which may have had lasting influence on both races. Their development was so similar that one of the first investigators in this field, Karl von Martius, even regarded the Tupis and Caribs as brother tribes and descendants of a common race. At present, however, one is more inclined to the view that the Tupis and Caribs came from different stocks, but were early and closely co-related.

The Caribs were likewise chiefly a race of fishermen, and their relations to the world of water were those which earliest reached a higher development. They, too, like the Tupis, the more the old home became too small for them, followed the rivers of their native land downward, so that they gradually got to the Amazon itself and so to the open sea. The traces of their migration in this direction are obliterated, and it is not impossible that their arrival at the mouth of the Amazon preceded the appearance of the Tupis.

But in that case it was probably also the Caribs, and not the Tupis, who first checked the advance of the Aruacs; indeed, the enmity between the

A Check to the Aruacs

Caribs and the Aruacs has left widespread traces, whereas between the latter and the Tupis contact took place at comparatively few points only. What may have given the impulse to the migrations of the Caribs is no clearer than the causes of all the other great movements of the races of the American continent. On the other hand, we are better informed as to the manner of their progress, owing to the fact that it was still fresh in the memory of the generation of aborigines found by the Spaniards when they discovered America. Of all Indian races the Caribs were by far the most feared. Even to the Europeans these dauntless sons of the wilderness offered a stubborn resistance, and indeed frequently came off victorious in their bloody battles with the first bands of discoverers, but only to fall, later on, before better equipped expeditions. The Caribs were ruthless in their warfare, not only with Europeans, but also with the Indian population, before the white men appeared.

At what period they were transformed from a comparatively harmless race of fishermen, as Karl von den Steinen found them in the original home of the race on the Upper Xingu, into the nation of bold and savage water-pirates, spreading

terror far around, as we find them in the fifteenth century, is, of course, a mystery. But the fact that the Caribs made their language prevail over almost the whole region north of the Amazon, including a large part of the Antilles, and this, so far as tradition leads us to infer, by violent methods alone, shows that the race must

have possessed quite extraordinary power. When the Caribs began their migrations they were still at the stage when the flesh of their enemies was welcome food; and they apparently never rose above this rather rude standpoint of anthropophagy.

Eating their enemies was so characteristic of the Caribs that among the Spaniards their name was identical with the term for man-eaters, and in its corruption to "cannibals" this term has become the common property of all civilised nations. This circumstance has fatally affected historical research, as, of course, races of other origin also adhered to the custom of anthropophagy, and it was generally sufficient for the discoverers of the sixteenth century to ascertain that a race was given to cannibalism to count it at once among the Caribs. It was only later and often most recent research that succeeded in bringing order into this confusion. In the cannibalism of the Caribs, as in that of the Tupis, there are no signs of the beginning of a refined conception. It is true that actual hunger will have but rarely driven them to it, for as fishermen and hunters they knew how to gain their livelihood from a bountiful Nature; moreover, as soon as their expansion over Aruac territory began, their women probably continued the agriculture practised by these tribes, although on a more limited scale.

But it is chiefly the expression of warlike triumph that serves to explain their cannibalism, and their wars with all hostile tribes were wars of extermination, in

The Shy and Peaceable Aruacs

which no male captives were made, but all the adult men were put to death. The shy and peaceable Aruacs could not have been dangerous opponents; they even met the Europeans upon their first appearance with respectful timidity, which was only changed to fearful flight after they had learned by years of suffering what bitter experiences were in store for them in intercourse with the white man. So that even weak parties of Carib warriors

must often have succeeded in overcoming far superior bands of their opponents. But if the Carib on the warpath behaved with ruthless ferocity towards the male portion of hostile tribes, he, too, spared the women. On the restless expeditions that he undertook, often for considerable distances, in his narrow canoe,

**Settlements
Founded by
the Caribs**

women could not accompany the warrior; they would have been a far greater hindrance to him than on expeditions by land. But as at least the longer expeditions were not undertaken exclusively for the purpose of spoil and plunder—although the warlike expeditions of the Caribs are often decidedly distinguishable from migrations—but had for their object the founding of new settlements, the Caribs probably mixed extensively with the women of another race. And it is only owing to the circumstance that the Carib expeditions were made exclusively on territory inhabited by Aruac races that the intermixture did not become more multiform.

The time of the Carib migrations can be somewhat more precisely judged than that of any other similar event. We have already indicated that the advance of the Caribs to the mouth of the Amazon seems to have preceded the arrival of the Tupis at that river. But the Tupi races must also have been pretty near the same goal at that time. Otherwise it can scarcely be explained why the Caribs should have extended their conquests exclusively in a direction in which they got farther and farther from the tribes they had left behind, so that finally they lost all touch with them. The discovery of these almost venerable remains of a people at the most primitive stage of development on the Xingu is really due to mere chance.

From there to the Amazon the Tupi population forms a perfectly continuous mass in which sprinklings of the Carib stock are nowhere to be found. So that it

**Spread
of the Aruac
Tribes**

must have been the advance of the Tupis that gave the Carib movement its northerly direction, and the weak resistance of the Aruacs must then have enticed the Caribs farther and farther, and have allowed them to spread over the north of South America very much more quickly than we can assume to have been the case with the migrations of the Aruacs, or even with those of the Tupis. In spite of this, it was, of course, centuries before the Caribs could

make their race the prevailing one from the mouth of the Amazon to the lagoon of Maracaibo. Their extreme outposts broke through the belt of the Cordilleras, presumably at no great distance from the northern sea-coast—even in the basin of the river Magdalena there is still a tribe of Carib origin, although rather as a detached horde amid nations of other races.

But, generally speaking, the higher civilisation of the races in the mountain regions of the Andes placed an insuperable obstacle in the way of their progress. In the basin of the Orinoco, whose tributaries they navigated in their canoes far into their upper courses, right to the foot of the mountains, spreading fear and terror among the dwellers on their banks, Carib tribes seem to have settled only to a limited extent; but at its mouth we find them numerous and almost exclusively represented.

That here they established their dominion on a stratum of Aruac races is unquestionable, although direct proof of it is not so clear as in other parts. The last conquest of the Caribs, which had not come to

**The Last
Conquest of
the Caribs**

an end at the time of the discovery of America, was that of the Antilles. When the Cordilleras checked his advance westward, the Carib, whose continual roving into new lands for centuries had become to him a necessary of life, looked around for new objects. While some made their raids up the Orinoco, others made their aim the small islands lying off the Venezuelan coast, often within sight, of whose Aruac population they presumably had heard from the coast-tribes of the mainland. It was probably here that they made a further and—for American conditions—important advance in the art of navigation: they learned to use the sail, an art probably known by none of all the other aborigines of the New World except the Maya races, but by these more perfectly.

The circumstance that the conquest of the islands took place in such recent times is of special importance in judging the nature of Indian migrations. On the large islands of the Antilles the first Spanish settlers found an almost unmixed population of the Aruac race—a peaceable, friendly, good-natured people, living on the abundant produce of their agriculture, with a little hunting and fishing added. But even these Aruacs already

PREHISTORIC SOUTH AMERICA

lived in constant fear of the Caribs, who sprang up on the coasts in their fast-sailing canoes, sometimes here, sometimes there, and plundered and burned one settlement of the Aruacs after another, murdering the men and carrying off the women.

The Aruacs were well aware, from the fate that had befallen the smaller islands in the course of the last generation, what the ultimate issue of this unequal struggle would be. When the continual raids had sufficiently weakened the male population of an island, the Caribs no longer appeared merely as flying robbers, but came in larger bands to crush the last resistance of the islanders. A war of extermination would then be waged upon the occupants of a permanent settlement on the island, and after the massacre or probably the flight of the last of these the settlement furnished a new centre of expansion to the unscrupulous Caribs. On the Lesser Antilles the Spaniards found almost everywhere the remarkable

Linguistic Phenomenon Explained

phenomenon that the language of the women was different from that of the men. In early times this gave rise to every possible kind of incorrect conjecture, until a closer study of the linguistic elements revealed the fact that the language of the women was a dialect of Aruac, while that of the men was Carib.

This discovery, in connection with the stories told by the islanders of the invasion of the Caribs, showed that the Antilles had been conquered during the existing generation, and that the women of the Caribs, with their different language, were none other than the female portion of the Aruacs, who had become the wives of the conquerors. To the historical student of Indian migrations this fact was of no ordinary significance, for it shows us, in the first place, how slowly the expansion of one race over the territory of another proceeded, it having taken generations to fill districts so small in extent as the islands of the Antilles. On the other hand, it gives us the key to the explanation of the extraordinary


multiplicity of the American languages, and to the bounds, effaced almost beyond recognition, between the races of one independent linguistic stock and those of another. For, though not in the conquering generation, in the offspring proceeding from the intermixture with strange women both the anthropological-physical and the ethnic and linguistic elements must naturally have blended in such a manner as, attaining a new fixity, to form a new race. The question has been much discussed whether the excursions of the Caribs may not have extended to the mainland of North America, which is at no great distance from the Antilles, and thereby have brought the native populations of the northern and southern continents in contact with one another, of which there is no trace on the isthmus connecting the two parts. But what one was inclined to regard as Carib influence in the art productions of northern Indians has not stood the test of scientific investigation.


It is certainly singular that the two parts of the American continent—on which for thousands of years man had been making slow progress in the development of his faculties—not only remained uninfluenced and unknown by mankind of the other continents, but should also have remained equally strange and unknown to each other, in spite of isthmus and island-bridge. And yet it seems to have been so. The line dividing the northern and southern races on the land bridge of Central America certainly does not come at the narrowest part; on the contrary, the territory occupied by the nations of southern origin extends to the

primitive sphere of culture of Central America. But the line is a sharp one: different races do not overlap one another here, as we so frequently find to be the case in the interior of nearly every continent. Neither can we trace the slightest influence of any consequence having been exercised by the inhabitants of the one half on those of the other.

Limits of Carib Excursions

The Line Between North and South





The Avondale Mounds in Washington County, Mississippi



The De Soto Mound in Jefferson County, Arkansas



NORTH AMERICAN MOUNDS AND THEIR PURPOSES

The American mounds were sometimes used for burial purposes by the primitive peoples. But the mound also entered into their worship, and the third illustration shows a religious ceremony centring round a small mound with symbolic shell and reversed arrows, while the chief huts of the village are burning. How large some of the mounds were is well illustrated in the second picture, some of them having from three to seven million cubic feet of material.

AMERICA
BEFORE
COLUMBUS



PRIMITIVE
RACES
OF AMERICA
III

RACES OF THE NORTH AND EAST

THE STORY OF THE PAST AS REVEALED BY THE ARTIFICIAL EARTHWORKS

LIKE the southern half, North America also witnessed extensive migrations in prehistoric and even in historic times, but the investigator who seeks to trace them is in a much more unfavourable position on the soil of the northern than of the southern continent. The civilisation brought to the New World from Europe has already extended its victorious march over almost the whole of the United States, a triumph which has filled the mother civilisation with undivided admiration and the daughter with pride.

This victorious march has swept away with unusual inconsiderateness the traces left of the ancient civilisation of the aboriginal population. Whereas in South America we still find the Indian master of vast regions, under conditions of life that evidently form to a large extent analogies to the peculiar aboriginal civilisation found

**Driving the
Indian from
North America**

by the first Europeans, in North America the Indian has for centuries been continuously driven by the white

man from the neighbourhood of his settlements; only in isolated cases have there been men in North America in earlier times who took a benevolent interest in the Indian, and attempted to reconcile him to the new civilisation and win him over to the new conditions.

It is only in the last few decades that the American people have also recognised that they were on the point of destroying their solitary and last opportunity of ascertaining the earlier history of their home, and, with that liberality which is so often found here, works have now been undertaken on a large scale, some of which have already been brought to a successful conclusion, with the object of ascertaining the historical meaning of the ethnographical relics in the territory of the United States. It is, moreover, true that

the Indians themselves no longer play any part in large portions of this territory. Where they have not already been quite exterminated or absorbed by civilisation, their traditions, although not generally quite so scanty as those of the Indians of South America, are still of very limited value; for, apart from the remembrance

**History
From
Excavations**

of their struggles for generations with the white man, their shadowy reminiscences of the time when the Indian was still sole lord of wood and prairie have been almost entirely effaced. Here, too, the most valuable part of our material is, on the one hand language, and on the other hand what the oldest writers were able to ascertain from the Indians when they first met them.

To this are added the results of excavations, which have been undertaken on a larger scale than in South America. But down to the present day the American has had erroneous ideas concerning the most important marks of the earlier history of his land, the famous artificial mounds of the pre-Columbian period. A far wider gap separates the history of recent from that of olden times in the northern than in the southern continent.

Both for geographical and for historical research North America falls into three groups, not always sharply defined, but clearly perceptible. The first is formed by the lands in the extreme north of the continent, extending from Alaska to

**Ice-bound
Lands of
the North**

Greenland, which are broken up by numerous flowing and standing waters, though these are rigidly ice-bound for a considerable part of the year. It has been supposed that these lands did not always bear the inhospitable character with which the long-continued cold and gloom of the Polar winter has stamped them in the present period of

the earth's history. But if this supposition is at all correct, it refers at best to times that are not separated from us by historical, but by geological periods; and if, perchance, the first man came to America by way of these most northern lands, this event was certainly followed by thousands of years in which his passage was sunk in absolute oblivion.

Where did the Innuits Come from? Not until times rather later than the decline of the Roman Empire did a new migration take place here, which is of very little importance in the general history of mankind, but has left some slight traces behind.

The Esquimaux—or, as they call themselves, the Innuits—have been taken by many for an American race, or for descendants of those Indians who had had a special development under the influence of Polar nature. If certain resemblances in build and in mode of life between them and the most northern Indian tribes of the Pacific coast, the Haidahs and Thlinkits, are not to be traced to mutual influence, we are certainly driven to such a conclusion. But, considering the strikingly Mongolian character of the Innuits and the still closer relationship that connects them with the races of Northern Asia, it is far more probable that their home is to be sought in Asia; as immigrants they have always been treated with hostility by the Indians. The custom of the Indians, by no means confined to South America, of annihilating the men in their tribal wars, but of incorporating the women in their own tribe, involved the formation of mixed peoples where the different races were in close contact for a great length of time.

In this case it was the north-west coast of Alaska, opposite the Asiatic continent, and in a more favoured climatic situation, which, at all events, afforded the first home to a large number of Inuit tribes which gradually came over, or else mutual influences have been at work which explain the analogous manners and customs of the Innuits and the Indians of North-west America. In any case, the Innuits found the American continent already peopled by Indians up to the latitude of Bering Strait; otherwise in their further migrations they would scarcely have turned to the inhospitable north, over whose vast area their traces extend in scanty relics of houses and implements. Whether they

America Peopled by Indians

made other attempts at a southward advance elsewhere cannot be ascertained from these finds; but in any case they must have met with the same hostile reception from the races of Indian blood as met them in the north-west.

Such a contact between the races cannot have been of long duration, as otherwise ethnographic proofs would have been found, as in the extreme west. Those who regard the Innuits as an Indian tribe, gradually driven toward the Pole, would find proof of their view in the fact that the northern sagas which relate the voyages of Eric Rauda to Vinland ascribe the destruction of the settlements there to the Skraelings, a name given by the northern settlers in Greenland to the Esquimaux.

Now, it is an undoubted historical fact that the Vikings undertook voyages to the north-east coast of America as far back as the year 1000, but owing to the saga's poetic dress, in which alone the little information relating thereto is preserved, we do not know with certainty where these settlements were, nor the character of the population found there.

Expansion of the Innuits The difference between the Skraeling, the Viking's enemy in Greenland, and the skin-clad North Indian, with whom he fought under similar conditions in Vinland, might easily make so little impression on the Viking's mind, used to the dress and manners of North European civilisation, that both would appear as one to the bard who recited Viking deeds in saga song.

In spite of this the sagas give us a clue to the date of the migrations of the Innuits. They doubtless made their way to Greenland from the American coast or from the islands lying north of it. As the Innuits were at war with the northerners of Greenland about 1200, and succeeded in driving them away during the course of the two following centuries, we may conclude with a fair amount of certainty that the expansion of the Innuits over the North American Continent must have come to an end about the same time.

The migrations of the Esquimaux have no connection with the history of the rest of America, whereas, on the other hand, there was frequent contact between the Indian races of North America, as there was between the races of South America. For the northern as well as for the southern half of the continent the eastern chains of the Cordilleras formed an unmistakable

AMERICAN RACES OF THE NORTH AND EAST

boundary of culture. In the north as well as in the south the region of higher civilisation lies on the Pacific side of the mountains, not on the Atlantic side. But the further step in assuming a connection between northern and southern civilisation and between the northern and southern primitive races is not justified.

If the Indian in the basin of the Mississippi is more closely related, ethnographically, to the Indians in the basin of the Amazon or Orinoco than to his western neighbours on the other side of the Cordilleras, this fact is sufficiently explained by the similarity of their conditions of life. Man at a low stage of civilisation is everywhere, both in the Old and New Worlds, dependent in the highest degree on his natural surroundings, and where these produce similar conditions the development of man will also tread similar paths.

On the whole, the Indian population of North America east of the Cordilleras exhibits a far greater uniformity of race than is the case in South America, and, although with the aid of language a number of largely different stocks may be distinguished (which presuppose a separate development for hundreds if not thousands of years), the division of the North American races is more recent than that of the South American. This is shown by the mere fact that, of the thousand or so different languages and dialects of the New World named by Brinton in his "History of the American Race," about 750 belong to the part south of the Isthmus of Panama and only 250 to Central and North America. But at the same time the multiplicity of the latter races is also so great as to have required an extraordinary length of time.

The most important problem of the pre-Columbian history of North America is formed by the question: Who were the builders of the so-called mounds? These mounds of earth, or, more rarely, stones, erected by the hand of man, often with a considerable expenditure of labour, are scattered more or less numerous over the greater part of the United States. We find them in the north near the Great Lakes and far into the territory of Canada. And although towards the south, from the confluence of the Mississippi and Arkansas, they become rarer, their traces may be found not only as far as the mouth of the Father of Waters, but even in the most

southern regions of the peninsula of Florida. On the west side the southern limit of the mound region has not yet been ascertained with certainty, but even there it extends to Texas and Mexico, touching the region of civilisation of the Pueblo Indians and the races of Central America. Its bounds are scarcely narrower in an east-and-west direction, for while the artificial mounds almost reach the 70th degree of longitude in the State of Maine in the east, their most western outposts in the north are beyond the 101st parallel. Now, the mounds in this vast area are certainly not numerous everywhere or equally distributed. On the other hand, it seems as if the real home of the mound-builders lay in the basin of the central and upper Mississippi and its eastern affluents, especially the Ohio, while the groups of such erections lying outside this region are characterised more or less as radiations from this centre.

When more careful attention was first given to the earthworks in the states of Ohio, Illinois, and Wisconsin in the early part of this century, people were quite astonished at their large number, the considerable size attained by some of them, and the original forms, sometimes bordering on the regularity of mathematical figures, which they exhibited in many instances. Astonishment grew when the interest that was thus awakened led to earthworks of like or allied character being constantly discovered in new parts, and when the excavations, which were at first made at only a few places, yielded inexplicable results. Thus the conviction gradually dawned upon scientific and lay investigators that the mounds must be the relics of a long-vanished nation.

Those whose conjectures were aided by a vivid imagination did not hesitate to connect the race of the mound-builders directly with the Toltecs, the race that for a long time was held to be the standard-bearer of every civilisation discovered on the soil of North and Central America. But even the more cautious were convinced that these erections proved the existence of a highly developed civilisation in an epoch thousands of years back. Unquestionably the artificial mounds were the work of a sedentary race, for the Indian who roved about in the state of a nomad could not possibly have had time, power, or inclination

**New World's
Thousand
Languages**

**Home of
the Mound-
Builders**

**Earthworks
a Proof of
Civilisation**

to erect even the most insignificant of these earthworks, not to speak of the structures—not very numerous, but of imposing dimensions—of Etowah, Cahokia, etc., the largest of which had a content of 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 cubic feet. To erect such structures required a population not only of far greater density than had ever

Fortifications on the Mississippi been found anywhere on the North American Continent, but one that must also have been excellently organised to be able to subject such labour as these gigantic works entailed to a common will. But what a race, what a state must that have been which not only produced these structures but protected the banks of the chief river-courses for many miles with extensive fortifications, such as would seem in early times to have accompanied the Mississippi in an almost uninterrupted chain from the mouth of the Arkansas up to the Illinois. And an almost incredible range of territory is given to this state if, instead of merely taking into account the region most thickly covered with such earthworks, we extend its boundaries as far as the earthworks can be found.

A sedentary population of such density must naturally have been mainly dependent on a cultivated food supply, and that the mound-builders had been agriculturists was evident from all that was brought to light in the excavations made in the mound region. Not only were ears and grains of maize found, with the vessels and implements necessary for its preparation, but the excavations, or inferences from them, proved that other seeds and fruits were also possessed by the mound-builders.

Indeed, their agriculture must have been already highly developed, for careful investigation revealed not only irrigation works and aqueducts of considerable extent in places, but, in the valleys of the great rivers, even cultivated patches, on which the excess of moisture had been counter-

Mound-Builders and Their Advanced Arts acted by a raising of the ground in beds. The mound-builders must also have possessed rich experience in handicraft. Their pottery exhibited not only a great variety of forms, adapted to the most different purposes, but in the better articles attained great technical perfection. Here, too, no trace could be found of the use of the potter's wheel, but some vessels seemed to have been given a glaze of very fair quality. The excavations could

naturally not give a very definite idea of the people's accomplishments in weaving, on account of the greater perishability of all fabrics, but even of this art both coarse and fine specimens were by no means wanting. It was thought that special proof of a higher civilisation was given by the specimens of copper ornaments brought to light in the earthworks. The whole of America was in the Stone Age when Columbus discovered it, so that if worked copper was found here, although in no considerable quantity, it must necessarily have belonged to a race of higher civilisation, and long periods must have elapsed since the decay of this race for its progress in culture to have been entirely lost again to after-ages.

The race had certainly had a special knowledge of architecture. This was proved not only by the almost incredible number of earthworks erected by them, and the astounding massiveness of the large mounds, but, above all, by the variety of form that they had been able to give to their works. It is true that the structures were often merely accumulations of earth

Earthworks Tell the Story of the Past of truncated conical form, or oblong-oval or rectangular mounds or terraces, but in other places they exhibited the most surprising forms. The outlines of some of them were unmistakable representations of living creatures—snakes, birds, and mammals, and even the human form. If this proved that this ancient race possessed an artistic eye, another kind of earthwork was still more calculated to inspire respect for its achievements in culture. Earthworks were discovered which reproduced the mathematical figures of the circle, rectangle, square, and polygon with an accuracy which investigators pronounced to be quite inconceivable without the use of instruments.

In its religious ideas such a people must certainly also have risen far above the naturalism and animism of uncivilised races, and of this, too, the remains seemed to offer proof. If a considerable part of the earthworks had served as fortifications, dwellings, and cultivated land, there were innumerable others which, from their position and form, would not have been suited for these purposes. Many of them proved to be graves, either of single persons or of whole families, and there were even graves for large numbers and burial-grounds like cemeteries. The manner

AMERICAN RACES OF THE NORTH AND EAST

in which the dead had almost always been interred with articles used in their earthly occupations left no room for doubt that the race of the mound-builders believed in a second existence. It even seemed as if religion played an extraordinarily important part among them in all the concerns of life. Almost everywhere that earthworks occurred with any frequency there were mounds of a certain kind which could not be explained at the first glance. These mounds, generally of conical form, had at their base, or even in their higher strata, a horizontal layer of firmly beaten clay or clayey earth, which, upon the removal of the overlying masses, in general proved to be a carefully levelled surface like a floor, rather inclined towards the middle, in the centre of which the traces of fire were often found.

The discoverers of this form of mound thought themselves justified in regarding these floors as sacred places, and the remains of fire as affording traces of sacrifices; and as human bones were repeatedly found in ashes, human sacrifices were supposed to have played an important part in the

Religious Rites of the Mound-Builders

mound-builders' religious rites, as in many other parts of the New World. The discoverers therefore gave these earthworks the name of altarmounds, and from their frequency they drew the conclusion that the old civilised state must have possessed a numerous and influential sacerdotal caste, to which presumably the most imposing of the great earthworks, the terraced pyramids for sanctuaries honoured by special worship, owed their origin.

Thus the picture of the race that erected the earthworks was no longer shadowy and indistinct; on the basis of these discoveries, and with the aid of the analogies of the civilisations found on American soil by the first Europeans, fairly definite ideas had been arrived at. But it was thought that quite an extraordinary age must be ascribed to this race, because at the time of the discovery of America all memory of these peoples had already vanished, and, from the high stage of civilisation they had occupied, it was thought that their gradual decline and the extinction of all their traditions must have taken a considerable space of time.

On the other hand, a particularly remarkable discovery had been made. One of the mounds representing living

things was discovered in the neighbourhood of Bloomington, Wisconsin; and several of the older archæologists thought they recognised in it the form of an elephant or some other animal with a trunk. Now, among the pipe-bowls in the form of animals that have been found in large numbers in excavations in the mound

region, the representation of an animal provided with a real trunk—as distinguished from the trunk-like snout of the tapir, which in Chiapas is a sacred animal—also occasionally occurs; they were therefore convinced that the builders of that mound must at least have had a traditional recollection of the form of an elephant or mastodon. But as the proboscideans were extinct on American soil long before historic times, the tradition of the mound-builders must have gone back to the ages to which the mastodon skeletons of the Missouri valley belonged. From the arrow-heads that were found with those skeletons it was assumed that the animals had been killed by man.

Although the above view of the mound-builders was formerly the predominant one, for a long time scholars have not been wanting who, doubting the existence of a prehistoric civilised race on the soil of North America, are of opinion that the ancestors of the same Indians who inhabit the United States to-day erected these mounds in comparatively recent times. The more the ancient history of the New World was subjected to methodical investigation, the greater became the number of the mounds. In the course of the last few years the systematic examination of the earthworks in the different parts of the Union, which has been undertaken on a very extensive scale by the North American Bureau of Ethnology at Washington, has proved irrefutably that the mounds really possess neither the age commonly attributed to them nor all the peculiarities demanded. On

The Mounds Under Examination

the contrary, they are not the work of one race, but are probably the relics of the different Indian races which inhabited the territory of the United States before and after the discovery of America by Columbus.

The inferences as to the age of the mounds drawn from the "elephant mound" had not met the approval even of many who still did not doubt that the builders of this mound intended to

represent an animal with a trunk. But after recent investigations this too seems by no means certain. The soil of the mound has undoubtedly been under cultivation for years, but its form, although not so clear, has remained quite recognisable. It now appears that the ground is very light sand, and that the trunk has probably been formed at the head-end merely by the long-continued influence of the elements, especially of the wind. The mound was presumably meant to represent the bear, an animal often used as a totem. In a like manner the most recent surveys have done away with other old erroneous ideas.

There is, at all events, no denying that a number of earthworks in the valley of the Ohio, especially those of the so-called Newark group, exhibit forms of almost mathematical regularity; but the circumstance that of all the circular circumvallations only one or two are almost perfectly round, while the great majority only imperfectly attain this evidently desired end, goes to prove that they were built experimentally rather than with the help of instruments of precision. It likewise proves quite erroneous to regard the artificial mounds over the whole extent of their range as uniform, and therefore as the relics of a single race. Closer investigation shows rather that a number of different groups of mounds can be so clearly distinguished by their form and contents that in certain districts we are even able to trace the settlements of two different mound-building populations at one and the same place.

The hypothesis of a particular ancient civilised race being the mound-builders collapses. The mounds remain to us as a class of highly important monuments, from which we can derive information of the earlier history of the North American Indians that no other source can give. Starting from the assumption that the state of Indian civilisation had remained practically the same since the discovery of America, if it had not advanced through intercourse with the white man, the Indians were considered to have been almost without exception nomadic races of hunters, whose unconquerable love of unrestrained freedom would never and nowhere have permitted them to form large communities and erect permanent dwellings. This conception is perfectly

Mounds as Monuments of the Past

The State of Indian Civilisation

unhistorical. In large tracts of North America there were, even in the sixteenth century, restless hordes of Indians, who lived almost exclusively by hunting, of which they were passionately fond.

But near to them, or separating them, and probably throughout the greater part of the present United States, there were also Indian races which had made, compared with them, quite considerable progress in the path of their culture development.

The Indian mounds and graves have left us evidences of a civilisation that tell an undeniable tale; and an impartial examination of the oldest accounts of the first meeting of the white man and the red man on North American soil confirms in numerous particulars what the mound-finds lead us to suppose. Individual re-

The Light of Research on the Dark Ages

searches are certainly not yet far enough advanced for the valuable material of the discoveries to be used wholly and fully. We know too little of the ancient migrations of the pre-Columbian Indians to be able with certainty to connect the boundaries that archæology traces in certain districts with definite racial boundaries. But where this has become possible the antiquities serve materially to clear up historical hypotheses, and a combination of the different methods of research will further reduce the uninvestigated area year by year.

The whole basin of the Mississippi—a broad strip of land beginning at the Great Lakes in the north and extending to the lowlands of the lower Mississippi—was in earliest times peopled by tribes comprised under the common name of Algonquins. Of the better known Indian tribes belonging to them are the Chippewas in the north, the Delawares, Mohicans, and Ottawas in the north-east, and the Shawnees in the south-east. From their traditions it is supposed that their original home is to be sought in the north-east, beyond the Great Lakes, although they had been driven thence before the time of Columbus by the nations of the Iroquois race. Their migrations from the north seem to have

proceeded by two separate branches. The one went in a south-easterly direction, mainly along the sea-coast; not, like the Tupis in South America, peopling only a narrow strip, but spreading out widely, and following the rivers that flow into the sea far into the Alleghany Mountains. In spite of their being near the water, the Algonquins were scarcely ever exclusively a race of fishermen. Whether they were already agriculturists when they moved down the east coast is doubtful.

Even the eastern Algonquins practised agriculture in later times, but their fellows who moved along the Great Lakes on their way westward, and in earlier times inhabited their banks, certainly did so even at the time of the migration. As was always the case, the farther the tribes were led apart by their migrations, which continued slowly for centuries, the more differentiated they became in customs and mode of life. If it were not for the unmistakable sign of a kindred language, one would scarcely suppose that the Chippewas of the north-west and the Shawnees in the south were brothers of one and the same race. A number of nations of the Algonquin race are distinguished from all other Indians of North America by their comparatively advanced civilisation. There is no doubt that even in early times they had taken to a settled mode of life and devoted themselves to agriculture.

Nor is it mere chance that in several points their religious ideas border on those of their neighbours in the extreme north-west. From certain peculiarities in this respect one might be inclined to seek their home in the north-west rather than in the east, for many of them remind us of the Tinnés on the one hand, and the Pueblo tribes on the other. The Chippewas and Lenapés already possessed, in their painted wooden tablets or sticks, a system of interchange of ideas that had advanced beyond the purely pictorial character to a kind of hieroglyphic symbolism, which was specially employed for preserving the remembrance of sacred rites. Their religious system, with the worship of the sun and the four cardinal points as the homes of the wind-gods, we shall find further developed among the Pueblo Indians.

A further resemblance to the latter obtains in the cult of the totems, or clan tokens, which we meet with not only in the Pueblos but also among many other

Indian tribes of the Pacific coast as far as the Thlinkits and Haidahs on the borders of Alaska. For this reason we may, at all events, regard races of this stock as the builders of the peculiar earthworks known as effigy mounds. It is an interesting fact that all the animals—bear, snake, various birds, fishes, etc.—from which most of the designations and sacred objects of the clans (the totems) were derived are represented in these mounds. As these earthworks did not serve as burial-places, and were little adapted for fortifications, we may perhaps regard them, like the meeting-hall of the Iroquois or the “kiva” of the Pueblo Indians, as the centre of the cult of the clan. Whether Indians of the Algonquin race were also the builders of the mounds on the central Mississippi and on the Illinois we would rather doubt, especially as this district exhibits mounds of various types that are all different from those of Wisconsin. If a not very reliable tradition of the Lenapés or Delawares can be credited, the answer would have to be decidedly in the negative.

In spite of their great progress in the paths of civilised life, the Algonquins did not manage to build durable dwellings. This is the more peculiar, as they might have seen those of the neighbouring Pueblo Indians, with whom commercial relations seem to have existed. But we may not place them lower in the scale of civilisation solely on this account. The erection of stone buildings—which are better able to defy the destructive influence of time than wooden huts at best only coated with lime, and even than mounds of loose earth—creates only too easily an erroneous idea of the degree of civilisation of a race.

At the lower stages of civilisation man is, however, primarily dependent on his natural surroundings, and if the limestone and sandstone plateaus of the west offered the Pueblo Indians the opportunity of easily becoming no mean builders, the wooded hill regions of the lake district denied to the Algonquins the opportunity of handing down to posterity similar impressive proofs of their civilisation. But the Algonquins achieved something that scarcely any other race of North Atlantic Indians did: they knew and worked copper. It certainly occurred in such purity in the hills between Lake Superior and Lake Michigan that in the

Builders of Effigy Mounds

The Algonquin Civilisation and Religion

Primitive Copper Workers

best specimens it could even be shaped by hammering in the cold state. Probably, however, they also knew a primitive and not very efficient method of smelting and welding, with the help of which they formed beads and small plates of the metal, while they were able to emboss the latter with figures. The bands of the Algonquins

Race Named After the Savannah

who were advancing south-eastward, having crossed the Savannah River, came upon solid masses of strange Indians, who rendered the continuation of their migration in the same direction impossible. This probably led first to a temporary halt, but, space eventually proving too limited for the gradually increasing numbers of the Algonquins, their migrations were resumed in a westerly direction. The Indians who marched up the Savannah, crossed the Alleghanies, and began to spread over the valleys of the Green River and Tennessee, were called after the Savannah by their neighbours, from their long sojourn on this river, and as "Savannees"—which with time has become "Shawnees"—have preserved the remembrance of this stage of their migrations down to historic times.

The Shawnees and related Delaware tribes are proved to have taken an important part in the erection of the earthworks that occur throughout Tennessee and the neighbouring states on the lower tributaries of the Ohio. A large number of such mounds in this district have been erected for burial purposes, sometimes singly, but generally in groups, and very often in connection with larger earthworks and circumvallations, and the manner of interment has so characteristic a stamp that in it we find undoubtedly a racial peculiarity.

Whereas in other parts of the mound area the dead were frequently buried in a crouching position, like the mummies of South America, or in bone-heaps after removal of the flesh, the mode of interment

Burial Customs of the Tribes

practised here reminds one greatly of that usual in Europe. The bottom and four side-walls of a hole in the earth were lined with flat stone slabs, and the corpse was laid in it, lying full length on its back. Flat stones served to close the sarcophagus, and, if there was any fear of the earth falling through the spaces between them, these spaces were often covered by a second layer of smaller slabs. Such graves are repeatedly found, even without mounds

over them, but they are especially numerous in the small conical mounds on the southern tributaries of the lower Ohio, where the Shawnees and kindred Indian races lived down to historic times. We should expect these Shawnees to have been the builders of the graves and the earthworks connected with them, and we are able to prove it. We thus obtain an important argument in judging of the age of many groups of earthworks, in opposition to the fanciful theory of a past of thousands of years.

The custom of interring the dead in stone receptacles, as above described, has been practised by Shawnee Indians not only in historic times, but, where there was suitable stone, down to the last century, and has been observed by numerous writers in different places independent of one another. In accounts of earlier times the erection of a mound a few feet in height and of conical form is repeatedly mentioned. Moreover, if excavations have revealed that burial-places of this particular kind have repeatedly contained articles of undoubted European

Check to the Algonquin Advance

origin among the things placed with the dead, the mounds of this type are certain proof that the particular localities were at some time occupied by members of the Shawnee group of the Algonquin race, whose migrations have been going on in this region down to historic and even post-Columbian times.

The Indians who checked the advance of the Algonquins in a southerly direction belonged, presumably, to the group of the Muskokis, whose best-known representatives were the Creeks and Chickasaws. Although these Indian tribes were the first to come in contact with Europeans at the time of the discoveries—the best part of De Soto's adventurous expedition from Florida to the Mississippi having been made through the territory of Indians of the Muskoki race—they have hitherto been more neglected by research than the more northern tribes.

As descendants of this race have been found only on the banks of the rivers flowing into the Gulf of Mexico parallel to the Mississippi, and as in this district they formed a compact body unmingled with foreign tribes down to the discovery of America, we must assume that they were less given to migration than most of the other Indians. The land occupied

AMERICAN RACES OF THE NORTH AND EAST

by them in the sixteenth century was presumably the ancient home of the race ; we may, perhaps, behold in them descendants of the earliest inhabitants of Eastern North America. In early times their abodes near the Mississippi undoubtedly extended much further northward, and possibly even further east ; so that there may be some truth in the tradition of the Lenapés that they drove the Muskokis from their more northern settlements on the Mississippi.

The Muskokis were also by no means at the low level of civilisation that, judging by modern views, is usually attributed to the earlier Indian population of the continent. They tilled the ground on the most extensive scale, and their agricultural produce excited the admiration of De Soto's Spaniards. Their settlements were called "towns" by the Spaniards, and some of them contained a large number of inhabitants. They, too, took a large part in the erection of the artificial mounds, and the characteristics of their work are speaking witnesses to the progress they had made. In the district

Practical Uses of the Earthworks

of the Muskokis are some of the largest mounds that the whole region of the mound-builders can boast. These earthworks—which probably bore at the same time the dwellings of the foremost members of the tribe, and formed a place of refuge for the whole tribe when attacked by enemies—are not, like the smaller mounds, round or conical in form, but remind one rather of the terraced erections on which rose the temples and palaces of the civilised races of Central America. The De Soto mound, although it is not absolutely proved that it was erected by the Muskokis, gives a fair idea of this type.

The most imposing erection of this kind is the Etowah mound in the south of Georgia, and it can be proved that it was still inhabited by Muskoki tribes at the beginning of the sixteenth century, being used as a palace and fortress by their chiefs. As it is surrounded by a large number of smaller mounds, which are enclosed by a kind of fortification, partly rampart and partly moat, we can form from this an idea of old Indian towns which agrees in so many respects with Le Moynes description that a great degree of reliability may be accredited to the latter. The Muskokis had acquired a degree of civilisation that

leads us to infer that they had been a sedentary race for a very long time. Although the ground of the district they occupied did not afford them suitable material for massive buildings, yet they, almost alone among the Indians of the East, built stronger dwellings than could be erected of purely vegetable materials.

How the Indians Built Their Houses


The most recent investigations and excavations have proved that some of the mounds that, by reason of their floor-like layers of clay and the remains of bones and ashes found in and beneath these, were pronounced by their first discoverers to be altar-mounds, in reality bore the houses of the Muskoki Indians.

The ruins of these houses, which appear here and there to have been round, but generally square, show that these Indians constructed their dwellings of a framework of wooden posts, between which the ground-work for a stucco-like wall-plaster was formed with cross-beams and interwoven twigs and branches. The plaster was left rough outside, but inside it was smoothed and whitewashed, as in the archaic buildings of the Pueblo Indians. It was applied only to the side-walls, on which it seems to have reached rather above the height of a man ; above rose an arched roof borne by the thin ends of the posts and by pliant staves, and covered with vegetable matter—a reminiscence of the leaf-hut that had been usual among most Indian races, and also in earlier times among the Muskokis. The bones and heaps of ashes in the mounds are explained by the custom of consigning a man's house to the flames when he died.

In Le Moynes description the deceased seems unquestionably to have been buried outside the village circle, under a mound which, on account of its smallness, we may perhaps regard as only the nucleus and beginning of the one to be erected. But among the Muskokis the deceased

Peculiar Burial Customs

was generally buried in the house itself, and, as soon as the fire had so far consumed the walls that the building collapsed, the place was covered up with earth. This peculiar mode of burial, of which traces may likewise be found in historic times, characterises in its turn, like the stone graves of the Shawnees, an ethnographic district, and enables us to throw a ray of light into the darkness that almost completely veils the earlier history



of the Indian races.


As in the south, so also in the north the territory of the Algonquins was bordered by foreign races of Indians. The land around the great North American lakes and their outlet to the sea, the River St. Lawrence, was the abode of the races of the Iroquois stock. Of all the Indians, these were most distinguished by their fine physical development and—probably as its consequence—by bravery, love of fighting, and warlike virtues, which long made them the most dreaded enemies. The real Iroquois, however, only became an important factor in the history of these districts in the last few centuries before the colonisation of North America. In earlier times the race of the Cherokees had seceded from them, and played no less important a part in the earlier history of America than they did subsequently in the time of colonial rule. The original home of the common race of the Iroquois and Cherokees is supposed to have been in the farthest north-east of the territory they afterwards occupied. It is true that in historic times the whole Lake region, including the districts bordering it on the south and west, was occupied by the Iroquois and the kindred race of the Hurons.

But this removal cannot have occurred in very early times, for these races seem to have taken but little part in the erection of artificial mounds. We are, therefore, forced to ascribe the earthworks of Michigan and Wisconsin to an earlier occupation of this district by Algonquins. And as these northern works are but rarely of a defensive character, it seems as if they were erected earlier than the period of struggle which must have attended the

expansion of the Iroquois. The races that erected the effigy-mounds were, therefore, probably past their prime, and had perhaps even settled in other parts, when the races of the Iroquois family received the impulse that helped them to expand over the greater part of northernmost America. On the other hand, the separation of the Cherokees from the main race belongs to a much earlier period. The direction of their migrations agrees admirably with

the theory that the original home of the race was in the extreme north-east. The Cherokees would then have moved off as a first wave in a southerly direction, so that in course of

time they came to the basin of the Ohio, where they are proved to have long had their abodes. They do not seem to



A "PREHISTORIC" SCENE OF TO-DAY

The above illustration of a Pueblo woman engaged in making pottery is from a drawing made by an artist in Mexico recently, and illustrates a scene which is no doubt the same to-day as before the dawn of American history, for the Pueblo Indians are a primitive people existing in a land where modern invention has attained its highest.

have found these districts uninhabited; on the contrary, it is certain that Algonquin tribes not only sojourned there temporarily before them, but, as they did farther south and west, built permanent settlements and tilled the ground. At least some of the mounds in the farther course of the Ohio may owe their origin to the latter; and under Algonquin influence, but also in consequence of

AMERICAN RACES OF THE NORTH AND EAST

continual fighting, the Cherokees in turn proceeded to build artificial mounds, which once more form a special province,

of the Cherokee district, and we must assume that the cultivation of tobacco played an

important part in the agriculture of the whole region. But the upper valley of the Ohio furnishes not only the most numerous, but also, to judge from their forms, the oldest types of the Indian pipe, and shows the uninterrupted course of its further development so clearly that we must suppose it to have been the abode of a race closely connected with the history of the tobacco-pipe, as the Cherokees were. The mounds furnish the most remarkable instances of circumvallations of almost mathematical regularity. But as these are not exclusively limited to the upper course of the Ohio, it remains doubtful whether the greater number of them may not have been erected by the earlier inhabitants of the valley for protection against the advance of the Cherokees, but have been restored by the latter, after the conquest, to serve the same purpose. Cherokee graves certainly occur in connection with many of these groups of mounds, and at least bear witness to the fact that the invaders adopted the manners and customs of the conquered as far as the earthworks were concerned; what part they may have taken themselves in developing this



PRIMITIVE PUEBLO WATER-CARRIERS

This scene, like that on the opposite page, is drawn from life of the present day, and is yet in every sense worthy to be regarded as a scene from prehistoric America.

primitive architecture is of course difficult to ascertain. The migration of the Cherokees through the valley of the Ohio took place practically in pre-Columbian times, but it had not yet come to an end when the white man entered this district. Only a little farther south, in the valley of the small river Tennessee, the agreement between the still existing groups of mounds and the position of the so-called "overhill towns" of the Cherokees, as recorded by the earliest visitors, testifies that these

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Indians, having once adopted the custom of mound-building, remained true to it even on their further migrations.

Yet another large branch seems to have been detached from the Iroquois race in the Hurons, who expanded in a westerly direction along the south bank of the River St. Lawrence as far as the lakes.

Five Nations of the Iroquois and Tuscaroras

Whether this took place at a time prior to the migrations of Iroquois tribes to the south cannot be proved, but is very probable; for whereas the "Five Nations" of the Iroquois and the Tuscaroras in the far south had so strong a consciousness of belonging to the same stock that at the beginning of the eighteenth century the latter returned to the north and were received into the league as a sixth nation, even in the time of the first settlers there existed between Iroquois and Hurons a bitter enmity which had lasted from time immemorial, and which had a decided influence on the settlement of the land by Europeans in colonial times.

As regards civilisation, these Iroquois races were doubtless behind the Cherokees in most respects. They also were agricultural and sedentary to a small extent. When the first colonists ascended the River St. Lawrence, Hochelaga was decidedly a town-like settlement of permanent character. Nor are earthworks entirely wanting in this district that mark the sites of old Indian settlements. But they do not bespeak the higher civilisation of the more southern districts.

They are clearly defensive works, and therefore were probably not built until the real Iroquois undertook the forcible extension of their dominion over the territory of their neighbours. But this cannot have been long before the discovery of America, as these wars were still going on when the first white men began to penetrate from the coast into the interior. By "Iroquois," in the narrower sense, are

Tribes that Inhabited Canada

meant only the tribes that inhabited the most northern states of the Union and the neighbouring districts of Canada down to the time of early colonisation. These, too, seem to have occasionally erected earthworks—a proof that even they did not lead an entirely unsettled life, although permanent dwellings and agriculture—these bases of progress in civilisation—play a smaller part with them than with most of the other nations. Of all

the races that the first European settlers found on American soil the Iroquois best represent the type that has erroneously been regarded as characteristic of the whole Indian population of North America.

In the main the Iroquois were still a race of hunters, and one that pursued its human game with the same cruelty and ruthlessness as its animal game. As they were an inland race, navigation and fishing did not play the same part in their economy as it did with the Tupis and Caribs, although they constructed excellent canoes of the bark of trees, and possessed a skill in damming up streams, for the purpose of catching the fish, that told of long experience. But their element was hunting and war. In build the Iroquois were superior to most of their neighbours, and to their comparatively wild life they owe a development of their physical powers such as was no longer possible even at the beginning of a civilised life.

By their strength, and still more by their bloodthirstiness and savage cruelty, they had made themselves a terror to all their neighbours far and wide. That racial relationship did not prevent them

Savage and Dreaded Iroquois

from displaying their warlike propensities is proved by the struggles between them and the Hurons, in which the latter, despite their equality in numbers, on account of their more peaceable disposition were forced to retreat farther and farther before their enemies. But the warlike expeditions of the Iroquois extended by no means exclusively, perhaps not even mainly, westward. Their southern neighbours had also to suffer severely from their hostility, and in all probability their invasions were the cause of the latest American migration, which we have still to mention, namely, that of the Sioux-Dakotas, which must probably have taken place only in the last few centuries before Columbus. It is a characteristic sign of the superiority of the Iroquois in war that the only bands that pushed southward seem to have been small in numbers; at any rate they were able only to establish tribes of moderate size in the conquered districts, such as the Conestogas, and the Susquehannas on the banks of the river of the latter name.

What has made the Iroquois specially famous is the league in which the five tribes that remained in the old home combined with one another for attack and



HIAWATHA, THE GREAT ONONDAGA CHIEF

Hiawatha, who among the American Indians was regarded as a person of miraculous birth, was supposed to have been sent on earth to teach man the arts of civilisation. It was he who first discovered the value of maize as food, and taught his people the sciences of navigation and medicine. When the white man landed in America to preach Christianity, Hiawatha exhorted the Indians to receive the words of wisdom, and then departed to Ponemah, the land of the "Hereafter." Longfellow's great poem has given to Hiawatha an abiding place in literature.

From the drawing by J. Walter Wilson, R.I.

defence. This has been regarded as proof of a special talent for statesmanship, and as showing consequently a higher degree of intellectual development than the other Indians possessed.

But weighty reasons are opposed to such an interpretation. In the first place, it is by no means certain that this league was the product of the uninfluenced mental development of the Indians. Hitherto it has been pretty generally assumed that the league of the Iroquois was concluded in the fifteenth century—about 1430. But the further the examination of Indian tradition with regard to underlying facts has been proceeded with, the more we have been convinced that all that seemed to appertain to the savage of an infinitely remote past, without history or record, in reality only applies to a few generations back. According to the latest calculation, the league was probably not made until about 1560; this assumption is strengthened by the stories of dissensions between the various Iroquois nations, which can scarcely belong to so remote a past as would result if the league was created about 1430.

If the alliance came about at so late a date, the earliest contact with the white man must have preceded it; whether this was of a hostile or amicable kind, it must have exercised a different influence on the origin of the idea of an alliance if the latter had grown out of purely Indian conditions. Too much honour has been done to the chiefs who formed the league by the conception that has been spread of its purposes. The idea that the league was intended to do away generally with the state of war, and bring about perpetual peace among all Indians, is in such striking contradiction to the whole history of the Iroquois race before and after it was made, that this interpretation may unhesitatingly be pronounced an erroneous one. The exaggerated manner the Indians

Hiawatha in History and Literature have of expressing themselves may certainly be credited with having formulated it in such grandiloquent terms, although no more was intended by them than to put an end to the dissensions between the small Iroquois tribes, which had previously been only too frequent.

Even so, there still remains sufficient in the League of the Five Nations to assure to the Onondaga chief Hiawatha,

who is considered to have been the father of the idea, quite as prominent a place in history as has been prepared for him in literature by Longfellow's immortal poem. In the whole history of the American nations, and the civilised races by no means excepted, there is not on record a second instance of the natives having had the insight to subordinate their sense of independence, which was carried almost to the point of unruliness, for any length of time to higher considerations.

Among the Mexicans we also find alliances of kindred races; but these neither rested on so intelligent a basis as the league of the Iroquois, nor were they destined to last so long or to exercise a similar influence on the fortunes of the nation. In the case of the Iroquois, the self-denying act of their chiefs had as its consequence the maintenance of their supremacy among their neighbours until the time when the latter, even earlier than they themselves, sank into insignificance before the invasion of the white man.

If the nations of the Iroquois league exhibit at the present day the highest percentage of natives who have not succumbed to European civilization, but have been able to reconcile themselves to it and become good citizens of a modern state, they owe this mainly to the wise foresight of their forefathers, who, by forming the league, created the first basis of a political order, from which accrued to them power over their kind, and respect and consideration on the part of the new immigrants.

When the races of Iroquois stock began to expand southward—a process which, as we have mentioned, belongs to the last few centuries before the discovery of America—they not only became involved in hostilities with the Algonquins, but another race was also driven by them from its abodes and forced to seek new districts. This was the Sioux or Dakota race, which certainly does not seem to have possessed in those times the importance that it afterwards acquired under the government of the United States. That the original home of these Indians, noted for the resistance they offered to settlers in the Far West in the course of the last century, was also east of the Alleghanies—in Virginia and North Carolina—is a discovery for which historical research has to thank linguistics. For, in the language



A SCENE FROM THE PRESENT THAT ILLUSTRATES THE PAST
A Pueblo hunter of Katzimo on the look-out.

of the long-neglected Indians of the central states, older forms of the same linguistic stock have been found whose later dialects are spoken in the vast region of the Sioux and Dakotas west of the

**The Sioux
a Race of
Hunters**

Mississippi. Even in the east the nations of this group were almost exclusively restricted to hunting; it seems that they never seriously took to agriculture or possessed permanent dwelling-places. A race that grew so little attached to the soil as these restless hunters must naturally have retired more quickly before the energetic advance of an enemy than the agricultural Algonquins and Cherokees.

Whether they fought with the latter in the valley of the Ohio we cannot tell from the obscure tradition of the Sioux tribes regarding this migration from the east. The migration certainly belongs to a later period than the secession of the Cherokees from the main race of the Iroquois. But probably the courses of the two races came but little in contact, as the Sioux, coming down the Big Sandy, reached the Ohio at a point lying on the south-west border of the territory over which the Cherokees expanded. As soon, however, as they were beyond reach of the hostility of the Iroquois the migration of the Sioux would also have assumed a slower pace, names of places and rivers confirming the tradition that they settled for some time in different parts of

the Ohio valley. But they never seem to have settled permanently; for Europeans who followed the Ohio downward came across no nations of this race on its banks. The names given by the Sioux themselves to the different groups reflect a long separation between the upper and lower part of the river. But when De Soto crossed the American continent he came upon nations of the Sioux race only on the other side of the Mississippi—a proof that the whole migration of the races from the eastern states to the borders of the region they still occupied in this century took place in pre-Columbian times. Probably many other races peopled these vast regions when the first white men set foot on American soil; but what we know of them is infinitely little.


Even what has been brought to light, by laboriously following up scarcely perceptible traces, regarding the great races of the Algonquins, Muskokis, Iroquois, and Sioux, is so scanty that it can scarcely be called their history. The extensive and

**Scanty
Results of
Research**

zealous researches that have only recently been begun on American soil will surely bring to light many other memorials to which even historical attributes may be given; but unfortunately more than a few main features in the pre-history of the American Indians science will scarcely ever be able to trace.



CHIEFS OF THE SIOUX RACE OF AMERICAN INDIANS



AMERICAN PEOPLES OF THE WEST THE LIFE, CUSTOMS AND CIVILISATION OF THE PREHISTORIC CLIFF-DWELLERS

IF we cross the Rocky Mountains from the east, we enter the region of a development in culture of an evidently different kind. This difference is most striking if we cross by the Upper Rio Grande and the affluents of the Colorado from the hunting-grounds of the buffalo-hunters into the territory of the Pueblo Indians. On closer examination, however, it appears that all the races of the Pacific coast, up to the borders of the Esquimaux region in Alaska, exhibit close agreement in the evolution of their customs, so that, in spite of linguistic differences, they are more closely related to one another than to their eastern neighbours.

The inhabitants of the far North-west—the Thlinkits, Haidahs, and Nootkas—are almost exclusively races of fishermen, a not very frequent occurrence on North American soil. It is evident, moreover,

Inhabitants of the Far North-West that they were not driven to this mode of life by their natural surroundings, but developed thus from the very beginning. This we may infer from the fact that, in spite of their racial individuality being comparatively highly developed, they have no traditions indicating an earlier and different state of development. When they first came in contact with Europeans they had developed, independently of foreign influences, a number of institutions that told of a very long period of gradual progress in culture. That they were expert navigators and fishermen and skilled boat-builders was too natural under the prevailing conditions to justify us in basing general conclusions upon it.

Like some of the Indians of the East, the natives of the North-west also attached chief importance, not to the family, but to the gens, or clan; accordingly they, too, did not occupy single houses, but built one house for all the families of a clan, in which each had only a compart-

ment. The same community also ruled their life outside the house: common the work, common the benefit. A special feature with them was the system of totems, or clan symbols derived from living things, for which a reverence similar to

Slavery Among the Indians fetishism was shown by all the members of the clan, but only by them. These totems certainly also had their share in develop-

ing the artistic efforts of the race, for the representations of the clan fetishes—sometimes of huge dimensions, as on the wooden totem-posts of the Haidahs and Bellacoolas—are among the most frequent proofs of their artistic sense, which exercised itself on the most diverse raw materials, such as wood, stone, and bone, but not clay. Now, with time a more highly developed social system had grown out of the gentile system.

Almost all the Indians of the North-west were familiar with slavery, and that in its most pronounced form, according to which the slave is the chattel and therefore the saleable property of his master. This presupposes a higher development of the ideas of clan, family, and property than we find among many other Indian races, whose slaves were almost exclusively captives taken in war, who either met a painful death or were amalgamated with the tribe. The same development is shown by the fact that almost all these races carried on a more or less extensive trade—the Sahaptins journeyed from the

Shell-Money as a Medium of Exchange upper Columbia to the Missouri—and even used shell-money as a standard medium of exchange, which seems to

have been recognised throughout the greater part of the Pacific coast to the borders of the Mexican states. Finally, all the Pacific tribes, although agriculture was either entirely unknown to them in consequence of the climatic conditions, or

only played a subordinate part, were sedentary, but with this peculiarity: they possessed permanent winter dwellings built of stone and earth, but in the fishing-seasons they erected also temporary summer dwellings at different places. In all these peculiarities there prevails among the Indians of Western North America, always excepting the sprinkling of tribes of much lower development in Central California, a very general agreement, which is by no means limited to the coast tribes who live by fishing, but extends to the agricultural tribes living farther south and east.

South and south-east of the territory of the north-west Indians, and separated from them by a number of small tribes, some of them still at a very low stage of development, is another large region of a similarly developed culture, which from the earliest times has interested scholars in no common degree—the region of the Pueblo Indians. Remains of these races have been preserved through all the vicissitudes of colonial wars down to the

present day, and under circumstances which make it still possible to study among them the traces of their early civilisation.


The boldest historical conjectures have been made about these races. Like the mound-builders, they, too, were supposed to have formed in prehistoric times a mighty and extensive empire with a highly developed civilisation. Such theories connected them, far more directly than was possible in the valleys of the Ohio and Mississippi, with the Central American civilised states of the Toltecs and Aztecs. A peculiar tradition of the latter supported this in a very remarkable manner. When the Spaniards, after the conquest of Mexico, inquired of the Aztec priests and scribes the early history of their race, they gave the following account. At a remote period they had set out from a place called Aztlan, which lay on a great lake in the far north; had wandered for countless years, during which they had been split up into several tribes, and

**History
of the Aztec
Peoples**



COLLECTION OF INDIAN CARVED PIPES OF NORTH-WEST AMERICA

Mansell



EXAMPLES OF DRILL BOWS USED BY THE EARLY INHABITANTS OF AMERICA Mansell

certainly noteworthy that in this very respect remarkable points of agreement have been discovered between the Indians of the North-west and the Pueblo races. In the whole region of the latter the sacred hall in which a great part of the religious ceremonies are held, and the others at least prepared for, is the "estufa," erroneously so called by the Spaniards from its peculiar structure. The Pueblo Indians call it kiva. In structure the kiva differs very considerably from all the other buildings of the Pueblo Indians in the most important points. It always lies more or less away from the rooms of which a pueblo (village) is composed, and which are built close to and over one another. It has the peculiarity that it is at least partly, and often entirely, sunk below the ground, and is only accessible by a ladder from an entrance built in the middle of the roof.

The kiva is to the Indians of the pueblos what their meeting-house is to the eastern Indians; here the men assemble to discuss common affairs, but especially to prepare for and to perform their religious rites. Even to-day there exist in the pueblos still inhabited by Indians a large number of such underground meeting-houses, which, so far as missionary activity has not yet done away with the remains of the

original rites, serve their old purposes. If we compare these kivas with those that occur in the remains of old Indian towns that have long been in ruins, it appears that centuries of intercourse with the white man have made scarcely any change in the kiva.

In the inhabited pueblos, and even in many that in all probability have sunk into ruins without being trodden by European foot, the kiva is a rectangular hall; on the other hand, the older the ruins are the more exclusively do we find kivas of circular form, although all the dwelling-rooms of the same ruins are

rectangular, and circular buildings occur only rarely throughout the Pueblo region in the form of towers. The circular kivas undoubtedly represent an older type; for whereas the four-sided kivas are lined with stone, carefully coated with plaster, and neatly whitewashed up to the posts forming the roof, the stone wall of the round kivas reaches to only three-fourths of the whole height. This is then completed by horizontal beams fitting into one another, which approach roundness owing to the number of angles they form, and are constructed exactly like those of the log-house type of building which the pioneers of the West learned from the Indians. This form of the kiva is certainly

How the Kivas were Built

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AMERICAN PEOPLES OF THE WEST

a reminiscence of the time when the Pueblo Indians were not the skilled builders they afterwards became. Its being sunk below the ground, a custom by which the Indians of various parts sought to give their dwellings greater height and better protection from the elements, and its beam-work point unmistakably to other conditions of life; but we can well understand how it is that only in these halls that served for religious purposes, long unintelligible to the Indians

Religious Dances of the Tribes

themselves, the memory of conditions has been preserved of which almost all trace has been lost in their general life. Now, it is undoubtedly very remarkable that round and square houses, partly dug in the ground, lined with stone slabs, and, at least in some cases, only accessible by an opening in the roof, occur as dwellings among various Indian races of California who are not particularly closely related to the Pueblo Indians either linguistically or ethnographically. Moreover, these same Californian races, like the Pueblo Indians,

make a great feature in their religious ceremonies of certain dances reminding one almost of theatrical performances, which in both cases, if not exclusively performed in the common dwelling-hall, were prepared in a part of it curtained off temporarily for the purpose. As in these dances almost similar masks, fashioned as snakes, skeletons, etc., occur in both cases, we are justified in assuming that these races have a common stock of traditional customs that is not due to late adoption or transmission, but to an original relationship.

That the stone structures of the cliff-dwellers, in the almost inaccessible cañons of the rivers that cut their way through the central plateau, are to be regarded as dwellings of the same races whose last remnants now inhabit the pueblos of the regions of Cibola and Tusayan under the name of Zuni and Moquis, is beyond all doubt. The transition between the architectural forms is unmistakable, and the connection between cliff-dwellings and houses, both on the



STONE ARROWHEADS, KNIVES AXES AND HAMMERS FROM DIFFERENT PARTS OF AMERICA

plateau and in the river valleys, has also been clearly proved by excavations, as has also the chronological sequence. We must certainly not overlook the fact that the migrations of the Pueblo Indians also proceeded slowly, in consequence of their living almost exclusively by agriculture. Indeed, at times events occurred which

**Pueblos
as Expert
Potters**

positively caused a retrograde movement, and to such an extent that the wanderers returned to parts they had left long ago and occupied anew their partly ruined dwellings. Such occurrences are even related in the traditions of the present Pueblo Indians of times certainly later than their first meeting with the Spaniards about the middle of the sixteenth century.

But although the most northern evidences of the Pueblo civilisation, the cave-ruins, reveal an architectural development that is in no respect inferior to that displayed by the carefully built pueblos of the valleys of the Chaco and Chelley, yet the other antiquities show an earlier type in the north, and furnish evidence of a later development that continued down to the time of those degenerate Pueblo Indians whom we know to-day.

Pottery especially affords us a further glimpse of the early history of these races. It is not chance that the North Californian tribes, who could work wood and stone skilfully, and otherwise occupied by no means the lowest rung of social culture, had no pottery. The potter's art develops only where Nature is not bountiful with that necessary, water, and man has to procure and preserve a supply. For races that live by fishing, wickerwork, more easily produced, suffices, and for this Nature had given them a suitable material in the reed and other aquatic creeping plants.

Of these they made baskets, which were often utilised as vessels in which fish could be cooked in water heated by the primitive method of throwing red-hot stones

**Process
of Pottery
Evolution**

into it. But water could not be kept in these receptacles for any length of time, and when these races migrated into drier districts their need of pottery led to its manufacture. The evolution of their pottery from spinning and basket-making is unmistakable from the manner, peculiar to the Indians of both north and south, of building their pots from an endless thread of clay. If the far North-west is the common home of the Californian and Pueblo

Indians, the latter evidently did not develop into potters until after the separation of the groups. This stage has not yet been discovered from the antiquities. We find the Pueblo races, even in their earliest northern abodes, at a respectable stage of development, not only as architects, but also as potters. In the central Pueblo regions, on the Chaco and Chelley, we then perceive a further advance, while the culmination of their artistic activity was reached at Sikyatki, not far from Moqui, which was destroyed only shortly before the arrival of the Spaniards.

We are not without an explanation of this. As is commonly known, the races of the west in the latitude of the Californian peninsula are divided up by the nations in the lowest stage of civilisation. Not only do the traces of a struggle with these occur in the south, in the cave-dwelling and the pueblos built on easily blockaded spurs of the plateaus, but dwelling-places agreeing remarkably with the pueblos also occur in the north as far as the Haidahs, a proof that the Pueblo races sought to protect themselves from the aggression of hostile tribes. This first attack

**Opposing
Races in
Contact**


by Athabaskan or Tinné tribes—for as such we must regard them, in spite of the scanty proofs of linguistic affinity—although not the immediate cause, probably decided the direction and subsequent development of the tribes that were driven south, which are first met with in history at the Mesa Verde and the river San Juan.

The theory that the whole region of the Pueblos, from the river Mancos in the north to the mouth of the Gila in the south, and from the Rio Pecos in the east to the Colorado in the west, ever constituted a united body politic is quite as untenable as the similar hypothesis regarding the region of the mound-builders. The statesmanship of the American natives has scarcely anywhere been great enough to form, much less maintain, an extensive state.

In the territory of the Pueblos there prevailed, probably during the whole period of their social prosperity, the same system of small communities based on the gens that the Spaniards found existing there at the discovery; its remains may still be recognised without difficulty from the traditions of the Pueblo Indians, in spite of the mixtures caused by the fusion of the population. It has its root in the soil. Their primitive agriculture, which is



TIGHTLY PLAITED WILLOW BASKETS



BASKET OF WOVEN YUCCA



COILED JAR FOUND IN CLIFFS



LARGE VASES OF THE COILED AND INDENTED VARIETY

WORK OF THE CLIFF-DWELLERS: EXAMPLES OF BASKET-MAKING AND POTTERY

Investigations among the cliff dwellings of the Mesa Verde have brought to light from graves and refuse-heaps many articles which help us to understand the people and their customs. The above examples of basket-making and pottery show in a most interesting manner how the latter was modelled on the former. The baskets were coated on the outside with a substance composed of clay mixed with rather coarse sand, stopping all the interstices and rendering them watertight, and the pottery, as shown in the illustrations was made to resemble in its outward appearance the baskets.

certainly said to have supplied in a good year crops sufficient to last for two or three years, did not suffer any great number of people in one place, owing to the unfavourable climatic conditions. The Pueblo region was certainly more thickly populated in earlier times than it is now, but when the Spaniards first entered it its period of prosperity seems to have been over. For although the earliest accounts give the number of large and small towns of the Pueblo Indians at seventy or seventy-one, these lie exclusively in the southern and eastern parts of the Pueblo

must also be assumed in quantity. For the height of development in culture often comes after the first traces of decline in a nation, but it scarcely ever precedes the culmination of the material development.

The petty jealousies and feuds of the small communities with one another had a fateful influence on the history of the Pueblo Indians. Occasion for these was incessantly given by outward circumstances—in the limited areas fit for cultivation, and the insufficient quantity of moisture, the most careful use of which could alone make the soil productive and



RUINS OF A CLIFF-DWELLING: "SPRUCE-TREE HOUSE" IN THE MESA VERDE, COLORADO

In a great plateau, thirty miles long and twelve or fifteen wide, situated largely in the Indian Reservation, and called the Mesa Verde, have been unearthed many examples of the communal cliff dwellings of the early inhabitants of America. The cliff-dweller has been described as "a dark-skinned fellow." His hair was usually black, and moderately coarse and long. He was of medium stature, and the back of his skull was flattened by being tied firmly against a board in infancy. He had fair teeth, much worn as the years grew upon him from munching ill-ground corn.

This and illustrations on pages 5713, 5715, and 5717 are from Nordenskiöld's "Cliff-Dwellers of the Mesa Verde."

region, the same as are still partly peopled by the descendants of the old natives, while the central and northern parts, in which the most architecturally perfect buildings have been found, seem to have been then, as they are to-day, forsaken and in ruins.

Although it is quite probable that many of the southern pueblos may not have existed when the more northern ones were built and inhabited, the circumstance that the latter are also technically the most perfect is a certain sign that the southern races already show the beginning of a decline which, as it is displayed in quality,

the land inhabitable. These outward conditions had an influence on the development of the Pueblo civilisation similar to the influence they had on the inhabitants of Peru, who had to fight with the same climatic difficulties. We therefore not only find here, as we do there, surprisingly ingenious and extensive irrigation works, but, from the analogy to Peruvian conditions and from the existing customs of the present Pueblo races, we may also infer that a water law was carefully made and enforced among the old Pueblo peoples. A continual struggle with drought is not



THE MESA SUMMIT AT THE TOP OF THE OLD TRAIL



THE ENCHANTED MESA AS VIEWED FROM THE NORTH

IN THE LAND OF MESAS: THE STRANGE TABLE-LANDS OF MEXICO

The natural formation of these mesas, or table-lands, of Mexico appealed to prehistoric man as suitable sites for his dwelling-places, and in the stone age of America many communities made their dwellings on the tops and in the crevices of these table-lands, where, owing to the difficulty of access, they could enjoy comparative safety from attacks.

indicated solely by the recollections of the present Indians, or by the ruins of the old works, but dependence on the fertilising moisture plays so prominent a part in the whole pronounced religious system of these races that we must suppose that the climatic conditions were little different then from what they are now.

Excavations in the ruins have often proved the existence of old sources of water in or near them, and it has often required only moderate labour in removing sand and rubbish to increase considerably the yield of these springs. That a race whose whole existence depended on obtaining water would have spared no pains to increase it is testified beyond doubt by the discovery of artificial reservoirs and similar works. In spite of this it would be wrong to see in variations of the sources of a water supply the only reason for the migrations of the Pueblo races, because these migrations were not from the dry districts to the more favoured ones, but exactly the reverse—from the woodland farther and farther into the arid sand-steppe.

If it were a mere hypothesis that the southward movement of the Pueblo Indians was brought about from an invasion of the Central Californian savages, there can scarcely be any doubt that the aggression of similar hostile races decided the further course of these migrations. And if some of the magnificent ruins of the valleys of the Chaco and Chelley are not well adapted for a prolonged defence, it only proves that at the time of their erection the pressure of hostile races had not yet begun. But this is easily accounted for by assuming that the buildings in these valleys, among which even cave-buildings are fairly numerous, were erected at a time when the more

northern settlements—which almost entirely lay protected, especially the numerous and extensive cave-dwellings on the Rio Mancos and other northern affluents of the San Juan—were still inhabited, and were adapted to form a barrier against marauding savages.

According to European ideas we are much inclined to think cave-dwellers men at the lowest stage of culture. But the cliff-dwellers of Western North America were not this at all. Sedentary, living almost solely by agriculture, they had already reached the stage of rearing domestic animals, and as basket-makers, weavers, and potters they were superior to almost all their neighbours. It was they who, like the Mexicans, produced those original feather-covered webs that excited the great astonishment of the Europeans. Their pottery is quite equal, in purity and simplicity of form and decoration, to that of their neighbours.

But there was one art in which the Pueblo Indians were superior to all the other races of the northern continent, including the Aztecs—the Mayas, in part, excepted—namely, the art of building. A race that was able to erect buildings in caves like the Cliff Palace discovered by Gustaf Nordenskiöld [see page 172] in a side valley of the Mancos was no longer

rude and primitive; it was a race which, if not to be numbered among civilised peoples, was at least well on the way to become one. Nature herself had certainly gone a long way toward making the inhabitants of this district builders. In the sandstone that encloses the narrow valleys of most of the waters of the north-western plateau-land in layers of varying resistance, the natives were offered a material



WEAPONS AND UTENSILS OF THE CLIFF-MEN



REMAINS OF THE GREATEST BUILDING OF THE CLIFF-DWELLERS

On page 172 of the History appears a remarkable illustration of a palace under a cliff in Cliff Palace Cañon, Colorado, indicating how considerable was the culture of those early people of America, and another view of that striking monument of the Stone Age is given in the above picture. "Literally hanging from a tremendous cliff," the buildings were inhabited by the first settlers of Colorado, who had every reason to feel themselves secure in their inaccessible homes.

that can almost be shaped of itself. This stone broke down to a considerable extent, under the influence of atmospheric forces, in pieces that required but little working to make them fit for house-building. The rudest buildings—sub-structures—such as are also to be seen at the Cliff Palace, were therefore probably constructed merely by piling up stones selected for the purpose; but of these simplest beginnings only a few traces have been preserved. The

**Buildings
of the Pueblo
Indians**

material is for the most part brought into the proper shape with great care, the layers secured by an almost invisible but sufficiently strong cement, and every joint so carefully faced with small stones that the outer surfaces of the buildings have not merely withstood the action of the weather for centuries, but even at the present day seem to be firm and smooth.


Moreover, the Pueblo Indians had two other architectural accomplishments in which few races of the New World equalled them: layering the material in strips of equal size—an advance which they

probably learned from the long layers in the stone of their native valleys—and mortising the joints, an art not even known by the Maya architects of Chichen-Itza. Such skill naturally presupposes long practice in the art, but we cannot trace its development. Besides the great assistance rendered by Nature, the migrations of the Pueblo Indians undoubtedly furthered the development of their architectural knowledge to an extraordinary degree, by giving them occasion to use the experience gained in the course of a building period whenever they erected a new settlement.

The migrations which we have had to assume as having been from north to south, in historic times, have not to be included in this respect. On the contrary, the buildings of the northern and central Pueblo regions—for instance, the Cliff Palace, and the ruins of Kintiel, Pueblo Bonito, and Nutria in the Chaco valley—while bearing traces of greater age, exhibit the highest development of Pueblo architecture, whereas the later settlements of the same regions and farther south are not so carefully built, although this



HOPI INDIAN GIRLS GRINDING CORN



INDIAN GIRLS WEAVING BASKETS



CAVE-DWELLER IN DANCING ATTIRE




AN INDIAN POTTER AT WORK


Underwood

SCENES IN THE PRIMITIVE INDIAN HOMES OF AMERICA


Some of the customs of America's early Indian inhabitants are here illustrated. In the first of these pictures there is represented a home scene at Shonghopavi, Arizona, where Hopi girls are shown in the act of grinding the shelled corn by rubbing it under flat stones of granite. The extraordinary fashion of hair-dressing depicted in the second illustration belongs exclusively to the maidens of the tribe, as after marriage the hair is arranged differently.



AN INDIAN RESERVATION



INDIAN VILLAGE SCENE



A MORNING PROMENADE



PLAZA "PUEBLO" OF MISHONGINOVI

Underwood

AMONG THE CLIFF-DWELLERS OF TO-DAY: SCENES IN AN INDIAN RESERVATION

Six hundred feet above the desert, in the Hopi Indian Reservation, Arizona, stands the picturesque village of Wolpi, shown in the two upper views on this page. The people inhabiting these rocky eminences are also depicted, the third illustration showing women and children of Oraibi, situated in the same reservation as Wolpi. Mishonginovi, a view of which is given in the last picture, is the second largest village of the ancient cliff-dwellers in Arizona.

is by no means explained by a want of material. Thus there is no alternative but to assume that the latter buildings were erected at a time when the conditions under which the Pueblo Indians lived had already changed for the worse. But as even these buildings belong to a period prior to the discovery by the Spaniards,

The Native Methods of Defence

we come once more to the conclusion that the golden age of the Pueblo races was already past in the sixteenth century. Here we are led to the further inference that the migrations of the Pueblo Indians cannot have been spontaneous.

Ideas drawn from modern warfare have been applied too much to ancient times, and consequently the defensive strength of the Pueblo towns has been declared so inadequate that the purpose of defence has been positively denied them. But we have only to consider the offensive and defensive weapons of the Pueblo Indians, who were in any case considerably superior to their opponents in social culture, to see at once that very primitive means of defence must have sufficed. The war waged by the Indians upon one another has always consisted in surprises; the idea of a siege, if only of days, or of the artificial cutting off of indispensable resources, especially of water, which became a dangerous weapon as the art of war advanced, need scarcely be seriously considered in the wars to which the Pueblo Indians were exposed. The attacks of the enemy had for their object plunder that was of immediate use and easy to carry away, and, if possible, prisoners, especially women and young persons.

The enemy, moreover, would certainly have tried to damage the crops of the Pueblo Indians in these wars; but to gather in the ripe fruit was a comparatively long business with the means at the disposal of these primitive races, and so the plundering Apache or Navajo

Combination for Defensive Purposes

would let the Pueblo Indian himself do this first; he preferred to fetch the stored-up crop from the house rather than the ripe crop from the field. But even the pueblos that did not lie in the inaccessible caves of the cañons or on the easily blockaded spurs or ledges at the edges of the plateau, but on the level ground of the river valleys or in the plains at the foot of the tableland, afforded sufficient protection from a sudden attack. Owing

to the massive style in which they were built, a larger number of inhabitants would be always threatened at the same time, and therefore could easily combine for common defence.

Furthermore, the older pueblos are far more closely built even than those now inhabited, so that outside they show an unbroken wall several stories high, while inside the stories rise in terraces from a central court. The entrance to this court was in most cases easily defended; further, the ground floor had no entrances opening on to the court, access being obtained to the rooms of the occupants solely from the first platform, which could be reached only by ladders.

The enemy were also educated by the continual struggle, and if the danger of their attacks and their numbers increased in the same measure as the strength of the defenders diminished through unfavourable outward circumstances, the more civilised and physically weaker Pueblo Indians would have eventually to yield to the more robust and hardy sons of the desert. But this would take place

Savage and Brutal Peoples

through circumstances mainly independent of the strength of the settlements. So at least we must imagine the war that gradually crushed out the civilisation of the Pueblo races over a considerable part of their ancient territory. They were surrounded north and east by Indian races that belonged to the most savage and brutal of the whole continent. The Apaches and Navajoes made themselves a terror even to the Anglo-Saxon pioneers of the West in the present century, and they were nations of the same stocks that surrounded the Pueblo region on various sides. Even when the Spaniards first entered this region they heard of the deadly enmity between the Pueblo Indians and their neighbours, and were themselves sympathetically drawn into the struggle.


Just as the peaceable inhabitants of the pueblos were at continual war with the flying robbers of the prairie in historic times, so, too, did their forefathers fight with their enemies' forefathers for their existence. From the circumstance that a marked relationship exists in build and in various customs between the Navajoes and the Northern Pueblo Indians at the present day some would draw the conclusion that the former are to be regarded, not so much as a tribe hostile to the Pueblo

AMERICAN PEOPLES OF THE WEST

Indians, but rather as a kindred tribe that once itself occupied settlements in the Pueblo region, and became a roving race of robbers only through hostile oppression. Although the fact remains that the Pueblo civilisation succumbed to the invasion of hostile neighbours, these must certainly have been other than the Navajoes. It is true that since the last century these Navajoes have been known as a tribe that practises agriculture, though to a limited extent ; that possesses the largest numbers of horses and sheep of any Indians of the west ; and whose squaws weave the finest coloured cloths of sheep's wool. But all these are acquirements that belong to times subsequent to contact with the white man. Moreover, the social progress

to south, we have left a whole group of Pueblo ruins—and that the most southern of all—unnoticed. The attention of the first Spaniards who entered the Pueblo region from Mexico was attracted by a number of ruins that met their eye in the basis of the Gila River, the most southern affluent of the Colorado. These were remains of settlements which unmistakably bear the character of the Pueblos, although they constitute a group of themselves.

The Gila valley, however, did not offer its inhabitants the suitable building material that had made the Pueblo Indians in the upper parts of the tableland such excellent builders. The ruins of this and the adjacent valleys are therefore distinguished by the material used,



WOODEN MASKS AND RATTLES OF THE NORTH-WEST COAST OF AMERICA

of the Navajoes rests chiefly in the hands of their women, whereas among the Pueblo Indians the main burden of tilling the ground falls to the men. This civilising influence of the female sex may be traced, however, in its ultimate origin, to the Pueblo Indians, whose women, captured in their raids, have been their teachers. This intermixture explains also the physical affinities of the races and resemblances in their languages.

One more point in the early history of the Pueblo races needs mention : their relations to their southern neighbours, the civilised races of Mexico. If in the foregoing we have assumed that the Pueblo civilisation progressed from north

which is a kind of brick made of mud mixed with vegetable substances and air-dried ; a material known in many parts by the Spanish name of " adobe," and frequently used in historic times and even to the present day. But otherwise these buildings are also distinctly the work of Pueblo tribes. Here, too, we have towns consisting mainly of a single solid mass of houses, or really only rooms ; these rooms, built over one another in storeys, enclose an inner court, from which they rise in terraces, while the outer walls are mostly perpendicular. This is therefore exactly the character of the more northern settlements of stone, such as we found from the cave-buildings on the San Juan to the open

towns of the Moquis and Zuñis. These buildings must have been erected by the same races that built the more northern ones, or by races nearly related to them.

Now, as these towns were found forsaken and in ruins by the Spaniards at a time when the central pueblos were still largely inhabited, they must certainly belong to an earlier period than many of the stone pueblos. But no conclusions may be drawn from this antagonistic to the view that the Pueblo civilisation developed generally from north to south. The race that built the ruins of the Gila valley, generally known as Casas Grandes, certainly did not learn its architecture here.

Generally speaking, the material, owing to its comparatively poor resistance to atmospheric influences, is by no means calculated to induce man to erect hollow buildings above ground. In the ruins on the Rio Gila we can perceive only the endeavour to retain architectural forms that had gradually become a need of the race, even in districts in which the natural conditions were considerably less favourable. The race that erected them separated from the body of the Pueblo Indians only when the latter had fully developed its characteristic civilisation farther north, on the plateaus of the sandstone mountains, and as no traces of the same civilisation occur farther south, it appears that this race, whether it was harassed by hostile peoples, or induced by natural causes again to change its abodes, rejoined the more northern members of the race before historic times. In the legends of the Indians who have

settled in the vicinity of these ruins since the last century they are almost exclusively called houses, palaces, or fortresses of Montezuma, and we shall scarcely be far wrong if we regard this as the survival of an indistinct recollection of the deeds of Moctezuma I. Ilhuicamina.

But such a tradition was certainly not developed until after the conquest of Mexico by the Spaniards. This is obvious, not only from the fact that the empire of

Development of Native Architecture

Mexico-Tenochtitlan never extended to anywhere near these parts, but above all from the circumstance that there is absolutely no style of architecture like that of the ruins of the Gila within the sphere of civilisation of the Central American states, and that the resemblances to the architecture of the Central American are much less within the Pueblo region than, for instance, in the region of the mound-builders. It may be considered historically proved that the spheres of civilisation of the Pueblo Indians and of the Maya and Nahua races, at least during

the time that their respective characteristic architectures were developing, were entirely exclusive of one another and had no connection whatever. But in all probability this was not always so. Although the legends of an original home in the far Aztlan of the north, in the form in which they became known to the Spaniards, referred only to comparatively unimportant changes of abode made by the various nations of the Nahua race at no very remote period, this does not preclude the



Underwood

THE HANDICRAFT OF INDIAN WORKERS
In this illustration are shown the artistic creations of Indian weavers and potters in a Hopi house, Grand Cañon, Arizona.



E. N. A.

TREES CUT DOWN BY PREHISTORIC MAN: REMARKABLE FIND IN ARIZONA

This unique picture illustrates an extraordinary discovery near Phoenix, Arizona, where, in recent times, a petrified forest was unearthed. It is supposed that the tree blocks, some of which are here shown, were chopped thousands of years ago by the prehistoric inhabitants of the country, becoming petrified in the course of the long ages.

possibility that in the very earliest times races lived even as far down as the region of Mexico who exhibited a racial relationship to all the other nations inhabiting the Pacific coast of North America.

Besides wide-spread linguistic resemblances there is the recurrence of religious ideas and customs, which are too peculiar to have been the result of simultaneous independent development in different places. The simultaneous worship of the sun and fire is certainly in itself an idea so


familiar to the primitive races of all ages and all lands that from its occurrence in different tribes we could not infer that they were related, even if it were not practised in like manner in other neighbouring tribes. On the other hand, it is very remarkable that both among the Pueblo Indians and among the civilised races of Central America all the fires throughout the tribe had to be extinguished at regular intervals; and that at one place only, amid elaborate religious ceremonies, priests appointed for the purpose, by rubbing two sticks, obtained the new fire, which was then spread from this one centre by speedy messengers. Another highly characteristic religious idea common to these same races is that of the feathered snake. Apart from the fact that Nature

Primitive Religious Ceremonies

itself furnishes no creatures as patterns for such a form, the snake is often one of the most dangerous enemies of man in the legends of American races. Among the Pueblo Indians it is also most closely connected with the deities of fertilising moisture, which to them is the essence of all good. Besides these there are a whole number of other resemblances.

We may mention a parallel of a non-religious character. Feathers, especially those of the gorgeously coloured tropical birds; or of the eagle as the symbol of power, have played an important part in the ornament of all primitive races. But only in very few parts of the earth has the attempt been made by primitive races to imitate, by weaving, the feather coat that adorns and protects the birds.

The races of the Mexican Empire brought this art to a perfection that has never since been attained, so that it is most singular that of all the American races only the Pueblo Indians practised a similar art, although considerably more primitive, and that not as a comparatively late acquirement, but where we first found them, on the northern borders of their territory, farthest from the Mexican borders, dwelling in the caves of the Mancos valley, and producing their characteristic archaic pottery.



GRANARIES OF THE INDIANS OF THE COLORADO DESERT



MOQUI INDIAN WOMEN BUILDING HOUSES

Among the Moqui Indians of America the customs of the sexes with regard to the division of labour are different from those generally prevailing among other tribes, the women performing heavy tasks, such as house-building, while the men undertake the lighter household duties and engage in such occupations as blanket-weaving.

SCENES IN THE LIFE AND CUSTOMS OF AMERICAN INDIANS

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